Systems  of  Ethics 


IN  THREE  PARTS 

PART      I. — THEORETICAL  ETHICS 
PART    II. — PRACTICAL  ETHICS 
PART  III. — HISTORY  OF  ETHICS 


BY 
AARON  SCHUYLER,  PH.D.,  LL.D. 

Professor  of  Philosophy  and  Higher  Mathematics, 
Kansas  Wesleyan  University 

AUTHOR  OF  LOGIC,  PSYCHOLOGY,  ALGEBRA,  GEOMETRY,  ETC. 


CINCINNATI:     JENNINGS    &     PYE 
NEW    YORK:     EATON     &     MAINS 


: 


IQO2,  BY 

NINGS  &  PYE 


TO 
THE  REV.  HORACE  A.  CLEVELAND,  D.D.,Lit.D., 

who  has  given  the  author  free  access  to  his  extensive 
and  well-selected  library,  and  whose  esteemed 
friendship  has  been  a  constant  source  of  encourage- 
ment and  inspiration,  this  volume  is  gratefully 
dedicated  B  Y  HIS  FRIEND. 


Preface 

/T*HE  following  treatise  on  Ethics  is  divided  into 
•*•  three  parts — Theoretical  Ethics,  Practical  Ethics, 
and  History  of  Ethics. 

The  first  part  gives  a  general  outline  of  ethics,  its 
sphere,  and  its  relation  to  other  sciences.  It  discusses 
the  various  systems  of  ethics — Theistic,  Intuitional, 
Utilitarian,  Evolutionary,  and  Eclectic.  It  investigates 
the  nature  of  the  good,  the  relation  of  law  and  duty, 
and  the  effect  of  moral  evil. 

The  second  part  treats  of  virtue,  duty,  reward,  and 
penalty. 

The  third  part  traces  the  history  of  ethics  from 
Greek  ethics,  through  Roman,  Mediaeval,  and  Modern, 
down  to  the  present. 

It  is  only  in  the  history  of  ethics,  which  sweeps 
over  centuries  of  thought  and  reveals  the  moral  life 
of  nations,  that  we  can  have  a  clear  view  of  what  has 
been  done  in  this  great  field  of  investigation. 

Whenever  practicable,  the  historical  matter  has 
been  drawn  from  original  sources.  The  writers  re- 
viewed, though  not  all  of  equal  importance,  were  se- 
lected as  showing  the  trend  of  ethical  thought;  but  it 

5 


6  PREFACE 

is  to  be  remembered  that  to  deal  fairly  with  a  system, 
or  to  let  it  speak  for  itself,  is  not  an  indorsement  of 
that  system. 

The  author  has  written,  not  as  an  advocate  of  a 
particular  system,  but  as  an  investigator  in  the  pursuit 
of  truth.  It  is  his  hope  that  this  treatise  may  interest 
many  minds,  and  aid  them  in  the  study  of  the  great 
subject  of  ethics,  and  thus  contribute  to  the  cause  of 
sound  morality. 

AARON  SCHUYLER. 

KANSAS  WESLEYAN  UNIVERSITY,         "1 
SAUNA,  KANSAS,  I902.J 


Contents 

part  first 
THEORETICAL  ETHICS  J 

PAGE 

I.  GENERAL  OUTLINE  OF  ETHICS,  n 

II.  THE  SPHERE  OF  ETHICS,  16 

III.  RELATION  OF  ETHICS  TO  OTHER  SCIENCES,  27 

IV.  THEISTIC  ETHICS,  35 
V.  INTUITIONAL  ETHICS,    -  42 

VI.  UTILITARIAN  ETHICS,  51 

VII.  EVOLUTIONARY  ETHICS,  64 

VIII.  EVOLUTION  OF  MORALS  IN  MAN  -      76 

IX.  ELECTIC  ETHICS,  -  85 

X.  THE  GOOD,  -        -     95 

'  XI.  THE  GOOD.— Continued,  108 

XII.  LAW  AND  DUTY,      -  -121 

XIII.  LAW  AND  DUTY.— Continued,  130 

XIV.  MORAL  EVIL,   -  -    i38 
XV.  MORAL  EVIL.— Continued, 14? 


part  Second 
PRACTICAL  ETHICS 

I.  EGOISTIC  VIRTUES,  ....        159 

II.  ALTRUISTIC  VIRTUES,  176 

III.  DUTIES,  183 

IV.  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS,  -  197 
V.  REWARDS  AND  PUNISHMENTS. — Continued,  -                 -        -        205 

7 


8  CONTENTS 

part  Cbird 

HISTORY  OF  ETHICS 

PAGE 

I.  GREEK  ETHICS,  215 

II.  GREEK  ETHICS. — Continued, 224 

III.  ROMAN  ETHICS,  234 

IV.  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS.— PATRISTIC,    -  -    243 
V.  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS. — SCHOLASTIC,  252 

VI.  MODERN  ETHICS. — ENGLISH,  -    261 

VII.  MODERN  ETHICS. — FRENCH  AND  GERMAN,        -  269 

VIII.  MODERN  ETHICS. — ENGLISH,  -    277 

IX.  MODERN  ETHICS. — GERMAN,      -  287 

X.  MODERN  ETHICS. — ENGLISH,  -    298 

XI.  MODERN  ETHICS. — ENGLISH,  310 

XII.  MODERN  ETHICS. — EVOLUTIONARY,        -  -    320 

XIII.  GREEN'S  "PROLEGOMENA  TO  ETHICS,"  330 

XIV.  MODERN  ETHICS. — OTHER  MORALISTS,  -    339 
XV.  MODERN  ETHICS. — OTHER  MORALISTS,      -  350 

XVI.  MODERN  ETHICS. — OTHER  MORALISTS,  -    360 

XVII.  MODERN  ETHICS. — OTHER  MORALISTS,  374 

XVIII.  MODERN  ETHICS. — OTHER  MORALISTS,  -  -    392 

XIX.  MODERN  ETHICS. — OTHER  MORALISTS,  404 

XX.  OTHER  MORALISTS. — EVOLUTIONISTS,     -  -   417 

XXI.  OTHER  MORALISTS,    ....  434 

XXII.  OTHER  MORALISTS, 445 


p>art 

I 

THEORETICAL  ETHICS 


[    UNIVERSITY    1 

Chapter  I 

-v-  ~^^^ 

GENERAL  OUTLINE  OF  ETHICS 

TTTYMOLOGY. — The  word  ethics  is  from  the  Greek, 
IJ  TO.  ^0i*a,  which  is  from  ?0os,  character,  related  to  €0os, 
habit  or  custom.  The  word  moral  is  from  the  Latin 
moralis,  from  mos,  custom,  usage.  Ethics  is  moral 
science. 

2.  Acts,  conduct,  moral  conduct,  habit,  character. — 
Acts  are  movements  of  organic  beings,  whether  aim- 
less or  with  a  purpose.  Conduct  is  an  act  with  a  pur- 
pose; that  is,  an  act  directed  to  an  end  or  a  desired 
result.  Moral  conduct  is  conduct  which  involves  right 
or  wrong,  because  aiming  at  a  good  or  bad  end.  Thus, 
swinging  the  arm,  when  walking,  is  an  act,  not  con- 
duct; viewing  the  stars  is  conduct,  not  moral  conduct; 
speaking  the  truth,  doing  justice,  lying,  defrauding, 
or  any  kind  or  injurious  act,  is  moral  conduct.  Here 
moral  conduct  signifies  both  right  and  wrong  conduct; 
that  is,  the  word  moral  is  generalized  so  as  to  include 
immoral. 

What  we  have  done  once,  we  are  likely  to  do  again; 
that  is,  acts  tend  to  recur.  Acts  repeated  form  habits; 
and  habits  crystallize  into  character,  which  is  the  cause 
of  subsequent  acts.  To  aid  in  the  formation  of  good 
character  is,  therefore,  an  important  end  in  the  study 
of  ethics. 

j.  Motives  or  springs  of  action. — The  motives  of  con- 

ii 


12  SYSTEMS    OF   ETHICS 

duct  are  found  chiefly  in  the  affections,  benevolent  or 
malevolent;  that  is,  in  love  or  hatred,  and  in  the  de- 
sires or  aversions.  A  wish  is  a  specific  desire,  as  when 
one  says,  "I  wish  you  would  call  to-morrow."  Motives 
appeal  directly  to  the  sensibility,  and  indirectly  to  the 
will.  They  are  weighed  by  the  intellect,  and  in  view 
of  them  the  will  acts.  Motives  are  reasons  for  volition, 
rather  than  causes  of  choice  or  decision. 

4.  Ends  and  means. — Ends  are  designed  results  of 
conduct;  they  are  ultimate  or  subordinate,  according 
as  they  are  final  or  are  means  to  ulterior  ends;  they  are 
good  or  bad  according  as  they  are  truly  desirable  or 
undesirable.     Thus,  perfection  and  happiness  are  good 
ultimate  ends;  imperfection  and  unhappiness  are  bad 
ultimate  ends.     Health,  wealth,  knowledge,  power,  po- 
sition, popularity,  notoriety,  and  the  like,  are  subor- 
dinate ends.     Means  are  agencies  employed  to  realize 
ends;  they  are  useful  or  deleterious,  as  they  contribute 
to  good  or  bad  ends. 

5.  Right  and  wrong. — Right,  from  rectus,   signifies 
straight,  correct,  according  to  rule,  or  means  suitable 
to  an  end.     Wrong  signifies  crooked,   incorrect,   not 
according  to  rule,  or  means  unsuited  to  an  end.     We 
say  right  or  wrong  conduct,  good  or  bad  character. 

6.  Motive,  choice,  aim,  intention,  conduct,  end. — Mo- 
tive is  an  incentive  to  action;  choice  is  the  selection 
of  an  end;  aim  is  the  purpose  to  realize  the  choice; 
intention   includes   the   aim   with   the   foreseen   conse- 
quences; conduct,  called  also  effort  or  overt  act,  is  the 
means  employed  to  accomplish  the  end,  which  is  the 
result,  consequence,  or  outcome.     These  are  elements 
of  moral  character. 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  13 

7.  Characterisation  of  the  dements  of  character. — The 
end  is  good  or  bad  as  it  conduces  to  the  welfare  or  in- 
jury of  those  affected;  the  motive  is  good  or  bad  in 
agreement  with  the  end;  the  choice  is  right  or  wrong 
as  the  motive  is  good  or  bad;  the  aim,  the  intention, 
and  the  conduct  are  right  or  wrong  in  agreement  with 
the  choice.     The  moral  quality  of  the  choice  is  deter- 
mined by  the  motive;  the  choice  itself  is  made  by  the 
person  who,  as  the  cause  of  the  choice,  is  responsible 
for  it,  since  he  freely  makes  it,   though  not  without 
motive,   yet  without  compelling  cause.      Motives   are 
reasons  for  choice,  but  are  not  causes  coercing  the  will. 
The  person  makes  the  choice,  directs  the  aim,  forms 
the  intention,  performs  the  act,  causes  the  consequences, 
and  for  all  these  he  is  responsible.     The  motive  is  the 
reason  why  the  choice  is  made,  and  involves  morality; 
the  intention  and  the  overt  act  relate  to  the  end  chosen, 
and  involve  responsibility.     Hence,  intentions  are  right 
when  seeking  to  realize  a  good  end  or  to  avoid  a  bad 
end;  they  are  wrong  when  seeking  to  realize  a  bad  end 
or   to  avoid   a  good   end.      Motives   are   good   when 
prompting  to  realize  a  good  end  or  to  avoid  a  bad  end; 
they  are  bad  when  prompting  to  realize  a  bad  end  or 
to  avoid  a  good  end. 

8.  Freedom  and  responsibility. — Freedom  resides  in 
the  person  who  employs  his  will  power  in  making  the 
choice  of  the  end,  but  not  in  the  choice  as  an  act,  which 
is  caused  by  the  will,  nor  in  the  intention  which  fol- 
lows the  choice,  nor  in  the  conduct  which  follows  the 
intention.     Responsibility  resides  in  the  person  for  his 
choice  of  end,  for  his  yielding  to  motive,  for  his  inten- 
tion, and  for  his  conduct. 


14  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

p.  Ethical  acts  and  states. — Those  acts  are  ethically 
right  which  are  intended  to  realize  a  good  end  or  to 
avoid  a  bad  end,  and  those  acts  are  ethically  wrong 
which  are  intended  to  realize  a  bad  end  or  to  avoid  a 
good  end.  Such  acts  are  moral  conduct.  Ethical  states 
are  love  and  hatred,  desire  and  aversion.  Love  of  good 
or  hatred  of  evil  is  right;  love  of  evil  or  hatred  of  good 
is  wrong.  A  desire  for  good  or  an  aversion  to  evil  is 
right;  a  desire  for  evil  or  an  aversion  to  good  is  wrong. 
Moral  character  is  the  attitude  of  a  person  towards 
good  and  evil,  right  and  wrong. 

10.  Rule   for  determining  good  and  evil,   right  and 
wrong. — Seek  light  from  every  possible  source,  as  reve- 
lation and  experience,  reason  and  conscience,  civil  law 
and  social  customs,  philosophy  and  science,  nature  and 
the  constitution  of  man.     Choose  a  good  end,  aim  and 
act    accordingly.      The    fixed    intention    to    do    right 
stamps  a  good  character. 

11.  Definition  of  ethics. — Ethics    is    the  j  science  ,  of 
right  and  wrong  in  choice  and  conduct,  and  of  good 
and  bad  in  character. 

12.  Divisions  of  the  treatise. — We  make  three  di- 
visions : 

I.  Theoretical  Ethics,  discussing, 

1.  The  sphere  of  ethics. 

2.  The  relation  of  ethics  to  other  sciences. 

3.  The  systems  of  ethics,  embracing: 

(1)  Theistic  ethics. 

(2)  Intuitional  ethics. 

(3)  Utilitarian  ethics. 

(4)  Evolutionary  ethics. 

(5)  Eclectic  ethics. 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  15 

4.  The  evolution  of  morals  in  man. 

5.  The  good. 

6.  The  moral  law  and  the  nature  of  duty. 

7.  Moral  evil. 

//.  Practical  Ethics,  discussing: 

1.  The  virtues — egoistic  and  altruistic. 

2.  Duties — personal,  social,  religious. 

3.  Rewards  and  penalties. 

///.  History  of  Ethics,  embracing: 

1.  Greek  ethics. 

2.  Roman  ethics. 

3.  Christian  ethics — patristic  and  scholastic. 

4.  Modern  ethics — English,  French,  German,  Amer- 
ican, including  various  schools  and  writers  to  the'  pres- 
ent time. 


Chapter  II 
THE  SPHERE  OF  ETHICS 

TTTHICS:  a  normative  science. — Ethics  is  called  a 
-*— '  normative  science  because  it  exhibits  the  norms, 
or  types,  of  right  conduct,  and  lays  down  the  laws  or 
rules  of  action  in  reference  to  an  ultimate  or  ideal  end, 
called  the  highest  good,  or  the  summum  bonum. 

In  this  respect,  ethics  differs  from  those  other 
sciences  which  treat  of  facts,  their  relations  and  laws, 
without  special  reference  to  their  application,  which 
is  left  to  the  corresponding  practical  arts.  The  prin- 
ciples of  ethics  have  direct  relation  to  practice  by  keep- 
ing the  ends  of  conduct — happiness  and  perfection — 
continually  in  view.  In  giving  the  ideal  of  moral  life, 
ethics  teaches  us  what  to  be  and  to  do. 

Though  not  strictly  the  art  of  living,  yet  ethics  is 
the  philosophy  of  the  art  of  living.  It  is  the  theory 
of  right  and  wrong  wrilling  and  doing.  It  seeks  also 
to  cultivate  right  states  of  the  sensibility  and  to  estab- 
lish right  moral  purposes.  It  aims  at  the  perfection 
of  character  and  the  attainment  of  the  highest  happi- 
ness for  self  and  others. 

2.  Ethics:  theoretical,  practical,  and  historical. — Ethics 
is  theoretical  when  dealing  with  the  principles  relat- 
ing to  the  moral  constitution  of  man,  his  relation  to 
the  moral  universe  and  to  the  laws  of  nature,  as  they 
regulate  its  evolution  to  a  rational  end.  In  treating 

16 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  17 

of  the  moral  nature  of  man,  ethics  is  scientific  or  psycho- 
logical. In  treating  of  the  destiny  of  man  in  relation 
to  the  moral  universe,  it  is  philosophical. 

Ethics  is  practical  when  giving  the  guiding  prin- 
ciples and  rules  of  a  righteous  life.  It  deals  with  the 
principles  rather  than  with  the  details  of  practical  con- 
duct. 

Historical  ethics  treats  of  the  origin  and  develop- 
ment of  the  science  in  the  various  systems,  through 
the  past  to  the  present  day.  The  nature  of  ethics  and 
the  problems  with  which  it  deals  can  be  learned  from 
the  history  of  its  development. 

3.  The  realm  of  etliits. — The  realm  of  ethics  is  the 
moral  character  and  conduct  of  man.     The  moral  law 
rules  in  the  sphere  of  liberty,  but  not  in  that  of  fate 
or  chance.     A  person  has  the  power  to  do  wrong,  but 
not   the  right.      Fate,   by   excluding  free  will,   would 
reduce  ethics  to  a  natural  science.     It  allows  no  more 
liberty  to  man  than  to  a  galvanic  battery.     Liberty  re- 
sides in  the  person  who  makes  the  choice,  but  not  in 
the  choice  as  an  act,  which  is  made  and  has  no  more 
liberty  than  a  vessel  made  by  the  potter.     The  vessel 
is  not  free,  but  the  potter  is  free  to  make  or  not  to 
make  it.     He  makes  the  vessel  for  an  end  which  is  the 
motive  or  reason  why  he  makes  it,  but  not  a  compell- 
ing cause.     Chance,  by  excluding  law,  would  reduce 
conduct  to  chaos,  and  render  the  science  of  ethics  an 
impossibility. 

4.  Moral   conduct. — Not    every    act    is    conduct,    as 
breathing;  and  not  all  conduct  is  moral  conduct,  but 
only  that  which  the  person  is  free  in  making,  and  which 
is  right  or  wrong,  because  springing  from  a  right  or 


l8  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

wrong  choice,  and  directed  by  a  right  or  wrong  aim. 
The  settled  purpose  always  to  do  right,  whether  in 
choice,  aim,  or  conduct,  goes  far  in  establishing  moral 
character  and  in  deciding  subsequent  conduct.  In  con- 
duct, the  best  means  to  the  end,  if  possible,  should  be 
chosen;  but  of  means  equally  available  and  morally 
equivalent,  the  choice  is- morally  indifferent,  and  may 
be  left  to  other  than  ethical  considerations.  Acts  at 
first  thought  to  be  morally  indifferent  may  afterwards 
be  found  to  involve  an  ethical  principle. 

The  ultimate  aim  of  each  person  should  be  so  to 
will  and  to  do,  as  to  realize  the  highest  possible  good, 
both  for  himself  and  for  others.  He  should  also  culti- 
vate right  affections  and  desires;  for  these  are  power- 
ful aids  to  a  righteous  life,  since  they  are  motives  or 
reasons  for  choice  and  conduct. 

The  special  means  employed  will  differ  for  different 
persons,  with  their  circumstances  and  their  natural  and 
acquired  endowments.  For  such  cases,  ethics  has  no 
particular  precept  to  give,  but  only  the  general  one: 
Do  those  right  acts  you  are  the  best  fitted  to  do,  as  you 
have  opportunity,  and  in  the  best  possible  manner.  Sound 
judgment  is  requisite  in  dealing  with  the  facts  of  prac- 
tical life.  In  aiming  at  what  ought  to  be,  we  should 
take  into  consideration  what  is,  and  thus  make  the 
most  of  the  circumstances. 

5.  Right  and  wrong  conduct,  objectively  and  subjec- 
tively considered. — Right  conduct,  objectively  consid- 
ered, is  that  conduct  which  tends  to  realize  a  good  end, 
or  to  prevent  a  bad  end.  Wrong  conduct,  objectively 
considered,  is  that  conduct  which  tends  to  realize  a  bad 
end,  or  to  prevent  a  good  end.  Right  conduct,  sub- 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  19 

jectively  considered,  is  that  conduct  whose  aim  is  to 
realize  a  good  end,  or  to  prevent  a  bad  end.  Wrong 
conduct,  subjectively  considered,  is  that  conduct  whose 
aim  is  to  realize  a  bad  end,  or  to  prevent  a  good  end. 
These  relations  are  thus  summarily  exhibited: 


{Objectively  right. 
Objectively  wrong 
Subjectively  wrong      {   Objectively  right. 


Subjectively  right        |   objectively  wrong. 


Conduct 

I    Subiectivelv  wrone      J 

Objectively  wrong. 


Having  blended  the  subjective  and  objective  views, 
we  can  say  absolutely  that  right  conduct  is  such  a  con- 
formity to  the  conditions  of  existence  as  tends  to  real- 
ize the  highest  good  of  all  concerned,  and  that  wrong 
conduct  is  non-conformity  to  these  conditions.  The 
fountain-head  of  right  conduct  is  a  good  character — 
a  deliberate  intention,  a  fixed  purpose,  always  to  do 
right.  This  purpose  will  determine  the  choice,  the  aim, 
the  conduct.  Character,  however,  is  not  innate.  It) 
is  formed  by  education  and  confirmed  by  conduct. 

6.  Kind  of  conduct  enjoined  by  ethics. — Conduct  sub- 
jectively right  is  that  which  ethics  enjoins.     It  prohib- 
its conduct  subjectively  wrong.     At  the  same  time,  it 
requires  of  a  moral  being  that  he  should  seek  light,  so 
that,  if  possible,  his  conduct  may  be  not  only  subjec- 
tively, but  objectively,  right.     Right  affections  and  de- 
sires naturally  issue  in  right  choices,  aims,  and  con- 
duct. 

7.  Other  normative  sciences. — These  are :  Logic,  the  < 
science  of  thought;  aesthetics,  the  science  of  beauty;  and 
economics,  the  science  of  wealth,  and  all  other  sciences 
dealing  with  ideals.     Those  sciences  which  treat  of  the; 
means  for  the  realization  of  ends  are  practical.     Some 


20  SYSTEMS    OF   F.TTIICS 

sciences  are  mixed;  that  is,  both  normative  and  prac- 
tical, as  the  science  of  medicine.  The  normative  sci- 
ences have  a  practical  bearing,  as  economics  on  the 
art  of  making  a  living,  logic  in  thinking  correctly  and 
avoiding  fallacy,  and  ethics  in  realizing  the  ultimate 
end,  the  summinn  bonum. 

8.  Relation  of  science  and  art.  Science  teaches  us  to 
know;  art  teaches  us  to  do.  Science  unfolds  principles; 
art  applies  them.  Some  arts,  as  sculpture  and  paint- 
ing, apply  the  principles  of  many  sciences.  Navigation, 
a  practical  art,  applies  the  principles  of  mechanics,  phys- 
ics, and  astronomy.  For  its  subject  matter,  oratory 
draws  on  the  wide  range  of  science,  literature,  and  art, 
and  in  fact  on  every  subject  of  human  interest.  Art 
frequently  outruns  its  corresponding  science,  deriving 
its  rules  empirically  or  from  the  inspiration  of  genius, 
as  in  the  early  stages  of  an  art. 

p.  Postulates  of  ethics. — The  following  postulates  are 
assumed : 

(1)  A  law  in  nature  regulating  its  evolution  to 
the  realization  of  a  rational  end. 

(2)  The  moral  nature  and  responsibility  of  man. 

(3)  A  correlation  between  man  and  nature. 

(4)  A  rational  end  at  which  man  should  aim. 
To  these  postulates,  theistic  ethics  adds: 

(5)  The  existence  of  God. 

(6)  A  future  life. 

10.  Laws.  A  law  is  a  rule  of  action.  As  to  origin, 
laws  are: 

(i)  Human,  as  civil  or  ecclesiastical  laws,  which 
are  positive  enactments,  changeable  and 
violable. 


ilVERSlTY 

THEORETICAL   ETHICS  21 

-  — _ — ga*^ 

(2)  Natural.    Those  regulating  the  action  of  the 
forces  of  nature,  as  the  laws  of  falling  bod- 
ies, which  are  constant  and  inviolable. 

(3)  Moral.     Those  which   determine   right  and 
wrong    in    human    character    and    conduct, 
which  are  unchangeable,  though  violable. 

As  to  application,  a  law  is  categorical  when  it  com- 
mands without  condition,  as  the  law  of  conduct:  Do 
right.  A  law  is  hypothetical  when  expressing  or  im- 
plying a  condition,  as  the  law  of  art,  addressed  to  those 
who  would  be  artists :  If  you  wish  to  be  an  artist,  study 
nature  as  well  as  art. 

ii.  Truth,  relative  or  absolute.  To  a  being  differ- 
ently constituted  from  man,  the  sensations  of  color, 
sound,  touch,  taste,  smell,  would  probably  be  very  dif- 
ferent from  those  we  experience,  since  these  sensations 
vary  with  the  organism;  but  truth,  rationally  appre- 
hended, not  dependent  on  the  senses  for  its  apprehen- 
sion, but  on  reason,  must  be  the  same  to  all  rational 
beings.  No  developed  rational  mind  will  deny  that 
every  event  must  have  a  cause;  that  body  and  motion 
imply  space;  that  succession  implies  time;  that  mathe- 
matical theorems  are  true;  that  it  is  wrong  wantonly 
to  injure  any  being;  that  it  is  right  to  promote  the  per- 
fection and  happiness  of  ourselves  and  of  others  within 
our  influence. 

Intermediate  between  the  facts  of  sensation  and  the 
truths  apprehended  by  rational  intuition  are  the  facts 
of  perception  pertaining  to  external  objects  and  the 
judgments  as  to  the  facts  of  nature;  hence  the  three 
classes  or  kinds  of  knowledge: 

(i)  The  senses  deal   with  facts   or  phenomena 


22  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

varying  with  the  subject,  though  the  ob- 
jective factor,  or  exciting  cause,  remains 
the  same.  Tomatoes  are  relished  by  some 
persons,  but  not  by  others.  Some  hanker 
after  tobacco;  others  regard  it  with  loathing. 

(2)  The  judgment  deals  with  facts,  varying  with 
the  object,  though  the  subject  remains  es- 
sentially the  same.    The  change  in  the  form 
or  position  of  an  object  is  noticed  by  the 
observer,  though  he  experiences  no  essen- 
tial change  in  himself.     We  understand  that 
the  earth  revolves  around  the  sun;  yet  this 
knowledge  is  neither  a  fact  of  sensation  nor 
a  truth  apprehended  by  reason  as  necessary; 
but  it  is  a  judgment  derived  from  observed 
facts. 

(3)  Reason,  or  rational  intuition,  deals  with  abso- 
lute truth,  the  subject  being  rational  and  the 
truth  necessary.     All  rational  minds  assent 
to   axioms   and   to   truth   logically   demon- 
strated. 

12.  Peculiarity  of  method. — Though  ethics  may  state 
the  end  at  which  it  aims  as  a  working  hypothesis,  yet 
this  end  need  not  be  regarded  as  axiomatic,  nor  as 
strictly  presupposed;  but  the  statement  of  the  end  may 
be  treated  as  a  thesis  to  be  established  as  the  science 
is  developed. 

/j.  The  laws  of  ethics  addressed  to  the  will. — The 
Jaws  of  other  normative  sciences  are  rules  for  the  at- 
tainment of  definite  ends,  which  may  or  may  not  be 
sought  without  incurring  guilt;  but  the  laws  of  ethics 
are  morally  binding,  though  they  may  be  violated. 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  23 

The  will  is  appealed  to  for  its  decision.  Ethics  deals 
especially  with  character  as  worthy  or  unworthy,  with 
conduct  as  right  or  wrong,  and  with  ends  as  good 
or  bad. 

14.  Peculiarity  of  the  art  of  conduct. — As  the  science 
of  conduct  differs  from  the  other  normative  sciences, 
so  the  art  of  conduct  differs  from  the  other  practical 
arts.     A  good  singer  is  one  who  can  sing  well;  but  a 
good  man  is  one  who  not  only  can  do  right,  but  one 
who  wills  to  do  right,  and  who  actually  does  what  he 
believes   to   be   right   whenever   there   is   opportunity. 
But  as  the  term  "good,"  as  here  used,  applies  to  char- 
acter, and  the  term  "right"  to  conduct,  it  is  not  nec- 
essary that  a  person  be  always  doing  something  in  order 
to  be  good.     A  good  man  is  good  even  when  asleep, 
since  he  has  such  a  character  that  he  does  right  when 
awake.     The  right  conduct  is  an  expression  of  good 
character.    The  conduct  ceases,  but  the  character  abides 
even  while  the  man  sleeps.     Ethics  deals  not  only  with 
ideals,  but  with  the  facts  of  moral  life  and  with  the  prin- 
ciples and  rules  of  moral  conduct. 

15.  The  essence  of  virtue  is  a  good  will. — Virtue  does 
not  consist  in  a  feeble  wish  to  be  good  or  to  do  right, 
but  in  a  settled  purpose  to  do  right,  even  if  it  requires 
sacrifices   on   our  part,   or   taxes   our  energies   to   the 
utmost.     It    requires,    not    simply    Swa/us,    the   ability, 
which  is  a  condition  of  virtue,  though  not  its  essence, 
but  that,  by  a  fixed  purpose,  the  Swa/us  be  transformed 
into  evepyeux;  that  is,  the  potential  energy  into  kinetic, 
whenever  there  is  occasion.    Virtue  transforms  the  will- 
ing to  do  right  into  the  doing,  and  that  from  the  love 
of  righteousness. 


24  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

16.  The  actual  and  the  obligatory. — Ethics  does  not 
overlook  the  actual.  It  considers  what  is;  but  it  is  chiefly 
concerned  with  the  ideal,  what  ought  to  be.  It  does 
not,  however,  tell  in  every  particular  case  what  ought 
to  be  done;  for  that  depends  on  many  contingencies 
not  foreseen;  but  it  lays  down  principles  which  guide 
in  ascertaining  duty,  and  declares  that  duty  ought  al- 
ways to  be  done.  It  insists  on  the  pursuit  of  ideal  ends 
by  right  means.  It  is  right  to  be  progressive  in  order 
to  overthrow  wornout  institutions  of  the  past,  or  to 
be  conservative,  in  order  to  check  a  hasty,  headlong 
movement,  miscalled  progress. 

77.  Conscience. — Conscience  is  that  characteristic  of 
man  which  distinguishes  him  as  a  moral  being.  It  is 
a  guide  to  conduct,  though  not  infallible. 

(1)  It  seeks  to  discriminate  between  good  and 
bad  ends,  right  and  wrong  means. 

(2)  It  affirms  the  obligation  to  choose  good  ends 
and  avoid  bad,  and  to  pursue  good  ends  by 
right  means. 

(3)  It  gives  a  sense  of  responsibility  for  choice 
and  conduct  by  declaring  that  we  are  justly 
liable  for  the  consequences. 

(4)  It  gives  a  sense  of  recompense. 

The  social  conscience  is  the  voice  of  the  people. 
Conscience  is  sometimes  said  to  be  the  voice  of  God. 
It  involves  reason  and  emotion;  it  appeals  to  the  intel- 
lect to  discriminate  between  good  and  evil,  right  and 
wrong;  it  stirs  the  sensibility  to  love  and  to  desire  the 
good,  and  to  hate  and  to  abhor  evil;  it  stimulates  the 
will  to  choose  the  good  and  to  do  right,  to  refuse  evil, 
and  to  avoid  wrong.  In  doing  right,  we  have  the  ap- 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  25 

proval  of  conscience,  the  approbation  of  God  and  of 
good  men.  In  doing  wrong  we  have  the  disapproval 
of  conscience,  the  disapprobation  of  God  and  of  good 
men. 

18.  Influence  of  ethics  on  public  morality. — People 
who  have  never  seen  a  book  on  ethics,  and  that  scarcely 
know  the  meaning  of  the  word,  pass  moral  judgments 
on  themselves  and  on  others,  and,  in  the  main,  cor- 
rect judgments.  How  is  this  to  be  accounted  for?  The 
moral  teachings  of  philosophers  of  all  ages  have  been 
disseminated  among  the  masses,  and  are  the  common 
sentiments  of  society.  Unconsciously  the  people  ab- 
sorb the  sentiments  of  their  leaders.  Again,  every  man 
is,  by  nature,  a  moralist,  as  he  is  a  logician.  The  prin- 
ciples of  ethics,  like  those  of  logic,  appeal  to  the  com- 
mon sense  of  the  people.  Of  what  use,  then,  is  the 
science  of  ethics?  The  history  of  ethics  shows  that 
the  science  is  a  growth,  or  development;  that  this  de- 
velopment has  been  accelerated  by  the  work  of  philos- 
ophers; and  that  their  opinions  have  corrected  and  in- 
tensified the  moral  sentiments  of  the  masses. 

In  the  course  of  time,  old  theories  are  modified  or 
discarded,  and  new  ones  proposed,  and  additional  prin- 
ciples discovered.  When  these  are  accepted  by  popular 
leaders,  they  are  promulgated  among  the  masses,  and 
become  a  part  of  the  consensus  of  opinion.  The  great 
value  of  ethical  science  consists,  therefore,  in  dissemi- 
nating the  principles  and  in  elevating  and  enforcing 
the  practice  of  morality,  by  awakening  loyalty  to  truth 
and  righteousness  among  the  people. 

Moral  quality  is  discerned,  at  first,  by  reflection  on 
our  own  motives  and  intentions.  Our  discoveries  are 


26  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

confirmed  by  observation  on  the  conduct  of  others. 
The  original  source  of  ethical  doctrine  is,  therefore,  the 
moral  consciousness  of  the  human  race,  as  developed 
in  the  individual  and  in  society  by  the  influence  of 
philosophy,  religion,  and  law.  Individuals  are  born 
into  a  society  having  a  moral  code;  but  the  code  itself 
is  subject  to  change  through  the  advance  of  knowledge 
and  the  general  progress  of  the  race. 


Chapter  III 

RELATION   OF   ETHICS  TO   OTHER 
SCIENCES 

T^THICS:  scientific,  philosophical,  and  practical. — Eth- 
•*— '  ics  is  scientific,  or  psychological,  when  treating  of 
the  moral  facts  of  society  and  of  the  moral  nature  of 
man.  It  is  philosophical  when  treating  of  the  good  in 
the  universe  and  of  the  ultimate  aim  of  human  effort. 
It  is  practical  when  treating  of  duty  and  laying  down 
rules  for  conduct. 

It  insists  on  the  right  intent,  which  is  to  be  mani- 
fest in  choice  and  aim,  and  embodied  in  conduct  as 
opportunity  is  afforded.  That  the  world  is  a  rational 
system,  exhibiting  design,  and  tending  to  an  ultimate 
good,  and  correlated  to  the  mind  of  man,  may  be  as- 
sumed as  a  working  hypothesis,  subject  to  verification 
or  refutation  as  we  proceed  with  the  development  of 
the  subject. 

2.  Relation  of  ethics  to  physical  science. — A  knowledge 
of  natural  objects,  their  properties  and  relations,  and 
the  laws  which  govern  their  interactions,  enables  us 
to  foresee  certain  consequences,  and  to  adapt  our  con- 
duct to  the  facts  of  nature,  so  as  to  realize  certain  re- 
sults, or  to  adjust  ourselves  to  the  inevitable;  yet  man 
can  not  only  adapt  himself  to  his  environment,  but  in 
many  instances  he  can  modify  his  environment. 

27 


28  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Advancing  knowledge  tends  to  free  us  from  super- 
stition. We  believe  less  in  signs  and  charms  and  omens, 
and  more  in  well-directed  effort  and  in  the  stability  of 
the  laws  of  nature.  We  are  becoming  less  afraid  of 
ghosts,  or  witches,  or  the  stars,  but  more  afraid  of 
foul  air,  bad  water,  unwholesome  food,  and  of  the  con- 
sequences of  immoral  conduct.  We  can  not  change 
the  laws  of  nature,  yet  to  a  certain  extent  we  can  modify 
the  facts.  Our  volitions  and  conduct  are  subject  to 
our  control.  Realizing  our  responsibility,  conscience 
warns  us  against  wrongdoing,  and  admonishes  us  that 
we  should  use  our  freedom  of  will  to  prevent  evil  and 
to  accomplish  worthy  ends.  Man  is  lord  of  creation, 
and  has  ''dominion  over  the  fish  of  the  sea,  and  over 
the  fowl  of  the  air,  and  over  the  cattle,  and  over  all 
the  earth,  and  over  every  creeping  thing  that  creepeth 
upon  the  earth."  To  exercise  worthily  his  lordship 
requires  knowledge;  hence  it  is  man's  duty  to  enlarge 
the  sphere  of  his  attainments. 

j.  Relation  to  biology. — Biology  is  the  fundamental 
science  of  the  organic  kingdoms — vegetable  and  ani- 
mal— giving  rise  to  the  special  sciences,  botany  and 
zoology.  Ethics  sustains  a  much  closer  relation  to 
biology  than  it  does  to  physics  or  to  chemistry.  Writers 
of  the  evolutionary  school  assume  its  connection  with 
biology  as  fundamental  in  character  by  placing  the  cri- 
terion of  moral  conduct  in  its  tendency  to  promote  or 
retard  the  development  of  life  and  the  organic  perfec- 
tion of  the  individual,  thus  assuming  that  right  or  wrong 
in  conduct  applies  also  to  physical  well-being  and,  con- 
sequently, to  all  kinds  of  life,  from  the  highest  to  the 
lowest  forms.  Of  course,  ethics  requires  that  our  con- 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  29 

duct  should  bear  favorably  on  the  development  of  life 
in  all  its  departments,  so  far  as  that  promotes  human 
perfection  and  happiness.  The  laws  of  life  apply  to 
moral  beings,  and  should  receive  the  attention  of  the 
students  of  ethics. 

.  4.  Relation  to  sociology. — Ethics  and  sociology  are 
intimately  related.  Sociology,  the  science  of  society, 
is  at  present  exciting  keener  interest  than  perhaps  any 
other  science.  The  social  relations  are  to  man  the 
source  of  his  greatest  joys  and  deepest  sorrows.  The 
phenomena  of  the  various  classes  of  society — the  crim- 
inal class,  the  pauper,  the  middle,  the  wealthy,  the  edu- 
cated— afford  ample  material  for  profound  study.  Con- 
sciousness of  kind,  like-mindedness,  the  social  impera- 
tive, draw  people  together,  and  mold  the  institutions 
of  society.  Why  do  people  aggregate  in  certain  locali- 
ties? They  go  where  they  think  they  can  best  make 
a  living.  Like-mindedness  begets  sympathy;  but  peo- 
ple co-operate  when  they  recognize  mutual  helpful- 
ness, and  believe  it  to  be  their  interest  to  work  to- 
gether. The  co-operation  may  spring  from  a  conscious- 
ness of  likeness  or  from  that  of  unlikeness,  the  differ- 
ence being  supplemental,  each  supplying  a  lack  in  the 
other.  Unlike-mindedness  begets  antipathy;  but  people 
antagonize  when  they  recognize  mutual  harmfulness, 
and  believe  that  their  interests  clash,  as  is  the  case  with 
rivals,  and  this  may  be  when  there  is  consciousness  of 
kind.  Thus  they  co-operate  or  antagonize,  as  their  in- 
terests dictate.  The  hope  of  social  favor  and  the  fear 
of  social  ostracism  are  powerful  stimuli  to  moral  con- 
duct. 

Ethics   properly   has   jurisdiction    over   those   phe- 


3O  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

nomena  of  society  which  involve  moral  distinctions, 
and  its  voice  ought  to  be  heeded  as  supreme.  As  so- 
ciety advances,  ethical  principles  exert,  as  they  should, 
a  continually-increasing  influence. 

5.  Relation  to  psychology. — Ethics  looks  to  psychol- 
ogy for  the  collection  and  classification  of  the  phenom- 
ena of  the  soul  and  for  the  determination  of  their  con- 
ditions and  laws.     The  processes  of  thinking,  feeling, 
and  willing,  as  revealed  in  consciousness,  are  facts  with 
which  psychology  has  to  deal;  but  a  portion  of  these 
facts  relates  to  moral  intentions,  and  thus  falls  within 
the  province  of  ethics,  which  legislates  for  those  voli- 
tions that  issue  in  moral  conduct. 

6.  Relation  to  logic. — Ethics   deals   with   right   and 
wrong  in  aim  and  conduct,  and  with  good  and  evil  as 
ends.    Logic  deals  with  the  validity  and  fallacy  of  think- 
ing, and  with  truth  and  falsity  as  objects  of  thought. 
Ethics  is  a  guide  to  the  will;  logic  is  a  guide  to  the  in- 
tellect.    Ethics  aims  to  bring  our  wills  into  harmony 
with  a  rational  self  and  with  the  ultimate  ends — the  per- 
fection and  happiness  of  rational  beings;  logic  aims  to 
secure  the  harmony  of  thought  with  itself,   with   the 
world  of  matter,  and  with  the  presuppositions  of  all 
experience.    The  realm  of  ethics  is  conscience  and  con- 
duct; the  realm  of  logic  is  intellect  and  thought. 

7.  Relation   to  (esthetics. — Ethics  and   aesthetics  are 
intimately  related.     The  Greek  TO  KO.\OV  signifies  either 
the  beautiful  or  the  good.    The  study  of  the  beautiful, 
by  withdrawing  our  minds  from  the  gross  or  the  im- 
moral, prepares  the  way  for  the  contemplation  of  the 
good  and  the  pursuit  of  worthy  ends  by  noble  means. 
Esthetics  teaches  us  so  to  adjust  our  environment  that 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS  31 

part  may  harmonize  with  part,  making  the  whole  ap- 
peal to  a  sense  of  beauty,  and  thus  to  gratify  a  culti- 
vated taste. 

Beauty  is  the  befitting  garb  of  goodness,  its  rightful 
adornment.  The  highest  virtue  ought  to  be  radiant 
with  the  highest  beauty.  In  seeking  aesthetic  culture, 
the  mind  fulfills  an  ethical  requirement;  for  this  ought 
to  be  done.  As  logic  deals  wjth  the  true,  so  aesthetics 
deals  with  the  beautiful  and  ethics  with  the  good. 

8.  Relation  to  economics. — Both  ethics  and  econom- 
ics are  concerned  with  the  good.  Ethics  concerns  it- 
self with  the  morally  good,  the  ultimate  end;  econom- 
ics with  those  goods  which  have  a  financial  value.  Both 
make  use  of  means  for  the  attainment  of  ends.  Ethics 
employs  choice  and  moral  conduct;  economics  capital, 
labor,  and  management.  Yet  wealth,  the  end  of  eco- 
nomic effort,  is  not  ultimate,  but  is  only  a  means  to  a 
higher  end;  that  is,  to  the  end  of  ethics,  the  perfection 
and  happiness  of  the  human  race.  It  is,  therefore,  evi- 
dent that  any  economic  effort  in  violation  of  moral 
law  must  finally  meet  with  defeat  and  end  in  disaster. 
Economic  writers  are  not  willing  that  their  science 
should  longer  be  stigmatized  as  the  dismal  science,  and 
are  endeavoring  to  bring  it,  more  and  more,  into  har- 
mony with  ethics. 

The  aim  of  ethics  is  broader  than  that  of  econom- 
ics. Mr.  Giddings  makes  a  statement  to  the  point: 
"The  economic  motive  is  the  desire  for  a  particular  sat- 
isfaction of  a  particular  organ  at  a  particular  time.  The 
ethical  motive  is  the  desire  for  the  varied  satisfaction 
of  the  entire  organism  through  continuing  time." 

Economics  shows  how  the  mind  seeks  to  adapt  the 


32  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

environment  to  itself,  so  as  to  secure  the  greatest  satis- 
faction. The  utilities  which  economics  seeks  satisfy  a 
natural  craving;  and  the  value  of  these  utilities  rises 
or  falls  with  the  desire  for  them.  Ethics  supplies  the 
needful  moral  restraints  against  the  excessive  desire  for 
wealth.  Sociology  deals  with  association;  economics 
with  wealth;  ethics  with  duty. 

Both  ethics  and  economics  lead  to  co-operation  as 
the  condition  of  the  greatest  success,  and  thus  stimu- 
late altruistic  tendencies  and  evolve  and  strengthen 
altruistic  sentiments  and  instincts. 

Duties,  by  long  performance,  become  transformed 
into  pleasures,  and  cease  to  be  duties;  but  duty,  in  some 
form,  will  remain  so  long  as  a  new  opportunity  of  co- 
operation for  good  becomes  apparent.  Duties  always 
have  a  social  reference,  even  the  so-called  duties  to  self. 
As  a  person  owes  duties  to  society,  it  becomes  his  duty 
to  render  himself  an  efficient  member  of  his  social  group. 
The  great  value  of  economics  consists  in  the  fact  that, 
in  increasing  wealth,  it  enlarges  our  opportunities  for 
rational  enjoyment. 

p.  Relation  to  politics. — Man  does  not  live  alone.  He 
is  a  member  of  society,  and  is,  therefore,  social;  he  is 
a  citizen  of  the  State,  and  is,  therefore,  political.  The 
citizen  owes  duties  to  the  State  which  he  can  not  right- 
fully ignore.  The  State  has  an  ideal  end,  as  well  as 
the  individual;  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  citizen  to  co- 
operate with  other  citizens  in  aiding  the  State  to  realize 
its  ideal  in  accomplishing  its  mission  in  the  world. 

What  can  be  thought  of  that  citizen  who  sells  his 
vote  for  money?  Every  voter  has  a  voice  and  a  duty 
and  a  responsibility.  The  citizen  ought,  therefore,  to 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  33 

inform  himself  on  political  questions,  so  that  he  can 
vote  intelligently.  A  political  campaign  does  much 
for  the  intellectual  and  moral  education  of  the  people. 

According  to  Hobbes,  self-love  is  the  sole  spring 
of  action;  but  self-interests  can  be  best  secured  by  plac- 
ing the  standard  of  duty  in  the  will  of  government,  as 
expressed  by  law.  In  an  absolute  monarchy  this  view 
involves  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  right  of  kings;  in  a 
republic  it  signifies  that  the  voice  of  the  people  is  the 
voice  of  God. 

70.  Relation  to  pedagogics. — Education  aims  at  the 
symmetrical  development  of  all  the  powers  of  a  hu- 
man being — the  physical,  the  intellectual,  and  the 
moral,  and  thus  becomes  a  powerful  aid  to  ethics  in 
the  realization  of  its  ideal.  It  is,  however,  the  prov- 
ince of  ethics  to  guide  in  the  work  of  education,  so  as 
best  to  promote  the  ultimate  end  of  life — the  perfection 
and  happiness  of  human  beings.  Moral  training  is  the 
most  important  part  of  education;  for  its  fruit  is  a  right- 
eous life.  The  acquisition  of  knowledge  is  the  means 
of  intellectual  training;  and  knowledge  itself  is  a  con- 
dition of  happiness,  since  happiness  is  a  consequent  of 
right  conduct,  and  right  conduct  requires  knowledge. 

//.  Relation  to  metaphysics. — Metaphysics  treats  of 
the  nature  of  being,  the  real  in  contrast  with  the  phe- 
nomenal. It  thus  deals  with  the  foundation  of  all  sci- 
ence, including  ethics.  If  in  ethics  we  go  beyond  the 
facts  and  laws  of  morality,  we  enter  the  domain  of  meta- 
physics. But  ethics  can  assume  an  ultimate  end  of 
conduct,  and  establish  the  laws  of  morality,  without 
raising  questions  concerning  the  nature  of  reality;  yet 
it  often  raises  and  discusses  questions  relating  to  God, 
3 


34  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

freedom,  and  immortality,  whose  final  solution  belongs 
to  metaphysics. 

12.  Relation  of  ethics  to  theology  and  of  morality  to 
religion. — Theology  is  the  philosophy  of  religion,  as 
ethics  is  the  science  of  morality.  Religion  is  a  life  of 
applied  theology  as  morality  is  that  of  applied  ethics. 
It  is  true,  however,  that  religion  may  exist  with  little 
knowledge  of  theology,  as  morality  may  exist  with  little 
knowledge  of  ethics.  On  the  other  hand,  there  may  be 
knowledge  of  theology  without  the  practice  of  religion, 
as  there  may  be  a  knowledge  of  ethics  without  the  prac- 
tice of  morality. 

Certain  writers  make  theology  the  basis  of  ethics, 
and  religion  that  of  morality,  while  others  reverse  the 
order.  Again,  other  writers  identify  theology  and  eth- 
ics, religion  and  morality,  while  others  make  them  in- 
dependent of  one  another.  The  early  history  of  these 
subjects  seems  to  favor  the  view  that  ethics  depends 
on  theology  and  morality  on  religion,  while  later  de- 
velopments indicate  their  independence.  /Religion  is 
belief  in  a  Supernatural  Being  and  allegiance  to  his  ) 
authority,  together  with  a  cult  or  ceremonial  of  wor- 
ship; morality  is  right  conduct  in  view  of  a  good  end. 
Religion  is  devotion  to  God;  morality  is  conformity 
to  righteousness.  Theology  is  the  rationale  of  religion; 
ethics  is  the  justification  of  morality. 

Theology  and  ethics,  religion  and  morality,  though 
not  identical,  are  not  antagonistic,  but  co-operate  in 
harmony. 


Chapter  IV 
THEISTIC    ETHICS 

GOD  the  Source  of  authority. — Theistic  ethics  takes 
for  its  supreme  rule  the  will  of  God.  It  holds  that, 
without  God,  no  sufficient  basis  can  be  found  for  right 
and  wrong,  but  that  in  the  belief  in  God  and  in  rever- 
ence for  his  character  and  in  allegiance  to  his  author- 
ity we  find  the  true  basis  for  morals. 

Theistic  ethics,  in  general,  may  be  accepted  alike 
by  the  Jew,  the  Christian,  and  the  Mohammedan,  or  by 
any  other  believer  in  God.  To  the  Christian,  the  New 
Testament  is  authority;  but  he  also  receives  light  from 
the  Old  Testament. 

2.  Christian    ethics. — The   specialized   form   of   the- 
istic  ethics,  called  Christian  ethics,  is  the  only  form  we 
shall  consider.     It  has  all  the  light  of  theistic  ethics, 
in  general,  as  the  will  of  God  revealed  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  world  and  in  the  moral  nature  of  man,  as 
accepted  by  all  Theists.     It  has  also  the  light  of  the 
Old  Testament,  as  accepted  by  Jews  and  Christians, 
and,  above  all,  the  light  afforded  by  the  New  Testament, 
as  accepted  only  by  Christians. 

3.  Old    Testament    ethics.— The    ethics    of    the    Old 
Testament  has  been  often  severely  criticised  for  its  ap- 
parent cruelty;  but  while  its  morality  is  not  complete, 
yet  it  has  a  true  ethical  root — it  was  adapted  to  the 

35 


36  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

people  and  to  the  times.  The  invasion  of  Canaan  by 
Israel  under  the  lead  of  Joshua  has  its  parallel  in  mod- 
ern times  in  the  occupation  of  the  American  continent 
by  Europeans. 

We  find,  however,  in  the  Old  Testament  writings 
moral  teaching  that  can  scarcely  be  surpassed  at  the 
present  day.  Take,  for  example,  the  fifteenth  Psalm: 
"Lord,  who  shall  abide  in  thy  tabernacle?  Who  shall 
dwell  in  thy  holy  hill?  He  that  walketh  uprightly,  and 
worketh  righteousness,  and  speaketh  the  truth  in  his 
heart.  He  that  backbiteth  not  with  his  tongue,  nor 
doeth  evil  to  his  neighbor,  nor  taketh  up  a  reproach 
against  his  neighbor.  In  whose  eyes  a  vile  person  is 
contemned;  but  he  honoreth  them  that  fear  the  Lord. 
He  that  sweareth  to  his  own  hurt,  and  changeth  not. 
He  that  putteth  not  out  his  money  to  usury,  nor  taketh 
reward  against  the  innocent.  He  that  doeth  these 
things  shall  never  be  moved."  The  Ten  Command- 
ments yet  stand  a  firm  foundation. 

4.  Neiv  Testament  ethics.  —  Notwithstanding  the 
gems  of  moral  teaching  scattered  through  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, yet  the  New  Testament  is  in  advance  of  the  Old. 
Take  the  following:  "Ye  have  heard  that  it  hath  been 
said,  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  and  hate  thine 
enemy.  But  I  say  unto  you,  Love  your  enemies;  bless 
them  that  curse  you;  do  good  to  them  that  hate  you; 
and  pray  for  them  that  despitefully  use  you  and  perse- 
cute you." 

In  the  New  Testament  we  find  the  condensed  state- 
ment of  the  Ten  Commandments  called  the  Law  of  love: 
"Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart, 
and  thy  neighbor  as  thyself."  We  have  also  the  Golden 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  37 

Rule,  which  directs  in  the  application  of  the  Law  of  love : 
"Whatsoever  ye  think  it  right  that  others  should  do 
unto  you,  do  ye  likewise  unto  them."  As  in  mathe- 
matics, so  in  morals,  the  rule  is  a  guide  in  the  application 
of  the  principle.  The  law,  "Thou  shalt  love  thy  neigh- 
bor as  thyself,"  may  seem  to  teach  that  a  man  having 
ten  thousand  dollars  should  give  five  thousand  to  his 
neighbor  who  has  nothing.  Reverse  the  relation  be- 
tween the  parties,  and  the  man  would  not  receive  five 
thousand  from  his  neighbor,  but  might  desire  work  at 
fair  wages.  The  Golden  Rule  is  a  guide  in  a  multiplicity 
of  instances. 

We  have,  moreover,  in  Christianity  a  most  powerful 
incentive  to  obedience  in  the  doctrines  of  immortality, 
responsibility,  future  reward  and  punishment,  but  above 
all  in  the  person  and  character  of  Jesus. 

5.  The  reason  for  the  laiv  of  love. — The  law  is  one 
thing,  but  the  reason  for  it  is  another.  What  is  the 
reason  for  the  law  of  love?  Why  should  we  love  our 
neighbor  as  ourselves?  Several  theories  have  been  pro- 
posed in  answer  to  the  question : 

(i)  The  eternal  fitness  of  things. — The  distinction  be- 
tween right  and  wrong  is,  by  some,  held  to  be  immut- 
able and  inherent  in  the  nature  of  things.  Reason,  it  is 
thought,  intuitively  apprehends  that  the  law  of  love 
is  the  highest  expression  of  duty,  and  that  conscience 
enforces  the  obligation  of  obedience.  This  theory  is 
really  that  of  intuitive  ethics,  which  will  be  considered 
more  fully  in  the  next  chapter.  If  reason  is  really  com- 
petent to  apprehend  the  law  of  love,  and  the  reason  for 
the  law,  there  would  be  no  need  of  revelation  on  that 
point.  Reason  gives  no  absolute  law,  since  the  nature 


38  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

of  things  is  not  immutable.  God  has  given  things  their 
nature;  but  he  might,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  have  given 
them  another  nature.  There  is  no  immutable  nature 
of  things  apart  from  the  will  of  God.  There  are,  how- 
ever, eternal  principles. 

In  the  nature  of  things  which  God  has  constituted, 
right  and  wrong  are,  no  doubt,  inherent;  but  this  is  so 
because  things  are  so  constituted.  The  nature  of  man, 
as  a  rational  and  moral  being,  is  an  appointment  of  God, 
and  being  rational  and  moral,  the  law  of  love  is  reason- 
able and  right.  If  reason  could  not  discover  this  law,  it 
can  see  the  righteousness  of  it  when  revealed. 

(2)  The  arbitrary  will  of  God. — The  reason  of  the 
law  of  love  is,  by  some,  held  to  be  the  arbitrary  will  of 
God.     Arbitrary  will  is  not  a  good  reason.     Indeed,  it 
may  be  doubted  whether  God,  as  infinitely  rational  and 
holy,  has  an  arbitrary  will.    His  will  is  the  expression  of 
his  perfect  character,  and  consequently  is  always  reason- 
able and  righteous.     Hence,  it  will  do  to  say,  knowing 
his  will  concerning  us,  we  know  our  duty. 

(3)  The  will  of  God  as  the  expression  of  his  perfect 
character. — The  will  of  God,  as  a  perfect  being,  it  is  said, 
is  the  reason  why  the  law  of  love  is  right,  and  why  it  is 
binding  on  our  conscience;  that  is,  the  law  is  right  be- 
cause God  wills  it.    Is  it  not  better  to  say,  God  wills  it 
because  it  is  right?    Having  made  man  a  sentient,  moral 
being,  the  law  of  love  is  right.     Knowing  God's  will,  we 
know  the  law  is  right.    The  will  of  God,  though  not  the 
reason  for  the  righteousness  of  the  law,  may  be  a  reason 
for  our  knowing  it.    God  has  a  reason  for  willing  as  he 
does,  and  knowing  his  will,  it  is  reasonable  to  obey. 

(4)  The  law  of  love  requires  the  greatest  worthiness 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  39 

and  confers  the  highest  happiness. — God's  character,  as 
a  wise  and  holy  being,  and  the  nature  of  things  which 
he  has  seen  fit  to  ordain,  require  the  law  of  love,  because 
it  confers  the  greatest  good  upon  men,  and  we  may 
believe  renders  satisfaction  to  God  himself.  Hence,  we 
conclude,  because  of  the  resulting  good,  God  has  en- 
acted the  law  of  love  as  the  expression  of  his  supreme 
will. 

Our  insight  into  the  nature  of  things,  at  best,  is  but 
partial;  God's  insight  is  perfect.  God's  will  is,  therefore, 
when  known,  a  more  perfect  guide  than  our  insight,  and 
is  consequently  binding  on  us  when  it  is  revealed.  In 
his  wisdom  God  has  constituted  things  as  they  are,  and 
in  this  constitution  is  found  the  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong.  God's  will  has  enacted  the  law  which 
embodies  the  highest  good  of  his  creatures,  and  this  law 
of  love,  as  revealed  to  us,  and  as  it  is  to  be  carried  out 
by  the  Golden  Rule,  is  the  best  guide  to  moral  conduct, 
yielding,  as  it  does,  the  most  desirable  consequences. 

6.  Special  duties. — These  will  be  considered  more  in 
detail  hereafter.  A  brief  consideration  will  suffice  here. 
Christianity  enjoins  duties  to  self,  to  society,  and  to  God. 

( i)  Duties  to  self. — These  include  care  over  life  and 
health,  self-support,  the  formation  of  proper  habits,  the 
culture  of  the  mind  and  heart,  the  selection  of  a  place  of 
residence,  the  choice  of  vocation,  the  formation  of  asso- 
ciations— social,  political,  or  religious,  the  choice  of  a 
companion,  the  cultivation  of  the  graces  of  the  Spirit, 
and,  in  short,  the  formation  and  preservation  of  a  good 
moral  and  Christian  character. 

It  behooves  the  individual,  if  he  would  do  all  these 
things  well,  to  know  himself,  to  learn  his  adaptations, 


40  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

to  study  his  environments,  and  to  adjust  properly  means 
to  ends.  He  finds  helpful  incentives  in  the  precepts  of 
the  Scriptures.  He  is  to  be  diligent  in  business,  to  study 
to  show  himself  to  be  a  workman,  so  to  run  that  he  may 
receive  the  crown  of  life. 

(2)  Duties  to  society. — No   man   liveth   to   himself 
alone.     Indeed  the  good  character  formed  and  main- 
tained in  himself  is  to  be  exemplified  in  right  conduct 
toward  others.     Duties  to  himself  and  family  are  to  be 
supplemented  by  duties  to  society,  to  the  Church,  to 
the  State,  to  the  world.     Let  every  man  look  not  only 
on  his  own  things,  but  also  on  the  things  of  others.    A 
wide  field  here  opens,   and   an   ample   opportunity  is 
afforded  for  the  employment  of  his  hands,  his  head,  his 
heart,  and  his  money.     The  kingdom  of  heaven  is  the 
realization  of  a  righteous  common  fellowship. 

Many  fields  of  beneficent  enterprise  remain  to  be 
cultivated.  The  question  which  each  thoughtful  person 
will  ask  himself,  What  can  I  best  do?  is  one  of  the  most 
important  in  practical  ethics.  This  question,  which  each 
one  must  answer  for  himself,  ought  to  be  settled,  not 
from  pride  or  vanity,  or  love  of  money,  or  from  any 
other  purely  selfish  consideration,  but  from  a  conscien- 
tious estimation  of  his  own  abilities,  in  view  of  his  obli- 
gations to  God  and  to  his  fellow  beings. 

(3)  Duties  to  God. — To  God,  as  his  Creator,  Bene- 
factor, Law-giver,  and  Judge,  man  owes  sacred  duties. 
God  has-  a  rightful  claim   to  man's  obedience.     The 
commands  of  God  are  not  grievous,  but  are  ordained 
for  man's  highest  good. 

Any  transgression  of  a  law  of  God  is  called  sin.  God 
forbids  sin  in  all  its  forms.  It  is,  therefore,  man's  duty 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  41 

to  repent  of  his  sins,  as  God  commands.  Repentance 
means,  at  least,  sorrow  for  sin,  a  turning  away  from  it, 
and  an  honest  effort  to  reform. 

Faith  in  God  is  also  required  of  man;  and  faith  brings 
justification,  a  pure  heart,  and  an  obedient  life,  charac- 
terized by  prayer,  reverence,  and  love,  and  the  fulfill- 
ment of  every  known  obligation.  Unbelief  is  a  reflec- 
tion on  God's  veracity. 

To  love  our  enemies  is  the  perfection  of  love,  which 
none  but  a  Christian  of  the  highest  type  can  have. 
"Render  to  no  man  evil  for  evil,  but  ever  follow  after 
that  which  is  good."  "Dearly  beloved,  avenge  not  your- 
selves, but  rather  give  place  unto  wrath."  "Love  work- 
eth  no  ill  to  his  neighbor." 

Christian  ethics,  honestly  applied,  would  solve  many 
of  the  difficult  problems  of  the  times. 


Chapter  V 
INTUITIONAL   ETHICS 


VIEW.—  The  term  intuitional,  as  applied 
to  ethics,  distinguishes  a  system  in  which  the  moral 
quality  of  conduct  is  assumed  to  be  immediately  known 
by  reason,  irrespective  of  consequences  or  of  external 
authority.  As  examples,  it  is  claimed  that  we  have  an 
intuition  of  the  obligation  to  be  truthful,  honest,  and 
just  in  purpose,  and  of  the  duty  of  the  corresponding 
conduct  in  actual  life. 

Those  holding  this  view  maintain  that  the  virtue  of 
veracity,  for  example,  is  binding  on  a  witness  in  court, 
though  he  foresees  that  his  testimony  would  probably 
lead  the  jury  to  a  wrong  conclusion  in  regard  to  the 
guilt  or  innocence  of  the  prisoner.  The  duty  of  veracity 
being  intuitively  apprehended,  it  is  maintained  that  the 
truth  ought  to  be  spoken  without  regard  to  conse- 
quences. 

A  person  having  written  to  Dr.  Martineau,  who 
accepted  the  intuitional  theory,  inquiring  whether  it 
would  be  right  to  deceive  one  dangerously  sick  as  to  the 
probability  of  recovery,  received  in  substance  the  reply  : 
"You  ought  to  tell  the  truth;  for  though  your  deceit 
were  available  in  the  first  instance,  it  would  not,  if 
known,  be  so  the  second  time."  Here  Dr.  Martineau 
went  back  on  the  theory  that  truth  ought  to  be  told 
regardless  of  the  consequences;  for  the  ulterior  conse- 

42 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  43 

quences  he  gives  as  the  very  reason  why  the  truth 
should  be  told. 

A  common  liar  is  detestable.  Truth  ought  always 
to  be  spoken  to  those  entitled  to  it,  which  holds  good 
in  the  ordinary  intercourse  of  society.  It  is,  however, 
sometimes  best  not  to  tell  the  truth.  Should  an  officer, 
knowing  all  the  plans  of  his  general,  if  captured  reveal 
those  plans  at  the  demand  of  an  enemy? 

It  is  not  right  to  tell  the  truth  to  a  tattler,  or  to  a 
malicious  person  who  will  make  a  wrong  use  of  the 
knowledge. 

Discretion  is  a  virtue  as  well  as  veracity,  and  a  little 
common  sense  will  tell  when  to  speak  and  when  to  keep 
silence,  or  when  to  deceive. 

A  witness  who  has  sworn  to  tell  "the  truth,  all  the 
truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth,"  may  rightfully  regard 
it  his  duty  not  to  violate  his  oath,  though  he  believes 
his  testimony  would  unjustly  condemn  the  prisoner.  He 
can  leave  the  consequences  to  God  and  to  the  court. 
Veracity  is  the  rule.  Good  sense,  guided  by  conscience, 
will  take  care  of  the  exceptions. 

2.  Consequences. — It  is  evident  that  consequences 
are,  in  certain  cases,  the  very  things  to  be  considered. 
Prudence,  which  is  universally  regarded  as  a  virtue, 
looks  to  consequences  in  shunning  danger  or  in  seeking 
safety.  Benevolence  aims  at  consequences  in  relieving 
misery  or  in  promoting  happiness.  Consequences  are 
the  things  aimed  at  in  legislation  and  in  all  the  laudable 
enterprises  of  the  world.  Consequences  can  be  taken 
as  a  guide  when  no  ethical  principle  is  violated;  but 
possible  consequences,  or  even  probable,  should  not  be 
suffered  to  override  an  accepted  ethical  principle. 


44  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Consequences  of  conduct  stretch  on  and  on  in  an 
interminable  series  of  causes  and  effects.  But  whether 
the  consequences  be  immediate  or  remote,  a  distinction 
is  commonly  made  between  those  aimed  at  and  those 
which,  though  foreseen,  form  no  part  of  the  motive  for 
the  act.  Responsibility  clearly  pertains  to  the  agent 
for  all  the  consequences  which  enter  into  the  motive  fol- 
lowed. Consequences  not  foreseen,  when  proper  effort 
is  made  to  foresee,  are,  so  far  as  the  moral  quality  of  the 
conduct  is  concerned,  wholly  irrelevant;  but  the  foreseen 
consequences  of  conduct,  whether  desired  or  not,  bear 
on  the  morality  of  the  act.  Thus,  if  two  consequences 
of  a  certain  act  are  foreseen  to  be  inseparable  from  that 
act,  one  of  which  is  desirable  and  the  other  undesirable, 
though  the  act  is  performed  for  the  sake  of  the  desirable 
consequence,  that  being  the  motive  for  the  act,  yet  re- 
sponsibility for  the  undesirable  consequence  can  not  be 
avoided.  In  such  cases  duty  must  be  decided  by  the 
weight  of  the  respective  consequences;  that  is,  the  act 
ought  or  ought  not  to  be  done,  according  as  the  desir- 
able or  undesirable  consequence  has  the  greater  weight. 
In  such  cases  the  intuitive  method  does  not  suffice,  but 
we  must  be  governed  by  considerations  of  utility. 

Intuition  may  declare  that  benevolence  is  always 
right;  but  the  question  arises,  Is  a  certain  act,  for  ex- 
ample giving  money  to  a  vagrant,  in  view  of  all  the 
consequences,  broadly  benevolent?  Is  it  objectively 
right,  though  from  a  narrow  view  it  may  seem  subjec- 
tively benevolent?  The  question,  Why  is  a  certain  act 
right?  is  always  legitimate.  The  answer,  It  is  right  be- 
cause it  is  seen  to  be  right,  gives  no  reason.  Better  say 
it  is  seen  to  be  right  because  it  is  right;  but  that  does 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  45 

not  answer  the  question,  Why  is  it  right?  Intuition 
must  take  the  position  that  right  is  ultimate,  and  no 
reason  can  be  given.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  this 
short  method  of  ethics  will  suffice.  To  say  that  the  moral 
quality  of  an  act  is  intuitively  apprehended,  is  to  shut  off 
the  question,  Why  is  it  right?  Utilitarian  ethics  answers 
the  question,  Why  is  a  certain  act  right  or  wrong?  by 
saying  that  the  act  is  subjectively  right  or  wrong  be- 
cause it  is  believed  to  be  conducive  to  a  good  or  bad 
end,  and  that  it  is  objectively  right  or  wrong  when  it  is 
so  conducive. 

In  certain  cases  coming  under  settled  principles  of 
morality  it  is  not  necessary  to  consider  the  consequences, 
and  intuitive  ethics  seems  to  suffice.  To  deal  honestly  is 
right;  to  defraud  one's  neighbor  is  wrong,  and  these 
are  known  to  be  so  in  actual  cases  at  once,  and  the  con- 
sequences need  not  be  thought  of.  But  the  question 
remains,  How  did  the  maxim  of  honesty  come  to  be 
accepted?  Was  it  not  found  long  ago  that  dishonesty 
worked  ill  to  society,  and  that  honesty  worked  well? 
The  principle  may  seem  intuitive  to  the  individual,  it 
may  actually  be  intuitive  to  him,  because  by  the  long 
experience  of  the  race  it  has  become  ingrained  in  hu- 
man consciousness,  so  that  to  the  individual  it  is  in- 
tuitive, though  to  the  race  inductive. 

But  many  questions  are  daily  thrust  upon  us  which 
can  not  be  settled  by  a  ready-made  maxim,  yet  which 
can  be  rightly  answered  only  by  a  careful  consideration 
of  the  consequences.  Of  all  the  consequences,  the  moral 
effect  of  conduct  upon  the  actor  is  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant. 

.  Subdivisions  of  intuitional  ethics. — According  to 


46  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Sidgwick,  intuitional  ethics  may  be  divided  into  per- 
ceptional, dogmatic,  and  philosophical. 

(1)  Perceptional  intuitionism. — An   intuitionist   may 
hold  that  the  moral  quality  of  any  particular  act  is  known 
immediately.     The  particular  instance,  and  others  like 
it,  form  the  basis  of  an  induction  and  correct  definition. 
Thus  Socrates  formed,  for  example,  the  definition  of 
justice,  by  considering  different  acts  called  just,   and 
then  forming  a  proposition  embodying  his  concept  of 
all  the  common  qualities  of  the  various  instances.  This 
is  the  scientific  procedure  in  forming  definitions;  but 
before  this  there  must  have  been  a  spontaneous,  com- 
mon-sense apprehension  of  the  nature  of  justice,  other- 
wise all  these  various  instances  would  not  have  been 
called  just.     They  would,  indeed,  .have  had  no  moral 
significance. 

A  perceptional  intuitionist  does  not,  however,  make 
deductions  of  duty  from  general  principles,  but  judges 
each  particular  case  on  its  own  merits.  He  regards  a 
system  of  ethics  as  superfluous,  or  even  misleading,  pre- 
ferring rather  to  be  guided  by  his  own  conscience  in 
passing  judgments  on  each  separate  case.  He  prefers 
to  discard  system;  but  to  discard  system,  and  to  judge 
each  case  on  its  own  merits,  is  his  system.  To  a  cer- 
tain extent,  it  may,  no  doubt,  be  employed  with  good 
results;  yet  it  is  incoherent,  uncertain,  and,  to  most 
minds,  unsatisfactory.  If  this  is  all  there  is  of  ethics, 
a  complete  treatise  on  the  subject  could  be  written  in 
two  sentences:  Do  what  you  perceive  to  be  right.  Re- 
frain from  what  you  perceive  to  be  wrong.  Excellent 
precepts,  as  far  as  available. 

(2)  Dogmatic  intuitionism. — Persons  of  a  deductive 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  47 

turn  of  mind  are  not  satisfied  with  individual  instances 
decided  upon  their  own  merits,  but  prefer  to  bring  spe- 
cial cases  under  a  general  principle.  They  give,  how- 
ever, no  other  account  of  their  general  principle  than 
that  it  is  intuitively  certain,  when  perhaps  it  is  a  generali- 
zation from  particular  cases,  or  is  accepted  on  authority. 
A  dogma  serving  the  purposes  of  deduction  often  finds 
ready  acceptance  as  a  rational  intuition. 

In  like  manner,  other  principles  are  accepted,  and 
by  generalization  what  is  common  is  found  till  we  reach, 
perhaps,  the  principle  of  reciprocity,  or  the  Golden  Rule. 
Is  this  rule  a  mere  dogmatic  statement,  or  is  it  a  ra- 
tional intuition,  or  is  it  an  induction  from  experience? 
To  answer  these  questions  properly  requires  thought. 

Again,  the  particular  intuition  of  which  the  prin- 
ciple is  a  generalization  does  not  always  present  it- 
self as  certain  beyond  question.  When  scrutinized 
closely,  doubts  frequently  arise.  Its  moral  quality  ap- 
pears to  vary  from  time  to  time,  though  the  circum- 
stances remain  essentially  the  same.  This  vacillation 
of  opinion  is  probably  due  to  the  fact  that  our  judgment 
is  more  or  less  influenced,  as  we  dwell,  perhaps  uncon- 
sciously, on  this  or  that  probable  consequence.  Doubt 
is  also  thrown  on  the  validity  of  moral  judgments  by 
finding  that  the  opinions  of  judges  supposed  to  be  com- 
petent do  not  harmonize.  These  doubts,  if  relating  to 
particular  acts,  can  be  dispelled  only  by  appealing  to 
general  principles,  which,  whether  intuitive  or  dog- 
matic, seem  to  settle  the  question. 

It  does  not,  however,  disprove  the  intuitive  char- 
acter of  a  proposition  by  finding  that  it  is  verified  by 
experience;  for,  if  true,  this  ought  to  be  the  case;  but 


48  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

the  question  is  still  open,  whether  the  principle  is  an 
intuition  or  an  induction. 

It  is  the  business  of  the  philosophers  of  the  intui- 
tional school  to  collect,  clearly  state,  classify,  and  har- 
monize ethical  maxims,  to  exhibit  their  relative  impor- 
tance, and  adjust  them  for  the  guidance  of  practical 
conduct.  This  they  have  done,  to  some  extent,  and 
we  shall  find,  as  we  proceed,  that  we  appeal  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  intuitional  school  when  it  would  be  im- 
practicable to  settle  questions  of  conduct  by  calculat- 
ing the  consequences,  which  is  often  a  very  difficult 
matter. 

/  ( 3)  Philosophic  intuitionism. — Without  denying  that 
the  precepts  of  common  sense  are  right,  that  they  may 
be  so  adjusted  as  to  harmonize,  that  they  are  so  com- 
plete as  to  cover  the  field  of  moral  conduct,  still  we 
may  search  for  a  deeper  reason  why  certain  conduct 
is  right  or  wrong. 

As  intuitionism  does  not  employ  ordinary  induc- 
tion, we  may  inquire,  What  is  the  philosophic  warrant 
for  passing  from  the  particular  instance  with  which  this 
school,  as  any  other,  must  begin  to  the  principle  ap- 
plicable to  all  like  cases.  The  principle  seems  to  be 
this :  Whatever  is  true  of  a  particular  instance  is  true  of 
all  instances  essentially  the  same;  for  that  which  exists 
to  make  the  first  instance  right  exists  in  the  second, 
and  in  the  third,  and  so  on  for  all  the  instances  essen- 
tially the  same.  A  failure  in  any  instance  would  show 
that  that  instance  is  not  essentially  the  same.  Like 
conditions  and  causes  are  followed  by  like  results.  This 
is  a  rational  intuition.  Of  course,  in  making  deductions 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  49 

from  this  principle  for  a  new  case,  care  must  be  taken 
to  see  that  the  case  is  essentially  the  same. 

The  above  principle  is  employed  in  cases  where  it 
is  little  suspected.  The  mathematician  proves  that 
the  square  of  the  hypotenuse  of  a  right  triangle  is 
equivalent  to  the  sum  of  the  squares  of  the  other 
sides  by  drawing  a  particular  right  triangle,  con- 
structing squares  on  the  three  sides,  and  showing, 
by  logical  reasoning,  that  for  the  figure  drawn,  the 
square  of  the  hypotenuse  is  equivalent  to  the  sum 
of  the  squares  of  the  other  sides.  He  at  once  gen- 
eralizes his  conclusion,  and  affirms  that  the  same  is 
true  of  any  other  right  triangle,  though  it  is  so 
small  as  to  be  invisible  to  the  naked  eye,  or  so  large 
that  its  sides  reach  the  stars,  or  though  the  sides  vary 
indefinitely  in  relative  length,  the  one  essential  condi- 
tion remaining,  that  the  triangle  is  right-angled.  This 
is  not  ordinary  induction;  for  we  do  not  prove  the 
proposition  for  several  cases,  and  then  infer  that  it  is 
true  of  all  other  cases.  We  prove  for  only  one  case, 
the  triangle  drawn,  and  then,  by  immediate  generaliza- 
tion, affirm  that  the  same  is  true  of  every  right  triangle, 
according  to  the  principle,  Whatever  is  true  of  a  par- 
ticular instance  is  likewise  true  of  all  instances  essen- 
tially the  same.  It  is  seen  that  the  demonstration  for 
any  other  right  triangle  would  be  essentially  the  same. 

For  one  to  promote  the  perfection  and  happiness 
of  himself,  so  far  as  this  does  not  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  others,  is  intuitively  apprehended  to  be  right. 
To  promote  the  perfection  and  happiness  of  others 
adds  to  his  own,  as  well  as  to  theirs,  and  is  also  intuitively 
4 


JO  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

known  to  be  right.  By  immediate  generalization  we 
reach  the  principle  that  the  conduct  which  aims  at  the 
perfection  and  happiness  of  self  and  others  is  subject- 
ively righteous  conduct,  and  if  it  actually  promotes 
the  common  welfare  and  is  wisely  directed,  it  is  also 
objectively  right. 

This  principle  has  received  a  wider  acceptance  than 
is  commonly  supposed.  Kant  says,  "That  conduct  is 
right  which  would  work  for  good  if  it  became  universal." 
The  final  justification  is  the  consequences,  taken  not 
simply  as  immediate  and  in  a  narrow  sense,  but  as  ulti- 
mate and  ;i.  the  widest  signification. 

A  Christian  moralist  may  affirm  that  "the  chief  end 
of  man  is  to  glorify  God  and  enjoy  him  forever."  This 
is  true  enough;  but  it  is  evident  that  we  can  add  noth- 
ing to  the  intrinsic  glory  of  God.  We  may  declare 
his  glory,  and  thus  induce  others  to  share  his  good- 
ness; for  no  doubt  God  takes  pleasure  in  the  perfection 
and  happiness  of  man.  To  glorify  God  is  therefore  a 
duty,  since  it  promotes  the  welfare  of  man  and  is  pleas- 
ing to  God.  The  ultimate  end  of  human  conduct  is 
the  perfection  and  happiness  of  man  as  the  crowning 
glory  of  God's  wisdom  and  goodness. 

An  evolutionist,  as  Herbert  Spencer,  does  not  ob- 
ject to  rational  intuition  when  it  is  regarded  as  de- 
veloped by  the  experience  of  the  race,  and  transmitted 
by  the  laws  of  heredity,  though  not  mysteriously  im- 
planted in  the  mind  of  the  individual,  yet  intuitively, 
immediately,  and  rationally  apprehended. 


Chapter  VI 
UTILITARIAN    ETHICS 

/CLASSIFICATION. — A    summary    classification    is 
^~s    thus  given : 

(  Hedonism. 

(  Egoism     1  Eudemonism. 
Utilitarianism     < 

[  Altruism    f  Hedonism. 

(  Eudemonism. 

2.  Genera!  ricw. — Utilitarianism  considers  the  value 
of  things.  In  view  of  their  good  or  bad  qualities,  they 
are  chosen  or  rejected.  Moral  acts  form  a  series  of 
choices  with  their  consequent  conduct;  and  moral  life 
is  a  certain  habit  of  choice  and  execution.  Utilitarians 
call  that  moral  which  is  favorable  to  the  life  and  wel- 
fare of  the  individual  and  of  the  race. 

What  objects  are  unconditionally  worthy  of  choice, 
and  consequently  ought  to  be  chosen?  The  objects  of 
choice  fall  into  two  classes — ends  and  means,  accord- 
ing as  they  are  final  or  instrumental.  Ends  have  a  pri- 
mary, an  intrinsic,  an  absolute  value,  and  are  chosen 
for  their  own  sake,  or,  more  strictly,  for  the  sake  of  the 
person  attaining  them.  Means  have  a  secondary,  an 
extrinsic,  a  relative  value,  and  are  chosen  for  the  sake 
of  the  ends,  or  for  the  sake  of  the  person  employing 
them  in  attaining  the  ends.  A  proper  end  is  a  good; 
a  right  means  is  a  utility.  Perfection  and  happiness  are 

51 


52  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

ends;  health,  wealth,  knowledge,  and  the  like  are  means. 
The  end  chosen  may  be  the  good  of  self  or  the  good 
of  others. 

If  the  end  is  the  good  of  self,  we  have  egoism;  if  the 
end  is  the  good  of  others,  we  have  altruism.  If  the  end 
is  a  sensation  of  pleasure,  as  in  tasting  food,  it  is 
hedonic;  if  it  is  a  higher  good,  as  the  satisfaction  from 
well-doing,  it  is  eudemonic. 

The  true  ultimate  end  is  called  the  good,  TO  aya.06vj 
sunimum  bomtm.  What  is  it?  Is  the  ultimate  good  per- 
fection alone?  That  might  be  found  in  a  watch,  in  a 
flower,  in  a  bird.  Is  it  happiness  alone?  That  possibly 
may  be  enjoyed  by  an  unworthy  person. 

Is  not  the  ultimate  good  for  man  the  union  of  per- 
fection and  happiness?  Is  it  not  that  rectitude  of  char- 
acter yielding  the  conscious  satisfaction  that  we  are 
in  harmony  with  the  power  in  the  moral  world  that 
works  for  righteousness?  In  working  for  the  good  of 
others,  what  should  be  our  aim?  To  help  them  in  at- 
taining happiness  is  right;  to  help  them  to  be  worthy 
of  happiness  is  better.  Consciousness  of  worthiness 
is  the  highest  enjoyment,  the  greatest  satisfaction. 
With  worthiness  of  character  God  is  well  pleased. 

5.  Subdivisions  of  utilitarianism. — The  subdivisions 
are: 

( i)  Hedonic  egoism. — This  system  makes  self-gratifi- 
cation, or  pleasure,  the  sole  object  of  choice.  It  is  based 
on  the  supposed  psychological  fact  that  pleasure  is  the 
only  thing  actually  chosen.  But  pleasures  are  higher 
or  lower.  Enjoyments  range  all  the  way  from  sensa- 
tions to  the  consciousness  of  rectitude. 

Mill  says:  "The  only  proof  capable  of  being  given 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  53 

that  an  object  is  visible  is  that  people  actually  see  it; 
the  only  proof  that  a  sound  is  audible  is  that  people 
hear  it,  and  so  on  of  the  other  sources  of  experiences. 
In  like  manner,  I  apprehend  the  sole  evidence  it  is  pos- 
sible to  produce  that  anything  is  desirable  is  that  peo- 
ple do  actually  desire  it." 

People  desire  pleasure;  therefore  pleasure  is  desir- 
able. This  is  the  experimental  basis  of  the  theory  of 
Hedonism.  It  suffices  to  prove  that  pleasure  is  desir- 
able in  the  sense  that  it  is  desired,  but  not  in  the  sense 
that  it  ought  to  be  desired,  or  that  it  is  the  only  thing 
desirable. 

Ethics  aims  at  the  good,  whatever  the  kind,  from 
the  lowest  to  the  highest  form.  It  warns  against  evil  of 
whatever  kind  or  degree.  It  deals  with  moral  con- 
duct— what  ought  or  ought  not  to  be  done.  We  ought 
to  aim  especially  at  the  highest  good.  Is  mere  pleas- 
ure— for  example,  the  gratification  of  appetite — the 
highest  good?  That  it  is  a  good  need  not  be  denied. 
We  are,  no  doubt,  under  moral  obligation  to  eat;  and 
the  gratification  of  the  appetite  is  an  accompaniment 
to  which  no  reasonable  objection  can  be  made,  and 
may  be  innocently  enjoyed.  A  good  dinner  is  cer- 
tainly not  objectionable. 

If  pleasure  is  the  only  object  of  choice,  the  only 
thing  that  can  be  chosen,  then  it  is  folly  to  say  that  we 
ought  to  choose  anything  else.  If  we  ought  to  choose 
anything  else,  then  we  can  choose  something  else;  for 
where  there  is  no  power  there  is  no  obligation;  and 
where  there  is  obligation  there  is  power.  The  ability 
to  do  is  coextensive  with  the  obligation. 

Pleasure  is  an  object  of  desire,  and  may  often  be 


54  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

innocently  chosen;  but  the  choice  of  pleasure,  without 
regard  to  consequences,  is  immoral,  and  is  condemned 
by  hedonists  themselves.  They  hold  that  we  ought 
to  consider  the  consequences,  and  make  a  reasonable 
choice.  This  was  the  teaching  of  Epicurus.  Pleasure 
is  the  gratification  of  desire.  It  springs  from  normal 
activity,  from  the  excitement  of  an  organ  or  its  re- 
action against  a  stimulus.  It  is  not  to  be  condemned 
when  legitimate,  but  only  when  excessive,  abnormal, 
or  unlawful.  The  bonum  delectabile  is  lawful,  if  not  in 
conflict  with  the  bonum  honestum. 

Acts  are  sometimes  spontaneous  from  instinct,  or 
from  constitutional  tendency;  and  if  the  act  is  accom- 
panied with  pleasure,  then  the  remembrance  of  the  pleas- 
ure re-enforces  the  impulse  to  repeat  the  act.  If  the 
pleasure  is  caused  by  an  object,  a  desire  for  the  pleas- 
ure begets  a  desire  for  the  object,  not  perhaps  as  an 
end,  but  as  a  means  to  the  end,  which  is  a  pleasurable 
state  of  the  sensibility.  The  object  which  excites  the 
pleasure,  however,  frequently  becomes  so  vivid  to  the 
imagination  as  to  seem  to  be  the  real  object  of  desire, 
while  the  consequent  pleasure  is  but  obscurely  recog- 
nized. In  this  case,  the  object  is  sought  for,  not  con- 
sciously as  a  means,  but  apparently  as  an  end.  Feel- 
ings of  pleasure  are  not,  therefore,  the  only  objects 
of  desire.  We  choose  the  pleasant  objects  themselves, 
and  often  without  thinking  of  the  feelings  they  excite, 
or,  if  we  think  of  the  pleasure,  we  seek  the  external 
cause.  We  also  choose  our  own  development  towards 
perfection.  We  choose  to  be  something  or  to  do  some- 
thing. In  fact,  we  choose  many  things  without  regard 
to  their  subjective  effects,  though  undoubtedly  investi- 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  55 

gation  will  reveal  these  effects.  They  come  frequently 
as  consequences,  not  always  as  ends  deliberately  chosen, 
and  sometimes  not  even  foreseen. 

a.  The  will  is  the  power  of  choice. — The  person  ex- 
erts his  own  inherent  energy  of  will,  or  power  of  choice, 
in  order  to  realize  the  end.  The  end,  as  motive,  is  not, 
however,  the  efficient,  but  the  final  cause  or  purpose 
of  the  choice.  The  motive  is  a  reason  why  the  person 
chooses,  not  the  cause  compelling  him  to  choose.  The 
simple  psychological  fact  is  expressed  by  the  person 
when  he  says,  "In  view  of  the  reasons,  I  will  do  this." 
He  does  not  say,  ''The  motive  compels  me  to  do  this." 
The  person  is  active,  not  passive,  in  choosing.  The  act 
of  choosing  is  also  itself  pleasurable.  For  the  sake  of 
the  end,  and  for  the  pleasure  of  choosing,  the  person 
makes  the  choice.  He  makes  it  freely;  for  if  he  is  com- 
pelled to  make  it,  responsibility  ceases.  If  the  question 
be  asked,  What  makes  the  choice?  the  answer  is,  Not 
the  motive,  but  the  person,  by  exerting  his  will-power 
in  view  of  the  motive.  If  the  question  is  asked,  What 
makes  the  person  choose?  the  answer  is,  He  is  not  made 
to  choose.  Being  an  original  source  of  activity,  a  reason, 
not  a  cause,  accounts  for  his  making  the  choice.  He  is 
the  efficient  cause  of  the  choice;  the  motive  is  only  a 
reason.  The  freedom  lies,  not  in  the  choice  as  a  prod- 
uct, but  in  the  person  who  makes  it.  When  we  say  the 
will  is  free,  we  do  not  mean  the  will  as  an  act,  as  a 
volition,  or  choice,  but  the  will  as  a  power,  or  more 
properly,  we  mean  the  person  is  free  in  using  his  will 
power.  The  will  as  volition  or  choice  is  a  product,  and 
hence  not  free,  but  caused — caused  by  the  person;  but 
the  person  is  free;  he  is  not  caused  to  cause  his  volition. 


56  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

The  person,  being  free,  is  justly  responsible   for  the 
consequences  of  his  conduct. 

b.  Freedom   does   not   render   choice   irrational. — The 
person  does  not  need  to  choose  irrationally  because 
he  is  free.     He  has  a  selecting  power  between  two  pos- 
sible motives,  and  is  under  moral  obligation,  but  not 
compulsion,  to  choose  wisely.    A  clear  view  of  the  end 
aids  him  in  doing  this.    He  is  stimulated,  not  compelled; 
he  is  solicited,  not  caused.    Motives  are  causes  of  states 
of  the  sensibility,  but  are  reasons  for  the  decisions  of 
the  will.     The  final  decision  or  choice  is  the  person's 
own  free  act,  for  which  he  alone  is  responsible.     If  he 
is  constrained  by  efficient  causes,  his  conduct  has  no 
more  moral  character  than  the  falling  of  a  stone.     In 
such  a  case  conscience  would  have  no  function. 

c.  The  effect  of  character. — The  character  of  a  per- 
son is  a  constituent  of  himself,  and  over  which  he  has 
great,  if  not  controlling  influence.     If  well  informed,  he 
can,  by  persistent,  well-directed  effort,  change  his  char- 
acter.    A  person  of  good  character  has  a  settled  pur- 
pose,  a  fixed  intent  to   choose  a  good   end,   and  he 
chooses  accordingly;  but  his  good  character  is  chiefly 
a  product  created  by  himself  by  previous  right  conduct. 
The  dynamic  in  choice  is  the  will-power  of  the  person; 
the  thing  chosen  is  the  end.     The  person  chooses  the 
good  end  for  wise  reasons.     He  is  assured  that  he  can 
make  the  right  choice  of  a  good  end,  however  strong 
the  opposing  solicitations.     Great  allowance,  however, 
should  be  made  for  persons  subject  to  the  adverse  in- 
fluences of  heredity,  environment,  education,  conduct, 
character;  but  this  is  a   matter  of  degrees,   reaching 
finally  to  an  abnormal  and  irresponsible  condition. 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  57 

d.  Is  pleasure  quantitative  only? — If  pleasure  is  quan- 
titative only,  and  is  the  only  good,  then  the  greater 
the  pleasure  the  greater  the  good.     But  pleasure  is  also 
qualitative,  and  is  not  to  be  graded  by  the  scale  of  quan- 
tity alone,  as  greater  or  less  in  degree,  but  also  by  the 
scale  of  quality,  as  higher  and  lower  in  kind.     If  two 
pleasures  are  so  related  that  but  one  can  be  enjoyed, 
then  a  choice  should  be  made  from  an  estimation  of 
both  quantity  and  quality,  giving  quality  the  preference. 

Pleasures  may  be  graded  in  an  ascending  scale,  as 
pleasures  of  appetite,  of  the  senses,  of  memory,  imagi- 
nation, thought,  success,  friendship,  love,  right  inten- 
tions, and  conduct.  Pleasure  of  the  higher  and  more 
permanent  form  is  called  happiness. 

Pleasures  directly  pursued  often  elude  our  grasp; 
but  in  the  pursuit  of  noble  ends  by  worthy  means  we 
find  pleasure  as  an  accompaniment.  It  is  not  directly 
sought,  but  comes  as  the  unsought  reward  of  virtue. 
It  may  seem  an  anomaly  to  call  pleasure  an  end,  and 
yet  not  make  it  a  direct  object  of  pursuit;  but  this  is 
not  a  question  of  its  desirability,  but  of  best  method 
of  attaining  it;  that  is,  it  is  a  question  of  means,  not  of 
end. 

e.  Why  do  we  seek  the  good  of  others? — If  our  own 
pleasure  is  the  only  object  of  choice,  then  it  is  impos- 
sible to  consider  the  good  of  others  as  an  end,  but  only 
as  a  means  to  our  own  enjoyment.    Do  we  try  to  please 
others  for  their  sake,  or  for  our  own?     No  doubt  we 
are  pleased  to  see  them  pleased.     But  whose  pleasure 
is  the  motive?     This  question  will  be  discussed  under 
the  head  of  Altruism,  but  it  may  be  profitable  to  think 
of  it  here. 


58  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

The  above  discussion  reveals  the  fact  that  sensa- 
tions of  pleasure  do  not  constitute  the  highest  end  of 
conduct.  The  ultimate  end  is  not  only  pleasant  to  a 
sentient  being,  but  worthy  of  the  pursuit  of  a  rational 
being. 

(2)  Eudemonic  egoism. — The  good  recognized  by 
egoistic  utilitarians  is  not  solely  the  sensation  of  pleas- 
ure, a  mere  feeling  of  the  sensibility,  however  agree- 
able; but  it  is  also  a  satisfaction  arising  from  a  well- 
executed  work,  from  a  generous  deed,  from  the  wel- 
fare of  one's  own  family  or  friends,  from  a  conscious- 
ness of  rectitude,  from  the  approval  of  conscience,  from 
the  approbation  of  good  people,  and,  above  all,  from 
the  testimony  that  we  please  God. 

a.  Distinction  between  pleasure  and  happiness. — Both 
pleasure  and  happiness  are  enjoyable.     In  this  respect 
they  are  alike.     Pleasure  is  the  agreeable  sensation  ac- 
companying the  legitimate  exercise  of  a  particular  or- 
gan; happiness  is  the  satisfaction  from  the  assurance 
of  the  welfare  of  the  entire  being. 

If  the  general  conditions  are  satisfactory  and  well 
assured,  happiness  is  not  suspended  by  temporary  pains. 
Happiness  is  more  permanent  than  pleasure;  it  is 
broader,  higher,  better;  it  is  eudemonic  rather  than 
hedonic.  It  is  removed  far  from  the  base  or  degrading, 
and  is  allied  to  the  worthy  and  the  elevating.  Satisfac- 
tion arises  from  the  development  of  a  good  moral  char- 
acter, from  a  consciousness  of  progress  towards  per- 
fection. 

b.  Consequences. — In  a  good  moral  state,  a  person 
habitually  gives  expression  of  a  worthy  character  in 
worthy  achievements.    For  the  attainment  of  good  ends 


THEORETICAL    ETHICS  5$ 

he  considers  his  own  personality  the  subjective  factor, 
and  the  environment  the  objective  factor.  He  then 
strives  so  to  adjust  the  subjective  and  objective  factors 
as  to  secure  the  best  possible  development,  and  thus 
to  be  able  most  perfectly  to  fulfill  his  mission  in  life. 

( 3)  Hedonic  Altruism. — As  it  is  right  to  seek  inno- 
cent pleasure  for  ourselves,  and  to  avoid  pain,  so  it  is 
also  right  to  seek  to  promote  the  pleasure  of  others, 
and  to  relieve  their  distress,  and  in  so  doing  we  find 
enjoyment  for  ourselves.  Our  enjoyment  in  doing  good 
to  others  may  be  of  a  higher  order  than  that  which  they 
receive;  that  is,  ours  may  be  eudemonic,  theirs  hedonic, 
as  when  we  give  a  hungry  man  a  dinner. 

a.  Is  self-interest  the  only  motive? — Let  us  renew 
the  question,  Why  do  we  seek  to  please  others?  Is 
it  for  their  sake  or  for  our  own?  This  is  a  much-mooted 
question.  The  story  of  Lincoln  and  the  pig  is  to  the 
point.  In  riding  along  a  road,  Lincoln  saw  a  pig  in  a 
ditch,  struggling  to  get  out.  He  rode  on,  but  could 
not  get  rid  of  the  thought  of  the  distress  of  the  pig. 
He  became,  at  length,  so  troubled  that  he  rode  back 
and  released  the  pig  at  the  expense  of  soiling  a  new  suit 
of  clothes.  He  then  rode  on  relieved.  Being  after- 
wards commended  for  his  kind  act,  he  replied:  "It  was 
not  goodness  at  all.  I  did  not  release  the  pig  for  the 
pig's  sake,  but  for  my  own.  I  was  distressed  at  the 
pig's  distress,  and  relieved  its  distress  to  get  rid  of 
my  own." 

If  Lincoln  had  not  had  a  benevolent  heart,  he  would 
not  have  been  troubled  at  the  distress  of  the  pig;  neither 
would  he  have  done  the  act  of  mercy.  If  we  do  good 
to  others,  not  to  give  them  pleasure,  but  for  our  own 


60  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

satisfaction,  we  would  cease  to  have  satisfaction.  We 
find  our  satisfaction  in  the  satisfaction  of  others.  The 
immediate  aim  is  to  give  others  satisfaction,  but  in  doing 
so,  satisfaction  unsought  comes  to  ourselves,  and  all 
the  greater  because  unsought.  Duty  done  to  others 
brings  the  highest  reward  to  ourselves. 

(4)  Eudemonic  Altruism. — We  may  distinguish  sev- 
eral kinds : 

a.  Duties  to  others  as  individuals. — As  we  seek  pleas- 
ure for  ourselves  and  for  others,  as  we  seek  happiness 
for  ourselves,  so  we  ought  to  seek  happiness  for  others. 
The  perfection  and  happiness  of  others  are  ends  objec- 
tive to  ourselves,  and  are  to  be  sought  for  their  sakes. 
As  we  receive  satisfaction  in  contributing  to  the  pleas- 
ure of  others,  so  we  receive  purer  enjoyment  in  promot- 
ing their  higher  welfare,  their  perfection  and  happiness. 
The  end  we  seek  should  be,  not  simply  pleasure  for 
ourselves  and  others;  it  should  be  not  simply  interest- 
ing, but  worthy  of  interest.     We  ought  to  do  good  to 
others,  not  for  the  sake  of  a  reward  to  ourselves,  but 
in  doing  them  good  we  reap  a  reward;  yet  the  less  we 
think  of  the  reward  in  advance,  the  richer  will  it  be 
when  it  comes. 

b.  Duties  to  society  and  to  our  country. — It  is  our 
duty,  since  we  receive  much  good  from  society,  to  render 
society  returns,  valuable,  if  not  adequate.    As  the  Gov- 
ernment, so  long  as  we  are  law-abiding,  protects  us  in 
our  right  to  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  so 
we  ought  to  be  patriotic  and  stand  by  our  country  in 
time  of  war  or  peril;  and  we  ought  so  to  study  the  Con- 
stitution of  our  country  and  the  current  political  ques- 
tions that  we  may  be  able  to  vote  intelligently.    In  ren- 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  6l 

dering  loyal  service  to  our  country,  we  contribute  to 
the  welfare  of  our  fellow-citizens,  and  aid  in  the  advance- 
ment of  civilization  and  the  progress  of  the  human  race. 

c.  Duties  to  the  race. — In  a  broad  sense,  the  human 
race  is  one.     Each  nation  receives  somewhat  from  all 
other  nations.     Hence  every  nation  should  exhibit  in- 
ternational comity,  and  every  citizen  should  be  a  philan- 
thropist.    His  sentiment  should  be,  "I  am  a  man,  and 
nothing  human  is  foreign  to  me." 

d.  The   individual   mission. — Every   person   has   his 
own  idiosyncrasies,  his  individuality,  and  a  certain  po- 
sition in  society.     His  characteristics  and  his  position 
indicate  his  function  in  life.     If  he  finds  that  he  is  not 
in  harmony  with  his  environment,  he  is  at  liberty  to 
seek  another  situation.     In  determining  his  capabilities, 
finding  his  niche,  and   fulfilling  his  function,  he  best 
promotes  his  own  perfection  and  happiness.     In  dis- 
charging his  duties  to  society,  he  most  satisfactorily 
promotes  his  own  welfare.     He  best  develops  his  own 
reason  by  seeking  to  comprehend  the  reason  displayed 
in  the  universe.     He  realizes  himself  by  realizing  his 
relations  to  the  world.     In  taking  for  his  ethical  end 
the  highest  good  of  the  rational  universe,  he  finds  his 
own  highest  good  as  the  unsought  reward  of  his  dis- 
interested conduct. 

e.  Eudcmonic    utilitarianism    not    objectionable.  —  To 
utilitarianism,  both  egoistic  and  altruistic,  thus  consid- 
ered as  eudemonic,  there  can  be  no  reasonable  objec- 
tion.   The  intuitionist  is  apt  to  say,  "Do  right  for  right's 
sake."    This  can  not,  of  course,  mean  that  right  is  a  per- 
sonality that  can  receive  benefit.     We  are  to  do  right 
that  we  may  be  right.    We  do  right  for  our  own  sake, 


62  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

for  the  sake  of  others,  for  God's  sake;  but  right  has  no 
sake.  Right  means  straight.  It  is  the  straight  way  of 
doing  things.  We  do  right,  not  for  the  sake  of  the 
way  of  doing,  but  for  the  sake  of  ourselves  and  others 
who  receive  the  benefit  of  our  right  doing.  When  we 
say  we  do  right  for  the  sake  of  the  good  resulting,  we 
mean  we  do  right  for  the  sake  of  some  one  who  expe- 
riences the  good  or  receives  the  benefit. 

A  reason  can  always  be  demanded  why  a  certain  act 
is  right.  The  tautological  answer,  It  is  right  because 
it  is  right,  is  mere  trifling.  If  it  is  said,  Virtue  is  beau- 
tiful, and  gives  satisfaction  without  regard  to  conse- 
quences, the  reply  is,  The  satisfaction  which  virtue  gives 
is  a  consequence  along  with  other  consequences.  The 
saying,  Virtue  is  its  own  reward,  means  that  the  ap- 
proval of  conscience  accompanying  the  consciousness 
of  a  virtuous  act  is  a  sufficient  reward. 

/.  Objection  to  utilitarianism  because  difficult  of  ap- 
plication.— An  objection  is  often  raised  against  utili- 
tarianism on  the  ground  that  it  is  difficult,  and  some- 
times impossible,  to  calculate  the  consequences,  and  that, 
therefore,  this  system  will  not  always  serve  as  a  guide 
to  conduct.  This  thoughtful  objection  is  worthy  of  con- 
sideration, and,  so  far  as  it  holds  true,  shows  that  utili- 
tarianism is  not  all  of  ethics;  but  it  does  not  show  that 
utilitarianism  does  not  hold  good  where  the  conse- 
quences can  be  foreseen.  No  system  of  ethics  is  with- 
out use.  In  many  cases  we  do  not  need  to  calculate 
the  consequences  of  our  acts.  The  intuitional  system 
has  supplied,  ready  for  use,  many  of  the  moral  maxims 
which  should  regulate  practical  conduct.  We  do  not 
need  to  know  the  endless  consequences  of  veracity,  hon- 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS  63 

esty,  and  chastity,  or  of  their  opposite,  to  know  that 
these  virtues  ought  to  be  practiced  and  the  vices 
avoided.  But  in  certain  cases  the  consequences  ought 
to  be  estimated;  and  utility  is  our  only  guide.  Thus 
a  wealthy  man,  without  heirs,  is  approaching  the  end 
of  life.  He  regards  it  his  duty  so  to  dispose  of  his 
wealth  as  best  to  subserve  the  interests  of  society.  Sev- 
eral plans  occur  to  him — a  costly  fountain,  an  opera- 
house,  a  public  library.  He  decides  to  found  a  library. 
He  may  be  mistaken  in  his  estimate  of  the  relative  bene- 
fits of  the  different  projects,  but  he  is  clearly  right  in 
considering  the  consequences. 


Chapter  VII 
EVOLUTIONARY   ETHICS 

A  CTION,  conduct,  moral  conduct. — Actions  are  all  the 
X*  movements — physical,  intellectual,  or  moral— 
which  organic  beings  are  continually  making.  Conduct 
is  action  adjusted  to  ends.  Moral  conduct  is  conduct 
adjusted  to  moral  ends.  It  involves  right  or  wrong, 
because  aiming  at  a  good  or  bad  end. 

Aimless  action  is  not  conduct,  as  swinging  the  foot 
by  one  sitting.  Conduct  morally  indifferent  as  to  end 
and  means  is  not  moral  conduct,  as  whether  one  attends 
the  lecture  or  the  concert,  or  whether  he  rides  or  walks. 
The  conduct  becomes  moral,  both  as  to  end  and  means, 
if  he  has  invited  his  wife  to  accompany  him,  and  she 
prefers  the  concert,  and  is  not  able  to  walk. 

Conduct,  to  be  ethically  right,  must  aim  at  a  sup- 
posed good  end,  with  a  good  motive,  and  employ  right 
means.  To  be  ethically  wrong  it  must  aim  at  a  bad  end, 
or  at  a  good  end,  with  a  bad  motive,  or  employ  wrong 
means. 

2.  The  idea  of  moral  conduct  reached  by  exclusion. — 
If  from  actions  in  general  we  exclude  purposeless  ac- 
tions, the  remainder  is  conduct;  and  if  from  conduct  in 
general  we  exclude  indifferent  conduct,  the  remainder 
is  moral  conduct.  The  term  moral  conduct  is  generalized 
so  as  to  embrace  both  good  moral  conduct  and  bad 
moral  conduct.  Acts  rise  by  insensible  degrees  into 

64 


THEORETICAL    ETHICS  65 

conduct,  and  conduct  into  moral  conduct.     Evolution- 
ary ethics  explains  how  this  is  brought  about. 

j.  Structure,  function,  conduct. — In  an  organism,  the 
function  of  an  organ  corresponds  to  its  structure,  and 
is  modified  as  the  structure  is  modified.  There  is,  no 
doubt,  a  reaction  of  the  function  on  the  structure,  so 
that  a  change  in  the  required  function,  continued  for 
generations,  or  for  a  single  life,  would  modify  the  struc- 
ture; that  is,  a  modification  of  the  work  demanded  of 
an  organ,  reacts  on  the  organ,  and  becomes  a  factor  in 
the  evolution  of  its  structure.  The  modification  is 
transmitted.  Conduct  is  correlated  with  structure  and 
function,  and  adjusts  itself  to  its  environment.  Higher 
beings  also  adjust  the  environment  to  themselves,  or  ad- 
just both  themselves  and  their  environment,  in  view 
of  attaining  an  ideal  end.  Choice  reacts  on  evolution 
and  association,  and  makes  a  variation  permanent. 

4.  Spencer  s  illustrations. — Infusoria  float  at  random, 
determined  in  their  course  by  the  varying  stimuli  of 
their  media.  Finding  food,  they  flourish;  failing,  they 
starve;  meeting  a  superior  foe,  they  are  devoured. 
Lacking  the  higher  senses  and  the  motor  organs,  their 
actions  can  scarcely  be  called  conduct.  Ascending  to 
the  rotifer,  we  find  that  by  a  whirling  motion  it  takes 
in  infusoria  as  food;  by  clinging  with  its  prehensile  tail 
to  some  object,  it  finds  support;  by  drawing  in  its  outer 
organs,  and  contracting  itself,  it  escapes  danger  and 
prolongs  life. 

A  low  order  of  mollusca,  as  the  ascidian,  floating  on 
the  waters,  at  the  mercy  of  every  enemy  it  may  chance 
to  meet,  whether  drifted  by  currents  or  stranded  on 
the  shore,  scarcely  exhibits  acts,  much  less  conduct. 
5 


66  SYSTEMS    OF   ETHICS 

A  higher  order  of  mollusca,  as  the  cephalopod,  by 
swimming,  by  crawling,  by  pursuing  its  prey,  by  hiding 
itself  in  a  cloud  of  ink,  by  using  its  arms  for  anchoring 
or  for  holding  its  prey,  so  adjusts  itself  to  its  environ- 
ment that  its  acts  rise  above  random  movement  to  con- 
duct adjusted  to  ends.  It  is  certainly  a  hedonic  egoistic 
utilitarian;  but,  as  we  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
it  raises  the  question,  Ought  I,  or  ought  I  not?  we  can 
not  consider  it  a  moral  being. 

5.  Natural  selection. — The  struggle  for  existence  be- 
tween hostile  species  is  a  means  of  evolution.     That 
species  which  secures  the  best  adjustment  to  the  envi- 
ronment survives,  while  others  become  extinct.    Success 
varies  as  the  efficiency.     The  fittest  survive,  the  unfit 
perish.     This  is  the  principle  called  natural  selection, 
or  the  survival  of  the  fittest.    The  fittest  are  those  best 
adapted  to  their  environment;  and  these  nature  selects 
to  live — they  survive. 

Advancing  to  the  higher  classes  of  vertebrates,  we 
find  animals  that  care  for  their  young,  and,  in  case  of 
mammals,  that  nourish  them  from  their  own  bodies.  We 
also  find  those  that  defend  one  another  in  case  of  at- 
tacks from  enemies.  Such  conduct,  though  it  is  called 
instinctive,  has  in  it  the  unconscious  germs  of  a  truistic 
morality. 

6.  Moral  conduct. — Intellect  is  evolved,  part  passii, 
with   the  evolution  of  structure  and   function,   till,   at 
length,  rational  elements  of  mind  appear.    Finally,  when 
it  is  seen  that  certain  conduct  is  befitting,  that  it  prop- 
erly adjusts  means  to  ends,  that  it  tends  to  the  highest 
good,  then  a  sense  of  obligation  arises,  conscience  is 
born,  and  instinct  is  no  longer  the  exclusive  guide. 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  67 

Thenceforward  the  course  of  conduct  found  to  be  ap- 
propriate is  enforced,  and  becomes  the  established  cus- 
tom. 

The  love  of  offspring — parental  affection,  paternal 
and  maternal,  especially  maternal — prepares  the  way  for 
altruistic  sentiments.  A  family  with  its  kindred  families 
develops  into  a  clan.  Now,  the  egoistic  feeling  is  no 
longer  allowed  to  dominate,  but  it  is  subordinated  to 
the  welfare  of  the  clan;  altruism  appears,  and  morality 
is  in  the  ascendent. 

7.  Ascending  scale. — An  ascending  scale  is  found  from 
the  lower  animals  to  man.     With  organs  greater  in  va- 
riety and  more  highly  differentiated,  and  with  corre- 
sponding enlargement  of  function,  reaching  more  nu- 
merous  objects,    multiplying   the   number   of   possible 
adjustments,  the  sphere  of  action  is  enlarged,  and  the 
dominion  over  nature  is  more  complete,  till  we  reach 
man,  the  being  not  only  the  most  highly  organized,  but 
also  rational  and  moral.    The  races  of  mankind,  from  the 
lowest  to  the  highest,  have  acquired  a  power  over  na- 
ture in  proportion  to  their  intellectual  development. 

How  much  more  perfect  is  the  adjustment  of  means 
to  ends  among  the  civilized  races  than  among  the  sav- 
age! With  advancement  in  knowledge  goes  a  quick- 
ening of  conscience  and  a  corresponding  advancement 
in  the  claims  of  moral  obligation,  including  those  per- 
taining to  self,  to  family,  to  society,  till  finally  the  aim 
is  the  highest  good  to  the  greatest  number. 

8.  The  work  of  ethics. — We  see,  then,  that  ethics 
deals  with  the  form  of  conduct  manifest  in  the  higher 
stages  of  evolution.    As  the  numbers  of  the  human  race 
increase,  man  lives  more  and  more  in  the  presence  of  his 


68  SYSTEMS    OF   ETHICS 

fellows,  and  it  becomes  more  and  more  essential  that 
his  conduct  should  comply  with  ethical  rules;  that  is, 
with  those  customs  considered  right. 

p.  Test  of  morality. — An  act  is  good  or  bad  accord- 
ing as  it  results  in  a  good  or  bad  end;  but  conduct  may 
have  various  results — one,  the  end  directly  aimed  at;  an- 
other, not  the  ostensible  end,  yet  clearly  a  consequence 
of  the  act.  If  the  one  end  is  good,  and  the  other 
bad,  what  is  to  be  done?  Act  in  accordance  with  an 
enlightened  conscience.  What  if  the  act  itself  is  im- 
moral? We  are  not  to  do  evil  that  good  may  come. 
The  end  does  not  sanctify  the  means.  An  act  may  seem 
to  be  objectively  right  because  it  apparently  tends  to 
a  good  end;  but  if  the  act  itself  is  immoral,  it  corrupts 
the  doer,  and  this  is  a  consequence  so  bad,  that  the  ap- 
parent good  end  can  not  be  taken  as  a  justification. 
What  is  the  source  of  moral  obligation?  We  may  look 
to  the  State,  to  the  consensus  of  public  opinion,  to  the 
Church,  to  conscience,  or  to  reason  as  the  last  resort, 
which  is  the  final  court  of  appeal  even  in  choosing  any 
other;  but  reason  refers  to  an  end  as  the  source  of  obli- 
gation— the  worthiness  of  moral  being. 

Incitements  to  acts  pertaining  to  the  good  of  self  are 
usually  strong  enough  without  moral  re-enforcement. 
The  ethical  help  here  needed  is  not  an  inducement  to 
look  after  self-interest,  but  that  we  should  rightly  dis- 
criminate between  lower  and  higher  good,  and  give  pref- 
erence to  the  higher.  The  same  is  true,  in  the  main, 
in  regard  to  our  duties  to  our  families,  for  here  the 
incentives  to  right  conduct  are  strong. 

Our  duties  to  society  are  altruistic,  and  chiefly  eude- 
monic.  Here  we  need  the  stimulus  of  moral  precepts. 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  69 

We  are  further  stimulated  to  promote  the  progress  of 
society,  by  seeing  that  it  involves  our  own  welfare. 

Those  acts  are  ethically  the  most  perfect  which  most 
completely  adjust  and  harmonize  our  duties  to  self,  to 
family,  to  society,  to  humanity,  and  to  God. 

10.  Is  life  ivorth  living? — The  pessimist  answers  no; 
the  optimist,  yes.     The  general  opinion  seems  to  be, 
after  weighing  the  arguments  on  both  sides,  in  favor 
of  a  modified  optimism.     Evolutionary  ethics  accents 
this  view,  and  proceeds  to  inquire,  What  is  the  ultimate 
good?    The  answer  of  utilitarianism  is  happiness.     Evo- 
lution accepts  this  answer,  with  some  modifications.    It 
places  a  high  estimate  on  the  development  of  the  organ- 
ism and  the  higher  forms  of  life.     It  regards  perfection 
as  that  state  of  being  capable  of  effecting  the  complete 
adjustment  of  means  to  ends,  and  therefore  not  as  the 
end,  but  as  the  means  to  the  end. 

As  evolution  accepts  the  utilitarian  view  of  the  end, 
let  us  consider: 

11.  The  tendency  of  utilitarianism. — The  tendency  of 
utilitarianism  is  towards  hedonism,  that  is,  to  reduce 
happiness  to   pleasure,   whether  egoistic   or  altruistic. 
To  this  we  demur.     With  utilitarianism,  in  general,  we 
have  no  quarrel.     Even  hedonism  has  its  value  if  kept 
within  its  place;  it  is  not,  however,  all  of  ethics,  but  only 
the   lowest   part.      Eudemonic    utilitarianism,   whether 
egoistic  or  altruistic,  emphasizes  the  ultimate  end — the 
general  good,  and  that,  of  course,  includes  the  good  of 
self  along  with  the  rest.    In  fact,  to  build  up  self  is  the 
best  preparation  for  building  up  others.    The  thing  to 
be  guarded  against  is  the  building  up  of  self  to  the 
injury  of  others. 


7O  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Our  own  highest  good  is  best  attained  when  not 
made  too  direct  an  object  of  pursuit.  Even  in  acquiring 
an  education,  it  is  better  to  keep  usefulness  in  view  than 
personal  advancement.  The  good  we  receive  is  chiefly 
found  in  the  satisfaction  from  disinterested  conduct  and 
noble  achievement.  Aristotle  taught  that  happiness 
consists,  not  in  the  possession,  but  in  the  practice  of 
virtue.  Satisfaction  is  also  experienced  in  the  proper 
exercise  of  well-developed  powers. 

12.  Perfection  the  highest  means  or  proximate  end. — 
If,  as  utilitarians  maintain,  perfection  is  not  the  ultimate 
end,  it  is  at  least  the  proximate  end,  the  very  highest 
order  of  means.  The  word  proximate  is  used  in  the  sense 
of  penultimate,  not  next  to  the  first,  but  next  to  the  last. 
The  best  way  of  securing  happiness  as  an  end,  is  to  make 
sure  of  a  virtuous  character  as  a  means,  and  even  then 
the  less  thought  about  the  resulting  happiness  the  better. 
We  need  not  try  to  deceive  ourselves.  We  may  know 
and  admit  that  happiness  is  the  ultimate  end,  and  yet  for 
the  time  being  keep  our  aim  directed  to  perfection  as 
the  proximate  end,  just  as  the  farmer  withdraws  his 
thoughts  from  the  crop  that  he  may  concentrate  them 
on  the  proper  preparation  of  the  soil.  Knowing  that 
multiplied  instances  of  happiness  will  certainly  flow  from 
a  good  character,  these  need  not  be  directly  aimed  at, 
nor  even  kept  in  mind,  and  the  aim  may  be  concentrated 
upon  attaining  moral  excellence  for  ourselves  and  pro- 
moting it  in  others. 

We  have  an  analogous  case  in  the  mathematician 
who,  knowing  that  a  formula  for  a  certain  purpose  will 
have  ten  thousand  applications,  concentrates  his  powers 
on  finding  the  formula,  and  though  the  formula  is  for  the 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  71 

sake  of  the  applications,  he  regards  the  applications  as 
a  matter  of  course,  about  which  he  is  not  at  present  con- 
cerned. In  like  manner  a  good  character  is  the  ethical 
formula  for  obtaining  manifold  blessings,  and  this  char- 
acter is  the  proximate  end  to  be  sought. 

Jj.  Views  of  virtue  as  held  by  inflationists  and  evo- 
lutionists.— There  is  a  marked  difference  between  the 
intuitional  and  evolutionary  schools  in  regard  to  the 
relation  of  virtue  to  happiness.  The  intuitionist  holds 
to  an  immediate  determination  of  conscience  to  approve 
the  several  virtues,  and  believes  that  they  tend  to  happi- 
ness by  a  predetermined  correspondence. 

An  evolutionist  holds,  with  the  utilitarian,  that  con- 
duciveness  to  happiness  is  a  test  of  virtuous  conduct  as 
well  as  a  consequence. 

An  evolutionist  does  not  hold  that  every  act  is  justi- 
fied by  the  pleasure  immediately  following,  or  con- 
demned by  the  accompanying  pain,  but  that  special  and 
proximate  pleasures  and  pains  ought,  in  many  instances, 
to  be  disregarded  in  consideration  of  the  higher  pleasure 
that  more  remotely  follows,  or  the  greater  pain  that  will 
finally  be  avoided.  To  do  a  mean  act  for  an  apparent 
immediate  advantage  is  to  lose  self-respect,  which  as  a 
consequence  overbalances  the  good,  and  forbids  the  act. 

14.  Evolution  of  the  cardinal  virtues. — It  will  aid  in 
the  elucidation  of  evolutionary  ethics  to  trace,  in  a  sum- 
mary manner,  the  development  of  the  cardinal  virtues, 
leaving  their  more  systematic  treatment  to  a  subsequent 
chapter.  Can  we  find  at  least  the  germs  of  these  virtues 
in  the  lower  animals? 

(i)  Prudence. — Among  the  lower  animals  the  germ 
of  prudence  is  seen  in  the  instinct  of  fear,  and  in  the  cun- 


72  SYSTEMS    OF    ETHICS 

ning  displayed  in  escaping  from  enemies.  In  man  the 
germ  has  developed  into  the  virtue  of  prudence.  The 
conscience  of  man  affirms  that,  for  his  own  sake,  and 
for  the  sake  of  those  depending  on  him,  and  for  the  gen- 
eral welfare,  it  becomes  his  duty  to  preserve  his  life, 
to  care  for  his  health  and  strength,  and  to  diminish  or 
avoid  danger,  so  far  as  he  can  do  this  without  sacrificing 
his  own  honor.  Fear  is  transformed  into  caution,  and 
cunning  into  wisdom. 

(2)  Courage. — Animals  frequently  display  the  qual- 
ity called  courage.     By  continual  calls  for  its  exercise, 
in  attack  or  defense,  it  becomes  habitual,  and  is  trans- 
mitted from  generation  to  generation. 

Courage,  as  Aristotle  has  shown,  is  a  mean  between 
the  extremes — cowardice,  a  deficiency  of  courage,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  rashness,  an  excess  of  courage,  on  the 
other.  Cowardice  is  fear  transformed  into  an  abject 
habit,  dishonorable  and  contemptible.  Rashness  is  fool- 
hardiness,  or  courage  without  the  guidance  of  wisdom. 

(3)  Temperance. — Temperance  is  moderation  or  self- 
control.    Animals  are  guided  by  their  appetites.    In  man 
the  guidance  of  appetite  should  be  supplemented  by  that 
of  judgment.    Temperance  is  more  than  abstinence  from 
intoxicating  drinks.     It  is  moderation  in  all  lawful  in- 
dulgences.    It  curbs  every  tendency  to  excess.     It  en- 
forces abstinence  from  all  unlawful  or  hurtful  pleasures. 

The  violation  of  the  virtue  of  temperance  is  more 
frequent  in  the  case  of  gluttony  than  in  that  of  drunken- 
ness. Of  these  vices  gluttony  is  more  common,  less  con- 
spicuous, more  respectable,  and  probably  more  harmful. 
The  virtue  of  temperance  is  fully  justified  by  its  good 
consequences. 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS 


73 


(4)  Veracity. — Animals  have  the  rudiments  of  lan- 
guage, and  communicate  with  one  another,  sometimes 
truthfully  and  sometimes  deceitfully.    A  hen  rinding  food 
informs  her  brood  by  a  peculiar  call,  which  they  readily 
understand.     Seeing  a  hawk  in  the  air,  she  gives  the 
note  of  warning.    The  chicks  take  the  alarm  and  hide  in 
the  bushes.     Prompted  by  affection,  the  hen  is  truthful 
in  communicating  with  her  charge,  but  has  no  concep- 
tion of  veracity  as  a  virtue. 

Animals  employ  deceit.  The  opossum,  through  fear, 
simulates  death,  and  thus  sometimes  finds  safety.  Some 
animals  show  deception  in  catching  their  prey.  But 
their  veracity  springs,  not  from  conscience  nor  their  de- 
ceit from  depravity,  but  from  a  slowly  evolved  instinct. 

In  man,  veracity  is  a  virtue.  Its  practice  is  a  duty 
enforced  by  conscience,  in  consideration  of  its  general 
utility.  The  exceptional  cases,  as  in  war,  in  which  deceit 
is  allowable,  enforce  with  greater  emphasis  the  duty  of 
truthfulness  in  dealing  with  others  in  all  the  ordinary 
affairs  of  life.  Insincerity  is  a  dire  disease. 

(5)  Justice. — Animals  defend  one  another,  and  resist 
encroachments  on  their  haunts,  or  the  plunder  of  their 
store  of  food.    A  pig  dragged  from  a  herd  of  swine  ex- 
cites by  its  squeal  hostile  demonstrations  against  the 
captor  from  the  rest  of  the  herd,  which  muster  to  defend 
or  avenge  their  unfortunate  companion.     But  a  hog 
acting  out  its  nature  seeks  to  appropriate  all  the  swill, 
though  its  fellows  starve.     Bees  defend  their  hive  and 
kill  off  the  lazy  drones,  on  the  principle  that  if  a  fellow 
will  not  work,  neither  shall  he  eat. 

Man  works,  accumulates  property,  or  invents  a  useful 
machine,  and  feels  that  he  has  a  right  to  the  fruit  of  his 


74  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

own  labor,  or  to  the  product  of  his  own  genius.  He 
defends  his  property,  and  resents  encroachments  on  his 
rights.  But  what  he  claims  for  himself  he  must  concede 
to  his  neighbors,  or  they  will  not  allow  his  claims.  From 
the  consequences  to  ourselves  of  the  acts  of  others, 
we  reason  to  the  tightness  or  wrongness  of  those  acts, 
and  then,  by  reversing  the  order,  find  rules  for  our  own 
conduct  towards  others. 

The  sentiment  of  mutually  respecting  one  another's 
rights  crystallizes  into  custom,  and  custom  becomes  em- 
bodied in  law,  which  is  enforced,  not  only  by  conscience, 
but  by  the  sanction  of  penalties.  The  rights  of  one  has 
for  its  correlative  the  duty  of  others  to  respect  those 
rights.  Justice  is  the  core  of  honesty,  and  an  honest  man 
is  God's  nobleman. 

(6)  Benevolence. — The  germ  of  benevolence  is  found 
among  animals  in  the  instinctive  affection  which  mates 
have  for  each  other  and  for  their  offspring.  Services 
rendered  to  the  weak  vary  inversely  as  their  power  to 
help  themselves,  as  is  seen  in  the  care  taken  of  the  help- 
less young.  But  the  benevolence  of  animals,  if  benevo- 
lence it  can  be  called,  has  a  restricted  range.  Sometimes 
a  mother  adopts,  in  place  of  her  lost  offspring,  those  of 
another;  but  this  is  done  from  the  intense  pressure  of 
the  maternal  instinct,  and  not  from  good  will.  A  hen 
sometimes  kills  one  of  her  own  brood,  perhaps  one  from 
her  own  egg,  because  the  chick  differs  in  color  from  the 
rest  of  the  brood.  She  has  a  suspicion  that  it  is  an  in- 
truder, and  vowing  that  the  little  Ishmael  shall  not  share 
bounty  with  her  own  Isaacs,  she  casts  it  off,  or  kills  it 
without  mercy.  Animals,  without  remorse,  prey  with 
intense  greed  on  those  of  other  species.  Selfishness  is 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  75 

the  rule  in  the  animal  kingdom.  Is  cruelty  the  law  of 
nature? 

Among  men  we  have  had  the  abhorrent  practice  of 
cannibals  devouring  those  of  their  own  species;  and 
among  civilized  races  how  often  do  self  and  avarice 
and  cruelty  and  hate  prevail !  Even  in  acts  called  benev- 
olent, how  often  are  the  doers  led  by  the  love  of  distinc- 
tion, or  of  praise,  or  of  power,  or  by  other  motives 
equally  unworthy!  Is  genuine  benevolence  a  fiction? 
If  not,  it  seems  to  be  the  crowning  glory  of  a  few  rare 
natures;  yet  these  are  a  hope  and  a  promise  of  what  is  in 
store  for  the  human  race  when,  by  the  evolution  of  its 
higher  nature,  it  discovers  and  embraces  the  truth. 

Natural  selection  applies  most  rigidly  to  rudimentary 
society;  it  is  modified  with  ethical  evolution.  The  world 
has  been  passing  through  preparatory  stages,  and  the 
human  race  seems  to  be  but  emerging  from  the  night  of 
barbarism,  and  about  to  achieve  its  high  destiny.  The 
lion  may  yet  lie  down  with  the  lamb,  and  the  leopard 
with  the  kid.  Then  men  will  beat  their  swords  into 
plowshares,  and  their  spears  into  pruning-hooks.  That 
day  will  dawn  when  benevolence  reigns  supreme. 

Natural  selection,  or  survival  of  the  fittest  in  respect 
of  the  whole  of  the  conditions  which  exist,  relates  especially 
to  the  survival  of  those  who  are  ethically  the  best,  as  the 
ethical  endowment  is  the  crowning  glory  of  man.  Mr. 
Fisk  has  shown  that  the  prolonged  helplessness  of  in- 
fancy has  developed  benevolence  and  forethought  in 
their  parents,  given  better  opportunities  for  the  educa- 
tion of  the  children,  and  has  thus  promoted  the  progress 
of  the  human  race. 


Chapter  VIII 

EVOLUTION    OF    MORALS    IN    MAN 

5EGINNING  and  growth  of  morals. — We  have  found 
that  the  traces  of  morality  in  animals,  though  the 
germs  are  found,  are  faint,  if  not  resolvable  into  in- 
stinctive action.  The  dog  has  been  thought  to  manifest 
conscience,  by  showing  signs  of  guilt  when  he  does 
forbidden  things;  but  what  appears  to  be  a  sense  of  guilt 
is,  perhaps,  the  fear  of  his  master's  lash.  The  dog  guards 
his  master's  property  or  protects  his  life,  thus  seeming 
to  show  a  sense  of  justice  or  even  of  benevolence;  but 
this  grows  out  of  a  blind  affection  for  his  master. 

If  we  wish  to  study  the  development  of  morals,  we 
must  turn  away  from  mere  animals,  even  from  those  of 
the  highest  type,  as  the  dog,  the  horse,  the  elephant, 
and  study  man,  who,  though  allied  to  animals  in  his 
physical  nature,  has  a  higher  nature,  and  is  a  rational, 
moral,  responsible  being. 

A  child,  physically,  intellectually,  and  morally,  is  a 
potential,  not  an  actual  man.  He  starts  in  life  with  in- 
stincts, appetites,  and  passions,  some  awake  and  active, 
others  yet  dormant.  His  intellect  is  undeveloped;  his 
knowledge  is  zero;  his  moral  powers  are  inert.  As  he 
develops  into  manhood,  he  is  at  first  guided,  as  is  best, 
by  his  seniors.  At  length  he  begins  to  think  for  himself; 
he  exhibits  free  will;  he  forms  social  ties;  he  attaches 

76 


THEORETICAL    ETHICS  77 

himself  to  a  political  party,  joins  a  Church,  or  becomes  a 
free-thinker. 

Low  elements  mingle  with  higher  in  all  human  acts, 
even  in  the  best  specimens  of  humanity.  The  individual 
rises,  as  the  race,  with  many  fluctuations,  from  the  auto- 
matic to  the  free,  from  the  animal  to  the  moral,  from  the 
material  to  the  spiritual.  The  instincts,  appetites,  emo- 
tions, affections,  and  desires,  guided  by  intellect  and  con- 
science, are  powerful  impulses  to  moral  development; 
but  left  without  guidance  they  speedily  lead  on  to  ruin. 
In  average  cases  there  is  more  or  less  moral  incomplete- 
ness. Mistakes  are  inevitable,  and  demands  for  charity 
are  frequent  and  reasonable;  yet  mistakes  can  be  cor- 
rected and  progress  promoted.  An  essential  condition 
of  progress,  applying  equally  to  the  immature  and  to  the 
advanced,  is  faithfulness  to  one's  ideal.  With  progress 
the  ideal  is  corrected  and  enlarged,  the  moral  life  is 
enriched,  and  manifests  itself  in  everwidening  activities. 

2.  Factors  of  moral  evolution. — These  factors  are 
threefold  : 

( i)  The  ethical  ideal. — The  development  of  an  ethical 
ideal  involves  a  conception  of  what  one  ought  to  be  or 
to  do,  also  a  sense  of  obligation  in  the  person  himself, 
and  a  fixed  will  or  steadfast  purpose  to  do  right.  Moral 
life  is  hastened  or  retarded  as  the  ethical  ideal  is  high 
or  low.  There  seems  to  be  a  gradual  elevation  of  stand- 
ard, as  is  shown  by  a  comparison  of  the  present  with  the 
past.  Certain  kinds  of  conduct,  such  as  gave  good 
standing  in  the  past,  will  scarcely  satisfy  the  require- 
ments of  to-day. 

Notwithstanding  many  exceptions,  there  seems  to 
be  a  growing  sense  of  personal  obligation  and  respon- 


78  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

sibility.  With  an  advancing  ideal  and  an  increasing 
sense  of  obligation,  the  purpose  to  do  right  becomes,  in 
a  corresponding  degree,  more  steadfast  and  potent.  The 
advance  is  maintained  by  the  consensus  of  opinion  and 
the  customs  of  society. 

(2)  A  moral  code. — A  second  factor  in  the  advance- 
ment of  morals  is  the  development  of  a  moral  code,  as 
expressed  in  social  customs,  and  as  embodied  in  the  en- 
actments of  civil  law.  f  Ethics  unfolds  but  does  not  en- 
force obligation.  \  It  declares  that  men  ought  to  do  right, 
and  aids  them  in  understanding  what  is  right,  but  can 
not  compel  them  to  meet  their  obligations.  Hence  the 
necessity  of  a  code  of  morals,  the  force  of  custom,  the 
precepts  of  religion,  and  the  sanctions  of  civil  law. 

The  moral  code,  however,  was  not  made  by  discover- 
ing abstract  principles  and  forming  them  into  a  system. 
It  began  spontaneously,  and  was  established  as  experi- 
ence confirmed  its  utility.  It  was  not  created  by  reflec- 
tion, but  by  reflection  it  was  criticised  and  corrected. 
Thus,  aggression  and  robbery,  for  example,  being  found 
by  experience  to  be  deleterious  to  the  interests  of  society, 
were  put  under  ban,  and  the  aggressors  punished. 

Thinkers,  and  moralists,  and  reformers  continually 
insist  on  higher  moral  principles  and  better  practices. 
Other  people  imbibe  their  views  and  imitate  their  ex- 
ample, till  at  length  their  opinions  become  a  part  of  the 
accepted  code,  and  their  conduct  the  practice  of  the 
better  classes.  The  fashion  becomes  the  custom,  which, 
if  need  be,  is  made  by  legislative  enactment  a  part  of  the 
civil  law.  This  is  seen  in  laws  relating  to  property,  to 
marriage,  and  to  the  right  of  suffrage.  Thus  a  correct 
principle  discovered  by  a  thinker,  put  in  practice  by  re- 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  79 

formers,  is  adopted  by  society,  and  embodied  in  the  civil 
code.  The  law  as  enacted  by  legislative  authority  is  car- 
ried out  and  applied  to  the  complex  details  of  life.  The 
working  of  the  law  is  the  final  test  of  its  wisdom,  and 
often  leads  to  its  modification  or  repeal. 

We  do  not  hold  with  Hobbes  that  civil  law  is  the 
standard  of  morals,  and  that  the  law  is  right  because  it 
is  enacted  and  enforced  by  the  authority  of  the  Govern- 
ment. Still  it  holds  good  that  the  fact  of  a  law  is  a 
presumption  in  its  favor. 

What  should  be  the  attitude  of  the  citizen  towards 
the  laws  of  his  country?  Laws  morally  right  should 
receive  his  hearty  support;  laws  morally  indifferent 
should  be  obeyed ;  laws  morally  wrong  may  be  disobeyed 
and  the  penalty  submitted  to,  or  obeyed  under  protest 
till  repealed;  but  the  course  taken  must  be  left  to  the 
conscience  of  the  citizen.  Let  him  remember  his  own 
fallibility,  and  that  it  is  more  probable  that  an  individual 
is  mistaken,  than  a  majority  of  a  legislative  body. 

Heretofore,  in  the  great  spheres  of  economics  and 
legislation,  evolution  has  gone  forward  with  but  little 
reference  to  morals;  but  it  is  now  beginning  to  be  under- 
stood that  neither  economics  nor  politics  can  safely  be 
left  without  the  guidance  of  ethical  principles.  In  busi- 
ness transactions  moral  principles  are  needed  to  check 
the  greed  of  gain.  The  avarice  of  wealth  may  be  brought 
to  realize  its  meanness  by  bringing  it  face  to  face  with 
the  necessities  of  the  poor.  Laws  ethically  unsound  are 
sure  to  be  found  to  be  unsatisfactory. 

Life  in  all  ranks  needs  to  be  permeated  with  good 
will.  The  Christian  law  of  love,  carried  out  in  practice 
by  the  Golden  Rule,  is  the  best  solution  of  the  evils  of 


8o  SYSTEMS    OF    ETHICS 

the  times.  Equal  justice  to  all,  or  special  favors  to  none, 
is  a  good  rallying  cry.  The  poor  and  the  dependent 
should  not  be  oppressed  by  the  rich  and  the  powerful, 
but  encouraged  to  help  themselves.  Self-help  will  secure 
competence  and  independence. 

The  law  of  love,  or  right  disposition  of  heart,  has 
its  limitations.  Good  will  does  not  make  a  good  finan- 
cier nor  a  wise  legislator.  These  require  accurate 
knowledge  and  practical  sagacity.  There  should  be  not 
only  a  benevolent  heart,  but  a  life  directed  by  wisdom — 
a  life  with  a  fixed  aim  to  realize  in  all  respects,  so  far 
as  possible,  a  rational  ideal  in  full  accord  with  the  highest 
standard. 

Each  man  has  his  own  endowments.  These  are  his 
credentials,  bestowed  by  nature,  fully  authorizing  him 
to  go  forward  and  fulfill  his  mission,  and  in  doing  this 
he  realizes  his  highest  happiness. 

Though  the  code  of  morals,  as  found  in  society,  en- 
joined by  the  Church,  or  enforced  by  civil  law,  is  in 
general  a  guide,  yet  much  must  be  left  to  the  discretion 
of  the  individual.  Many  duties  are  unformulated,  many 
questions  each  person  must  ask  and  answer  for  himself. 
What  shall  be  my  particular  line  of  work?  How  shall  I 
treat  my  friends?  and  how  my  enemies?  What  returns 
should  gratitude  make  for  a  favor?  In  all  this  multi- 
plicity of  details,  every  individual  can,  by  the  exercise 
of  his  own  common  sense,  best  raise  the  questions  and 
answer  them  for  himself. 

An  enlightened  mind  learns  to  discriminate  between 
the  letter  and  the  spirit.  These  narrow-minded  Phari- 
sees who  thought  that  Jesus  had  committed  a  great  sin 
in  healing  the  withered  hand  on  the  Sabbath-day  went 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  8l 

out,  and  on  that  very  day  held  a  council  to  find  how  they 
might  destroy  the  Son  of  God.  On  the  other  hand,  that 
all  things  may  be  done  decently  and  in  order,  it  is  right 
to  observe  certain  forms,  and  to  conform  to  the  propri- 
eties of  life.  Good  morals  require  that  we  do  not  offend 
the  aesthetic  tastes  of  cultivated  people,  nor  needlessly 
violate  the  rules  of  etiquette. 

(3)  The  enlargement  of  the  moral  Held.  This  may 
be  done: 

a.  Subjectively,  in  bringing,  as  time  goes  on,  a  greater 
number  of  personal  actions  within  the  sphere  of  morals. 
As  the  moral  character  of  a  person  is  developed,  he  sees 
that  acts  once  regarded  as  indifferent  have  a  moral  bear- 
ing, and  should  be  brought  under  the  dominion  of  con- 
science. Knowing  the  influence  of  example,  he  dis- 
allows in  his  conduct  any  act  which  he  believes  might 
lead  other  people  astray.  His  exemplary  conduct  is  a 
pattern;  his  influence,  though  unconscious  to  himself, 
is  powerful  in  its  quiet  effect.  A  conscientious  man 
realizes  that  it  is  good  neither  "to  drink  wine,  nor  to  do 
anything  whereby  his  brother  stumbleth,  or  is  offended, 
or  is  made  weak."  He  is  careful  how  he  spends  his  time, 
and  will  not  allow  himself  to  drive  out  for  pleasure  when 
he  has  agreed  to  deliver  a  lecture  in  the  evening  for 
which  he  is  still  unprepared.  Yet  he  is  no  fanatic,  and 
will  drive  out  for  health  or  for  pleasure  when  no  good 
reason  appears  to  the  contrary.  It  is  a  curious  question 
why  certain  persons  observe  certain  ethical  rules,  and 
disregard  others.  They  will  not  cheat  their  neighbor, 
but  do  not  hesitate  to  defraud  the  Government.  Does 
this  grow  out  of  the  fact  that  their  ethical  ideal  is  imper- 
fectly developed?  or  is  it  because  they  persuade  them- 
6 


82  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

selves  that  in  defrauding  the  Government  they  wrong 
no  one  in  particular,  since  their  gain  of  a  thousand  would 
be  but  an  infinitesimal  loss  for  each  when  divided  by 
the  millions  of  the  Nation?  Perhaps  they  persuade 
themselves  that  by  due  caution  they  can  conceal  their 
conduct;  but  from  two  at  least  it  can  not  be  concealed — 
God  and  themselves. 

b.  Objectively,  in  extending  moral  activities  to  a  wider 
range  of  objects.  A  conscientious  person,  with  an  ethical 
ideal,  applies  the  principles  of  morals  to  wider  and  still 
wider  range  of  objects. 

Formerly  it  was  thought  that  economics  had  nothing 
to  do  with  morals;  that  business  is  business,  and  that, 
therefore,  a  man  in  business  has  a  right  to  do,  and  that 
he  always  would  do,  that  which  he  thought  would  bring 
him  the  greatest  returns  financially.  It  is  true  enough 
that  business  is  business,  and  that  a  man  in  business  has 
a  right  to  do  the  best  he  can  for  himself,  provided  that 
in  so  doing  he  wrongs  no  one  else;  but  he  should  be 
guided  in  business  by  moral  principles.  Ethics  has  a 
rightful  supervision  over  economics,  whenever  moral 
principle  is  involved. 

As  economics  within  its  range  is  an  independent 
science,  so  also  is  politics  as  the  science  of  Government. 
In  their  spheres  these  sciences  are  supreme.  As  to 
tariffs,  revenues,  taxes,  methods  of  administration,  the 
coinage  of  money,  and  the  like,  so  long  as  these  things 
are  purely  economical  or  political,  ethics  does  not  pre- 
sume to  dictate;  but  when  they  invade  the  domain  of 
morals,  ethics  has  a  right  to  make  its  voice  heard.  If 
it  is  true  that  the  Decalogue  has  no  place  in  politics,  then 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  83 

politics  has  no  right  to  touch  a  question  involving  mor- 
als. But  Government  does,  to  a  certain  extent,  guard 
public  morals,  as  is  shown  by  its  supervision  of  matter 
passing  through  the  mails,  and  in  its  attitude  towards 
lotteries  and  prize-fighting. 

A  man's  private  moral  standard  is  often  more  strict 
than  the  social  code,  and  still  more  than  the  political, 
yet  he  allows  the  conventionalities  of  society  to  guide 
his  social  conscience,  and  party  creed  his  political.  The 
true  course  is  to  carry  the  principles  of  private  morals 
into  social  intercourse  and  public  life. 

We  ought  not  to  forget  our  moral  obligations  in  deal- 
ing with  dependents,  with  inferior  races,  with  colonial 
dependencies,  or  with  the  lower  orders  of  the  animal 
kingdom.  Cruelty  to  animals  is  a  crime,  and  cruelty  to 
servants  a  greater  crime. 

As  the  moral  field  increases  in  extent,  it  loses  in  con- 
tent. Passing  from  self  to  family,  to  countrymen,  to 
mankind,  there  is  danger  of  considering  the  moral  law 
less  binding  as  its  sphere  becomes  more  general.  The 
principles  are  less  specific,  but  none  the  less  sacred.  It 
is  as  truly  duty  to  be  patriotic,  philanthropic,  benevolent, 
as  it  is  to  be  faithful  to  one's  family. 

Have  we  any  liberty  to  trample  on  the  rights  of  a 
man  because  he  is  a  foreigner?  Have  we  any  right  to 
treat  a  domestic  with  cruelty?  Have  we  any  right  to  buy 
a  horse  at  half  its  value,  because  the  owner  is  compelled 
to  raise  a  small  sum  of  money?  Whatsoever  ye  think  it 
right  that  others  should  do  unto  you,  do  ye  also  in  like 
circumstances  unto  them.  This  is  the  golden  rule  of 
practical  morals. 


84  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

The  moral  code  is  the  supplementary  legislation  of 
public  opinion,  in  view  of  the  common  welfare.  It  acts 
both  as  a  restraint  from  evil,  and  as  an  incentive  to  be- 
neficent deeds.  It  is  becoming  more  and  more  perfect 
with  the  evolution  of  society.  It  behooves  every  good 
citizen  not  only  to  sustain,  but  to  elevate  the  standard 
of  morality. 


Chapter  IX 
ECLECTIC   ETHICS 

1  METHODS  of  eclecticism. — From  the  review  of  the 
^J-  four  systems — the  theistic,  the  intuitional,  the 
utilitarian,  the  evolutionary — we  find  good  in  all  of 
them.  The  question  is  at  once  suggested,  Can  we  not, 
by  selecting  the  good  from  each  of  these  systems,  and 
combining  the  selections  into  an  aggregate,  form  a  more 
complete  system? 

The  suggestion  is  worthy  of  consideration,  and  even 
of  fair  trial;  but  success  in  the  trial  will  depend  on  the 
method  adopted,  not  so  much  of  selecting  as  of  com- 
bining the  selections.  There  are  two  methods  of  com- 
bining— the  conglomerate,  and  the  unifying.  Some 
ethical  writers  are  eclectic,  but  there  is  no  compact, 
cohering  eclectic  system. 

(i)  The  conglomerate  method. — Selections  from  all 
the  systems  can  be  made  and  combined,  perhaps  not 
without  order,  but  without  a  central,  unifying,  organiz- 
ing principle.  The  result  will  be  a  conglomerate  system, 
if  system  it  can  be  called,  having  its  type  in  a  conglomer- 
ate rock. 

A  noted  attempt  of  like  nature  has  been  made  in 
philosophy  by  that  brilliant  genius,  Victor  Cousin.  The 
want  of  a  unifying  principle  prevents  the  eclectic  phi- 

85 


86  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

losophy  from  becoming  a  true  system.  The  method  of 
eclecticism  decided  its  destiny,  and  thus  verified  the 
statement  of  Cousin  himself:  "As  is  the  method  of  a 
philosopher,  so  is  his  system,  and  the  adoption  of  a 
method  decides  the  destiny  of  his  philosophy." 

(2)  The  unifying  method. — Some  one  central  unify- 
ing principle  can  be  chosen,  around  which  are  to  be  col- 
lected and  organized  all  the  selections  made  from  the 
various  systems.  The  central  principle,  however,  must 
have  sufficient  vitality  to  assimilate  the  selections  from 
the  other  systems,  so  that  they  can  be  organized  into  a 
compact,  harmonious  system.  Without  a  principle  of 
unity,  embodying  the  ultimate  end  of  ethics,  the  selec- 
tions from  the  various  systems  can  not  be  assimilated 
and  organized  into  a  coherent  system,  but  with  such  a 
vital  principle  an  eclectic  system  is  possible. 

What  shall  the  principle  be?  What  is  the  ultimate 
end  of  conduct?  What  ought  to  be  the  highest  aim 
of  a  moral  being?  The  different  systems  give  somewhat 
different  answers.  Theistic  ethics  declares  that  "the 
chief  end  of  man  is  to  glorify  God  and  to  enjoy  him  for- 
ever." Intuitional  ethics  wavers  between  perfection  and 
happiness.  Utilitarian  ethics  answers  the  highest  good 
of  the  greatest  number.  Evolutionary  ethics,  says  the 
perfection  of  organic  life.  Eclectic  ethics  selects  all  the 
good  of  all  the  systems,  and  thus  forms  a  complete  sys- 
tem. It  does  this  by  finding  the  true  fundamental  prin- 
ciple, around  which  it  collects  and  organizes  all  subor- 
dinate principles.  What  is  the  fundamental  principle? 

2.  The  ultimate  end. — The  highest  good  of  all  sentient 
beings  is  the  ultimate  end  of  conduct.  Accepting  the 
highest  good  of  sentient  being,  including  self  and  all 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  87 

others,  especially  those  in  any  way  affected  by  us,  as  the 
ultimate  end,  it  becomes  our  duty  to  aim  so  to  direct 
our  conduct  as  to  realize,  as  far  as  possible,  this  ultimate 
end,  or  highest  good. 

Conduct  habitually  directed  aright  crystallizes  into 
virtuous  character,  whose  central  and  controlling  ele- 
ment is  the  will  to  do  right.  The  motto  then  becomes; 
I  will  do  right  according  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge 
and  ability.  Conduct,  habit,  character,  constitute  a 
trinity.  Conduct  guided  by  an  ideal,  and  controlled  by 
will,  forms  habit,  and  habit  crystallizes  into  character, 
and  character  determines  subsequent  conduct. 

Duty  is  directly  related  to  conduct,  and  indirectly 
to  character  and  happiness.  Conduct  that  establishes 
character  needs  the  guidance  of  the  intellect  and  the 
control  of  the  will.  Conduct  that  issues  from  character 
is  spontaneous  and  as  habitual  seems  to  produce  itself, 
yet  it  should  not  be  left  without  the  guidance  of  reason. 
The  immediate  aim  should  be  right  conduct.  Good 
character  and  right  subsequent  conduct  and  happiness 
will  follow  as  natural  consequences. 

Character  taken  as  the  sole  ultimate  end  gives  a  one- 
sided system,  the  result  of  which  is  apt  to  be  an  un- 
wholesome withdrawal  from  the  activities  of  life.  Self- 
satisfaction  as  to  character  leads  naturally  to  an  indispo- 
sition to  effort.  Divorced  from  action,  by  regarding  its 
end  as  already  attained,  character  is  of  little  worth.  If 
it  is  said  that  good  character  will  certainly  issue  in  right 
conduct,  it  may  be  replied  that  it  will  thus  issue,  if  it  is 
believed  that  the  end,  continued  satisfaction,  is  to  be 
secured  only  by  continued  right  conduct.  But  if  it  re- 
gard the  end,  perfection  of  character,  as  already  attained, 


88  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

it  will  ask,  What  need  of  further  effort?  A  self-satisfied 
Pharisee  is  neither  a  progressive  nor  a  useful  man. 

Character  is,  no  doubt,  a  proximate  end,  yet  a  means 
to  ulterior  ends.  The  question  can  properly  be  asked, 
Why  should  I  seek  to  establish  a  good  character?  If 
it  is  said,  A  good  character  is  a  beautiful  thing  in  itself, 
the  reply  is,  That  is  true;  yet  the  reason  given  for  a  good 
character  is  sesthetical,  not  ethical;  but  a  beautiful  thing 
is  valuable  on  account  of  the  innocent  pleasure  it  gives. 
If  it  is  said  a  good  character  is  a  good  thing  in  itself,  it 
may  be  asked,  Good  for  what?  The  reply  must  be  the 
good  conduct  that  follows,  and  the  ethical  satisfaction 
which  it  brings.  Then  the  character  is  for  the  sake  of 
the  conduct  which  follows,  and  the  satisfaction  which 
constitute  the  end;  but  let  it  not  be  forgotten  that  the 
satisfaction  can  not  be  enjoyed  without  the  character, 
which  is  its  indispensable  condition.  The  fact  is,  we 
should  seek  to  establish  a  good  character,  because  from 
a  good  character,  as  a  never-failing  fountain,  issue  the 
living  streams  of  refreshing  waters,  making  the  desert 
blossom  as  the  rose.  But  good  character  is  established 
by  right  conduct,  and  only  by  right  conduct  can  it  be 
maintained.  The  thing  of  immediate  concern  is  right 
conduct,  and  it  is  that  upon  which  the  eye  is  to  be  con- 
stantly kept.  The  ultimate  good,  the  highest  satisfac- 
tion, of  all  concerned,  is  the  final  justification  of  right 
conduct  and  good  character.  Worthiness  of  character 
is  to  be  directly  sought,  happiness  only  indirectly,  or  not 
at  all,  as  it  follows  necessarily  from  worthiness  of  char- 
acter; but  the  immediate  effort  should  be  concentrated 
on  conduct. 

If  attention  be  directed  to  pleasure  as  the  end,  the 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  89 

tendency  is  to  heclonic  egoism,  regardless  of  the  means; 
and  the  consequence  is  likely  to  be  moral  disaster.  Shall 
attention  be  directed  to  happiness  as  the  end?  Not  too 
directly;  for  then  it  loses  its  charm,  or  escapes  altogether. 
Happiness  is  more  delightful,  if  not  anticipated  or  not 
directly  pursued.  To  do  right  is  the  matter  of  immediate 
concern;  the  consequences  naturally  follow;  but  whether 
happiness  should  be  directly  or  indirectly  pursued,  is  a 
question  of  method,  not  of  end. 

j.  Duty  the  immediate  end. — If  duty  is  made  the  im- 
mediate object  of  attention,  the  question  arises,  What  is 
duty?  The  answer  is  suggested  by  the  word.  Duty  is 
what  is  due;  it  is,  of  course,  right  conduct — to  will  and 
to  do  what  is  right.  But  what  is  right  conduct?  It  is 
right  means  to  a  good  end.  Right  conduct  is,  there- 
fore, that  to  which  we  should  direct  immediate  attention, 
knowing  that  good  results  will  follow  as  natural  conse- 
quences. We  are  to  deal  directly  and  chiefly  with  con- 
duct. Ethics  may  be  defined  as  the  science  of  conduct. 
It  treats  of  the  right  and  wrong  in  conduct.  But  how  do 
we  know  what  is  right  or  wrong  in  conduct?  Here 
emerge  the  different  systems  of  ethics.  Let  us  see  what 
each  has  to  say. 

( i)  T heist ic  ethics  affirms  that  we  should  do  right, 
or  exhibit  the  various  virtues  in  our  conduct,  because 
this  is  the  will  of  God.  Knowing  or  believing  that  cer- 
tain conduct  is  the  will  of  God,  we  believe  that  it  is  right, 
and  that  we  ought  to  govern  ourselves  accordingly.  To 
determine  the  will  of  God  we  may  look  to  nature,  to 
reason,  or  to  revelation.  But  God's  will  is  not  arbitrary, 
and  we  may  be  permitted  to  inquire  into  the  reason  why 
God  wills  certain  conduct.  We  can  say,  I  trust  without 


90  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

presumption,  that  if  we  can  find  the  ultimate  end  of  right 
conduct,  the  end  that  is  not  the  means  to  an  ulterior 
end,  then  we  can  say,  We  believe  God  wills  that  conduct, 
for  the  reason  that  it  tends  to  realize  the  ultimate  end. 
In  the  last  analysis,  the  highest  good  of  sentient  being 
must  stand  as  the  final  reason  or  justification  of  conduct. 
In  his  goodness  God  has,  no  doubt,  given  to  most  minds 
such  a  degree  of  common  sense  that,  guided  by  revela- 
tion, they  immediately  know  the  right  and  wrong  in  con- 
duct without  the  task  of  calculating  the  consequences. 

(2)  Intuitional  ethics  declares  that  we  have  an  intui- 
tive knowledge  of  right  and  wrong.     It  is  true  that  in 
many  instances  we  say  that  certain  conduct,  such  as 
speaking  the  truth,  honest  dealing,  doing  kind  deeds, 
and  the  like,  is  intuitively  known  to  be  right,  and  that 
it  ought  to  be  performed   without  regard   to   conse- 
quences.    This  is  true,  and  it  answers  as  the  ordinary 
guide.    We  need  not  stop  to  calculate  the  consequences 
of  honesty  or  of  dishonesty,  to  know  that  we  ought  not 
to  cheat  our  neighbor.    In  case  of  the  ordinary  virtues, 
we  can  rely  on  the  maxims  of  common  sense.     This  is 
done  by  both  the  utilitarian  and  the  evolutionist,  who, 
however,  give  another  account  of  their  origin. 

(3)  Utilitarian    ethics    maintains    that     experience 
proves  that  all  virtuous  actions  result  in  the  general  wel- 
fare, which  is  the  final  test.     It  also  maintains  that  if  it 
were  found,  by  experience,   to  be  true  that   honesty 
brought  bad  results,  then  honesty  would  no  longer  be 
a  virtue,  thus  making  the  consequences  of  conduct  the 
test  of  its  moral  character.     The  consequences  would 
verify  the  moral  character,  even  if  the  character  were 
known  intuitively.     Is  conduct  known  to  be  right,  be- 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS  91 

cause  known  to  be  useful,  or  is  it  known  to  be  useful, 
because  known  to  be  right? 

(4)  Evolutionary  ethics  can  not  deny  the  claim  of  the 
intuitional,  that  to  the  individual  the  principal  virtues 
are  known  intuitively;  but  he  holds  that  the  intuitions 
themselves  are  the  products,  not  of  an  original  intuitive 
faculty,  but  of  the  experience  of  the  race;  that  all  past 
generations  have  found,  by  experience,  that  honesty  is 
the  best  policy,  and  that  the  tendency  to  believe  this  is 
inherited,  and  is  now  so  strong,  that  it  seems  intuitive. 
Thus  the  evolutionist  concedes  to  the  intuitionist  that 
the  virtues  seem  to  be  intuitively  known,  but  agrees 
with  the  utilitarian   that   their  general   utility  is  their 
justification,  and  this  utility  has  been  discovered  by  the 
experience  of  the  race. 

Intuitionists  reply  with  force  that  honesty  is  not  pol- 
icy at  all.  By  this  they  do  not  mean  that  it  will  not 
result  in  good;  but  that  a  man  who  deals  fairly  for  the 
reason  that  in  the  long  run  he  can  make  the  most  by 
such  conduct,  is  not  an  honest  man  at  all;  but  that  an 
honest  man  deals  fairly  because  it  is  right,  without  regard 
to  consequences.  Now,  the  old  question  emerges,  Do 
the  consequences  make  it  right?  What  is  right?  and 
why? 

(5)  Eclectic  ethics,  not  the  conglomerate,  but  the  uni- 
fying form,  can  take  the  highest  good  of  sentient  being 
as  the  ultimate  end,  since  it  is  not  for  the  sake  of  any- 
thing else,  and  is  therefore  ultimate  as  well  as  good. 
The  highest  good  of  sentient  being  is  self-realisation  of 
all  the  possibilities  of  good  with  the  attendant  satisfaction. 

Taking  the  ultimate  end,  the  highest  good  of  sentient 
being  as  the  unifying  principle,  eclectic  ethics  can  levy 


92  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

contributions  on  all  other  systems,  and  arrange  the  selec- 
tions about  this  principle,  and  thus  organize  a  compact 
coherent  system.  In  this  sense,  eclecticism  is  both  al- 
lowable and  profitable,  for  it  enlarges  the  field  of  view 
and  is  more  complete  than  any  other  system.  In  fact, 
all  the  systems  have  good  points  and  contain  more  or 
less  of  truth,  which  may  be  gleaned  from  them. 

Theistic  ethics,  based  as  it  is  on  authority,  was  effect- 
ive in  the  early  stages  of  civilization,  and  even  now  is 
the  most  available  for  people  in  a  low  degree  of  develop- 
ment, or  even  for  people  of  average  cultivation. 

Intuitional  ethics  is  available  for  people  of  some  cul- 
ture and  good  common  sense,  but  who  have  neither  the 
time  nor  the  inclination  to  study  the  philosophy  of  ethics. 

Utilitarian  ethics  satisfies  those  who  wish  to  submit 
every  principle  to  the  test  of  experience  or  to  the  veri- 
fication of  experiment,  as  in  science. 

Evolutionary  ethics  gives  the  philosophy  of  the  origin 
and  development  of  morals. 

Eclectic  ethics  satisfies  those  who  desire  complete- 
ness, and  seek  light  from  every  possible  source. 

4.  Means  and  ends. — Means  and  ends  form  a  sliding 
scale.  For  the  time  being  the  attention  can  be  with- 
drawn from  the  ultimate  end,  the  highest  good  of 
sentient  being,  and  directed  to  character,  the  proximate 
end,  or  to  conduct,  the  means  to  character,  or  to  some 
form  of  good,  as  health,  wealth,  position,  and  the  like. 
In  securing  means,  the  end  is  often  nearly,  if  not  quite, 
left  out  of  sight,  and  the  means  taken  for  the  end.  Thus, 
a  farmer  desires  a  new  plow.  He  searches  about  the 
hardware  store  for  one  to  his  liking.  At  the  time  the 
plow  seems  to  be  the  end  of  his  effort;  but  the  plow  is 


THKORKTICAL    ETHICS  93 

the  means  for  turning  over  the  soil,  which  is  the  end 
for  which  the  plow  was  bought.  Plowing  the  soil  is  the 
means  to  the  crop,  as  its  end;  the  wheat  is  the  means  to 
the  flour  to  be  made  of  it,  or  to  the  money  it  will  bring; 
the  flour  is  for  the  bread;  the  bread  is  to  be  eaten;  the 
food  gives  strength  for  work,  the  means  to  a  multi- 
plicity of  subordinate  ends;  and  not  only  for  work,  but 
for  all  moral  conduct,  the  means  to  character,  the  proxi- 
mate end,  issuing  in  the  highest  good  to  self  and  others, 
as  the  ultimate  end.  In  like  manner  the  money  for 
which  the  wheat  is  sold  is  the  means  to  ends,  which  in 
turn  become  means  to  other  ends,  and  so  on  till  the  ulti- 
mate end  is  attained. 

The  good  at  last  attained  must  not  be  mere  pleasure, 
which,  though  having  a  certain  value,  is  a  lower  form 
of  good,  but  is  unsatisfactory  to  a  rational  being.  It 
must  come  through  a  noble  character,  which  is  a  con- 
stant source  of  the  highest  good,  the  purest  happiness  to 
self  and  to  others.  Practically  it  is  better  to  aim  at  per- 
fection than  at  happiness,  not  a  self-satisfied  perfection, 
which  considers  the  end  as  already  attained,  and  that 
there  is  nothing  more  to  do,  but  at  that  perfection  of  the 
moral  nature  whose  very  essence  is  the  energy  of  will 
directed  by  wisdom  and  benevolence,  and  whose  end  is 
the  highest  good  of  the  greatest  number. 

5.  Order  of  means  and  ends. — Aim  immediately  at 
conduct  as  a  means  to  character,  and  at  character  as  a 
means  to  assured  conduct,  which  is  a  means  to  wealth, 
knowledge,  power,  position,  and  the  like,  and  to  a  more 
highly  developed  character,  and  finally  to  the  purest 
continued  happiness,  a  consciousness  of  rectitude,  the 
ultimate  good. 


94  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Perfection,  if  it  be  a  possibility  without  sensibility,  is 
of  no  more  value  than  that  of  a  well-constructed  and 
beautifully-finished  machine,  which  is  not  an  end,  but  at 
best  only  a  means  to  an  end.  We  are  again  brought  to 
the  conclusion,  that  pure  enjoyment,  the  rational  satis- 
faction springing  from  uprightness  of  character,  is  the 
ultimate  end;  but  this  calls  for  continual  work,  as  it  is 
always  true  that  much  remains  to  be  done,  so  that  the 
chief  attention  is  ever  to  be  given  to  right  conduct, 
which  will  continue  to  insure  its  good  consequences. 
Much  land  will  always  remain  to  be  possessed. 

The  term  good  strictly  applies  to  ends,  but  it  is  often 
applied  to  means  when  regarded,  for  the  time  being,  as 
ends.  Thus  we  speak  of  good  conduct  or  of  a  good 
character.  It  is,  however,  more  appropriately  applied 
to  an  object  than  to  an  act.  Thus  it  is  proper  to  say 
a  good  plow,  a  good  man.  The  term  right  is  properly 
applied  to  actions.  Thus  we  say,  Fair  dealing  is  right, 
not  good.  Right  conduct  is  conducive  to  good  char- 
acter, which  is  "the  promise  and  the  potency"  of  the 
highest  blessedness. 

The  value  of  happiness  is  not  diminished,  but  en- 
hanced, by  its  variability,  which  adds  to  the  fullness  arid 
richness  of  its  wealth. 


Chapter  X 
THE   GOOD 

desirable. — The  ultimate  end  is  the  good.  What 
•*•  is  the  good?  If  we  answer,  The  good  is  the  desir- 
able, then  we  may  ask,  Is  the  desirable  what  people 
actually  desire,  or  is  it  what  they  ought  to  desire?  The 
answer  is,  The  desirable,  in  general,  is  what  people 
actually  do  desire;  but  the  ethically  desirable  is  what 
they  ought  to  desire — the  morally  good. 

The  sensibility  is  the  susceptibility  of  feeling.  It 
is  the  condition  of  pleasure  and  pain,  of  happiness  and 
misery.  If  there  were  no  susceptibility  to  feeling,  there 
would,  of  course,  be  no  feeling,  and  the  words  pleasure 
and  pain  would  have  no  meaning.  The  sensibility  is  not 
only  susceptibility  to  pleasure  and  pain,  but  to  happi- 
ness and  misery. 

2.  The  ethically  desirable. — What  ought  we  to  de- 
sire? Manifestly  we  ought  to  desire  what  is  good  and 
can  be  enjoyed  without  interfering  with  any  established 
rights.  A  right  implies  the  correlative  duty  to  respect 
that  right,  and  thus  restricts  our  enjoyments  within  a 
certain  range.  The  enjoyment  or  satisfaction  which 
springs  from  right  conduct  is  the  ethically  good.  Ob- 
jects which  agreeably  affect  the  sensibility  are  good  in 
a  subordinate  sense,  but  more  properly  they  are  useful, 
since  they  are  means  rather  than  ends. 

95 


96  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

j.  Pain  not  the  only  evil;  pleasure  not  the  only  good. — 
It  is  not  to  be  understood  that  there  is  no  evil  but  pain 
and  no  good  but  pleasure  in  the  form  of  physical  sen- 
sations. Higher  than  the  pleasures  of  sensation  are 
the  enjoyments  that  come  from  the  accomplishment  of 
a  laudable  undertaking,  from  a  discovery  or  an  inven- 
tion, from  overcoming  difficulties,  from  doing  good 
to  others,  from  victory  over  faults,  from  genuineness  of 
character,  from  the  realization  of  our  highest  possibili- 
ties, from  the  reflex  of  right  action  in  any  form.  More 
to  be  dreaded  than  pain  are  the  evils  of  misconduct, 
unworthiness,  defeat,  disgrace,  degradation,  remorse. 
Evil  is,  therefore,  more  than  pain,  and  good  more  than 
pleasure,  if  the  words  pleasure  and  pain  are  restricted, 
as  they  are  apt  to  be,  to  their  lower  signification  of 
sensations. 

4.  Extension  of  the  signification  of  the  words  pleasure 
and  pain. — The  term  pleasure  is  not  always  restricted  to 
the  low  sense  of  sensation.  In  fact,  it  is  frequently 
extended  to  mean  satisfaction  or  enjoyment  in  the  higher 
forms.  Thus  "At  thy  right  hand  are  pleasures  for  ever- 
more." In  like  manner,  the  term  pain  need  not  be  re- 
stricted to  the  ache  accompanying  the  abnormal  ex- 
citement of  a  nerve,  but  it  may  be  extended  to  the  woes 
of  the  spirit,  as  grief  or  remorse.  A  mother  says  to 
her  child,  "Your  conduct  pains  me."  "A  wounded 
spirit  who  can  bear?" 

With  this  extended  meaning  of  pleasure  and  pain, 
the  good  is  any  form  of  lawful  pleasure,  and  evil  is  any 
form  of  pain.  Still,  it  is  believed  that  when  we  mean 
the  higher  forms  of  the  good,  the  word  satisfaction  or 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  97 

happiness  is  preferable  to  pleasure.  Likewise,  when 
we  mean  moral  evil,  a  more  appropriate  word  than  pain 
can  be  selected,  such  as  unworthiness,  or  sense  of  guilt, 
or  sin. 

5.  Satisfaction  the  good. — Satisfaction  in  the  realiza- 
tion of  our  highest  possibilities  is  the  good,  the  ultimate 
end.      Conduct,    character,    virtue,    perfection,    though 
proximate  ends,  are  means  to  the  ultimate  end — the 
satisfaction  involved  in  the  moral  activity  of  a  rational 
being.      Material    things,    as   lands,    houses,    equipage, 
money,  credits,  and  the  like,  are  only  means,  utilities; 
they  afford  pleasure,  enjoyment,  and  contribute  to  hap- 
piness.    The  word  satisfaction  may  be  regarded  as  the 
genus    containing    the    species — pleasure,    enjoyment, 
happiness.     It  has  also  the  negative — dissatisfaction. 

As  there  is  a  gradation  of  pleasures,  using  the  word 
in  its  wider  sense,  so  there  is  a  gradation  of  means,  the 
highest  of  which  is  perfection  of  character.  Some  things 
are  better  than  others,  not  only  as  ends,  but  as  means, 
since  they  produce  pleasures,  not  simply  greater  in  de- 
gree, but  higher  in  rank. 

6.  Quantity  of  pleasures. — Pleasures  may  be  graded 
as  to  quantity,  that  is,  degree  of  intensity  and  duration, 
or  time  of  continuance,   as  greater  or  less.     Strictly 
speaking,  the  distinction  of  quantity  as  greater  or  less 
can  be  applied  only  to  pleasure  the  same  in  kind,  as  two 
agreeable  odors  or  two  sensations  of  taste,  but  only  in 
a  loose  way  to  a  smell  and  a  taste.     These,  having  no 
common  unit  of  measure,  are  incommensurable;  but  we 
may  say,  one  is  more  agreeable  than  the  other. 

7.  Quality  of  pleasures. — Quality  may  be  estimated 
7 


90  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

trom  the  objects  affecting  the  sensibility,  or  from  the 
rank  of  the  sense  through  which  the  sensibility  is  af- 
fected, or  from  the  nature  of  the  affection. 

The  pleasure  in  contemplating  the  starry  heavens 
is  certainly  higher  than  that  from  the  gratification  of 
appetite. 

The  senses,  smell,  taste,  touch,  hearing,  sight,  form 
an  ascending  scale.  The  aesthetic  pleasures  from  beauty, 
grandeur,  sublimity,  are  not  all  of  equal  worth.  The 
same  is  true  of  the  pleasures  from  the  fine  arts,  land- 
scape and  architecture,  sculpture  and  painting,  music 
and  poetry,  conversation  and  oratory.  The  difference 
of  the  pleasures  from  the  art,  as  from  music  and  paint- 
ing, is  certainly  a  difference  of  quality.  The  same  is 
true,  likewise,  of  the  intellectual  enjoyments  of  percep- 
tion, memory,  imagination,  reasoning,  and  of  the  eth- 
ical enjoyments  of  right  conduct.  In  grading  pleasures 
according  to  quality,  do  we  not  introduce  a  new  prin- 
ciple? No;  the  principle  is  still  the  good,  as  satisfaction. 
We  discriminate.  Some  kinds  of  satisfaction  are  higher, 
richer,  purer,  than  others;  still  satisfaction  is  the  good. 
What  is  good  or  bad  in  ourselves  is  good  or  bad  in 
others.  What  is  right  or  wrong  in  ourselves  is  right 
or  wrong  in  others.  Human  nature  is  essentially  the 
same  in  all. 

The  distinctions  between  the  different  satisfactions 
are  derived  from  consciousness  and  reflection;  that  is, 
from  the  immediate  experience  of  these  satisfactions 
and  their  discrimination.  Each  pleasure  and  pain  has 
its  own  specific  peculiarities  of  quality.  The  classifica- 
tion of  the  feelings  is  a  logical  convenience  in  taking  a 
survey  of  their  extent  and  natural  groupings.  The  quali- 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS      .  99 

ties  of  the  pleasures  are  known  immediately  by  experi- 
ence, and  can  be  known  in  no  other  way.  Why  has 
one  object  a  greater  value  than  another?  Is  it  not  be- 
cause we  prefer  the  effect  which  one  gives  us  to  that 
of  the  other?  It  is  not  simply  a  greater  sense  of  value, 
but  a  sense  of  greater  value. 

8.  Cause  of  difference  of  quality. — Objects,  as  causes, 
affect  the  organs  of  sense,  and  produce  sensations  as 
effects.  Each  sensation  is  the  joint  product  of  the  two 
factors,  the  action  of  the  object  and  the  reaction  of  the 
organ.  The  condition  of  sensation  is  the  synthesis  of 
the  object  and  the  organ.  The  peculiarity  of  the  sen- 
sation is  due  rather  to  the  object  than  to  the  organ, 
since  varying  the  object,  the  organ  remaining  the  same, 
the  sensation  varies,  as  is  shown  by  experiment,  in  tast- 
ing, in  succession,  salt,  sugar,  cinnamon,  pepper.  With- 
out doubt,  the  quality  of  the  sensation  is,  in  part,  due 
to  the  constitution  or  the  condition  of  the  organ,  as 
the  same  kind  of  food  is  relished  by  one  animal  and  not 
by  another,  or  by  the  same  person  at  one  time  and  not 
at  another  time.  But  since  the  sensation  varies  with 
the  cause,  the  subject  remaining  essentially  the  same, 
we  learn,  by  experience,  to  identify  the  cause  from  the 
peculiarity  of  the  sensation. 

There  is  no  abstract  pleasure,  only  as  a  concept  of 
the  logical  class,  called  pleasure;  yet  the  concept  is  not 
pleasure,  but  only  the  notion  or  idea  of  pleasure.  Actual 
pleasures  are  all  concrete.  Pleasures  are  subjective; 
they  are  our  own  experiences  of  which  we  are  conscious; 
but  they  have,  as  we  have  seen,  objective  conditions; 
and  the  difference  of  the  objects  accounts  for  the  differ- 
ence of  the -pleasures.  The  difference  of  pleasures  is 


IOO  SYSTEMS    OF   KTTTTCS 

not  only  quantitative — a  difference  in  degree  of  intensity 
and  in  duration — but  qualitative — a  difference  in  kind  or 
rank — as  we  have  already  seen. 

p.  Rank  of  pleasures. — The  rank  of  pleasures  is  esti- 
mated by  their  quantity — that  is,  their  degree  of  intens- 
ity and  duration — and  by  their  quality — that  is,  their 
worth,  richness,  or  purity.  Preference  is  due  to  quality 
rather  than  to  quantity. 

Pleasures  of  the  same  kind  may  be  compared  as 
to  quantity,  and  the  preference  given  to  the  greater, 
which  thus  outranks  the  less;  but  this  holds  good  only 
up  to  that  degree  of  intensity  or  duration  producing 
the  best  effect.  Thus  a  hungry  man,  having  begun  to 
eat  his  dinner,  may  properly  eat  more,  and  continue 
to  eat  till  he  reaches  that  point  where  more  would  be 
injurious,  when  he  ought  to  cease.  Of  course,  this 
point  is  somewhat  indefinite,  and  can  not  be  precisely, 
but  only  approximately,  determined  by  the  satisfaction 
of  his  appetite,  supplemented  by  his  judgment.  Na- 
ture allows  a  little  margin.  It  is  not  like  crossing  a 
line,  but  rather  like  crossing  a  belt  of  some  width.  It 
will  do  to  cease  anywhere  within  the  belt. 

10.  Do  pleasures  differ  in  quality? — This  has  been 
called  in  question,  but  without  good  reason.  If  pleas- 
ures do  not  differ  in  quality,  but  only  in  quantity,  how 
could  we  distinguish  between  two  different  smells  of 
the  same  intensity,  or  two  tastes,  or  a  smell  and  a  taste? 
It  is  true  that  a  sensation  has,  in  itself,  no  moral  qual- 
ity; but  there  may  be  a  moral  preference  for  one  rather 
than  for  another. 

Quality  is  even  a  more  fundamental  distinction  than 
quantity.  It  is  by  quality  that  we  identify  and  classify. 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  IOI 

When  pleasures  are  alike  in  quality,  we  compare  as  to 
quantity;  but  when  they  are  unlike  in  quality,  they  can 
be  compared  only  as  to  quality,  since  having  no  com- 
mon unit  of  measure,  they  are  incommensurable  as  to 
quantity. 

One  pleasure  is  chosen  in  preference  to  another; 
but  even  choice  is  not  a  sure  test  of  rank;  for  one  per- 
son chooses  the  pleasure  of  appetite  rather  than  the  ap- 
proval of  conscience,  while  another  person  chooses  the 
approval  of  conscience.  The  consensus  of  opinion  of 
those  best  competent  to  judge  is  to  be  regarded.  The 
rank  of  pleasures  differing  in  quality  is  settled  pri- 
marily by  their  worth,  and  secondarily  by  their  intens- 
ity. Thus  the  pleasures  of  the  senses  rank  in  general 
according  to  the  ascending  scale  of  smell,  taste,  touch, 
hearing,  sight;  but  a  man's  hunger  may  be  so  great 
that,  for  the  present,  he  may  properly  prefer  a  good  din- 
ner to  the  sight  of  the  finest  scenery. 

There  is  an  ascending  scale  in  the  aesthetic  pleas- 
ures, also  in  the  intellectual.  The  same  is  true  of  the 
practical  activities  of  life,  as  in  improving  property,  ac- 
quiring a  fortune,  gaining  friends,  attaining  position, 
influence,  fame,  and  in  social  intercourse,  in  political 
action,  in  moral  conduct,  in  a  religious  life. 

ii.  Rule  in  case  of  competing  pleasures. — Pleasures 
often  conflict  and  compete  for  choice.  Thus  sensual 
pleasures  may  compete  with  intellectual,  or  the  intel- 
lectual with  the  moral.  In  all  such  cases  the  general 
rule  is,  Decide  according  to  rank,  taking  into  considera- 
tion the  conditions  and  circumstances  of  the  conflict. 
But  how  shall  the  rank  be  determined?  The  science 
of  ethics  can  answer  this  question  only  in  a  general 


io2  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

way,  leaving  much  to  the  judgment  and  conscience 
of  the  individual;  and  this  is,  no  doubt,  the  best  for  the 
individual,  as  the  decision  of  the  question  is  a  means 
of  education.  Some  cases  are  difficult  to  decide,  as,  for 
example,  Should  a  young  man  attend  college,  or  stay 
at  home  and  assist  his  overworked  father?  Is  his  fa- 
ther able  to  hire  help,  or  is  he  not  able? 

12.  Question  as  to  end. — The  reduction  of  happiness, 
in  the  final  analysis,  to  pleasure,  by  certain  utilitarians, 
and  pleasure  to  sensation,  together  with  the  desire  of 
intuitionists  to  base  ethics  on  reason  instead  of  on  the 
sensibility,  has  led  certain  writers  of  the  intuitional 
school  to  place  the  ultimate  end  in  duty  or  conduct  or 
perfection  of  character. 

They  ask,  Can  feeling,  which  is  more  or  less  transi- 
tory, be  the  ultimate  end?  Perfection  is  not  an  eternal 
fixity  of  being,  but  an  unceasing  pursuit  of  the  good. 
The  variable  character  of  feeling  breaks  up  monotony, 
and  adds  to  its  variety  and  richness.  It  can,  on  the  other 
hand,  be  asked,  Can  that  be  ultimate  which  is  a  means 
to  something  else?  Can,  therefore,  perfection,  which 
is  a  means  to  happiness,  be  ultimate?  We  may  aim  at 
many  things  which,  for  the  time  being,  are  taken  for 
ends,  but  which  are  found  to  be  means  to  ulterior 
ends.  Thus  we  should,  no  doubt,  aim  at  duty  or  right 
conduct  as  an  immediate  end;  but  right  conduct  is  for 
the  sake  of  its  consequences,  one  of  which  is  progress 
towards  perfection  of  character;  but  perfection  of  char- 
acter, combining  energy,  wisdom,  and  goodness,  though 
a  proximate  end,  though  it  may  be  aimed  at,  for  the 
time  being,  without  regard  to  ulterior  consequences,  is 
the  never-failing  fountain  from  which  flow  the  conse- 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  103 

quences  of  other  like  conduct  with  all  its  accompani- 
ments of  pure  enjoyments. 

/j.  The  unity  of  the  subject  of  moral  action. — The  in- 
tellect, the  sensibility,  and  the  will,  though  discriminated 
for  psychological  purposes,  though  different  capabili- 
ties, are  faculties  of  the  same  ego,  and  never  act  sepa- 
rately. Cognition,  feeling,  and  volition  are  manifestly 
phenomena  of  the  same  individual  self,  yet  at  one  time, 
cognition  may  be  more  prominent,  at  another  feeling, 
at  another  volition. 

Choice  or  decision  has  reference  to  an  object  or  to 
an  act.  It  is  duty  to  make  a  right  choice  of  object,  or 
decide  to  do  a  right  act;  yet  neither  choice  nor  the  ob- 
ject, neither  decision  nor  the  act,  is  the  end.  But  it 
may  be  asked,  Is  not  the  fixed  will  always  to  aim  to  make 
a  right  choice,  or  to  decide  to  perform  a  right  act,  the 
consummation  of  ethical  effort?  It  is,  no  doubt,  the 
proximate  end  to  have  a  right  will;  but  if  this  right  will 
was  not  satisfactory,  if  it  resulted  in  no  good  conse- 
quences, no  one  would  aim  at  it.  It  is  satisfactory.  The 
satisfaction,  however,  is  not  a  sensation,  but  is  a  con- 
sciousness of  rectitude.  The  realization  of  integrity  of 
character,  with  its  accompanying  satisfaction,  is  the 
highest  good,  the  ultimate  end. 

How  abundant  is  the  good  springing  from  truth 
alone,  from  the  beauty  of  ideas,  their  relations  to  one 
another,  the  cogency  of  an  argument,  the  validity  of 
a  demonstration,  the  revelations  of  science,  the  laws  of 
nature,  the  beauties  of  art,  the  gems  of  literature.  The 
field  is  practically  inexhaustible,  and  the  satisfaction 
without  alloy. 

From  moral  conduct  is  derived  the  approval  of  con- 


104  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

science,  the  approbation  of  the  good,  kindness  returned 
for  kindness  received,  the  witness  of  the  prosperity  of 
friends,  all  of  which  is  enjoyed  in  the  only  seat  of  en- 
joyment— the  sensibility.  Such  enjoyment  is  final  satis- 
faction. 

The  blessings  of  religion  are  matters  of  experience, 
and  are  consciously  enjoyed  in  the  sensibility.  The  es- 
sence of  religion  is  love  to  God  and  love  to  man.  Love, 
though  inseparable  from  a  knowledge  of  its  object,  is 
a  feeling,  a  state  of  the  sensibility.  True  love  is  the 
highest  happiness.  Blessedness  is  only  another  name 
for  the  highest  happiness  of  which  man  is  capable — 
the  love  of  God.  Love  does  not  feed  on  self.  It  is 
not  self-consuming,  but  it  goes  out  to  an  object,  and 
involves  healthful  action  and  reaction. 

14.  The  Epicurean  view  of  the  good. — The  Epicureans 
found  the  good  in  pleasure;  and  though  they  did  not 
exclude  the  higher  pleasures,  as  they  distinguished  two 
kinds  of  pleasure — the  permanent  and  the  transitory — 
the  leaders  giving  preference  to  the  permanent,  yet  the 
tendency  of  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Epicureans  was  to 
let  their  pleasures  degenerate  into  mere  bodily  sensa- 
tions. 

Pleasure,  even  in  its  lower  sense,  is  a  good,  but  not 
the  sole  good,  nor  the  chief  good.  Epicureanism  has 
not  been  justified  by  the  facts  of  its  history.  Its  watch- 
word finally  became,  "Let  us  eat  and  drink;  for  to-mor- 
row we  die." 

75.  The  Stoic  view. — The  Stoics  rose  above  pleasure 
in  all  its  forms,  and  found  the  ultimate  end  in  virtuous 
conduct,  personal  dignity,  or  excellence  of  character. 
Though  they  admitted  that  pleasure  is  to  be  preferred 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  105 

to  pain,  yet  they  did  not  make  it  an  object  of  pursuit. 
Stoicism  has  produced  some  noble  characters,  as  Zeno 
the  founder  of  the  system,  Epictetus,  and  the  Emperor 
Marcus.  The  tendency  of  the  system,  however,  is  to  an 
unsympathetic  attitude  of  its  votaries  towards  their  fel- 
low-men, save  those  of  their  own  persuasion.  Aiming 
at  the  impossible,  Stoicism  has  produced  many  pretend- 
ers, as  those  unmasked  in  the  writings  of  Lucian. 

16.  Theistic  view. — Theistic    ethics    maintains   that 
much  labor  is  saved,  and  certainty  gained,  by  taking 
the  will  of  God  as  the  rule  of  duty  and  the  glory  of  God 
and  the  enjoyment  of  his  love  as  the  end.    For  the  ma- 
jority of  mankind,  religion  is,  no  doubt,  more  service- 
able than  rational  ethics.     The  will  of  God  is  a  guide 
to  duty,  and  through  duty  to  perfection  of  character, 
from  which  is  derived  the  highest  happiness.     But  what 
is  the  will  of  God?    "Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God 
with  all  thy  heart,  and  thy  neighbor  as  thyself."     Love 
is  the  highest  happiness.     The  love  of  God  is  indeed 
blessedness.     Objective  good  finds  its  highest  expres- 
sion in  God,  the  Source  of  the  highest  happiness.    Here 
happiness  or  blessedness  is  the  outcome,  the  end.    The- 
istic ethics  is,  in  reality,  a  confirmation  of  eudemonism. 
In   fact,   its   central   principle   is   eudemonic,    "Blessed 
are  the  pure  in  heart;  for  they  shall  see  God."     Seeing 
God  is  the  means,  blessedness  is  the  end. 

17.  Intuitional  view. — Intuitionists  hold  that  rational 
ethics  must  be  based  on  a  rational  principle  intuitively 
apprehended.    This  claim  is  not  unreasonable.     It  may 
justly  be  assumed,  as  a  rational  intuition,  that  the  ulti- 
mate end  is  the  highest  good  of  sentient  being,  includ- 
ing not  only  self,  but  all  others.     It  is  the  accepted 


106  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

end  of  utilitarianism,  and  is  not  unacceptable  to  evolu- 
tionists. No  form  of  good  need  be  rejected,  neither 
pleasure,  nor  enjoyment,  nor  happiness,  nor  satisfac- 
tion, nor  perfection,  neither  egoistic  good,  nor  altru- 
istic. It  is  not  necessary  that  a  person  should  neglect 
himself.  In  fact,  if  he  does  not  take  care  of  himself, 
he  will  be  in  no  condition  to  help  others.  To  care  for 
self  for  the  sake  of  others — as,  for  example,  the  head  of 
a  family  should  do — is  a  duty  and  is  sound  morality. 
Prudence  is  not  morals,  but  it  is  right  to  be  prudent 
and  wrong  to  be  imprudent. 

Granting  that  the  ultimate  end  is  the  highest  good 
of  sentient  being,  and  that  this  principle  is  intuitively 
apprehended,  still  the  question  arises,  What  is  the  high- 
est good  of  sentient  being?  Can  intuitionism  give  an 
answer?  We  judge  not;  for  some  intuitionists  declare 
that  the  highest  good  is  a  good  will,  others  say  perfec- 
tion, others  happiness  or  blessedness. 

If  we  should  admit  that  the  highest  good  is  happi- 
ness, still  the  question  occurs,  What  form  of  happiness 
is  the  highest  good?  Is  it  the  greatest  in  intensity  or 
the  longest  in  duration?  Or  shall  we  consider  the  qual- 
ity, its  intrinsic  worth,  its  purity,  or  freedom  from  gross 
elements?  Shall  we  choose  momentary  gratifications, 
because  intense,  and  thus  lose  self-respect?  These  are 
questions  that  can  be  answered  only  by  the  conse- 
quences, as  determined  by  experience. 

The  nature  of  good  we  learn  from  experience,  and, 
having  learned  this,  we  judge  that  the  conduct  of  others 
is  right  or  wrong,  according  to  the  consequences;  and 
by  the  same  standard  we  judge  our  own  conduct;  but 
it  is  only  in  society  that  conduct  can  affect  other  people, 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  107 

and  hence  it  is  only  in  society  that  our  moral  nature 
can  be  fully  developed. 

The  ethical  element  is  not  found  in  the  result,  as  good 
or  evil,  but  in  the  will — that  is,  the  volition — as  right 
or  wrong,  because  aiming  to  realize  good  or  evil. 

To  will  or  to  do  a  certain  thing  is  right  or  wrong 
subjectively,  according  as  the  consequences  are  thought 
to  be  good  or  bad.  Ethics  requires  right  intention  and 
right  conduct. 


Chapter  XI 
THE    GOOD.— CONTINUED 

TJTILITARIAN  view  of  the  good.— The  nature  of 
tx  man  must  decide  the  nature  of  the  ultimate  good. 
If  man  is  capable  of  enjoying  good  only  in  the  form  of 
sensation,  then  hedonism  is  the  true  system.  But  if 
pleasures  are  distinguished  by  quality  as  well  as  by 
quantity,  or,  better,  if  we  discriminate  between  pleasure 
and  happiness,  and  if  man  is  capable  of  enjoying,  not 
only  isolated  momentary  pleasures,  but  also  that  higher 
and  more  enduring  enjoyment  called  happiness,  if  he 
finds  satisfaction  in  the  happiness  of  others,  then  eude- 
monism  is  the  true  system.  Philosophers  of  different 
schools  have  said:  Act  according  to  nature;  but  the 
true  nature  of  man  is  not  that  which  is  common  to  him 
and  the  brute,  but  that  which  is  characteristically  hu- 
man— his  reason  and  moral  nature;  and  it  is  only  in 
acting  according  to  the  dictates  of  these  that  he  acts 
according  to  his  true  nature. 

The  word  utilitarianism  is  misleading,  if  referring 
to  the  end,  but  appropriate  if  referring  to  the  means. 
Utility  is  a  means,  not  an  end;  but  the  ultimate  good 
is  the  end,  not  the  means.  Eudemonism  is  appropriate 
as  the  name  of  the  system  whose  ultimate  end  is  the 
highest  good  of  sentient  being. 

108 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  109 

In  giving  preference  to  happiness  over  pleasure,  it 
is  not  necessary  to  reject  pleasures  altogether,  but  to 
subordinate  them  to  happiness.  Pleasure  is  a  part  of 
our  experience.  It  gives  zest  to  life,  and  may  often 
be  innocently  enjoyed,  and  is,  in  fact,  indispensable. 
It  is  condemned,  without  reason,  by  an  anchorite  or  a 
cynic. 

2.  Faults  of  utilitarianism. — Three  faults  have  been 
charged  against  utilitarianism,  and  not  without  reason: 

(1)  The  tendency  of  the  system  to  degenerate  into 
hedonism. — When  this  tendency  is  followed,  and  the  ex- 
treme is  reached,  the  passions  are  unchained,  and  men 
yield  to  an  inordinate  indulgence  of  appetite,  and  wor- 
ship the  goddess  of  voluptuousness. 

(2)  The  system  tends  to  a  calculating  morality. — If  the 
control  is  given  to  reason,  then  the  tendency  of  utilita- 
rianism is  to  become  a  calculating  morality,  which  ex- 
tinguishes spontaneity  and  warm  impulses  and  noble 
sentiments. 

The  above  charges  are  both  true — the  first,  when 
the  pursuit  is  after  uncomputed  pleasure;  the  second, 
when  the  pleasure  is  first  computed,  then  pursued. 

(3)  Consequences  can  not  always  be  computed. — This 
fault  is  fatal  to  utilitarianism  as  an  exclusive  system; 
but  as  other  systems  supply  its  lack — for  example,  the 
theistic  and  the  intuitional,  while  utilitarianism  supplies 
the  lack  of  these  other  systems  when  it  is  needful  and 
possible  to  compute  the  consequences — the  contest  be- 
tween the  systems  may  here  be  regarded  as  a  drawn 
game — all  are  useful,  and,  in  certain  respects,  all  are  de- 
fective. 

The  charge  that,  in  considering  quality,  we  are  in- 


110  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

troducting  a  new  principle,  that  of  excellence  or  degree 
of  goodness,  has,  in  part,  already  been  answered  in 
Chapter  X,  7.  The  principle  is  still  the  good.  There  can 
be  no  reasonable  objection  to  the  act  of  distinguishing 
between  kinds  of  good. 

Janet,  a  distinguished  French  writer  on  morals,  says : 
"For  myself,  I  see  no  difficulty  in  accepting  the  theory 
of  pleasures  thus  transformed;  for  the  principal  ground 
of  my  objection  to  the  utilitarian  philosophy  is  that  it 
considers  only  the  quantity  of  pleasures,  and  not  their 
quality."  But  some  utilitarians  do  distinguish  pleas- 
ures by  their  quality  as  well  as  by  their  quantity,  and  of 
these  John  Stuart  Mill  is  an  illustrious  example. 

Even  the  Epicureans  regard  mental  pleasures  as  su- 
perior to  physical.  In  estimating  pleasures,  we  are  not 
only  to  calculate,  with  Bentham,  their  quantity — that 
is,  their  duration  and  intensity — together  with  their 
probability  or  certainty,  but  also,  with  Mill,  to  estimate 
their  intrinsic  worth.  But  if  this  consideration  of  qual- 
ity transforms  utilitarianism  into  eudemonism,  let  it  be 
transformed,  as  it  ought  to  be. 

j.  Evolutionary  view. — Evolutionary  ethics  insists  on 
the  development  of  organic  life,  as  the  proximate  end, 
but  accepts  happiness  as  the  outcome  or  ultimate  end. 

4.  Eclectic  view. — If  eclecticism  is  to  be  successful 
as  a  system  of  ethics — and  any  system,  to  be  complete, 
must  be,  to  a  certain  extent,  eclectic — it  must  select 
some  central,  vital  principle  as  the  highest  good  of  sen- 
tient being,  and  around  this  central  principle  organize 
its  system.  The  eclectic  feature  tends  to  completeness. 
This  amounts  to  the  same  thing  as  to  say  that  eude- 
monism, holding  fast  to  the  highest  good  of  sentient 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS  in 

being,  as  the  ultimate  end,  should  become  eclectic,  and 
thus  maintain  its  claim  as  the  true  system. 

5.  Postulate  of  freedom. — In  the  play  of  motives — 
affections,  desires,  aversions — man  is,  no  doubt,  pas- 
sively affected  by  the  interaction  of  these  forces;  but 
when  we  rise  into  the  higher  regions  of  moral  activity, 
the  freedom  of  the  will  must  be  postulated.     If  there 
is  no  freedom,  then  duty,  obligation,  responsibility,  are 
words  without  signification.     What  determines  the  vo- 
lition?    The  ego  determines  the  volition,  not  neces- 
sarily without  motives,  but  in  view  of  motives,  which 
are  reasons,  not  causes,  of  volition.     There  can  be  no 
fatalistic  ethics.     Mechanism  is  not  morals;  it  obliter- 
ates the  distinction  between  right  and  wrong;  it  anni- 
hilates right  as  merit  and  wrong  as  guilt.     A  machine 
neither  merits  reward,  nor  deserves  punishment.    If  man 
is  responsible,  he  is  free;  but  he  is  responsible;  there- 
fore he  is  free. 

6.  Aim  of  life. — Each  person  ought  to  have  an  ideal 
of  life,  and  adjust  his  efforts  to  its  realization.     Pleas- 
ure, of  course,  attends  the  creation  of  the  ideal,  the 
effort  to  realize  it,  and  the  realization.     The  effort  is 
not  directly  for  the  pleasure,  but  for  the  purpose  of 
realizing  the  ideal.     The  excellence  of  the  conduct  is 
proportionate  to  the  perfection  of  the  ideal  and  to  the 
wisdom  with  which  the  realization  of  the  ideal  is  at- 
tempted.    Happiness,  though  not  the  conscious  aim,  is 
the  outcome  and  the  philosophical  justification  of  the 
ideal  and  the  effort.    It  is  found  in  normal  energy. 

The  aim  is  raised  far  above  the  unbridled  gratifi- 
cation of  appetite,  that  sure  downward  road  to  ruin. 
Happiness  is  best  attained,  not  by  direct  methods,  but 


112  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

by  indirect.  No  one  maintains  that  misery  is  a  proper 
object  of  pursuit;  but  pain  is  not  to  be  shunned  at  the 
expense  of  duty;  but  the  performance  of  duty,  though 
sometimes  painful,  will,  in  the  end,  bring  a  rich  reward. 

7.  Rule  in  case  of  apparent  conflict  between  self-inter- 
est and  duty. — When  self-interests  and  duty  are  in  appar- 
ent conflict,  self-interests  ought  always  to  give  way  to 
the  dictates  of  conscience.     But  the  conflict  is  only  ap- 
parent.    A  settled  purpose  to  do  right,  carried  out  in 
well-directed  executive  acts,  will  at  last  yield  the  best 
results.      Experience   has   confirmed  this   in   all   cases 
where  confirmation  is  possible,  and  thus  we  are  led  to 
the  belief  that  nature  itself  is  a  rational  system,  ordained 
and  governed  by  an  all-wise  and  beneficent  Author. 
"There  is  a  power  in  the  world  that  works  for  righteous- 
ness." 

8.  The  ideal  man. — The  ideal  man  is  one  well  devel- 
oped physically,  intellectually,  and  morally,  abounding 
with  energy  directed  by  wisdom,  working  out  the  prob- 
lem of  life  with  a  free  good  will,  realizing  his  highest 
possibilities.     Individuals  differ  greatly  in  their  natural 
endowments,  in  excellencies  or  defects  of  disposition,  in 
appetites   and   passions,    in   integrity   or   depravity,   in 
knowledge  or  ignorance,  in  industry  or  indolence,  in 
heredity  or  environment,  in  strength  or  weakness  of 
character,    so   that,   in   dealing  with   others,   we   have 
ample  opportunity  for  doing  good  and  abundant  calls 
for  charity. 

p.  The  good  and  law. — Law  is  the  rule  of  action. 
Duty  is  conformity  to  righteous  law.  Is  the  law  the 
reason  for  the  good,  or  is  the  good  the  reason  for  the 
law?  Is  duty  the  principle  of  the  good,  or  is  the  good 


THEORETICAL    ETHICS  113 

the  principle  of  duty?  It  is  clearly  duty  to  obey  right- 
eous law.  Is  the  law  right  irrespective  of  consequences, 
or  do  the  consequences  justify  the  law,  giving  to  it  its 
righteous  element,  making  obedience  right  and  con- 
sequently obligatory?  Not  simply  one  consequence, 
but  all  of  the  consequences  are  to  be  considered. 

Kant's  doctrine  is  that  duty  is  not  founded  on  the 
good,  but  that  the  good  is  founded  on  duty — that  a  good 
will  is  the  only  absolute  good,  and  that  the  duty  to  have 
a  good  will  is  the  highest  duty.  He  would  not  say, 
Do  this  because  it  will  result  in  good,  but  do  this  be- 
cause the  moral  law  requires  it,  and  hence  because  it 
is  duty;  but  the  law  requires  it  for  its  results. 

The  reason  for  knowing  that  a  certain  conduct  is 
right  is  not  always  the  reason  for  its  being  right.  Thus, 
if  an  act  is  known  to  be  morally  obligatory,  it  is  known 
to  be  right,  for  the  reason  that  it  would  not  be  obli- 
gatory unless  is  were  right.  For  instance,  knowing  that 
an  act  is  commanded  by  unquestionable  authority,  we 
know  that  it  is  obligatory,  and  hence  that  it  is  right; 
but  this  is  the  reason  for  knowing  that  the  act  is  right, 
and  not  the  reason  lor  its  being  right.  It  is  true  that 
an  act,  in  itself  morally  indifferent,  is  made  obligatory, 
and  hence  right,  because  commanded  by  law  regularly 
enacted;  but  no  law  can  make  a  flagrant  wrong  right. 
A  law  is  not  good  simply  because  law;  for  then  there 
could  be  no  bad  laws,  and  no  law  would  need  to  be  re- 
pealed. It  must  be,  at  least,  not  bad.  The  fact  that 
there  are  laws,  both  good  and  bad,  and  that  bad  laws 
ought  to  be  repealed,  and  sometimes  are  repealed,  is 
proof  that  law  is  based  on  the  good,  and  not  the  good 
on  law. 
8 


114  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

We  believe  a  law  to  be  good  when  we  know  that  it 
is  the  enactment  of  a  legislative  body  in  which  we  have 
confidence,  and  that  it  has  been  signed  by  a  wise  and 
conscientious  executive;  but  we  know  it  to  be  good  when 
we  know  that  it  will  promote  the  general  welfare,  or 
that  it  is  the  fiat  of  an  infallible  lawgiver.  In  the  latter 
case,  we  simply  know  that  it  is  good  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
but  not  the  reason  why  it  is  good. 

The  enactment  of  an  infallible  lawgiver  is  not,  how- 
ever, the  fiat  of  an  arbitrary  will  whose  motto  is,  sic  volo, 
sic  jubeo.  The  infallibility  of  the  lawgiver  is  a  conse- 
quence of  his  wisdom,  which  deals  with  reasons.  Now, 
although  we  do  not  claim  to  be  able  to  fathom  the 
depths  of  Divine  wisdom,  or  fully  to  comprehend  all 
God's  reasons,  even  when  he  deigns  to  reveal  them,  yet 
till  we  find  something  deeper  it  seems  to  be  a  sufficient 
justification  of  God's  laws  that  obedience  to  them  pro- 
motes the  general  welfare. 

Confusion  arises  from  the  different  senses  of  the  word 
good.  The  central  and  strictly  proper  meaning  is  pleas- 
ure, enjoyment,  satisfaction,  happiness,  blessedness;  in 
short,  all  agreeable  states  of  the  sensibility  that  can  be 
rightfully  desired.  Good  is  also  applied  to  laws  which 
tend  to  the  general  welfare  and  to  objects  which  afford 
pleasure,  and  in  this  sense  is  equivalent  to  useful.  It  is 
also  applied  to  conduct,  and  in  this  case  good  means 
right.  A  will  to  do  right  is  goodness. 

An  act  is  morally  good — that  is,  right — when  it  is 
believed  to  be  duty,  and  when  it  is  done  because  it  is 
duty,  and  not  from  any  selfish  considerations. 

But  why  is  it  duty  to  perform  a  certain  act?  The 
answer,  a  righteous  law  requires  it,  is  sufficient  for 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  115 

obedience;  but  what  gives  the  law  its  righteous  char- 
acter? The  answer  is,  obedience  to  the  law  works  for 
the  general  welfare. 

A  good  will,  as  Kant  contends,  is  indeed  the  central 
element  of  a  good  character;  but  a  good  will  is  a  fixed 
purpose  to  do  right;  that  is,  to  promote  the  common 
good.  The  highest  good  of  sentient  being  stands,  there- 
fore, as  the  ultimate  end  of  conduct. 

According  to  Kant  prudential  rules  are  hypothetical 
imperatives,  as  these :  If  you  would  prosper  in  business, 
deal  justly;  if  you  wish  to  be  a  physician,  study  medicine; 
but  the  moral  law  is  a  categorical  imperative,  and  is  to 
be  obeyed  without  regard  to  conditions  or  consequences. 
This  is  true  when  we  know  that  an  act  is  required  by  the 
moral  law;  but  the  reason  for  the  law  itself  is  the  good 
consequences  of  obedience.  God  can  say,  As  I  will  the 
well-being  of  my  creatures,  I  enact  the  moral  law.  Man 
can  say,  As  the  moral  law  is  righteous,  I  will  render  un- 
conditional obedience.  He  can  also  say,  I  have  an  ad- 
ditional reason  for  obedience — the  law  works  for  the 
general  good. 

Kant's  categorical  imperative,  Act  in  such  a  manner 
as  you  would  be  willing  all  others  should  act  in  like  cir- 
cumstances, has  for  its  reason  the  beneficial  conse- 
quences of  such  action.  To  speak  the  truth  is  required 
by  the  categorical  imperative;  yet  Kant  gives  a  reason 
why  we  should  keep  our  promise:  "If  we  break  our 
word,  we  seem  to  admit  by  that  very  act  that  others 
have  a  right  to  break  theirs  to  us,  and  in  such  a  case  it 
would  be  impossible  to  trust  any  promise,  and  distrust 
would  become  general."  Again  Kant  says:  "We  ought 
to  show  pity  to  persons  in  distress,  because  we  could 


Il6  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

not  desire  a  state  of  society  in  which  no  one  sympathizes 
with  another,  and  consequently  in  which  we  could  expect 
no  help  if  we  should  be  overtaken  by  misfortune."  Thus 
speaks  Kant's  good  sense  in  spite  of  his  high  scheme. 
He  fully  admits  the  principle  that  in  the  last  analysis 
conduct  is  justified  or  condemned  by  its  good  or  bad 
consequences.  The  ultimate  and  sufficient  reason  for 
morality  is  that  it  results  in  the  general  welfare.  ''The 
greatest  good  to  the  greatest  number"  is  the  practical 
maxim  for  the  regulation  of  individuals,  society,  or  the 
State.  Sensible  people  do  not  lose  sight  of  conse- 
quences. 

JO.  Personality. — A  person  is  a  being  endowed  with 
intellect,  sensibility,  and  will.  He  is  capable  of  greater 
or  less  perfection  and  happiness,  and  has  in  himself  the 
possibility  of  dignity  and  moral  worth.  A  mere  thing 
is  an  object  destitute  of  the  attributes  of  personality. 

Man,  as  a  person,  has  a  natural  right  to  life,  liberty, 
the  pursuit  of  happiness,  the  fruit  of  his  labor,  and  the 
development  of  his  powers  by  a  suitable  education.  He 
can  not  justly  be  deprived  of  these  rights  unless  he  for- 
feits them  by  crime,  or  becomes  incapable  of  rational 
conduct,  or  makes  himself  dangerous  to  the  safety  of 
others.  He  can  reasonably  demand  that  his  rights  be 
respected,  and  he  is  likewise  under  obligation  to  respect 
the  rights  of  others.  Indeed,  man  is  morally  bound  to 
care  for  himself  in  order  that  he  may  more  perfectly 
discharge  his  obligations  to  others.  He  should  aim  at 
his  own  perfection,  refrain  from  marring  his  character, 
weakening  his  powers,  or  needlessly  diminishing  his  own 
resources,  thus  becoming  better  able  to  fulfill  his  mission 
in  the  world. 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS  117 

Granting  that  moral  quality  lies  not  in  the  external 
act  nor  in  the  result,  but  in  the  will,  the  aim,  yet  it  is 
still  true  that  a  right  aim  is  an  aim  at  a  good  result.  A 
good  will  is  a  fixed  purpose  so  to  order  conduct  that  the 
consequence  is  the  highest  good  of  all  concerned. 

ii.  Need  of  a  standard. — The  need  of  a  standard  has 
in  part  been  supplied : 

(1)  Bent  hum's  rule. — Utilitarianism  was  rendered  al- 
truistic by  Bentham's  rule,  "The  greatest  good  to  the 
greatest  number."    Still  in  measuring  the  moral  quality 
of  conduct  by  its  result,  there  is  danger,  as  Butler  points 
out,  of  giving  loose  rein  to  every  species  of  immorality. 
It  is  not  difficult  for  one  bent  on  mischief  to  find  some 
sophistical  reason  which  seems  to  justify  his  conduct. 
A  robber  can  say,  "I  will  do  more  good  with  the  money 
than  this  old  miser." 

(2)  Kant's  test,  "Allow  no  conduct  in  yourself  you 
would  not  be  willing  should  become  universal,"  is  a 
check  to  the  improper  application  of  Bentham's  rule. 

(3)  Mill's  principle. — Another  check  was  given  to  the 
downward   tendency  of  utilitarianism   by  John   Stuart 
Mill,  in  the  distinction  he  made  in  the  quality  of  pleas- 
ures.    The  higher  pleasures  outrank  the  lower,   and 
ought  always  to  subordinate  them.     Here,  though  the 
good  is  still  pleasure,  in  its  wider  sense  the  test  of  rank 
is  not  pleasure,  but  is  found  in  worth  or  dignity,  expe- 
rience showing  that  the  higher  pleasures  bring  the  better 
consequences.     Mill,  however,  did  not  find  the  warrant 
for  this  test  in  rational  intuition,  but  in  the  consensus 
of  opinion,  on  the  principle  that  the  opinion  of  the  many 
is  binding  on  the  few. 

(4)  Spencer  s   generalization    of   Mill's    principle   of 


Il8  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

quality. — Spencer  says,  "Empirical  utilitarianism  is  but  a 
transitional  form  to  be  passed  through  on  the  way  to 
rational  utilitarianism."  In  a  letter  to  Mill,  Spencer  says : 
"The  view  for  which  I  contend  is  that  morality,  prop- 
erly so  called,  the  science  of  right  conduct,  has  for  its 
object  to  determine  hoiv  and  why  certain  modes  of  con- 
duct are  detrimental,  and  certain  other  modes  beneficial. 
These  good  and  bad  results  can  not  be  accidental,  but 
must  be  the  necessary  consequences  of  the  constitution 
of  things;  and  I  conceive  it  to  be  the  business  of  moral 
science  to  deduce  from  the  laws  of  life  and  the  condi- 
tions of  existence  what  kinds  of  actions  necessarily  tend 
to  produce  happiness,  and  what  kind  to  produce  unhap- 
piness.  Having  done  this,  its  deductions  are  to  be  rec- 
ognized as  laws  of  conduct,  and  are  to  be  conformed  to 
irrespective  of  a  direct  estimation  of  happiness  or 
misery." 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  end  of  conduct  is  maintained 
to  be  happiness,  and  the  system  is  still  utilitarianism, 
but  utilitarianism  transformed  from  an  empirical  to  a 
rational  system. 

Spencer,  however,  holds  that  the  deductions  from  the 
principles  are  to  be  accepted,  notwithstanding  their  util- 
ity is  opposed  by  apparent  facts.  Still  it  is  well  to  re- 
member, knowing  the  fallibility  of  human  reason,  that 
however  rational  our  system,  or  however  carefully  we 
make  our  deductions,  it  is  always  wise,  whenever  pos- 
sible, to  test  our  conclusions  by  their  consequences,  and 
thus  to  verify  them.  In  natural  science  we  test  theory 
by  experiment,  so  here  by  experience. 

The  commonly  accepted  virtues  are  fully  justified  by 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  119 

their  consequences,  which  guide  also  in  exceptional  and 
anomalous  instances  and  in  cases  of  conflict. 

12.  The  luw  of  happiness. — Happiness  is  the  conse- 
quence of  normal  development,  and  of  conduct  in  har- 
mony with  the  nature  of  man  and  the  constitution  of  the 
universe.  Man,  as  a  rational  being,  apprehends  that 
conformity  of  his  conduct  to  the  constitution  of  nature 
and  to  the  laws  of  his  own  being  will  confer  the  greatest 
possible  happiness;  but  happiness  does  not  feed  on  self; 
it  is  found  in  relation  to  its  object — the  highest,  the 
action  and  reaction  between  self  and  God. 

/j.  Perfection. — A  human  being  is  ideally  perfect 
who  possesses  all  the  organs  and  faculties  of  his  physical, 
intellectual,  and  moral  nature,  without  deficiency  or  re- 
dundancy in  health  and  maturity,  harmoniously  devel- 
oped and  trained  to  fulfill  their  functions.  This  ideal 
perfection  is  never  actually  reached,  but  only  approxi- 
mated. Perfection  involves  energy  or  working  power, 
sagacity  or  wisdom,  purity  or  uprightness  of  character, 
benevolence  or  good  will.  Perfection  and  happiness, 
though  not  identical,  are  most  intimately  associated. 
Progress  towards  perfection  is  the  subjective  condition 
of  happiness;  therefore  seek  not  for  happiness  directly, 
but  rather  seek  to  be  worthy  of  happiness. 

An  excellent  character,  which  is  clearly  within  the 
reach  of  people  normally  constituted,  is  the  certain 
means  to  happiness;  therefore  by  good  conduct  form 
right  habits,  which  will  crystallize  into  righteous  char- 
acter, with  all  its  untold  possibilities  of  good. 

14.  Will  and  reason. — The  constant  will  of  every 
rational  being  is  to  make  an  effort  to  attain  satisfaction. 


120 


SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 


The  function  of  practical  reason  is  to  find  what  efforts 
will  afford  satisfaction. 

Cardinal  Newman  said :  "All  virtue  and  goodness 
tend  to  make  men  powerful  in  this  world;  but  they  who 
aim  at  the  power  have  not  the  virtue.  Again,  virtue  is 
its  own  reward,  and  brings  with  it  the  truest  and  highest 
pleasures;  but  they  who  cultivate  it  for  the  pleasure's 
sake  are  selfish,  not  religious,  and  will  never  gain  the 
pleasure,  because  they  can  never  have  the  virtue." 

Happiness  is  the  outcome  of  virtue,  and  is  found  only 
when  not  directly  sought,  as  the  unsolicited  reward  of 
goodness.  The  true  end  is  the  realization  of  self  as 
efficient  for  good,  and  as  accomplishing  good  by  wisely 
directed  energy,  with  the  attendant  ultimate  satisfaction. 
It  is  better  to  deserve  happiness  than  to  be  happy.  The 
ultimate  good  is,  therefore,  harmony  with  universal  law, 
affording  unalloyed  satisfaction. 


Chapter  XII 
LAW    AND    DUTY 

OBJECT  of  laiv. — Law,  the  rule  of  action,  has  for 
its  object  the  promotion  of  order,  security,  and 
the  common  interests  of  society. 

The  subjective  principle  of  good  is  sympathy  for. 
our  fellow-beings.  The  principle  of  evil  is  selfishness 
with  its  attendant  cruelty.  Selfishness  seeks  gratifica- 
tion without  regard  to  the  interests  of  others.  In  dis- 
regarding the  rights  of  others  it  becomes  cruel. 

The  moral  law  is  the  Divine  will,  which  is  not  arbi- 
trary, but  reasonable,  the  dictate  of  wisdom  and  good- 
ness. Its  tendency  is  to  repress  selfishness  and  to  pro- 
mote good  will  and  mutual  helpfulness  among  men. 

To  do  right  is  to  obey  the  moral  law.  The  conse- 
quence of  obedience  is  concord,  harmony,  the  common 
welfare.  The  consequence  of  disobedience  is  discord, 
confusion,  social  evils.  The  law  commands  in  the  name 
of  reason  for  the  sake  of  humanity. 

Duty  is  what  is  due;  that  is,  it  is  what  we  owe  to  self, 
to  others,  and  to  God;  and  hence  it  is  what  ought  to  be 
done.  It  is  obligatory  to  obey  righteous  law,  morally 
obligatory,  but  not  compulsory. 

Laws  may  be  roughly  classified  as  natural,  social, 
civil,  ecclesiastical,  moral,  divine.  To  these  may  be 

121 


122  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

added  the  mathematical,  logical,  psychological,  meta- 
physical. Under  natural  law  we  have  physical,  chemical, 
astronomical,  biological,  physiological.  It  is  with  moral 
law  that  we  are  now  concerned,  whether  written  or  un- 
written. 

A  sense  of  obligation  arises  when  a  person  believes 
that  a  certain  thing  ought  to  be  done,  that  he  is  able  to 
do  it,  that  it  will  not  be  done  unless  he  does  it,  and  that 
its  neglect  will  result  in  evil.  In  such  a  case,  no  oppos- 
ing duty  forbidding,  he  says,  "I  ought  to  do  it."  If 
he  neglects  to  do  it,  his  conscience  upbraids  him. 

2.  Objections  to  the  fact  of  duty. — These  objections 
are  the  following : 

(i)  Free  zvill  a  fiction. — This  objection  may  be  thus 
stated:  Every  thing  in  nature  is  governed  according  to 
law.  The  universal  reign  of  law  proves  that  man's  con- 
duct is  subject  to  law,  leaving  no  place  for  free  will. 
Man's  actions  are,  therefore,  necessitated  by  forces  be- 
yond his  control;  accordingly  there  can  be  no  duty,  no 
obligation. 

The  above  argument  is  a  glaring  fallacy.  It  assumes 
that  there  is  no  free  will,  the  very  thing  it  tries  to  prove, 
else  it  could  not  say,  Every  thing  in  nature  is  governed 
according  to  law.  By  free  will  we  do  not  mean  free 
volition  as  a  product,  but  a  free  ego  who  freely  uses  his 
will  power  in  producing  his  volitions.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  say  that  the  ego  acts  without  reasons,  for  he 
decides  in  view  of  reasons;  but  he  is  not  compelled  to 
decide  by  determining  causes. 

Any  one  who  accepts  one  of  the  following  statements, 
and  rejects  the  other,  will  know  whether  he  is  on  the 
side  of  liberty  or  of  necessity:  In  view  of  motives,  as 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS  123 

reasons,  the  ego  decides;  under  the  pressure  of  motives, 
as  determining  causes,  the  ego  is  compelled  to  decide.  In 
the  latter  case,  the  decision  is  but  the  transmission  of  the 
impulse  from  the  antecedent  motive  through  the  ego  to 
the  consequent  volition,  and  the  ego  is  simply  passive. 

Moral  responsibility  requires  freedom  in  the  subject. 
A  moral  agent  may  always  act  according  to  reason,  and 
yet  be  free,  for  he  is  not  compelled  so  to  act.  He  is  not 
necessarily  a  fool  because  he  is  free;  but  if  he  acts  from 
necessity,  he  has  no  more  responsibility  than  a  threshing 
machine.  As  the  ego  is  conscious  of  effort  in  volition, 
it  is  not  passive,  but  active. 

Where  does  responsibility  lie?  Evidently  where  free- 
dom lies,  in  the  doer.  To  make  this  clear,  suppose  two 
desirable  alternatives :  then  we  have  ego,  desire,  prefer- 
ence, choice,  appropriation.  The  desire  is  not  free,  for 
that  is  induced  by  the  attractiveness  of  the  objects;  the 
preference  is  not  free,  for  that  is  determined  by  the 
greater  attractiveness  of  one  of  the  alternatives;  the 
choice,  as  a  product,  is  not  free,  for  that  is  made  by  the 
ego  according  to  preference;  the  appropriation  is  not 
free,  for  that  is  determined  by  the  choice;  but  the  ego 
is  free  in  making  the  choice,  according  to  preference  as 
a  reason,  and  not  as  a  compelling  cause.  As  the  ego  is 
reasonable,  the  choice  is  always  made  according  to  the 
preference;  but  that  is  certainty,  not  necessity.  Free- 
dom is  the  condition  of  obligation. 

(2)  Duty  irrational. — Fourier  says :  "What  a  strange 
idea  that  God  has  implanted  within  us  passions,  in  order 
that  we  may  repress  them;  as  though  a  father  were  to 
develop  vices  in  his  child,  in  order  that  he  may  after- 
wards have  the  glory  of  overcoming  them !  What  could 


124  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

be  less  in  conformity  with  the  economy  of  Divine  wis- 
dom than  to  create  a  self-contradictory  being,  composed 
of  two  natures,  one  of  which  is  commanded  to  reduce 
the  other  to  vassalage,  while  everywhere  else  in  the  uni- 
verse we  see  unity  of  source  and  unity  of  action.  And 
it  would  not  be  so  bad  had  God  but  given  at  the  same 
time  efficacious  means  with  which  to  combat  them !  But 
we  have  nothing  of  the  sort.  Every  one  knows  how 
weak  is  reason  in  the  presence  of  passion,  and  those  who 
preach  to  others  are  the  first  to  be  vanquished  in  the 
struggle  with  themselves.  The  worst  evil  is  not  their 
weakness,  which  comes  from  nature,  and  for  which  they 
are  not  responsible;  but  it  is  the  universal  hypocrisy 
which  results  from  this  conflict  between  theory  and  prac- 
tice, since  all  have  on  their  lips  moral  maxims  which  they 
sacrifice,  without  scruple,  when  there  is  any  question  of 
satisfying  their  passions." 

Fourier  concludes  that  the  proper  aim  of  the  human 
race  is  not  duty,  but  happiness,  and  that  happiness  is  the 
gratification  of  the  appetites  and  passions;  but  in  order 
that  this  gratification  may  be  enjoyed  without  injury,  it 
is  necessary  to  discover  the  true  mechanism  of  the  pas- 
sions, and  act  accordingly.  But  it  is  evident  that  the 
unlimited  gratification  of  appetite,  of  passion,  of  am- 
bition, of  the  love  of  gain,  can  not  be  indulged  without 
untold  misery  to  others;  but  unlimited  gratification  will 
be  indulged,  unless  law  intervenes  with  its  wholesome 
restraint.  It  is  only  necessary  to  appeal  to  the  experi- 
ence of  mankind  to  see  the  consequences  of  lawless  in- 
dulgence. To  abolish  law  in  the  present  condition  of 
mankind,  is  to  give  license  to  every  crime,  and  to  reduce 
society  to  anarchy;  but  the  necessity  of  law  involves  the 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  125 

duty  of  obedience.  If  the  human  race  should  ever  reach 
that  degree  of  perfection  when  civil  law  would  no  longer 
be  necessary,  it  would  be  because  the  duty  of  obedience 
to  both  natural  and  divine  law  is  more  perfectly  observed. 

Man's  true  nature  is  found  in  what  is  peculiar  to 
him,  rather  than  in  what  is  common  to  him  and  the 
brute.  His  peculiar  characteristics  are  his  reason  and 
his  moral  nature,  and  he  attains  his  true  happiness  only 
when  these  hold  the  supremacy,  but  under  their  regency 
he  advances  surely  towards  perfection  and  happiness. 

j.  Evolutionary  theory  of  the  origin  of  law  and  the  idea 
of  duty. — It  was  found,  by  yielding  to  appetite,  that  cer- 
tain things,  though  agreeable,  were  injurious;  while 
other  things  were  useful,  though  disagreeable.  A  natu- 
ral sympathy  inclines  mankind  to  pity  and  kindness. 
Finding  it  necessary  to  abstain  from  certain  actions,  and 
needful  to  perform  others,  maxims  of  conduct  were 
formed  and  arranged  into  a  moral  code.  These  were 
acted  upon  by  subsequent  generations,  the  tendency  to 
accept  them  was  strengthened  and  transmitted,  their 
empirical  origin  was  lost  sight  of,  till  finally  they  were 
taken  to  be  intuitive  truths. 

How  did  the  idea  of  duty  originate?  How  came  the 
moral  maxims  to  be  regarded  as  obligatory?  Parents 
desirous  of  protecting  their  children  from  evils  which 
they  have  themselves  endured,  and  wishing  to  give  them 
advantages  superior  to  what  they  had  themselves  en- 
joyed, provide  for  their  instruction,  and  frame  rules  for 
their  conduct  and  enforce  obedience.  In  like  manner, 
chiefs,  kings,  priests,  and  law-makers  form  codes  of  laws, 
and  through  the  reverence  or  superstition  of  the  people, 
or  by  military  power,  enforce  obedience  to  their  author- 


126  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

ity.  Obedience  is  regarded  a  duty,  so  long  as  the  au- 
thority is  believed  to  be  legitimate.  Laws,  without 
doubt,  are  often  made  in  the  interest  of  the  ruling  classes, 
and  as  the  enactments  of  tyrants  are  oppressive  to  the 
people,  and  result  in  their  degradation,  there  is  reason 
for  the  opinion  of  those  who  declaim  against  the  hypoc- 
risy of  priests  and  the  misrule  of  tyrants.  The  religious 
and  civil  freedom  now  enjoyed  has  been  won  by  des- 
perate struggles,  and  can  be  maintained  only  by  acting 
on  the  principle  that  ''eternal  vigilance  is  the  price  of 
liberty." 

Still  it  holds  true  that,  notwithstanding  abuses,  both 
religion  and  law  have  been  greatly  beneficial  to  the  hu- 
man race,  chiefly  by  maintaining  order,  thus  giving 
security  to  property  and  encouragement  to  industry.  To 
escape  from  the  evils  of  anarchy  people  will  fly  to  des- 
potism. 

It  is  natural  for  man  to  worship;  religion  is  incor- 
porated in  his  very  constitution.  From  this  fact  design- 
ing priests  have  found  it  easy  to  forge  the  chains  of 
ecclesiastical  despotism.  Advancing  intelligence  breaks 
these  chains,  and  secures  to  every  man  the  right  to  wor- 
ship God  according  to  the  dictates  of  his  own  conscience. 

Do  we  prize,  as  we  ought,  the  blessings  of  civil  and 
religious  liberty?  But  liberty  can  be  enjoyed  only  under 
the  protection  of  law.  Without  the  guarantee  of  gov- 
ernment, anarchy  and  rapine  would  run  riot,  and  by 
robbing  labor  of  its  reward  would  frustrate  the  cherished 
hopes  of  humanity.  Safety  is  found  by  overthrowing 
priestcraft  and  despotism,  by  shunning  irreligion  and 
anarchy,  and  by  establishing  and  maintaining,  to  use  the 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  127 

words  of  the  immortal  Lincoln,  "a  Government  of  the 
people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the  people." 

Granting  that  governments  originated  in  the  author- 
ity, or  by  the  usurpation  of  the  chief,  the  king,  and  the 
priest,  that  they  are  sometimes  oppressive,  yet  in  the 
end  the  people  will  correct  abuses,  enact  good  laws, 
establish  order,  protect  property,  life,  and  character,  and 
enforce  observance.  The  necessity  of  law  implies  the 
duty  of  obedience  to  its  commands. 

Obedience  is  forced  upon  a  child;  but  as  he  grows 
up  to  manhood  his  mind  rises  to  the  idea  of  duty.  If  the 
primitive  instincts  of  a  man  are  those  of  a  brute,  if  he 
is  compelled  to  obedience  to  law  by  a  superior  force, 
yet  he  rises  above  this  state  to  a  higher  condition  from 
which  he  is  forbidden  by  his  moral  nature  to  descend  to 
his  former  level. 

Even  certain  animals  have  higher  instincts  prompt- 
ing them  to  the  acts  of  migration,  hibernation,  storing 
food,  caring  for  their  young.  If  animals  do  these  things, 
how  much  more  should  the  moral  law  be  obeyed  by  man, 
who  apprehends  the  beauty  of  truth,  the  excellence  of 
the  social  instincts,  and  their  superiority  to  the  selfish! 
Knowing  this,  man  can  not,  without  self-reproach, 
gratify  his  selfish  instincts  at  the  expense  of  his  friends, 
his  country,  or  the  human  race;  the  self-reproach  is  the 
smiting  of  conscience  for  the  violation  of  his  obligations. 
No  one  blames  himself  for  the  unavoidable,  but  for  doing 
wrong  or  refusing  to  do  right.  Self-reproach  is  hard 
to  bear.  The  approval  of  conscience  is  a  rich  reward. 

A  sense  of  responsibility  arises  whenever  one  sees 
that  his  conduct,  over  which  he  has  control,  either  of 


128  SYSTEMS    OF    ETHICS 


g 


doing  or  refraining,  would  accomplish  more  good  than 
evil,  and  thus  contribute  to  the  general  order  and  wel- 
fare, by  tending  to  raise  humanity  to  a  higher  plane  of 
life;  but  the  level  of  humanity  is  rising,  the  duties  are 
enlarging,  the  rights  are  better  known  and  held  to  be 
more  sacred,  and  thus  man's  possibilities  for  good  are 
transformed  into  actualities. 

4.  Nature  of  duty. — Considering  law  as  the  rule  of 
action,  duty  is  the  obligation  to  respect  law  by  comply- 
ing with  its  behests.  There  are,  as  we  have  seen,  various 
kinds  of  law.  Moral  law  places  its  subjects  under  obli- 
gation, but  not  under  compulsion;  they  ought  to  obey, 
but  have  the  option  to  obey  or  to  disobey.  The  obliga- 
tion and  the  freedom  constitute  the  duty  of  obedience. 
The  subjects  of  moral  law  are  persons,  not  things.  A 
thing  has  no  option,  and  deserves  neither  praise  nor 
blame;  but  a  person  realizes  his  obligation  to  do  his  duty, 
for  the  performance  of  which  he  has  the  approval  of  con- 
science, and  for  failure  a  sense  of  guilt.  Though  a  moral 
agent  is  under  obligation  to  do  right,  he  is  not  under 
compulsion;  he  is  not  free  from  responsibility  or  from 
desert,  but  he  is  free  to  do  or  to  forbear,  and  for  the 
use  he  makes  of  this  freedom  he  is  accountable.  He 
can  do  right  or  wrong,  but  ought  to  do  right. 

There  is  something  awful  in  the  remorse  of  a  guilty 
conscience;  it  bites  back;  it  gnaws  at  the  heart;  it  is  the 
worm  that  dieth  not,  the  fire  that  is  not  quenched. 
Ethics  provides  for  reformation,  but  not  for  forgiveness. 

Religion  alone  holds  out  the  hope  of  deliverance 
from  remorse  by  the  forgiveness  of  sin  through  the 
mercy  of  God.  But  is  it  presumption  to  declare  that 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  129 

God  will  on  certain  conditions  forgive  sin?  "When  in- 
deed we  are  charged  with  presumption  in  discussing  the 
Divine  will  and  the  Divine  character,  the  whole  basis 
on  which  we  stand  must  have  been  forgotten.  We  as- 
sume, not  that  we  are  intruding  by  our  own  reasoning 
into  the  awful  secrets  of  the  Divine  nature,  but  that  God 
has  been  graciously  pleased  to  reveal  his  nature  and  his 
will  to  us,  in  a  certain  measure  and  under  certain  limi- 
tations." 
9 


Chapter  XIII 

LAW    AND    DUTY.— CONTINUED 

^DELATION  of  moral  law  to  other  laws. — Moral  laws 
J-  *.  sustain  interesting  relations  to  other  laws.  Thus 
a  person  standing  on  the  top  of  a  high  tower  has  the 
power  to  leap  off  or  not  to  leap.  The  law  of  self-preser- 
vation enjoins  the  duty  of  not  leaping.  He  has  the 
option  of  leaping  or  not  leaping;  but  should  he  leap,  he 
has  not  the  option  of  falling  or  not  falling.  He  falls 
according  to  the  physical  law  of  gravitation.  A  moral 
law  forbade  the  leap,  and  a  violation  of  that  law  was 
wrong.  After  the  leap  it  was  not  wrong  to  fall;  for  then 
he  could  not  refrain  from  falling.  It  was  wrong  only 
to  leap. 

Good  food  nourishes  the  body,  and  poison  destroys 
it,  according  to  physical  laws;  but  a  moral  law  enjoins 
the  duty  of  taking  food  and  of  refraining  from  taking 
poison.  Here  the  reward  or  penalty  is  the  natural 
consequence  of  the  act.  Moral  law  enjoins  upon  free 
beings  such  conduct  as  they  believe  will  accomplish 
good  results.  Right  conduct,  objectively  considered,  is 
conduct  attended  with  good  results.  Duty  is  the  obli- 
gation to  ascertain  what  conduct  is  right,  so  far  as  this 
can  be  done,  and  then  heartily  to  perform  that  conduct. 
In  case  of  civil  law,  as  there  is  in  all  ordinary  cases 
a  presumption  that  the  law  is  righteous,  there  is  an  ante- 

130 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  131 

cedent  moral  law  which  enjoins  obedience,  and  the  re- 
ward of  obedience  is  in  general  the  participation  with 
others  in  the  good  consequences  of  obedience.  Man 
can  reach  his  highest  perfection  only  in  society  regu- 
lated by  prudent  social  customs,  wholesome  moral  re- 
straints, and  wise  civil  laws. 

Sometimes  rewards  are  offered  by  Government  for 
acts  not  positively  commanded,  but  only  encouraged, 
as  bounties  for  killing  rapacious  animals,  for  the  pro- 
duction of  certain  crops  as  sugar,  or  to  induce  men  to 
enlist  in  the  army  or  navy.  But  penalties  of  violated 
civil  laws  are  positive  inflictions.  An  act  is  often  a  vio- 
lation of  both  civil  and  moral  law,  and  a  double  penalty 
is  suffered,  in  the  positive  infliction  and  in  the  remorse 
of  conscience.  A  crime  undetected  by  man  can  not 
escape  the  criminars  conscience  nor  the  eye  of  God. 

2.  What  to  do  when  we  believe  an  act  to  be  right  or 
know  it  to  be  right. — When  we  believe  an  act  to  be  right, 
it  becomes  our  duty  to  do  it,  simply  because  we  believe 
it  to  be  right.  This  is  the  case  when  we  know  that  the 
act  is  enjoined  by  proper  authority,  though  we  may  not 
know  why  it  is  enjoined.  We  know  an  act  to  be  right 
when  we  know  that  it  is  not  forbidden  by  any  law,  and 
that  its  consequences  are  good.  If  the  act  is  called  in 
question,  we  justify  it  by  the  consequences. 

j.  Why  should  we  do  right? — When  it  is  said,  Do 
right  for  the  sake  of  the  right,  we  are  not  to  understand 
that  abstract  right  is  a  being  that  receives  any  benefit 
by  our  doing  right,  but  that  we  do  right  for  the  sake  of 
ourselves  being  right,  and  for  the  good  of  others.  If  the 
act  falls  under  a  moral  law,  we  need  not  look  to  the  con- 
sequences; yet  these  are  implicitly  accepted  as  good, 


132  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

and  though  the  act  is  right,  if  the  law  requiring  it  is  be- 
lieved to  be  righteous,  yet  it  is  the  good  consequences 
which  make  the  law  righteous,  and  these  consequences, 
when  known,  constitute  the  rational  and  final  justifica- 
tion of  the  act. 

These  considerations  show  that  practically  we  may 
often  decide  the  moral  character  of  an  act  without  spe- 
cial regard  to  its  consequences,  from  the  belief  that  the 
law  enjoining  it  is  right,  but  that  ultimately  the  right- 
eousness or  unrighteousness  of  the  law  depends  on  the 
good  or  bad  consequences  of  the  act  that  is  commanded 
or  forbidden.  These  consequences  of  the  act  constitute 
the  final  justification  of  the  law,  which  otherwise  would 
be  the  edict  of  an  irrational  law-giver;  and  the  justifica- 
tion of  the  law  is  the  rational  verification  of  the  morality 
of  the  act. 

4.  Kant's  categorical  imperative. — It  may  be  asked. 
Does  not  Kant's  categorical  imperative  teach  that  duty 
is  obedience  to  the  law  for  the  sake  of  the  law,  and  that 
to  look  to  the  consequences  for  the  justification  of  obedi- 
ence is  to  destroy  the  moral  character  of  the  act?  Kant 
was  not  a  divine  law-giver,  and  it  is  time  his  categorical 
imperative  is  disposed  of.  The  law  has  no  sake.  It  does 
it  no  good  to  obey  it;  hence  the  reason  for  obedience  is 
not  the  sake  of  the  law;  but  if  there  is  no  reason  for 
obedience  the  law  is  irrational,  and  obedience,  save  that 
it  secures  order,  would  be  a  matter  of  indifference. 

What,  then,  is  the  reason  for  obedience?  A  person 
ought  to  obey  the  law  for  the  sake  of  others,  and  for 
his  own  sake.  But  does  not  this  make  the  action  sel- 
fish, -and  thus  destroy  its  moral  character?  Certainly 
not  when  one  obeys  the  law,  not  thinking  of  his  own 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS  133 

good,  but  of  the  good  of  others.  He  then  obeys  the 
law  for  the  sake  of  others,  not  thinking  at  the  time  of 
his  own  good,  though  afterwards  he  enjoys  the  satis- 
faction of  knowing  that  his  good  is  involved  in  their 
happiness.  Altruistic  morality  is  surely  not  selfish. 

But  what  of  the  morality  of  a  person's  obedience 
for  his  own  sake?  Such  an  act,  if  not  moral,  is  not  im- 
moral, and  is  justified  by  the  good  consequences.  A 
person's  own  sake  is  just  as  valuable  as  the  sake  of  any 
other  person,  and  in  promoting  it  he  adds  to  the  sum 
of  the  good  of  being,  and  hence  performs  a  moral  act, 
which  would  be  approved  by  any  reasonable  beholder. 
No  moral  law  requires  that  one  should  be  regardless  of 
self,  though  it  is  sometimes  required  that  a  person 
should  sacrifice  his  own  interest  for  the  sake  of  the 
greater  good  of  others. 

Doing  good  to  self  is  also  justified  on  the  moral 
ground  that  a  person  in  doing  good  to  self  increases  his 
power  of  doing  good  to  others.  Increasing  his  own  per- 
fection and  happiness  increases  his  power  to  promote 
the  perfection  and  happiness  of  his  fellow-beings. 

The  law  then  having  no  sake,  Kant's  categorical  im- 
perative, when  reduced  to  its  principle,  is  resolvable  in 
every  case  into  an  hypothetical  imperative.  Kant  when 
pressed  to  give  a  reason  made  this  reduction  himself. 
He  says:  "If  we  break  our  word,  we  seem  to  admit  by 
that  very  act  that  others  have  a  right  to  break  theirs  to 
us,  and  in  such  a  case  it  would  be  impossible  to  trust 
any  promise,  and  distrust  would  become  general." 
Then  do  right  if  you  wish  the  welfare  of  society,  and  not 
for  right's  sake,  which  is  a  nonentity. 

Perfection  may  be  sought  without  keeping  our  own 


134  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

happiness  continually  in  mind,  and  perfection  is  the 
surest  means  to  ultimate  happiness,  both  for  our  our- 
selves and  for  our  fellow-beings.  We  therefore  obey  the 
moral  law,  because  obedience  promotes  our  own  per- 
fection and  happiness,  and  the  perfection  and  happiness 
of  those  within  the  range  of  our  influence.  Obedience 
to  the  moral  law  should  be  the  immediate  aim;  good 
consequences  will  surely  follow. 

5.  Duty  based  on  reasons. — Duty  is  demanded  be- 
cause of  its  consequences;  but  when  known  it  becomes 
absolute,  and  is  to  be  performed  without  further  refer- 
ence to  consequences,  whether  they  be  agreeable  or 
disagreeable.  The  steadfast  will  always  to  do  right  is 
to  be  carried  into  execution  at  every  opportunity. 
When  we  wish  to  find  the  rationale  of  duty,  when  we 
seek  to  justify  duty  to  the  eye  of  reason,  and  satisfy  a 
sensitive  conscience,  then  we  rest  with  satisfaction  on 
the  ultimate  aim  of  our  conduct — the  highest  good  of 
the  greatest  number,  and  feel  assured  that  our  conduct 
is  fully  justified. 

In  the  application  of  this  principle,  in  carrying  it  out 
in  practice,  the  details  of  execution,  which  are  multi- 
form, must  be  left  to  the  good  sense  of  the  individual. 
Specific  directions  would  be  embarrassing  and  mislead- 
ing, and  an  insult  to  his  intelligence.  No  two  persons 
are  alike.  They  differ  in  disposition,  in  endowment,  in 
development;  their  environments  are  infinitely  varied; 
the  work  falling  to  each  is  peculiarly  his  own.  It  there- 
fore becomes  the  duty  of  each  person  to  study  himself, 
his  disposition,  his  tastes,  his  abilities,  his  resources,  his 
environment,  and  then  to  choose  wisely  the  niche  he 
is  to  fill,  to  develop  his  powers  to  their  fullest  extent,  to 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  135 

equip  himself  specially  and  thoroughly  for  his  work,  and 
to  discharge  the  duties  of  life  to  the  best  of  his  ability. 

The  good  to  be  accomplished  is  illimitable;  but  duty 
is  restricted  by  the  limitations  of  the  individual.  No 
man  can  do  all  good;  but  he  can  do  his  own  duty  and 
thus  discharge  his  own  obligations.  The  function  of 
each  is  fulfilled  by  the  adjustment  of  faculty  and  en- 
vironment so  as  best  to  accomplish  his  o\vn  work.  The 
freedom  of  choice  of  life  work  is  related  to  the  indi- 
vidual's own  satisfaction;  the  proper  performance  of  his 
duties  is  related  also  to  the  satisfaction  of  those  affected 
by  the  performance.  A  right  choice  of  life  work  is  that 
which,  in  view  of  faculty  and  environment,  best  fulfills 
the  functions  of  the  individual,  and  thus  best  promotes 
the  social  welfare.  By  doing  in  the  best  manner  his 
own  work  every  one  fulfills  his  mission,  attains  his  happi- 
ness, encourages  his  fellows,  discharges  his  obligations 
to  society,  and  gains  lasting  honor. 

6.  Foundation  of  obligation. — The  world  is  a  rational 
system  of  universal  order,  governed  by  general  laws, 
and  man  is  a  rational  being  capable  of  understanding 
his  relations  to  the  universe.  If  order  is  preferable  to 
disorder,  and  harmony  to  discord,  it  is  man's  duty  to 
conform  to  the  general  order.  In  promoting  the  wel- 
fare of  his  fellow-beings,  so  far  as  he  is  able,  he  best 
realizes  what  is  most  worthy  in  himself. 

There  are  different  kinds  and  degrees  of  perfection — 
that  of  minerals,  vegetables,  animals,  rational  beings. 
Everything  has  a  degree  of  perfection  which  determines 
its  place  in  the  scale  of  being.  Man  has  an  excellence 
proper  to  himself,  not  in  what  is  common  to  him  and 
the  brute,  but  in  those  higher  endowments  of  reason 


136  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

and  conscience  peculiar  to  himself.  He  is,  moreover, 
a  progressive  being,  capable  of  increasing  in  knowledge, 
in  power,  and  in  all  moral  excellence.  Every  man  par- 
takes of  the  endowments  common  to  humanity,  and  has 
also  certain  traits  peculiar  to  himself,  and  in  his  endow- 
ments as  a  man,  and  in  his  own  individual  characteristics 
he  finds  his  highest  good  and  his  proper  position  by 
divine  warrant. 

A  person  can  best  perform  his  duties  to  society  by 
first  performing  the  duties  he  owes  to  himself,  that  of 
attaining  by  a  symmetrical  education  the  highest  degree 
of  perfection  of  which  he  is  capable.  Every  person  has 
in  himself  an  element  of  excellence,  the  discovery  and 
development  of  which  determines  his  proper  place  in 
society.  The  great  diversity  of  talent  is  wonderfully  and 
wisely  adapted  to  secure  the  good  of  the  whole.  The 
element  essentially  important  in  each  is  what  is  char- 
acteristic of  him,  rather  than  that  which  is  common  to 
him  and  other  people.  In  working  his  best  powers  to 
their  utmost,  though  not  neglecting  his  weaker  facul- 
ties, each  one  finds  his  happiness,  does  the  most  good, 
and  discharges  his  obligations  to  society. 

A  good  maxim  in  education  is,  Cultivate  with  the 
greatest  care  your  strongest  powers,  for  from  these  you 
will  achieve  success;  but  do  not  neglect  your  undevel- 
oped faculties. 

7.  Man's  supremacy. — Man's  superiority  over  the 
lower  animals  gives  him  the  rightful  supremacy,  and 
constitutes  him  lord  of  creation;  but  he  should  rule 
humanely  according  to  reason.  Cruelty  to  animals  is 
a  crime,  and  a  cause  of  degradation  to  man  himself. 

Man  has  also  higher  and  lower  orders  of  faculties. 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  137 

The  superior  nature  of  man  has  the  rightful  authority 
over  his  inferior  nature;  but  there  is  a  struggle,  a  con- 
flict for  mastery  between  man's  higher  and  lower  na- 
tures, ''for  these  are  contrary  the  one  to  the  other."  In 
this  conflict  between  his  higher  and  lower  natures,  man, 
though  under  obligation  to  live  as  a  rational  being,  is 
often  brought  "into  captivity  to  the  law  of  sin  and 
death,"  which  worketh  in  his  members. 

Here  again  we  can  resort  to  Christian  ethics,  and  to 
religion  itself.  "For  what  the  law  could  not  do  in  that 
it  was  weak  through  the  flesh,  God  sending  his  own  Son 
in  the  likeness  of  sinful  flesh,  and  for  sin  condemned  sin 
in  the  flesh:  that  the  righteousness  of  the  law  might  be 
fulfilled  in  us,  who  walk  not  after  the  flesh,  but  after 
the  Spirit." 


Chapter  XIV 
MORAL   EVIL 

MORAL  EVIL  assumes  many  forms — aggression, 
violence,  cruelty,  robbery,  strife,  crime,  vice,  sin. 
These  moral  evils  take  specific  names,  and  overlap  more 
or  less. 

1.  Infanticide. — The  desire  to  preserve  the  lives  of 
adults  in  times  of  scarcity  of  food  has  among  barbarous 
tribes  led  to  the  cruel  practice  of  infanticide  as  a  sup- 
posed duty.     People  on  the  verge  of  starvation  might 
be  driven  to  infanticide  by  the  incentive  of  self-preser- 
vation, and  having  begun  the  practice  from  necessity 
would  continue  it  from  force  of  habit  till  it  became  the 
custom  of  the  tribe. 

The  destruction  of  many  of  the  female  children  also 
had  the  inducement  of  getting  rid  of  a  burden,  since 
they  would  be  useless  in  the  chase  or  in  war,  and,  as 
consumers,  would  draw  on  their  scanty  supply  of  food. 
Tribes  which  killed  their  girls  often  obtained  wives 
from  other  tribes  by  seizures,  or  as  captives  in  war. 

Children  among  savage  or  half-civilized  tribes  were 
often  killed  in  fits  of  anger.  They  were  also  sacrificed 
to  propitiate  their  chiefs,  or  as  offerings  to  their  gods, 
as  in  case  of  children  cast  into  the  Ganges. 

2.  Homicide. — Homicide    has    been    sanctioned    by 
social  custom,  as  the  Hindoo  suttees,  or  as  the  victims 

138 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  139 

sacrificed  at  the  funeral  of  chiefs,  or  as  the  slaves,  at  the 
death  of  their  masters,  that  they  might  serve  him  in  the 
world  of  shades,  or  the  putting  to  death  of  a  messenger 
that  he  might  carry  a  message  from  the  chief  to  his  dead 
ancestor  in  the  world  of  spirits. 

The  sacrifice  of  human  victims  to  appease  their  gods 
was  made  by  the  Scythians,  the  Phoenicians,  and  per- 
haps by  the  Greeks,  in  pre-Homeric  times,  in  the  wor- 
ship of  Artemis,  as  in  the  case  of  Iphigenia,  the  daughter 
of  Agamemnon. 

In  ancient  Mexico  thousands  of  victims  were  annu- 
ally slain  on  altars  of  sacrifice,  and  wars  were  made 
that  the  slaughtered  might  satisfy  the  hunger  of  the 
gods. 

Multitudes  of  martyrs  have  fallen  victims  to  bigotry 
in  pagan  and  even  in  Christian  persecutions.  The  mem- 
ory of  these  cruelties  has  not  yet  faded  from  the  minds 
of  men.  The  religon  which  was  to  bring  "peace  on 
earth,"  and  which  we  trust  will  yet  bring  "good  will 
to  men,"  has  hitherto,  through  the  selfish  ambitions  of 
worldly  leaders,  too  often  brought  hate,  and  the  sword, 
and  the  fagot. 

The  cruelties  practiced  against  the  Jews  in  the 
Middle  Ages  scarcely  seem  credible,  though  they  are 
authenticated  facts  of  history.  So  cruel  was  their  treat- 
ment, that  in  their  despair  they  cried  out  in  the  morn- 
ing, "Would  God  it  were  evening!"  and  in  the  evening, 
"Would  God  it  were  morning!"  Even  to  this  day  the 
reproach  and  disabilities  of  the  Jews  are  not  wholly 
removed. 

Among  the  Fijians  murder  was  thought  to  be  hon- 
orable. The  same  was  true  of  the  Bushmen.  In  other 


140  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

tribes  paradise  was  thought  to  be  the  reward  of  the  man 
who  had  slain  many  victims. 

It  was  the  custom  among  the  Indians  to  boast  of 
the  number  of  scalps  they  had  taken.  With  them  the 
biggest  bully  is  the  biggest  man.  The  victor  in  a  tussle 
exclaims,  "Me  big  Injun." 

The  practice  of  cannibalism,  with  its  horrid  orgies, 
was  a  prevailing  custom  among  the  barbarous  tribes  of 
the  South  Sea  Islanders,  also  in  some  tribes  of  the  Dark 
Continent. 

j.  Dueling. — In  the  most  enlightened  nations  duel- 
ing, a  deadly  combat  between  two  persons,  has  been  a 
common  practice.  There  are  two  forms : 

In  the  Middle  Ages,  the  judicial  duel  was  a  trial 
regulated  by  law  as  proof  of  guilt  or  innocence.  The 
modern  duel  is  the  judicial  duel  stript  of  its  legality. 

Spirited  men  are  sensitive  of  their  honor,  and  quick 
to  take  an  insult.  A  challenge,  a  duel,  and  probably  the 
death  or  serious  injury  of  one  or  both  the  parties  is  the 
consequence. 

It  would  require  an  extended  history  to  record  the 
instances  of  duels  and  the  details  of  the  practice.  An 
authority  says  "that  in  the  eight  years  between  1601 
and  1609  two  thousand  men  of  noble  birth  fell  in  duels." 
The  total  number  of  victims  would  reach  many  thou- 
sands. A  change  of  sentiment  has  inclined  men  to 
settle  their  quarrels,  not  by  "the  code  of  honor,"  but  in 
a  legal  way. 

4.  Wars. — To  satisfy  the  ambition  of  rulers,  wars 
have  in  the  past  been  the  practice  of  the  most  enlight- 
ened nations,  and  at  present  these  nations  go  to  war  to 
gratify  ambition  or  to  satisfy  their  sense  of  honor.  A 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  141 

war  of  humanity,  as  the  late  war  of  the  United  States 
against  Spain,  is  a  new  thing  in  history.  When  all  wars 
are  discontinued,  save  those  for  the  relief  of  the  op- 
pressed, we  may  look  for  peace  on  earth. 

In  the  long  wars  of  Europe — for  example,  the  hun- 
dred years'  war,  and  the  thirty  years'  religious  war — 
there  were  not  only  the  usual  attendant  cruelties,  but 
there  were  scattered  highwaymen  and  organized  com- 
panies of  robbers,  who  had  their  fortresses  in  the  fast- 
nesses of  the  mountains,  and  lived  luxuriously  on  the 
spoils  taken  from  the  people.  Even  soldiers  turned 
brigands,  and  sailors  became  pirates.  Officers  cheated 
their  soldiers,  and  princes  robbed  the  nations  by  debas- 
ing the  coinage. 

The  peaceful  tribes,  as  the  Eskimos,  have  been 
uniformly  honest.  There  seems  to  be  a  close  connec- 
tion between  war  and  robbery,  perhaps  because  war 
familiarizes  the  minds  of  men  with  deeds  of  violence, 
and  gives  greater  facility  for  plunder  in  the  unpro- 
tected homes,  and  the  greater  security  to  the  freebooter 
on  account  of  the  general  confusion. 

At  the  present  day,  though  in  a  measure  restrained 
by  comity,  or  by  international  law  and  by  Christian 
sentiment,  nations  are  yet  too  ready,  on  the  pretext  of 
national  honor,  to  plunge  into  war,  regardless  of  its 
wastefulness  of  treasure  or  its  destructiveness  of  hu- 
man life. 

There  are,  we  know,  the  ethics  of  war,  its  laws  and 
usages,  which,  in  the  hands  of  such  commanders  as 
General  Grant,  have  somewhat  mitigated  its  horrors. 
Still  the  ethics  of  war  is  the  ethics  of  strife,  not  of 
peace;  of  enmity,  not  of  amity.  May  we  not  hope  that 


142  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

the  Peace  Convention  of  the  nations  at  The  Hague, 
called  by  the  Czar  of  Russia,  is  a  promise  of  peace  and 
good  will  among  the  nations?  Let  national  contro- 
versies be  settled  by  arbitration,  as  even  now  is  some- 
times done,  and  not  by  force  of  arms. 

5.  Slavery. — One  of  the  worst  consequences  of  an- 
cient wars  was  slavery.     The  prisoners  of  war  were 
either  slaughtered  or  sold  as  slaves.     In  Athens  and 
Rome,  slaves  at  times  outnumbered  the  citizens.     In 
modern  times  the  captives  in  the  African  tribal  wars 
were  bought  by  slave-traders  from  the  victorious  chiefs 
with  trinkets  or  with  rum,  and  sold  to  enlightened  peo- 
ple for  slaves.     The  tribal  wars  were  often  instigated 
by  the  slave-traders  themselves,  for  the  express  purpose 
of  obtaining  slaves. 

But  the  rising  moral  sentiment  of  the  present  age, 
under  the  good  providence  of  God,  has  induced  the 
Christian  nations  to  brand  the  slave-trade  as  piracy,  and 
has  abolished  "the  sum  of  all  villainies,"  slavery  itself, 
within  their  borders.  It  now  lingers  as  a  relic  of 
barbarism  only  among  the  benighted  nations  of  the 
earth. 

6.  Robbery. — The  seizure  of  the  property  of  the  van- 
quished was  regarded  as  the  right  of  the  victors.    Wars 
were  instigated  for  the  sake  of  the  plunder,  and  soldiers 
encouraged  to  enlist  by  appeals  to  their  avarice. 

Robbery,  however,  exists  in  times  of  peace,  as  well 
as  in  times  of  war.  It  is  a  crime  against  the  right  of 
property.  It  is  not  a  wrong  practiced  only  in  the  early 
ages  of  history,  but  it  is  a  common  crime  to-day  among 
all  nations.  It  is  practiced  by  highwaymen,  burglars, 
bank-robbers,  train-robbers,  forgers,  defaulters,  thieves, 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  143 

swindlers,  deadbeats,  and  frauds  of  every  description, 
whose  name  is  legion.  Public  sentiment  protects  wealth 
earned  honestly  and  employed  conscientiously.  Many 
wealthy  men  are  doing  great  good  with  their  wealth. 

The  halo  of  romance  has  been  thrown  round  the 
exploits  of  bandits  and  pirates,  and  their  daring  deeds, 
told  in  a  well-written  novel  or  graceful  poem,  have  in- 
flamed the  imaginations  of  many  an  ardent  youth,  and 
incited  him  to  a  career  of  outlawry  and  crime. 

The  Spartans  taught  their  boys  to  steal,  but  pun- 
ished them  for  stupidity  if  detected.  The  crime  of  the 
boys  was  thought  to  be  not  in  the  theft,  but  in  their 
unskillfulness  in  not  escaping  detection.  The  same 
sentiments  have  prevailed  among  other  people. 

Certain  tribes  do  not  allow  stealing  among  them- 
selves, yet  encourage  their  people  to  rob  other  tribes 
by  accounting  it  honorable.  Such  practices  tend  to 
provoke  war.  Among  the  Turcomans,  celebrated  rob- 
bers not  only  become  famous,  but  are  accounted  heroes, 
and  after  death  are  worshiped  as  saints,  and  pilgrimages 
are  made  to  their  shrines. 

The  crew  and  passengers  of  a  vessel  stranded  on  an 
inhospitable  shore  were  often  plundered  by  the  natives 
and  reduced  to  slavery. 

We  know  from  English  history  that  among  the 
Norsemen  piracy  and  robbery,  practiced  in  bold,  open, 
honest  fashion,  were  accounted  honorable.  The  adven- 
turers became  the  sturdy  settlers  of  old  England,  and 
to  them  some  of  us  can  trace  our  ancestry.  The  Nor- 
man invasion  was  a  high-handed  encroachment  on  the 
rights  of  the  Saxon  inhabitants;  but  the  result  was,  no 
doubt,  an  advance  in  civilization.  The  Saxons,  how- 


144  SYSTEMS    OF   ETHICS 

ever,  had  before  encroached  on  the  rights  of  the 
Britons. 

The  struggle  for  existence  is  seen  even  in  the  vege- 
table kingdom.  A  large  tree  overshadows  a  smaller  one 
near  by,  stunts  its  growth,  and  finally  causes  it  to  die. 
Weeds,  unless  uprooted,  will  destroy  the  garden  vege- 
tables. 

In  the  animal  kingdom  unceasing  war  exists.  The 
lamb  eats  the  grass,  and  the  wolf  the  lamb.  The  toad 
eats  flies,  the  snake  the  toad,  the  hawk  the  snake. 

"  So,  naturalists  observe,  a  flea 
Has  smaller  fleas  that  on  him  prey ; 
And  these  have  smaller  still  to  bite  'em; 
And  so  proceed,  ad  infinitwn" 

"Life  evermore  is  fed  by  death, 

In  earth,  and  sea,  and  sky; 
And,  that  a  rose  may  breathe  its  breath, 
Something  must  die." 

Not  only  does  one  species  prey  upon  another,  but 
hostility  exists  between  individuals  of  the  same  species. 
The  earth  has  many  a  waste  and  desert  place.  Some 
parts  are  devastated  by  floods,  tornadoes,  volcanic  erup- 
tions, and  by  earthquakes,  and  some  countries  are  deci- 
mated by  famine  or  pestilence. 

Among  men,  nation  wars  against  nation,  or  one  part 
of  the  nation  rebels  against  the  government.  France 
takes  Alsace  and  Lorraine  from  Germany,  and  Ger- 
many retakes  Alsace  and  Lorraine  from  France.  The 
Turk  conquers  the  Greek,  and  the  Greek  regains  his 
independence.  England  taxes  her  American  Colonies 
without  allowing  them  representation,  and  the  Colonies 
rebel  and  gain  their  independence.  Spain  oppresses  her 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  145 

colonies,    and    they   sever    their    connection    with    the 
tyrannical  Power. 

Within  the  nation  is  turmoil  and  party  strife.  Now 
one  party  rules,  and  anon  it  is  hurled  from  power.  An 
eye  for  an  eye,  a  tooth  for  a  tooth,  a  blow  for  a  blow. 
Retaliation  is  sometimes  postponed  till  opportunity  is 
given  for  a  decisive  blow.  Cherished,  postponed,  and 
planned,  retaliation  is  revenge.  Rivalry  and  the  strug- 
gle for  existence  lead  to  aggression,  and  aggression 
to  counter  aggression.  Wrong  invites  revenge.  Feuds 
between  families  or  tribes  or  clans  sometimes  continue 
for  generations,  and  often  terminate  in  arson  or  murder. 
The  fact,  however,  that  revenge  will  be  taken  sooner  or 
later  is  no  doubt  a  check  to  original  aggression. 

In  primitive  times,  and  even  now  among  barbarous 
tribes,  revenge  is  considered  a  duty,  and  no  rest  is  al- 
lowed till  satisfaction  is  attained.  In  modern  times 
among  civilized  people  revenge,  though  not  regarded 
as  a  duty,  is  often  cherished,  and  to  satisfy  hatred  is  vis- 
ited on  the  offender.  This  is  seen  in  the  Vendetta,  in 
lynch  law,  and  in  the  inflictions  of  the  White  Caps. 

No  one  but  a  Christian  of  the  highest  type  can  love 
his  enemies.  Resentment  for  wrong  will  not  be  laid 
aside  till  the  truth  of  the  Divine  declaration  is  accepted : 
"Vengeance  is  mine,  I  will  repay,  saith  the  Lord." 

One  of  the  best  means  of  suppressing  evil  tendencies 
is  steady  employment  at  some  regular  and  useful  work. 
Vitality  is  thus  expended  which  otherwise  would  be 
employed  in  some  kind  of  vicious  conduct.  In  man's 
present  moral  condition,  it  is  well  for  him  that  he  has 
to  labor.  It  would  be  a  great  relief  if  idle  men  could 
be  employed  in  useful  labor  at  fair  wages. 
10 


146  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

7.  Sources  of  moral  evil. — These  are  .chiefly  the  ma- 
levolent affections  and  selfish  desires. 

(1)  The  malevolent  affections  are  sources  of  frightful 
evils.    Of  these  evil  affections  there  is  a  long-  list.     Dis- 
like, antipathy,  contempt,  scorn,  disdain,  pride,  haughti- 
ness,   arrogance,    envy,   jealousy,    malice,    resentment, 
hatred,  anger,  wrath,  rage,  fury,  revenge.     To  yield  to 
these  is  to  wrong  our  fellows  and  to  injure  ourselves. 

(2)  The  selfish  desires  crave  gratification,  regardless 
of  the  woes  caused  to  fellow-beings,  and  thus  become 
the  source  of  innumerable  evils.     These  selfish  desires 
are  manifest  in  avarice  or  excessive  desire  for  wealth, 
in  vanity  or  undue  craving  for  praise,  in  selfish  ambition 
or  inordinate  desire  for  power  or  fame,  and  in"  unbridled 
appetites  or  passions.    It  is  easy  to  see  how  these  selfish 
desires  work  to  the  injury  of  society. 


Chapter  XV 
MORAL    EVIL.— CONTINUED 

CRIME. — Crime  includes  those  offenses  against  soci- 
ety which  are  punishable  by  civil  law.  It  does 
not  include  all  moral  offenses.  Those  not  punishable 
under  civil  law  are  excluded,  such  as  ingratitude,  com- 
mon lying,  and  the  like.  Lying  under  oath  is  the  crime 
of  perjury.  Certain  great  crimes,  such  as  murder, 
treason,  desertion  from  the  army,  are  punished  with 
death.  Crimes  are  of  various  kinds  and  degrees,  with 
corresponding  punishments,  varying  with  the  nation. 
In  England,  the  number  of  capital  crimes  is  now  far 
less  than  formerly,  and  prisoners  are  treated  with  far 
less  cruelty. 

The  proper  method  of  dealing  with  criminals  is  a 
great  practical  problem.  It  has  political,  economical, 
and  social,  as  well  as  moral  bearings.  It  is  receiving  the 
earnest  consideration  of  thoughtful  minds.  We  refer 
our  readers  to  the  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of 
Political  and  Social  Science,  also  to  the  International  Jour- 
nal of  Ethics,  both  published  at  Philadelphia. 

2.  Vice  and  Sin. — Vice  is  the  opposite  of  virtue; 
hence  every  virtue  has  its  corresponding  vice.  As 
moral  evils,  the  vices  may  be  regarded  both  in  their 
internal  and  external  aspects;  that  is,  in  character  and 
conduct.  As  we  speak  of  virtuous  character  and  virtu- 


148  SYSTEMS    OF   ETHICS 

ous  conduct,  so  we  speak  of  vicious  character  and  vi- 
cious conduct.  Vice  as  conduct  embraces  crime,  or  the 
infraction  of  duty  punishable  by  the  civil  law,  and  sins, 
or  the  infractions  of  duty  which  break  the  moral  law, 
but  which  may  or  may  not  be  crimes,  that  is,  punishable 
by  the  civil  law. 

All  crimes  that  break  the  moral  law  are  sins,  but 
all  sins  are  not  crimes — those  not  punishable  under  civil 
law;  but  there  are  crimes  that  are  not  sins;  for  example, 
the  crime  of  an  anti-slavery  man  in  refusing  to  aid  in 
capturing  a  runaway  slave,  at  the  command  of  the 
marshal,  under  the  act  called  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law. 
Such  a  refusal  was  not  a  sin,  though  technically  a  crime. 
It  would  have  been  a  sin  to  have  aided  in  the  capture. 
He  could  have  avoided  the  crime  by  committing  the 
sin.  What  ought  a  man  to  do  in  such  a  case? 

When  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  was  in  force,  many 
claimed  that  there  is  a  higher  law  which  ought  to  be 
obeyed,  when  in  opposition  to  a  wicked  civil  law.  The 
subject  called  out  a  great  discussion.  In  such  a  case 
a  person  ought  to  obey  his  conscience,  at  the  same  time 
remembering  that  his  judgment  is  fallible,  and  that  the 
presumption  is  in  favor  of  the  righteousness  of  the  civil 
law.  Each  person  must  be  the  judge  of  his  own  duty. 

j.  Enlargement  of  the  list  of  sins. — Conscientious 
persons  are  continually  discovering  additional  sins,  as 
their  moral  aims  outrun  the  moral  code  of  society, 
which  expresses  the  moral  sense  of  the  average  person. 
The  advanced  opinions  of  the  conscientious  and  the 
intelligent  gradually  find  their  way  into  the  accepted 
moral  code.  The  growth  of  the  moral  sense  of  society 
gradually  finds  embodiment  in  law,  and  thus  transforms 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  149 

sins  into  crimes.  But  many  sins  involve  their  own 
punishment,  which  is  regarded  as  sufficient,  and  ac- 
cordingly are  not  made  crimes,  consequently  not 
punishable  under  civil  law.  Sin,  as  the  voluntary 
transgression  of  the  moral  law,  involves  guilt  and  re- 
sponsibility, the  indispensable  condition  of  which  is  the 
freedom  of  the  will.  Character  is  formed  by  conduct. 
Man  as  a  free  being  can  so  control  his  conduct  as  essen- 
tially to  modify  his  character;  hence  he  is  responsible 
for  his  character. 

4.  Elements  of  character.— The  character  of  a  person 
is  the  resultant  of  several  elements  or  components — 
heredity,  environment,  personal  effort,  and  the  provi- 
dence of  God. 

(i)  Heredity. — Heredity  is  that  component  of  char- 
acter which  is  received  by  nature — the  peculiar  consti- 
tution, disposition,  traits,  and  proportionate  strength 
of  powers,  which  one  receives  as  an  inheritance  from 
his  ancestors. 

No  doubt  all  human  beings  have  certain  things  in 
common — the  same  original  powers  which  entitle  them 
all  to  be  called  human  beings;  but  there  is  a  difference 
in  the  physical  organization,  in  the  fineness  of  fiber  and 
nerve,  in  temperament,  and  in  the  relative  strength  of 
the  original  powers. 

Sometimes  the  disproportion  of  faculties  is  so  great, 
and  the  corresponding  tendencies  so  powerful,  as  to  be 
well-nigh,  if  not  quite,  irresistible.  The  individual  is 
abnormal,  and  if  the  unduly  strong  elements  are  appe- 
tites or  passions,  he  is  likely  to  become  a  monster  in 
crime.  The  overmastering  passion  sweeps  away  all  op- 
position from  the  will,  and  the  individual  yields  himself 


150  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

to  the  unbridled  gratification  of  his  desires.  As  abnor- 
mal specimens  of  humanity,  such  persons  are  not  to  be 
judged  by  the  ordinary  standard,  thus  requiring  large 
measures  of  charity. 

It  is  difficult  for  a  normal  person  to  judge  correctly 
or  to  treat  fairly  an  abnormal  one.  He  has  no  experi- 
ence which  can  supply  a  standard  for  judgment.  In 
many  cases,  doubtless,  the  proper  destination  of  ab- 
normal specimens  of  humanity  is  the  hospital  or  the 
asylum,  rather  than  the  penitentiary  or  the  gallows. 
The  subject  requires  and  is  receiving  careful  attention. 

In  average  cases  there  is  no  fatality.  A  man's  actions 
are  subject  to  his  own  control,  and  for  his  actions  he 
alone  is  responsible.  But  how  is  a  criminal  made  out 
of  an  average  individual?  By  first  committing  slight 
misdemeanors,  yielding  to  temptation  from  time  to  time, 
forming  bad  habits,  and  going  on  from  bad  to  worse, 
till  finally  the  tendencies  to  evil  become  practically  irre- 
sistible. He  then  becomes,  to  all  intents  and  purposes, 
an  abnormal  specimen,  only  he  is  responsible  for  his 
condition,  as  the  one  abnormal  by  nature  is  not  re- 
sponsible. 

Can  such  a  one  rescue  himself  from  his  condition? 
He  may;  but  he  must  begin  to  do  right  when  he  can, 
and  avoid  the  sins  he  can  avoid,  changing  his  environ- 
ment, if  possible,  and  especially  his  company,  and  con- 
tinue to  work  in  this  way  till  final  victory  is  secured. 
Sometimes  it  is  possible  to  reform  at  once  by  one  great 
effort;  if  so,  then  so  much  the  better. 

(2)  Environment. — That  component  in  the  forma- 
tion of  character  which  consists  in  the  surrounding  in- 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  IJI 

finances,  including  educational  advantages  and  religious 
influences,  is  called  environment.  It  is  found  in  the 
home,  the  father  and  mother,  brothers  and  sisters,  in 
relatives  and  neighbors,  street  companions  and  occa- 
sional acquaintances,  the  teacher  and  the  school,  the 
Church  and  public  gatherings,  the  show  and  the  fair, 
the  college  and  the  professional  school,  the  business  pur- 
suits and  benevolent  enterprises,  and  whatever  other 
outside  influences  act  on  a  person  throughout  his  entire 
course  of  life. 

That  the  environment  exerts  a  powerful  influence 
in  molding  character  will  not  be  questioned.  Take  two 
children,  born  the  same  day,  one  in  a  wealthy,  refined 
Christian  family  of  a  city,  and  the  other  in  a  family  of  a 
savage  tribe,  and  let  them  be  interchanged,  and  each 
treated  in  all  respects  as  the  other  would  have  been, 
and  what  would  be  the  result  when  the  boys  became 
men?  Heredity,  without  doubt,  would  show  in  each 
case;  but  the  outcome  would  prove  what  a  tremendous 
power  there  is  in  environment.  How  careful,  then, 
should  parents  be  in  regard  to  the  environment  of  their 
children. 

(3)  Personal  effort. — A  young  man  just  about  to 
begin  his  life's  work  is  likely  to  be  impressed  with  a 
sense  of  his  own  importance.  He  takes  for  his  gradu- 
ating thesis  the  subject,  "Every  Man  the  Architect  of  His 
own  Fortune."  This  undoubtedly  is,  in  a  large  measure, 
true,  and  is  not  a  bad  motto  for  a  young  man  to  keep 
before  his  mind.  Much  depends  on  the  person's  own 
effort,  and  on  this  fact  lies  his  responsibility,  and  he  has 
good  grounds  to  found  high  hopes,  if  he  does  according 


152  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

to  his  best  ability;  but  other  components  contribute  to 
the  result,  other  factors  to  the  product,  and  with  these 
he  must  reckon. 

(4)  The  providence  of  God. — It  is,  however,  often  true 
that  a  man,  after  meeting  with  many  reverses  and  dis- 
appointments in  life,  and  finding  the  outcome  not  as  he 
had  anticipated,  concludes  that  he  is  not  the  architect  of 
his  own  fortune,  or  that  he  is  not  a  skillful  architect. 
Perhaps  after  years  of  trial  a  new  field  of  work  opens 
to  him,  in  which  he  finds  enjoyment  and  an  opportunity 
for  usefulness.  He  now  exclaims, 

"  There  is  a  divinity  that  shapes  our  ends, 
Rough-hew  them  how  we  will." 

A  person  old  enough  to  understand  somewhat  of 
the  responsibilities  of  life  needs,  first  of  all,  to  adjust  his 
relations  to  God,  to  his  fellow-beings,  and  to  himself. 
He  then  should  choose  wisely  his  business  in  life;  next 
he  should  make  a  thorough  preparation  for  his  work. 
Having  entered  upon  his  work,  he  must  be  industrious 
and  energetic;  he  must  use  common  sense  and  manage 
skillfully;  he  must  be  a  progressive  and  growing  man 
to  the  end  of  life. 

The  good  providence  of  God  is  over  us  all,  and  it  is 
not  a  superstition  to  look  to  God  for  help  and  guidance, 
to  supplement  our  own  efforts  and  management.  The 
wisest  men  have  had  this  faith.  "The  meek  will  he 
guide  in  judgment." 

Notwithstanding  the  best  that  we  can  do,  in  spite 
of  the  maxims  of  prudence  and  the  laws  of  morality, 
the  fact  of  sin  encounters  us  on  every  hand,  and  mars 
many  a  character  that  otherwise  would  be  beautiful. 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  153 

Is  sin  a  consequence  of  ignorance?  Is  it  true,  as  Soc- 
rates taught,  that  every  man  would  do  what  is  right,  if 
he  only  knew  what  is  right?  Both  Spinoza  and  Leib- 
nitz make  immorality  the  product  of  confused  ideas, 
and  thus  an  error.  At  first  view  this  looks  plausible, 
and  the  argument  in  support  of  this  opinion  seems  con- 
clusive. It  can  be  stated  thus:  Every  man  desires  the 
greatest  possible  good  for  himself;  but  he  can  obtain  the 
greatest  possible  good  only  by  doing  right;  hence  he 
would  do  right  if  he  only  knew  what  is  right;  that  is,  sin 
is  resolvable  into  ignorance. 

The  fallacy  in  the  above  argument,  as  I  take  it,  is 
that  the  wrong-doer,  though  he  may  accept  the  second 
premise  theoretically — that  he  can  obtain  the  greatest 
possible  good  only  by  doing  right,  yet  refuses  to  act 
on  it  in  practice,  preferring  present  intense  gratification 
to  a  distant,  milder,  though  truly  a  higher  good. 

It  is  perfectly  certain  that  in  many  cases  the  doctrine 
of  Socrates  is  not  true.  For  example,  a  drunkard  knows 
full  well  that  he  is  on  the  downward  road,  and  that  the 
course  he  is  pursuing  will  lead  to  his  ruin;  yet  with  his 
eyes  open  to  the  consequences,  such  is  the  strength  of 
appetite  that  he  pushes  on  till  he  plunges  into  the  abyss. 
In  such  cases,  truer  than  the  words  of  Socrates  are  those 
of  Ovid: 

"  Video  meliora  proboque ;  deteriora  sequor." 

But  is  not  a  drunkard  in  an  abnormal  condition? 
Yes,  and  so  are  a  multitude  of  others.  Are  they  respon- 
sible? In  a  majority  of  cases,  undoubtedly  they  are  re- 
sponsible, at  least  for  allowing  themselves  to  drift  into 
such  conditions;  and  even  now  rescue  in  many  cases  is 


154  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

not  hopeless.  But  if  his  own  strength  is  not  sufficient, 
there  is  One  mighty  to  save  and  strong  to  deliver,  and 
none  will  appeal  to  him  in  vain. 

The  doctrine  of  freedom  does  not  explain  why  some 
men  become  criminals,  and  others  virtuous  citizens.  It 
explains  only  that,  in  all  normal  cases,  each  man  has  the 
power  to  do  right,  and  is  responsible  for  doing  wrong. 
The  great  criminals  are  unbalanced;  they  are  monsters 
by  heredity,  or  have  been  made  so  by  their  environment, 
or  have  made  themselves  so  by  their  conduct,  or  per- 
haps some  have  been  made  so  by  overmastering  tempta- 
tion. There  is  occasion  for  charity;  but  society  must 
be  protected  from  the  outrageous  conduct  of  the  dan- 
gerous criminal  classes. 

One  thing  seems  clear — the  diseased,  the  imbecile, 
the  excessively  abnormal,  and  the  incorrigibly  wicked 
should  not  be  allowed  to  contract  marriage  alliances. 
It  seems  wrong,  in  the  overcrowded  condition  of  the 
population  of  the  world,  to  allow  misery  to  be  propa- 
gated. Depravity,  the  tendency  to  sin,  is  hereditary, 
but  not  actual  personal  sin.  We  are  not  responsible 
for  the  sin  of  Adam.  It  will  quite  suffice  if  we  answer 
for  our  own  sins. 

The  analysis  of  sin  reveals  an  objective  factor — some 
object  which  tempts,  entices,  or  allures;  a  subjective 
factor — some  appetite,  affection,  or  desire  of  the  sensi- 
bility; the  action  of  the  objective  factor  and  the  re- 
action of  the  subjective;  the  accompanying  excitement 
of  the  sensibility  craving  gratification,  and  soliciting  the 
will  to  yield  to  the  temptation;  the  consent  of  the  will; 
the  corresponding  outward  act,  doing  the  wicked  deed. 
The  will  is  not  coerced,  but  chooses  the  evil,  though 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS  155 

not  without  temptation.  The  sin  is  in  the  wrong  de- 
cision, which  objectifies  itself  in  the  outward  act. 

The  central  element  of  morality  is  a  right  will;  that 
is,  a  will  to  do  right — a  will  that  embodies  itself  in  deeds. 
It  is  the  ultimate  right  act,  and  its  consequence  is  the 
ultimate  good — the  consciousness  of  rectitude. 

According  to  Fichte,  all  right  moral  action  is  the 
striving  towards  the  ideal — the  full  realization  of  a  per- 
fected self. 

According  to  Hegel,  the  source  of  morality  is  not 
in  the  subjective  but  in  the  objective  will,  in  that  im- 
personal power  of  the  world  of  reason,  shared  and 
actualized  by  individual  wills,  the  consensus  of  the  moral 
opinions  of  the  good.  Development  takes  place  in  this 
universal  world  of  reason  by  the  participation  of  the 
individual  reason.  Hence  the  highest  good  is  the  de- 
velopment of  the  universal  world  of  reason.  The  aim, 
then,  should  be  to  eliminate  evil  from  the  universe,  and 
to  bring  all  wills  into  harmony  with  the  will  of  the  uni- 
versal reason,  bringing  all  rational  beings  to  the  final 
goal — the  realization  of  integrity  of  character,  with  its 
attendant  satisfaction. 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS 


Chapter  I 
EGOISTIC   VIRTUES 

T\EFINITION  of  virtue. — Virtue  is  personal  worthi- 
J~S  ness.  It  is  the  steadfast  disposition  to  pursue 
ultimate  good  by  the  employment  of  right  means.  It 
aims  to  realize  the  standard  of  excellence. 

That  there  is  something  heroic  or  unflinching  in 
virtue  is  implied  in  the  etymology  of  the  word.  Vir  is 
not  simply  homo,  a  man;  but  a  heroic  man,  a  hero. 

2.  General  characteristics  of  the  virtues. — These  are 
purity,  decision,  independence,  and  heroism. 

1 i)  Purity. — This  signifies  not  only  the  absence  of 
inordinate  appetites,  unholy  affections  and  desires,  and 
unclean  images;  but  it  also  means  the  absence  of  hypoc- 
risy, intrigue,  double-dealing,  and  all  meanness,  and  the 
presence  of  honesty  and  integrity  of  character,  which 
speak  through  the  eye  and  illuminate  the  countenance 
with  truth  and  goodness. 

(2)  Decision. — There  is  in  virtue  the  strong  will  to 
carry  the  righteous  purpose  into  execution.     A  firm 
rein  is  held  over  the  appetites,  the  passions,  the  affec- 
tions, and  the  desires.     There  is  a  decided  purpose  not 
to  swerve  from  the  path  of  rectitude,  whatever  be  the 
allurements  of  pleasure,  the  inducements  of  gain,  or  the 
appeals  to  ambition.    Virtue  is  marked  not  only  by  the 
placid  countenance,  but  by  the  firm  lip  and  steady  look. 

159 


l6o  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

(3)  Independence. — A  virtuous  person  is  self-poised; 
he  is  not  carried  about  with  every  wind  of  doctrine,  nor 
swayed  by  popular  opinion;  but  he  is  ready  to  stand 
alone,  if  need  be,  and  maintain  his  convictions  steadfast 
in  the  integrity  of  his  spirit  and  in  the  persuasion  of  the 
righteousness  of  his  cause. 

(4)  Heroism. — The  virtuous  man  is  heroic;  he  has 
the  courage  of  his  convictions;  he  will  face  opposition, 
persecution,  imprisonment,  or  death,  rather  than  prove 
false  to  the  cause  of  truth.     All  honor  to  the  martyr. 
Of  such  the  world  is  not  worthy. 

5.  Virtue  compared  with  merit  and  duty. — Virtue  is 
the  disposition,  the  steadfast  purpose  to  do  right;  merit 
lies  in  the  particular  volition  to  do  a  right  thing,  and  in 
carrying  out  the  volition  into  execution  in  the  best 
possible  manner.  In  contrast  with  duty,  virtue  is  what 
a  person  ought  to  possess;  duty  is  what  he  ought  to 
perform.  Virtue  is  the  good  internal  state;  duty  is  the 
right  external  conduct.  Virtue  is  goodness;  duty  is 
righteousness.  Virtue  is  the  fountain;  duty  is  the 
stream.  Virtue  is  to  be;  duty  is  to  do.  According  to 
the  Epicureans,  the  pursuit  of  happiness  is  virtue;  ac- 
cording to  the  Stoics,  the  pursuit  of  virtue  is  happiness. 
The  essence  of  virtue  is  the  harmony  of  the  intellect  and 
will  in  the  endeavor  to  perfect  the  entire  being. 

4.  Virtues  peculiar  to  various  classes  of  society. — There 
are  shades  of  differences  in  the  virtues  of  the  various 
classes  of  society,  as  of  men  and  women,  the  old  and 
the  young,  the  parent  and  the  child,  the  teacher  and 
the  pupil,  the  rich  and  the  poor,  the  wise  and  the  igno- 
rant, the  strong  and  the  weak,  the  one  in  health  and 
the  one  who  is  sick,  the  one  in  authority  and  the  one 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  l6l 

under  authority.  The  difference  is  not  in  virtue  itself, 
but  in  the  phase  of  virtue  required,  and  in  the  mode 
of  carrying  it  into  execution. 

5.  Aristotle's  conception  of  virtue. — Aristotle  regarded 
each  virtue  as  a  mean  between  two  extremes — one  ex- 
treme distinguished  by  excess,  and  the  other  by  defect. 
Thus,  courage  is  a  mean  between  rashness,  the  excess 
of  courage,  and  cowardice,  the  defect.     This  way  of 
regarding  the  virtues  has  some  practical  advantages, 
as  it  is  a  standing  admonition  to  avoid  extremes.     We 
can  say,  if  we  choose,  that  rashness  is  due  to  a  defect 
of  prudence,  and  cowardice  to  an  excess. 

Likewise  generosity  may  be  regarded  as  a  mean 
between  the  extremes,  prodigality  and  stinginess.  Aris- 
totle says:  "Everybody  who  understands  his  business 
avoids  alike  excess  and  deficiency." 

6.  Classification  of  the  virtues. — The  virtues  may  be 
classified  as  the  egoistic,  or  self-regarding  virtues,  and 
the  altruistic,  or  other-regarding  virtues.     Each  of  these 
has  several  subdivisions. 

7.  Egoistic  virtues. — The  egoistic  virtues  may  be  di- 
vided into  prudence;  courage,  including  valor  and  forti- 
tude; temperance,  including  moderation  and  self-con- 
trol; purity,  including  cleanliness  and  chastity;  industry, 
frugality. 

The  egoistic  virtues  are  not  necessarily  immoral  or 
even  non-moral,  as  some  moralists  maintain,  on  the 
ground  that  they  are  selfish.  It  is  true  that  sometimes 
certain  self-gratifications  are  sought,  regardless  of  the 
fact  that  they  interfere  with  the  rights  of  others.  This 
is,  of  course,  immoral ;  but  such  a  course  does  not  show 

a  true  interest  in  self  in  promoting  its  highest  welfare, 
ii 


162  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

but  in  something  else  regarded  as  a  means  of  gratifi- 
cation. 

It  is  certainly  right,  and  even  duty,  for  a  person  to 
regard  his  own  true  interests,  including  all  those  that 
range  from  bodily  health  up  through  his  intellectual 
progress  to  his  highest  moral  and  spiritual  interests. 
No  duty  is  more  imperative,  and  to  do  this  duty  is  true 
moral  conduct,  and  the  fulfillment  of  the  first  moral 
obligation.  A  person  in  rightly  advancing  his  own  wel- 
fare is  in  better  condition  to  advance  the  welfare  of  his 
fellow-beings. 

The  egoistic  virtues  lead  each  person  to  find  and 
maintain  his  proper  position  in  the  moral  order.  It  is 
the  duty  of  every  one  to  find  his  niche,  and  to  make  sure 
of  his  footing.  This  gives  him  a  base  of  operations  as 
he  advances  from  the  egoistic  virtues  to  altruistic. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  egoistic  virtues  in  detail : 

( i)  Prudence. — Fear  is  a  compound  of  aversion  and 
expectation.  Prudence,  in  its  rudimental  form,  is  a 
combination  of  fear  and  cunning.  When  fear  is  trans- 
formed into  caution  and  cunning  into  wisdom,  we  have 
the  virtue  of  prudence.  It  is  wisdom  or  forethought 
employed  in  guarding  personal  interests  from  antici- 
pated danger.  Prudence  is  the  fundamental  egoistic 
virtue.  "Do  thyself  no  harm." 

A  conscientious  man  deems  it  right  to  guard  his 
own  rights  and  to  conserve  his  powers,  in  order  that  he 
may  attain  to  his  own  highest  good,  promote  the  inter- 
ests of  his  family,  advance  the  welfare  of  society,  and 
thus  fulfill  his  mission  in  the  world.  Employing  his 
powers  of  forethought,  he  can  see  the  premonitions  of 
coming  evil.  Anticipating  its  approach  from  the  threat- 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  163 

en  ing  signs,  he  employs  his  wisdom  to  thwart  the  wicked 
designs  of  an  adversary,  or  to  avert  an  impending  calam- 
ity. "A  prudent  man  foreseeth  the  evil  and  hideth  him- 
self, but  the  simple  pass  on  and  are  punished." 

There  are  many  occasions  for  the  exercise  of  pru- 
dence, as  in  guarding  health  and  strength,  avoiding 
hazardous  business  enterprises,  making  preparations  to 
weather  an  expected  financial  crisis,  guarding  the  morals 
of  the  family,  avoiding  needless  antagonisms  and  con- 
flicts, laying  provisions  in  store,  depositing  surplus 
earnings  in  bank,  insuring  property  or  life,  avoiding 
building  in  places  exposed  to  malaria  or  on  grounds 
liable  to  inundation,  avoiding  bad  water  or  unwhole- 
some food,  and  observing  temperance  in  eating  and 
drinking. 

Thus  we  see  that  prudence  is  not  identical  with 
cowardice,  but  is  consistent  with  both  bravery  and 
wisdom.  After  exercising  due  prudence,  and  making 
sure  that  you  are  right,  then  push  forward  with  bold- 
ness. 

(2)  Courage. — Courage  is  the  virtue  required  in 
encountering  danger  or  in  enduring  suffering.  It  is, 
therefore,  both  an  active  and  a  passive  virtue.  In  its 
active  form,  it  is  called  valor  or  bravery;  in  its  passive 
form,  patience  or  fortitude.  Valor  incurs  danger  with- 
out wavering;  fortitude  endures  pain  without  flinching. 
As  a  rule,  valor  is  the  courage  of  men;  fortitude  of 
women.  Men  bravely  face  danger;  women  patiently  en- 
dure suffering,  but  shrink  from  encountering  danger. 
A  man  loses  his  property,  and  becomes  insane  or  com- 
mits suicide;  a  woman  loses  hers,  and  begins  work 
anew.  Bravery  and  fortitude  lead  on  to  victory. 


164  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

In  the  battle  of  life,  with  its  dangers  and  sufferings, 
there  is  much  need  of  courage,  both  as  valor  and  as 
fortitude.  Some  are  called  upon  to  face  the  enemy  on 
the  field  of  battle,  and  others  to  endure  the  pain  of 
sickness. 

Courage  enables  us  to  encounter  difficulties,  to  over- 
come obstacles,  and  to  endure  the  reverse  of  fortune,  so 
common  to  the  lot  of  humanity.  A  man  destitute  of 
courage  is  almost  certain  to  be  a  failure. 

Moral  courage  is  required  to  advocate  the  cause  of 
truth  when  unpopular,  or  to  endure  persecution  for 
righteousness'  sake. 

Courage  restrained  by  prudence  will  not  rise  to 
rashness,  and  cheered  by  hope  it  will  not  sink  into 
cowardice.  Hence  be  very  courageous;  avoid  rashness 
on  the  one  hand,  and  cowardice  on  the  other.  Courage 
is  the  very  heart  of  virtue. 

(3)  Temperance. — Temperance  is  moderation  or 
self-control.  It  has  special  reference  to  appetite.  It 
signifies  total  abstinence  from  all  injurious  or  unlawful 
gratification  of  appetite,  and  the  restraint  of  lawful  grati- 
fication within  reasonable  bounds.  Intemperance  in 
eating  is  gluttony;  in  drinking,  drunkenness. 

Among  primitive  people,  worshipers  of  ancestors, 
or  those  who  thought  the  gods  may  be  hungry,  con- 
sider intemperance  a  vice,  since  it  deprives  their  ances- 
tors or  the  gods  of  their  share  of  food  or  drink,  and 
hence  libations  to  the  gods.  On  the  other  hand,  among 
the  Greeks,  in  their  Bacchanalian  revels,  the  god  of  wine 
was  supposed  to  be  honored  by  their  orgies. 

The  need  of  the  virtue  of  temperance  is  apparent 
from  a  consideration  of  the  evils  of  intemperance.  The 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  l6j 

wise  man's  advice  is  good:  "Be  not  among  wine-bibbers, 
nor  among  riotous  eaters  of  flesh;  for  the  drunkard  and 
the  glutton  shall  come  to  poverty."  Again:  "Look  not 
upon  the  wine  when  it  is  red,  ...  at  the  last  it  biteth 
like  a  serpent  and  stingeth  like  an  adder." 

It  is  possible  to  be  intemperate  in  other  forms  of  in- 
dulgence besides  eating  and  drinking,  as  in  recreation, 
or  in  fact  in  any  kind  of  conduct.  One  may  work  im- 
moderately. 

The  appetites  have  their  proper  functions.  They  in- 
cite to  necessary  acts,  which  otherwise  would  be  neg- 
lected; but  they  should  not  have  control.  Their  proper 
rank  is  that  of  subordination.  In  the  moral  realm,  the 
will  is  the  sovereign,  and  reason  the  chief  counselor. 

(4)  Purity. — Purity  embraces  both  cleanliness  and 
chastity. 

a.  Cleanliness  of  person,  if  not  strictly  a  virtue,  is 
akin  to  morality.    Filthiness  of  the  flesh  is  closely  allied 
to  filthiness  of  the  spirit.     It  is  certainly  commendable 
to  have  not  only  our  hearts  sprinkled  from  an  evil  con- 
science,   but    our    bodies    washed    with    pure    water. 
"Cleanliness  is  next  to  godliness." 

b.  Chastity  is  a  virtue  of  the  highest  honor.    No  vice 
is  more  detrimental  to  health,  or  more  degrading  and 
loathsome  than  unchastity.     It  was  this  vice  that  called 
down  the  wrath  of  God  on  Sodom  and  Gomorrah,  those 
corrupt  cities  of  the  plains. 

The  high  rank  of  chastity  among  the  virtues  is  evi- 
dent from  the  fact  that  by  the  mention  of  a  virtuous 
woman  we  instantly  think  of  a  chaste  woman.  The  high 
standard  of  this  virtue  among  women  is  their  highest 
honor;  but  the  standard  should  be  no  lower  among 


l66  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

men.  But  the  actual  standard  is  higher  among  women; 
why  is  this?  Because  of  the  consequences.  Unchastity 
in  woman  is  a  greater  evil  than  it  is  in  man.  Giving 
birth  to  a  child  identifies  the  mother.  She  knows  her 
own  children;  a  father  accepts  his  from  faith  in  his  wife. 
The  future  progress  of  the  human  race  depends 
largely  on  the  promotion  of  the  virtue  of  chastity. 
Young  people  should  be  instructed  in  respect  to  this 
virtue  .and  its  opposite  vice,  and  their  morals  carefully 
guarded.  Great  interests  are  at  stake. 

(5)  Industry. — This  is  primarily  an  economic  virtue. 
Industry  promotes  the  prosperity  of  the  individual;  it 
is  not  only  egoistic,  but  is  also  altruistic,  as  it  is  bene- 
ficial to  the  family  and  to  society  and  the  State.     By 
absorbing  the  energies  of  the  individual,  it  is  a  restraint 
against  vicious  tendencies;  and  in  this  respect  it  has  a 
moral  bearing,  as  well  as  in  increasing  the  resources  of 
the  individual  for  good. 

(6)  Frugality. — This    is   also    an    economic    virtue. 
But  in  guarding  against  waste,  extravagance,  and  lux- 
ury, it  conserves  the  resources  of  the  individual  and 
promotes  the  general  welfare,  and  hence  may  be  reck- 
oned among  the  moral  virtues. 

All  the  egoistic  virtues  have  an  altruistic  bearing, 
since  a  person,  by  increasing  and  conserving  his  own 
resources,  is  better  able  to  be  useful  to  others.  The 
utility  of  these  virtues  is  their  final  justification — they 
tend  to  promote  the  welfare  of  the  human  race. 

8.  Habit  is  the  tendency  to  action  acquired  by  repe- 
tition. 

The  importance  of  habit  is  evident  from  the  fact  that 
the  virtues  and  the  vices  are  formed  and  confirmed  by 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  167 

habitual  conduct,  which  crystallize  into  character.  The 
importance  of  habit  is  also  illustrated  by  the  common 
proverbs:  Habit  is  second  nature;  Man  is  a  bundle  of 
habits;  The  force  of  habit  is  hard  to  break;  It  was  done 
by  the  force  of  habit. 

The  basis  of  habit  is  the  plasticity  of  matter  and 
mind.  An  impression  made  upon  a  body  tends  to  abide, 
since  matter,  in  general,  is  not  perfectly  elastic.  The 
mind  tends  to  act  as  it  has  acted  before,  since  thought 
forces  follow  the  old  paths,  or  lines  of  the  least  resist- 
ance. 

(1)  The  laws  of  habit. — An   impression    tends   to 
abide;  an  act  tends  to  recur.     The  tendency  to  recur 
varies  with  the  strength  of  the  act,  with  the  number  of 
repetitions,  with  the  recentness  of  the  repetitions,  with 
the  interest  taken.     Continuance  in  well-doing  develops 
into  the  habit  of  well-doing;  continuance  in  evil-doing, 
into   the   habit  of  evil-doing.      Habit   crystallizes   into 
character,  which  tends  to  permanency. 

(2)  The  classes  of  habits  are  physical,  intellectual, 
and  moral. 

a.  Physical  habits   are    illustrated   by   a   tablecloth, 
which  readily  folds  in  the  old  creases;  by  a  bow,  which, 
being  often  bent,  acquires  a  set.     A  nervous  current 
through  the  brain  follows  an  old  track.    A  person  winds 
his  watch  at  a  stated  time;  or  if  not,  forgets  to  wind  it. 

b.  Intellectual  habits  are  illustrated  by  the  fact  that 
we  think  readily  as  we  have  thought  before;  that  proc- 
esses at  first  difficult  become  easy  after  sufficient  prac- 
tice, as  the  performance  of  a  skillful  musician  or  mathe- 
matician.   Right  habits  of  thought  are  easy  to  continue; 
wrong  habits  are  hard  to  break  up.    A  habit  of  attentive 


l68  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

observation  gives  an  accurate  knowledge  of  facts;  clear 
thinking  makes  the  cogent  reasoner;  a  patient  investi- 
gator becomes  a  discoverer  or  an  inventor. 

c.  Moral  habits. — A  right  act  tends  to  recur.  A  con- 
tinuation of  right  acts  is  right  conduct.  Right  conduct 
forms  good  character.  Good  character  reproduces  right 
conduct.  A  right  character  tends  to  permanence.  A 
wrong  act  tends  to  recur.  A  continuance  of  wrong  acts 
is  wrong  conduct.  Wrong  conduct  forms  bad  char- 
acter. Bad  character  reproduces  wrong  conduct.  A 
bad  character  tends  to  permanence. 

(3)  Precepts. — These  precepts  aid  in  forming  good 
habits  and  correcting  bad  habits. 

a.  Form  early  in  life  as  possible  good  habits,  phys- 
ical,  intellectual,   and   moral,   by   persistence   in    right 
conduct. 

b.  Correct  bad  habits  as  promptly  as  possible,  by 
refraining  from  wrong  conduct,   for  which   substitute 
right  conduct. 

(4)  Consequences. — The     consequences     prove     the 
value  of  the  plan. 

a.  Right  habits  diminish  effort,  relieve  from  anxiety, 
economize  energy,  render  the  work  accurate,  and  set 
thought  free  for  something  else  while  the  work  goes  on. 

b.  Habit  is  an  ally  if  right,  an  enemy  if  wrong. 

c.  Right  habits  bring  their  own  reward;  bad  habits 
their  own  punishment. 

d.  Exceptions  break  the  force  of  habit,  and  prevent 
it  from  crystallizing  into  character. 

e.  Good  character  manifests  itself  in  well-doing,  and 
receives  the  crown  of  life. 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  169 

($)  Rules. — The  following  rules  will  be  of  service : 

a.  Form  a  good  practicable  plan  of  conduct. 

b.  Carry  out  the  plan  as  far  as  possible  without  ex- 
ceptions. 

c.  Seek  opportunities  for  doing  good,  or  make  op- 
portunities. 

p.  Business. — The  following  precepts  will  serve  as 
guides : 

(1)  Find  out  your  proper  work,  learn  the  best  meth- 
ods, and  put  them  in  practice. 

(2)  Make  honorable  contracts  and  fulfill  them. 

(3)  Render  faithful  service  if  an  employee. 

(4)  Pay  the  wages  promptly  if  an  employer. 

(5)  Be   careful   about   making  promises,   but  keep 
them  when  made. 

(6)  Avoid  dishonesty  and  every  species  of  fraud. 

(7)  Establish  a  good  character,  and  take  care  of  your 
reputation. 

(8)  Stand  by  the  truth,  but  do  not  needlessly  make 
enemies. 

(9)  Aim  at  success  by  industry,  economy,  and  good 
management. 

(10)  Work  for  your  own  perfection  and  happiness, 
(n)  Work    for    the    perfection    and    happiness    of 

others. 

(12)  Remember  that  you  are  known  to  yourself  and 
to  God. 


Chapter  II 
ALTRUISTIC   VIRTUES 

COMPARISON  of  the  egoistic  and  altruistic  virtues. — 
We  have  distinguished  the  virtues  as  egoistic  and 
altruistic,  not  that  the  egoistic  virtues  have  no  refer- 
ence to  other  people,  or  that  the  altruistic  have  no  refer- 
ence to  self;  but  because  the  egoistic  virtues  relate 
primarily  to  self,  and  secondarily  to  others;  and  the 
altruistic  primarily  to  others,  and  secondarily  to  self. 
The  egoistic  virtues  are  the  necessary  basis  of  the  altru- 
istic, and  the  altruistic  the  ripe  fruitage  of  the  egoistic. 

2.  Classification  of  the  altruistic  virtues. — The  altru- 
istic virtues  may  be  divided  into  sympathy,  justice,  and 
benevolence.  Under  justice  may  be  grouped  gratitude, 
honesty,  veracity;  and  under  benevolence,  pity,  com- 
passion, mercy,  charity;  the  domestic  affections  relate 
both  to  justice  and  to  benevolence;  so  do  the  patriotic 
sentiments.  Suavity,  courtesy,  politeness,  are  primarily 
matters  of  etiquette,  with  a  secondary  relation  to  morals. 

5.  Sympathy. — Sympathy  is  fellow-feeling,  or  feeling 
with  others  as  they  feel.  Some  animals  are  solitary  in 
their  habits,  others  are  gregarious.  The  difference  turns 
on  the  preponderance  of  the  self-maintaining  or  the 
race-maintaining  tendency.  When  animals  act  from 
sympathy,  they  do  this  from  an  instinctive  impulse,  and 
•not  from  any  rational  motive. 

Solitariness  prevails  when  support  and  safety  can  be 

170 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS 

better  obtained  by  dispersion,  and  gregariousness  when 
food  is  more  easily  obtained  by  searching  for  it  in  con- 
cert, and  protection  by  combined  resistance  against 
attack. 

Sociality  begins  to  prevail  as  the  dispersive  ten- 
dencies diminish,  and  the  gregariousness  becomes  more 
advantageous.  Companionship  begets  sympathy,  which 
becomes  a  strong  bond  of  union.  As  two  musical  in- 
struments tuned  to  the  same  pitch  vibrate  in  unison, 
and  as  a  vibration  in  a  string  of  one  causes  a  like  vibra- 
tion ia  the  corresponding  string  of  the  other,  so  do  two 
individuals  of  the  same  species  tend  to  feel  in  concert, 
and  this  fellow-feeling  is  the  fundamental  fact  of  sym- 
pathy. 

Sympathy  is  the  rudimental  form  of  the  altruistic 
virtues,  as  prudence  is  of  the  egoistic.  It  increases  so 
long  as  the  pleasure  it  affords  preponderates  over  pain; 
it  decreases  whenever  unpleasant  effects  prevail.  The 
tendency  to  sympathy  is  found  between  individuals  of 
the  same  species,  between  the  sexes,  and  between  par- 
ents and  offspring.  It  is  strengthened  by  sameness  of 
nationality,  by  social,  party,  and  Church  relations,  by 
equality  in  culture,  and  by  harmony  of  interests. 

Antipathies  are  generated  by  the  conflicting  inter- 
ests of  social  classes,  parties,  Churches,  societies,  by 
rivalries  between  individuals,  by  the  antagonisms  of  hos- 
tile nations,  instigated  by  the  selfish  ambition  of  the 
rulers,  causing  wars;  by  the  worldly  aspirations  of  the 
leaders  of  religious  opinions,  instigating  ecclesiastical 
bigotry.  All  these  antagonisms  have  greatly  hindered 
the  prevalence  of  universal  sympathy,  so  essential  to  the 
highest  happiness  of  the  human  race,  by  aiding  in  the 


172  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

development  of  the  higher  forms  of  the  altruistic  vir- 
tues— justice  and  benevolence. 

4.  Justice. — Justice  is  the  rendering  to  every  one  his 
due.  It  grants  the  freedom  of  self-realization,  provided 
it  does  not  interfere  with  the  self-realization  of  others. 
It  is  due  recompense  for  something  rendered,  whether 
beneficial  or  injurious.  It  implies  impartiality  in  its 
distribution;  the  observance  of  legal  obligations,  con- 
tracts, and  definite  understandings;  the  fulfillment  of 
reasonable  expectations;  reparations  for  injury,  and  the 
punishment  of  crime.  It  signifies  a  fair  return  for  serv- 
ices, taking  into  consideration  the  labor  required  in  the 
service,  and  the  value  of  the  service  to  whom  it  is  ren- 
dered. 

The  adage,  "Be  just  before  you  are  generous,"  seems 
to  indicate  that,  in  the  popular  mind,  justice  is  a  virtue 
quite  distinct  from  benevolence,  and  this  is,  in  an  im- 
portant sense,  true.  Justice  relates  to  social  life,  and 
is  therefore  of  public  concern;  while  benevolence  relates 
to  private  life,  and  is  therefore  of  private  concern.  But 
when  we  raise  the  question,  Why  ought  we  to  be  just? 
the  answer  first  given,  Justice  is  due  others,  raises  the 
further  question,  Why  give  others  their  due?  The  an- 
swer is,  In  doing  so,  we  promote  the  general  welfare, 
and  to  do  this  is  the  dictate  of  benevolence.  The  obli- 
gation to  promote  the  general  welfare  is  self-evident 
and  ultimate. 

Traces  of  the  instinct  of  justice  may  be  found  among 
animals.  A  male  bird  feeding  his  mate  while  she  sits 
on  her  eggs,  affords  a  beautiful  instance  of  compen- 
satory justice.  Young  animals  receiving  benefits  from 
their  parents,  in  proportion  to  their  helplessness,  indi- 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  173 

cates  affection,  not  justice;  but  mature  animals  win 
rewards  in  proportion  to  their  efficiency.  In  the  strug- 
gle for  existence,  individuals  perish,  but  nature  pre- 
serves the  species: 

"So  careful  of  the  type  she  seems; 
So  careless  of  the  single  life." 

The  biological  law  of  natural  selection  is  an  instance 
of  the  justice  of  nature.  Those  survive  and  prosper 
which,  as  a  rule,  are  most  efficient. 

Natural  justice  is  interfered  with  in  various  ways. 
Many  species  of  a  low  type  survive  by  the  slaughter  of 
multitudes  of  other  species.  Again,  multitudes  perish, 
the  good  and  bad  alike,  from  scarcity  of  food  or  the  in- 
clemency of  the  weather,  or  from  the  intrusion  of  para- 
sites. In  proportion,  however,  to  the  evolution  of  the 
organism,  the  ratio  between  efficiency  and  prosperity  is 
more  constant,  and  justice  becomes  more  uniformly 
exemplified. 

In  these  cases,  individual  conduct  is  somewhat  re- 
stricted by  considerations  of  the  general  good.  Habits 
thus  formed  become  traits  of  character  for  the  species 
and  operate  as  laws,  the  infraction  of  which  is  visited 
with  penalties.  An  idle  beaver  is  banished  from  the 
community.  The  working  bees  kill  the  drones.  A  flock 
of  crows  kill  an  offensive  companion.  A  rogue  of  an 
elephant  is  expelled  from  the  herd.  Here  we  see  the 
beginning  of  justice,  and  such  acts  tend  to  the  evolution 
of  higher  capabilities. 

(i)  Modification  of  the  law  connecting  prosperity  with 
efficiency. — Mr.  Spencer  has  pointed  out  a  threefold 
modification. 


174  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

a.  In  favor  of  the  helpless  young  which  are  cared 
for  by  their  parents  in  proportion  inversely   to   their 
efficiency. 

b.  Among  gregarious  animals  individual  aggressive- 
ness is  restricted  by  social  requirements  of  non-interfer- 
ence with  the  wants  of  the  associated  individuals. 

c.  The  sacrifice  of  individuals  is  sanctioned  when  it 
contributes  to  the  prosperity  of  the  whole. 

The  first  restriction  applies  to  animals  in  general, 
the  second  to  gregarious  animals,  the  third  in  case  of 
enemies  of  different  species. 

In  the  human  race  the  law  that  prosperity  is  propor- 
tional to  efficiency  works  for  the  preservation  of  the 
species,  by  securing  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  and  the 
spread  of  the  best  races  of  mankind  over  the  world. 
The  law,  as  applied  to  man,  has  the  same  threefold  re- 
striction as  when  applied  to  animals — the  young  are 
cared  for  without  merit,  the  strong  are  not  allowed  to 
encroach  on  their  fellows,  and  the  individual  is  sacrificed 
in  the  face  of  enemies  when  the  good  of  the  whole  re- 
quires it,  with  this  extension,  the  enemies  may  be  of  the 
same  species. 

•  Among  the  earlier  races  of  mankind  justice  first 
took  the  form  of  repelling  aggression,  obtaining  satis- 
faction for  the  infringement  of  rights,  the  punishment 
of  crime,  and  resistance  against  invasion.  An  eye  for 
an  eye,  a  tooth  for  a  tooth,  blood  for  blood,  life  for  life. 
The  fear  of  retaliation  checked  aggression. 

In  the  spread  of  the  human  race  there  would  be 
collisions  of  tribes  and  nations.  Wars  were  undertaken 
for  conquest,  as  well  as  for  defense.  In  some  cases,  no 
doubt,  wars  have  contributed  to  the  progress  of  man- 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  175 

kind;  but  the  overthrow  of  the  Roman  Empire  by  bar- 
barous hordes  proves  that  for  a  time  human  progress 
may  be  reversed  by  war,  though,  as  events  have  shown, 
only  to  return  with  the  greater  momentum. 

Each  man  is  free  to  act  as  he  will,  provided  he  does 
not  encroach  on  the  equal  freedom  of  another.  What 
each  person  claims  for  himself,  he  must,  of  course,  con- 
cede to  others,  else  his  claim  will  not  be  allowed. 

(2)  Checks  to  injustice. — Several  factors  have  co- 
operated : 

a.  The  fear  of  retaliation. — Aggression  arouses  re- 
taliation.    Men  do  not  tamely  submit  to  robbery  or  to 
any  form  of  injustice.     Aggression  is  taught  justice  by 
resistance.    Justice  is  taught  by  the  force  which  resists 
injustice.     Equals  can  not  overcome  one  another,  and 
so  are  taught  toleration.    Free  thought  is  the  best  means 
for  the  discovery  and  defense  of  truth. 

b.  The  dread  of  social  disgrace. — All  the  people  sym- 
pathize with  the  one  wronged,  and  even  when  they  do 
not  aid  in  bringing  upon  the  aggressor  summary  venge- 
ance, yet  they  brand  him  with  the  mark  of  his  crime. 
The  dread  of  disgrace  is  a  check  to  all  forms  of  injustice. 

c.  The  dread  of  punishment. — The  chief  desirous  of 
keeping  his  tribe  strong,  and  the  king  his  nation,  pass 
laws  against  mutual  aggression,  and  enforces  them  by 
penalties.    The  fear  of  penalty  deters  from  outrage. 

d.  Religions  or  superstitions  fear. — The  worship  of 
departed  chiefs  or  kings  tends  to  give  to  the  observance 
of  their  laws  the  sanctions  of  religion.    Still  more  ought 
the  fear  of  God  check  injustice,  and  undoubtedly  it  has 
this  effect. 

Aggressions,  then,  are  checked  through  fear  of  re- 


176  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

taliation,  social  disgrace,  legal  punishment,  and  divine 
retribution.  All  these  tend  to  develop  and  enforce  a 
sense  of  justice,  and  to  advance  the  interests  of  the  hu- 
man race. 

In  the  progress  of  man,  habits  and  customs  change 
with  the  environment,  and  lead  to  a  modification  of  the 
moral  code.  Superior  individuals  take  the  lead.  Their 
advancement  is  followed  by  that  of  others,  till  the  habit 
of  the  few  becomes  the  customs  of  the  many,  when  at 
length  the  custom  is  embodied  in  law  and  enforced  by 
penalties. 

Justice  forbids  encroachment  on  the  rights  of  others; 
the  activity  of  each  is  limited  by  the  rights  of  his  fel- 
lows. Men  arc  equal  in  respect  to  natural  rights,  but 
not  in  their  powers,  their  activities,  their  opportunities, 
or  their  rewards.  Justice  is  a  reasonable  virtue. 

(3)  Development  of  the  idea  of  justice. — When  a  per- 
son, by  his  labor  or  by  his  thought,  has  produced  some- 
thing of  value,  if  robbed  of  it  he  feels  that  he  has  been 
wronged,  and  seeks  satisfaction.  If  without  provoca- 
tion he  is  injured,  he  resents  the  outrage.  Injury  to 
one's  friends  is  taken  as  injury  to  himself,  and  resented 
accordingly.  This  is  especially  true,  if  those  injured  are 
of  his  own  family.  Justice  to  self  is  naturally  extended 
so  as  to  include  justice  to  others.  It  excludes  all  fraud, 
sharp  practice,  and  double-dealing.  If  we  expect  others 
to  respect  our  rights,  we  are  under  obligation  to  respect 
theirs.  In  fact,  if  we  do  not  respect  their  rights,  they 
will  not  respect  our  rights. 

Justice  implies  that  each  has  his  own  sphere,  limited 
by  the  sphere  of  others.  Equality  of  rights  is  the  mutual 
limitation.  Within  his  own  sphere  each  is  at  liberty  to 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  177 

do  his  best  in  his  self-realization.  As  powers  inherited 
or  developed  differ,  achievements  differ;  hence  there 
will  be  inequality  of  success,  but  there  need  be  no  injus- 
tice, since  the  success  of  one  does  not  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  another. 

Every  man  is  free  to  do  the  best  he  can  for  himself, 
provided  in  so  doing  he  does  not  encroach  on  the  equal 
freedom  of  others.  Before  the  law  rights  are  equal,  and 
should  be  equally  respected.  A  powerful  person  should 
be  prohibited  from  encroaching  on  the  rights  of  the 
weak.  Law  can  not  give  equal  powers  to  all,  but  it  can 
guard  the  rights  of  all,  and  as  far  as  possible  abolish  arti- 
ficial distinctions. 

What  is  the  sphere  of  an  individual?  Is  his  position 
inherited  or  acquired?  This  depends,  in  part,  on  the 
form  of  Government.  In  hereditary  monarchies,  one 
may  be  born  a  noble,  or  heir  to  the  throne.  Under  any 
form  of  Government,  one  may  be  born  an  heir  of  wealth 
or  a  child  of  poverty;  but  the  sphere  of  the  majority  is 
largely  a  consequence  of  conduct.  Each  wins  his  po- 
sition for  himself. 

In  case  of  election  for  office,  where  two  or  more 
candidates  contend  for  the  same  position,  the  general 
modes  are  regulated  by  customs;  but  the  particular  de- 
tails of  the  contest  must  be  left  to  the  conscience  of  the 
contestants.  The  people  generally  honor  a  magnani- 
mous bearing. 

Mutual  sympathy  is  developed  by  common  dangers, 
common  suffering,  common  defeats,  common  interests, 
common  pursuits,  common  success. 

There  will  be  conflict  of  interest;  hence  the  need  of 
law  and  the  administration  of  justice.  Aggression  must 

12 


178  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

be  prohibited  and  punished,  and  the  law  enforced  with 
the  utmost  impartiality,  and  with  equal  and  exact  jus- 
tice. 

(4)  Virtues  subordinate  to  justice. — These  are  grati- 
tude, honesty,  veracity. 

a.  Gratitude  is  due  for  favors  received.     The  senti- 
ment or  disposition  of  gratitude  is  a  virtue.    The  exhi- 
bition of  gratitude,  in  a  substantial  form,  is  a  duty. 
Ingratitude  is  a  moral  baseness.     Thankfulness  is  pri- 
marily a  matter  of  etiquette,  though  secondarily  a  duty. 

b.  Honesty  is  fair  dealing.    It  scorns  fraud.    Its  high 
sense  of  honor  refuses  to  take  advantage  of  ignorance 
or  necessity.     It  renders  a  full  equivalent  for  what  it 
receives.    It  is  a  virtue  of  sterling  worth. 

c.  Veracity,  or  truthfulness,  is  essential  in  the  deal- 
ings of  man  with  man.     Lying  is  a  degrading  vice,  fit 
only  for  scalawags  and  slaves. 

Is  lying  ever  justifiable?  Veracity  is  the  rule;  and 
to  those  entitled  to  it,  truth  ought  always  to  be  spoken. 
The  exceptions  to  veracity,  as  deceiving  an  enemy  in  the 
time  of  war,  and  analagous  cases,  can  safely  be  left  to 
the  enlightened  conscience  of  those  disposed  to  do  .right. 

5.  Benevolence. — Etymologically  considered,  benevo- 
lence signifies  good  will.  It  does  not  rest  in  good  will; 
but  it  carries  the  good  will  into  execution  in  deeds  of 
beneficence. 

The  two  principal  altruistic  virtues — justice  and  be- 
nevolence— are  thus  distinguished.  Justice  is  requisite 
for  public  safety;  benevolence  for  private  chanty;  justice 
relates  to  equity,  benevolence  to  goodness;  justice  can 
be  legally  exacted,  benevolence  is  voluntary;  justice  is 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS 


179 


righteousness,  benevolence  is  love;  justice  is  exact  in  ful- 
filling the  letter  of  the  law,  benevolence  goes  beyond  the 
letter  and  exhibits  the  spirit;  in  practical  affairs  justice 
is  primary,  benevolence  is  secondary;  justice  must  not 
be  set  aside,  though  it  may  be  tempered  by  benevolence; 
justice  commands  the  judgment,  benevolence  wins  the 
heart;  the  judge  must  sentence  the  convicted  criminal, 
as  an  act  of  justice,  according  to  law,  yet  when  he  has 
the  discretion,  benevolence  may  lead  him  to  mitigate 
the  penalty. 

Justice  is  demanded  by  the  public  welfare,  and  it 
must  be  impartial;  yet  the  root  of  justice  is  benevo- 
lence— the  desire  for  the  public  good.  Though  the 
function  of  government  is  primarily  justice,  or  public 
equity,  yet  Government  may  properly  undertake  those 
great  measures  of  beneficence,  where  private  benevo- 
lence would  be  inadequate,  as  general  education,  the 
care  of  the  insane,  the  blind,  the  deaf;  but  it  should  not 
take  from  the  earnings  of  the  frugal  to  support  the  in- 
dolent, for  to  do  so  would  be  to  discourage  industry, 
to  place  a  premium  on  inefficiency,  and  to  disturb  the 
normal  relations  between  conduct  and  consequences. 

It  is  the  duty  of  Government  to  maintain  justice 
by  securing  to  all  the  people  the  unhindered  pursuit  of 
happiness;  but  if  it  undertakes  to  furnish  them  with  the 
means  of  happiness,  it  transcends  its  function.  The 
shiftless  classes  lay  the  blame  of  their  poverty  on  the 
Government,  and  believe  that  society  is  fundamentally 
wrong,  and  ought  to  be  radically  changed,  so  that  all 
shall  have  equal  shares  in  the  products  of  labor  without 
regard  to  merit;  the  result  is  communism.  The  worst 


180  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

classes  go  further.  Seeing  others  better  off  than  them- 
selves, they  conclude  that  society  ought  to  be  destroyed; 
the  result  is  anarchism. 

Society,  in  its  widest  extent  embracing  the  entire 
population,  may  be  roughly  grouped  in  four  classes — 
the  criminal  class,  the  pauper  class,  the  middle  class,  and 
the  wealthy  class.  To  diminish  the  criminal  and  the 
pauper  classes,  and  to  elevate  the  middle  class,  is  a  great 
problem,  one  worthy  to  engage  the  head  and  the  heart 
of  every  lover  of  the  human  race.  Upon  the  wealthy 
and  the  cultivated  classes  devolves  a  great  responsibility. 

Benevolence  takes  various  special  forms,  as  the  fol- 
lowing: 

1 i)  Pity  is  the  sympathy  for  others  excited  by  their 
sufferings.     It  regards  its  object  not  only  as  suffering, 
but  as  weak  and  inferior,  and  hence  pity  is  allied  to  con- 
tempt.   The  condescension  implied  in  pity  is  humiliating 
to  high-minded  sufferers;  but  benevolence  avoids  display 
of  condescension. 

(2)  Compassion  is  the  sympathy  excited  by  misfor- 
tune, prompting  relief.     The  priest  and  the  Levite,  no 
doubt,  pitied  the  man  who  fell  among  thieves,  yet  they 
passed  by  on  the  other  side;  but  vthe  good  Samaritan 
had  compassion  on  him,  dressed  his  wounds,  carried  him 
to  an  inn,  and  paid  for  his  care. 

(3)  Mercy  is  compassion  extended  to  fallen  enemies, 
or  to  those  exposed  to  suffering  for  demerit,  by  one 
who  has  the  means  of  vengeance  or  the  power  to  remit 
or  mitigate  the  penalty.     Justice  may  exclude  mercy, 
but  it  does  not  exclude  compassion. 

(4)  Esteem  is  the  regard  we  have  for  others  in  view 


PRACTICAL    ETHICS  l8l 

of  their  excellencies  of  character.     It  extends  only  to 
those  regarded  as  worthy. 

(5)  Friendship  is  the  mutual  attachment  of  two  per- 
sons who  have  predilections  for  one  another,  exclusive 
of  relationship  or  the  tender  tie  of  love.     It  is  often  a 
very  strong  attachment,  as  in  the  case  of  David  and 
Jonathan,  or  Pythias  and  Damon. 

(6)  The  domestic  affections — conjugal  love,  parental 
and  filial  love,  and  fraternal  love — are  charming  virtues, 
and  the  corresponding  duties  exemplifying  these  vir- 
tues in  conduct  render  home  a  paradise. 

(7)  Patriotism,  or  love  of  country,  is  gratified  with 
national  prosperity,  and  stirred  to  self-sacrificing  activity 
in  times  of  national  peril. 

(8)  Philanthropy,   or  love  of  mankind,  is  broader 
than  patriotism.     It  regards  nothing  human  as  foreign 
to  itself,  but  is  beneficent  to  all  mankind. 

(9)  Piety,  or  love  to  God,  embraces  reverence,  ad- 
oration, gratitude,  trust,  and  obedience.     Love  to  God 
naturally  leads  to  love  to  man. 

Benevolence  seeks  to  promote  the  highest  possible 
good  to  every  sentient  being  within  our  influence.  It 
is  the  crowning  virtue,  the  fulfillment  of  the  law,  the 
consummation  of  moral  excellence. 

The  essence  of  virtue  is  the  aim  to  realize  the  highest 
ideal  of  excellence.  The  satisfaction  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  advancement  toward  perfection  is  the  highest 
good. 

6.  Incentives  to  action. — The  virtues  find  their  basis 
in  the  deep-seated  principles  of  human  nature,  the 
instincts,  appetites,  affections,  and  desires. 


l8a  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

(1)  The  primary  incentives  are  egoistic:  instinct  for 
self-preservation,  appetite  for  food  and  drink,  love  for 
family,  desire  for  victory,  for  achievement,  for  power, 
for  knowledge,  for  popularity.     These  are  numerous, 
energetic,  enduring. 

(2)  The  secondary  incentives  are  altruistic:  attach- 
ment for  friends,  respect  for  superiors,  the  sentiments 
of  sympathy,  justice,  and  benevolence.    These  are  fewer, 
milder,  less  impulsive  than  the  primary,  but  give  perma- 
nent satisfaction,  have  the  rightful  supremacy,  and  work 
no  evil. 

The  self-regarding  propensities  are  not  to  be  ex- 
tirpated. They  are  essential  to  life;  but  the  social  in- 
stincts are  entitled  to  the  position  of  superiority  and 
control. 


Chapter  III 
DUTIES 

/CLASSIFICATION  of  ditties.— Duties  may  be  classi- 
v*'    fied  as  personal,  social,  and  religious. 

( i)  Personal  duties. — Personal  duties  embrace  self- 
conservation,  self-culture,  and  self-conduct. 

a.  Self-conservation  relates  both  to  the  body  and  to 
the  mind. 

The  body  is  to  be  cared  for  by  guarding  its  health, 
strength,  agility,  longevity,  and  beauty.  The  health  is 
to  be  guarded  by  avoiding  unnecessary  exposure  to 
dangers,  inclemencies  of  the  weather,  and  contagious 
diseases,  abstaining  from  narcotics,  intoxicating  drinks, 
unwholesome  food,  and  supplying  the  body  with  whole- 
some food  and  drink,  suitable  clothing  and  shelter,  and 
pure  air,  taking  sufficient  exercise,  rest,  and  sleep,  and 
securing  moderate  temperature  and  cleanliness  of  per- 
son. Good  health  is  the  basis  of  strength,  agility,  lon- 
gevity, and  beauty.  A  cheerful  disposition,  freedom 
from  worry,  and  trust  in  God  tend  to  preserve  good 
health. 

The  mind  should  be  kept  free  from  all  prejudices, 
hobbies,  superstition,  bad  passions,  and  morbid  con- 
ditions of  every  kind,  and  its  sanity  guarded  with  the 
utmost  care.  Congenial  domestic,  social,  and  religious 
relations  exert  a  favorable  influence  on  the  preservation 
of  the  health,  both  of  the  body  and  the  mind. 

183 


184  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

b.  Self-culture. — The  body  and  mind  are  not  only 
to  be  kept  free  from  deleterious  influences  and  main- 
tained in  health,  but  are  to  be  cultured  and  kept  in  a 
vigorous  condition. 

The  strength  of  the  body  is  augmented  by  exercise, 
alternated  by  rest,  by  taxing  it,  but  not  by  overtaxing. 
The  agility  of  the  circus-rider  is  a  marvel,  and  shows 
what  training  can  do  for  the  body.  Athletic  sports, 
properly  guarded,  ought  to  be  encouraged.  A  vigor- 
ous body  is  a  substantial  basis  for  a  vigorous  mind. 
Good  health  is  the  requisite  basis,  not  only  of  strength 
and  of  agility,  but  also  of  beauty.  Intellectual  and 
moral  health  gives  spiritual  beauty,  which  speaks 
through  the  eye  and  animates  the  countenance  with  the 
radiance  of  truth  and  goodness.  Intellectual  culture  is 
a  fruitful  theme.  The  field  of  knowledge  is  vast  and 
greatly  diversified,  and  supplies  the  means  for  the  culti- 
vation of  all  our  intellectual  powers,  perceptions,  mem- 
ory, imagination,  reason. 

As  means  of  culture,  we  have  the  family,  the  school, 
the  church,  literature,  society,  business,  the  professions 
and  pursuits  of  life.  Nature,  science,  art,  literature,  open 
their  varied  and  inexhaustible  treasures.  Notwithstand- 
ing all  these  aids,  culture,  if  it  be  genuine,  must  be 
largely  self-culture. 

The  duty  of  moral  and  spiritual  culture  is  apparent. 
Mistakes  of  the  heart  are  more  fatal  than  those  of  the 
head.  A  young  man  can  make  no  greater  mistake  than 
to  believe  that  he  must  be  dishonest  if  he  would  succeed 
in  businesss.  Dishonesty  is  not  the  road  to  successs, 
but  to  ruin. 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  185 

An  honest,  thoughtful  man  deserves  respect,  and  is 
entitled  to  his  opinions,  whatever  they  may  be;  but 
society  has  the  right  to  suppress  conduct  dangerous  to 
its  welfare. 

The  will  needs  the  guidance  of  reason  in  regard  to 
its  general  purposes  and  particular  volitions.  The  gen- 
eral purpose  always  to  do  right  will  decide  in  advance 
many  special  volitions,  since  it  will  not  allow  dishonesty, 
untruthfulness,  or  immorality  in  any  form.  To  know 
what  to  choose,  what  to  do,  how  to  carry  out  a  plan, 
requires  a  cultivated  intelligence. 

Self-culture  should  aim,  by  exercise,  due  in  amount 
and  kind,  to  develop  the  powers  of  the  soul  in  their  rela- 
tion to  one  another,  in  view  of  the  mission  of  life,  call- 
ing in  as  aids  glowing  enthusiasm,  personal  interest,  and 
laudable  ambition. 

c.  Self-conduct  involves  self-control  and  self-direc- 
tion. 

Self-control  rightly  aims,  not  to  eradicate  any  of  the 
faculties  of  the  soul,  but  to  purify  and  regulate  them. 
We  have  no  needless  or  hurtful  powers;  but  our  passions 
are  often  unduly  excited,  and  exhibit  hurtful  manifesta- 
tions. Abnormal  excitement  is  to  be  allayed,  and  the 
lower  activities  subordinated  to  the  higher. 

Self-direction  marks  out  the  line  of  conduct  to  be 
pursued,  and  guides  special  activities.  Here  the  will, 
prompted  by  goodness  and  guided  by  wisdom,  assumes 
control  of  the  person,  and  adjusts  his  relations  to  God, 
to  his  fellow-men,  and  to  himself. 

The  right  choice  of  life  work  is  a  matter  of  the  ut- 
most importance;  for  herein  lies  success  or  failure.  In 


186  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

deciding  this  question,  a  person  should  study  himself, 
his  powers,  his  tastes,  his  adaptations,  the  means  at 
his  command,  and  choose  accordingly. 

Having  chosen  his  life  work,  he  needs  to  make  a 
thorough  preparation,  both  general  and  special.  Then 
having  found  his  place,  he  must  work  persistently  and 
skillfully,  and  be  a  growing  man  all  his  days. 

Every  person,  however  wealthy,  should  learn  some 
trade  or  gain  a  knowledge  of  some  business,  which  may 
be  a  means  of  support  in  case  he  should  lose  his  fortune. 
Many  persons  have  profited  by  this  precaution.  No  one 
should  suffer  himself  to  live  an  idle  life.  Idleness  tends 
to  immorality. 

Money-getting,  though  important,  is  not  the  chief 
end  of  man;  and  the  business  of  life  should  not  be  chosen 
with  this  as  the  sole  object,  but  should  be  made  a  matter 
of  deliberate,  conscientious  choice.  Money  is  a  means, 
not  an  end.  Mammon  worship  is  a  fashionable  religion ; 
but  the  miser's  heaven  is  a  room  with  bolts  and  bars, 
with  a  strong  iron  chest  full  of  gold.  The  devotee 
enters,  bars  his  doors,  blinds  his  windows,  opens  his 
chest,  worships  his  hoard,  but  with  a  palpitating  heart, 
fearing  that  the  robber  is  at  the  door;  but  death  is  in 
swift  pursuit,  and  will  soon  snatch  him  away  from  his 
treasure. 

Devotion  to  the  life  work  wisely  chosen,  not  because 
of  its  supposed  respectability,  but  because  it  is  useful, 
and  corresponds  to  aptitudes  and  desires,  is  almost  a 
guarantee  of  success. 

The  egoistic  virtues  of  prudence,  courage,  temper- 
ance, and  purity  are  to  be  exhibited  in  conduct,  what- 
ever be  the  avocation  in  life  or  the  special  duty  required 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  187 

to  be  performed;  and  these  prepare  the  way  for  the 
social  duties,  calling  out  the  altruistic  virtues  of  sym- 
pathy, justice,  and  benevolence. 

(2)  Social  duties. — These  are  duties  to  the  family, 
to  society,  to  the  State. 

a.  Domestic  duties,  though  somewhat  alike  for  all  the 
members  of  a  household,  yet  vary  with  individual  cases, 
as   husband;   wife,   father,   mother,   children,   brothers, 
sisters. 

Marriage  is  a  mutual  and  voluntary  compact  be- 
tween one  man  and  one  woman,  to  forsake  all  others, 
and  to  live  together  as  husband  and  wife  till  separated 
by  death.  The  parties  are  supposed  to  be  capable  of 
giving  a  free  and  deliberate  consent  to  the  union,  and 
neither  of  them  married  or  betrothed  to  a  third  party. 
Great  bodily  defect,  mental  imbecility,  insanity,  heredi- 
tary disease,  near  consanguinity,  or  extreme  youth  or 
old  age  should  be  considered  a  bar  to  marriage.  An 
ideal  marriage  is  founded  on  affection,  its  obligations 
are  sacred,  and  home  ought  to  be  a  paradise. 

On  the  husband  and  father  devolves  the  duty  of 
supporting  the  family,  and  providing  for  the  education 
of  the  children.  The  wife  and  mother  rules  the  house 
and  cares  for  the  children,  especially  in  their  tender 
years.  Natural  affection  prompts  all  the  members  of 
the  family  to  mutual  good  will  and  helpfulness,  and  to 
the  duty  of  manifesting  the  domestic  virtues  in  corre- 
sponding conduct.  The  homes  of  a  people  are  the 
strength  of  the  nation. 

b.  Society  duties  fall  naturally  into  groups,  as  the  fol- 
lowing : 

The  duties  of  teachers  and  pupils  are  analagous  to 


l88  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

those  of  parents  and  children.  Upon  the  teacher  de- 
volves the  duty  of  governing  the  school  and  instructing 
the  pupils.  He  needs  self-possession  and  tact.  Good 
scholarship  is  an  indispensable  prerequisite.  In  fact,  he 
needs  to  know  much  more  than  the  things  he  is  called 
upon  to  teach.  Not  relying  altogether  on  his  scholar- 
ship, the  conscientious  teacher  will  make  a  careful  prep- 
aration for  each  day's  work.  He  should  not  only  under- 
stand what  he  teaches,  but  be  able  to  make  things  clear. 
A  reputation  for  scholarship,  well  sustained,  will  con- 
tribute largely  to  his  success;  yet  he  needs  not  only  the 
reputation,  but  the  possession. 

The  teacher  has  a  wide  range  of  knowledge  open  to 
him,  from  which  to  draw  resources — the  common 
branches,  the  languages,  the  mathematics,  the  natural 
sciences,  the  political  and  social  sciences,  history,  liter- 
ature, art,  philosophy,  and  theology.  If  the  teacher  is 
enthusiastic,  he  will  inspire  a  like  enthusiasm  on  the 
part  of  his  pupils,  who  will  then  not  only  respect  their 
teacher,  but  will  make  rapid  progress  in  their  studies. 

The  pastor  and  people  sustain  to  one  another  sacred 
relations.  The  pastor  is  the  shepherd  of  the  flock.  To 
be  the  instructor  and  guide  of  his  people,  he  needs  not 
only  general  knowledge  and  culture,  and  special  knowl- 
edge of  theology,  but  a  deep  religious  experience.  To 
instruct  others  properly  in  the  divine  life,  he  needs  com- 
munion with  his  God.  I  pull  off  the  shoes  from  my 
feet,  for  I  stand  on  holy  ground. 

It  is  the  duty  of  the  members  of  the  Church  to  sup- 
port the  pastor,  and  to  co-operate  with  him  in  all  his 
labors  of  love,  and  to  entertain  towards  one  another 
feelings  of  fellowship  and  good  will.  In  this  world  of 


PRACTICAL    ETHICS  189 

toil  and  sorrow  and  sin  the  Church  is  a  city  of  refuge, 
where  multitudes  gather  till  the  storms  of  life  be  over- 
past. 

Other  voluntary  associations  exist — clubs,  literary  as- 
sociations, scientific  associations,  secret  orders  organ- 
ized for  protection,  success  in  business,  mutual  improve- 
ment, or  social  advancement.  In  all  these  the  principles 
of  ethics  and  the  virtues  find  many  applications,  and  the 
duties  full  scope. 

General  society,  however,  affords  the  most  ample  field 
for  the  application  of  the  virtues  in  the  discharge  of 
moral  duties. 

We  have  our  friends  and  neighbors  and  acquaint- 
ances, who  can  be  brought  more  or  less  under  our  in- 
fluence, and  will  be  for  better  or  for  worse.  We  meet 
with  strangers;  and  what  shall  be  our  attitude  towards 
them?  Shall  we  meet  them  with  a  cold  stare,  or  shall 
we  greet  them  with  a  kindly  welcome?  We  probably 
have  enemies;  how  shall  we  treat  them?  Shall  we  hate 
them,  and  return  evil  for  evjj,  or  shall  we  love  them,  and 
pray  that  God  may  give  them  a  better  heart?  How 
shall  we  treat  the  unfortunate  and  the  outcast?  Shall 
we  drive  the  tramp  from  our  door,  or  give  him  some- 
thing to  eat,  and  encourage  him  to  work? 

Shall  our  influence  tend  to  raise  or  to  lower  the  tone 
of  public  sentiment  and  the  standard  of  morality?  What 
shall  be  our  attitude  towards  needed  public  improve- 
ments, and  what  towards  needless  extravagance?  What 
can  we  do  towards  encouraging  a  course  of  high-toned 
public  lectures?  What  can  we  do  to  found,  enlarge,  or 
improve  a  public  library?  What  can  we  do  for  the  poor 
or  for  those  struggling  against  adverse  circumstances? 


190  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

How  can  we  enlist  the  sympathy  of  the  wealthy  in  behalf 
of  the  needy? 

Employers  and  employees  owe  reciprocal  duties. 
Employers  should  give  fair  wages,  and  pay  promptly; 
and  employees  should  render  faithful  service.  A  share 
in  the  profits,  when  rising  above  a  certain  per  cent, 
would  render  the  workmen  more  efficient.  Arbitration 
could  supersede  strikes  and  lockouts. 

c.  Civic  duties  relate  to  the  tribe  or  the  nation,  whose 
respective  heads  are  the  chief  and  the  executive,  whether 
president,  king,  queen,  or  emperor. 

The  nation,  called  also  the  State,  is  the  outgrowth 
of  the  family,  which  is  the  unitary  social  group.  As  an 
organization  to  protect  rights  and  promote  the  welfare  of 
the  people,  the  State  is  ordained  of  God;  but  its  special 
form,  whether  a  republic,  an  oligarchy,  or  a  monarchy, 
absolute  or  limited,  is  left  to  the  people  themselves. 
The  State  is  a  natural  development;  it  originated  with- 
out the  formality  of  a  social  compact.  Each  State  has, 
under  the  providence  of  God,  its  mission  in  the  world. 
It  disseminates  its  principles,  protects  its  citizens,  and 
affords  them  ample  scope  for  activity;  and  for  this  serv- 
ice the  citizen  is  expected  to  be  loyal  and  patriotic. 

The  State,  consisting  of  the  entire  body  of  the  peo- 
ple as  an  organic  whole  or  nation,  is  represented  by  the 
Government,  a  body  of  men  selected  by  the  people,  to 
which  are  delegated  powers  necessary  for  the  protection 
of  society  and  the  maintenance  of  the  rights  of  the  peo- 
ple, in  whom  rests  ultimately  the  sovereign  power. 

The  Government  is  usually  divided  into  three  co- 
ordinate branches — the  legislative,  the  judicial,  and  the 
executive. 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  191 

The  legislative  branch,  in  our  Nation,  consists  of 
two  houses,  the  Senate  and  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives; in  England,  it  consists  of  the  House  of  Lords 
and  the  House  of  Commons.  The  two  houses  make  the 
laws  for  the  whole  people. 

The  judicial  branch  interprets  the  laws,  decides  upon 
their  constitutionality,  applies  them  to  particular  cases, 
and  presides  in  trials  civil  or  criminal,  and  passes  sen- 
tences on  offenders. 

The  executive — for  example,  the  President  with  his 
Cabinet — sees  that  the  laws  are  enforced.  In  our  coun- 
try the  President  has  a  veto  power  over  legislation, 
which  can  be  overruled  only  by  a  two-thirds'  vote  of  the 
legislative  body.  The  Executive  with  his  Cabinet,  espe- 
cially the  Secretary  of  State,  manages  the  correspond- 
ence with  other  nations,  and,  with  the  advice  and  consent 
of  the  Senate,  appoints  foreign  ministers,  the  judges  of 
the  Supreme  Court,  and  some  other  important  officials. 

No  better  statement  of  the  functions  of  civil  govern- 
ment can  be  found  than  that  expressed  by  the  opening 
paragraph  of  our  Federal  Constitution: 

"We,  the  people  of  the  United  States,  in  order  to 
form  a  more  perfect  union,  establish  justice,  insure 
domestic  tranquillity,  provide  for  the  common  defense, 
promote  the  general  welfare,  and  secure  the  blessings  of 
liberty  to  ourselves  and  our  posterity,  do  ordain  and 
establish  this  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of 
America." 

The  State,  as  represented  by  the  Government,  owes 
duties  to  its  citizens,  to  itself  as  a  nation,  to  other  States, 
and  to  God  who  has  given  it  its  mission  in  the  world. 

The  duty  of  the  State  to  its  citizens  is  to  secure  their 


192  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

rights,  to  guarantee  their  freedom,  to  protect  their  lives 
and  property,  to  foster  enterprise,  to  provide  for  the 
general  education  of  the  youth,  and  to  disseminate  use- 
ful knowledge  among  the  people. 

The  State  has  duties  to  itself,  in  securing  its  self- 
development,  in  ascertaining  and  accomplishing  its  mis- 
sion in  the  world,  and  in  maintaining  its  independence 
and  dignity  against  the  aggressions  of  other  States. 

The  State  owes  duties  to  other  States,  as  made 
known  by  international  law,  relating  to  the  comity  of 
nations,  to  treaties,  alliances,  arbitrations,  and  to  the 
various  relations  of  peace  and  war. 

The  State  owes  duties  to  God.  It  is  ordained  of  God 
for  great  ends,  and  it  is  its  duty  to  see  that  these  ends 
are  accomplished.  Its  laws  are  based  on  the  laws  of 
God.  It  should  encourage  religion,  and  guarantee  to 
every  citizen  freedom  to  worship  God  according  to  the 
dictates  of  his  own  conscience. 

The  citizen  owes  to  the  State  the  duties  of  respect 
and  love  and  support,  and  obedience  to  its  righteous 
laws.  Though  mindful  of  the  fact  that  one  man  is  more 
liable  to  mistake  than  a  majority  of  a  legislative  body, 
yet  the  citizen,  especially  when  sustained  by  a  respect- 
able number  of  his  fellow-citizens,  may  seek  the  repeal 
of  obnoxious  laws  through  the  legitimate  channels  of 
legislation.  He  may  obey  the  law  till  repealed,  or  dis- 
obey and  take  the  consequences. 

It  is  seldom  that  open  resistance  to  law  is  called  for, 
as  this  is  rebellion  or  revolution.  An  attempt  at  revo- 
lution is  justifiable  only  in  those  extreme  cases  where 
the  Government  is  clearly  wrong  and  oppressive,  and 
then  only  when  it  is  probable  that  the  revolution  will  be 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  193 

successful;  for  if  it  should  fail,  the  evils  would  only  be 
aggravated. 

The  citizen  should  seek  to  gain  knowledge  in  regard 
to  the  nature  of  the  Government,  its  workings  in  the 
different  departments,  the  measures  proposed  by  the 
various  political  parties,  that  he  may  vote  intelligently, 
and  aid  the  Government  in  the  management  of  its  af- 
fairs, and  in  carrying  out  its  mission  in  the  world. 

"Westward  the  course  of  empire  takes  its  way." 
Our  own  Nation,  having  gathered  up  the  wisdom  of  the 
ages,  is  to  be  the  leader  of  the  nations  in  the  arts  of 
peace,  and  in  disseminating  the  blessings  of  science  and 
true  religion  over  the  face  of  the  earth. 

(3)  Religious  duties. — These  are  due  to  God,  to  the 
Church,  and  to  the  world. 

a.  Duties  to  God  embrace  repentance,  faith,  and 
obedience. 

Repentance  is  more  than  sorrow  for  sin,  because  in- 
volving punishment.  It  signifies  reformation,  sincere 
and  hearty  and  decided.  Man  was  created  in  the  moral 
image  and  after  the  likeness  of  God;  but  man's  moral 
nature  has  been  disordered  by  sin.  Each  individual  has 
inherited  this  moral  depravity,  and  after  reaching  the 
years  of  accountability  has  in  some  form  or  other,  and 
probably  in  many  ways,  violated  the  laws  of  God.  He 
has  disfigured,  though  not  wholly  lost,  the  image  of 
God.  Reason  and  conscience  remain,  and  imperatively 
urge  the  duty  of  reformation. 

Faith  is  trust  in  God.  The  foundation  of  true  faith 
is  a  knowledge  of  God  as  the  creator  and  upholder  of 
all  things,  as  the  source  of  all  power,  wisdom,  and  good- 
ness. Reason  affirms  an  ultimate  reality,  self-existent 
13 


194  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

and  eternal,  the  origin  of  all  other  realities.  If  nothing 
is  eternal,  there  never  would  have  been  anything.  The 
eternal  reality  must  be  the  adequate  source  of  all  other 
realities. 

God,  the  all-powerful,  wise,  and  holy  being,  is  en- 
titled to  our  entire  confidence.  He  will  not  forsake 
those  who  trust  in  him.  Indeed,  if  we  do  not  trust  in 
him,  we  have  no  foundation  for  confidence.  "All  other 
ground  is  sinking  sand." 

Obedience  naturally  follows  repentance  and  faith. 
God's  laws  were  enacted,  not  for  his  benefit,  but  for  our 
good,  and  in  keeping  them  there  is  great  reward.  The 
laws  of  nature  and  of  mind  are  the  laws  of  God,  as  well 
as  those  of  revelation.  Most  of  the  evils  which  afflict 
the  world  would  disappear,  if  all  would  heartily  obey  the 
laws  of  God.  "Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with 
all  thy  heart.  Thou  shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself." 

The  root  of  morality  is  the  principle  of  love;  but  we 
need  a  guide  in  the  application  of  the  law  of  love  to 
our  neighbor,  and  this  guide  we  have  in  the  Golden 
Rule:  "Whatsoever  ye  think  it  right  that  others  do  to 
you,  do  ye  likewise  unto  them."  Piety  requires  the  de- 
votion of  our  whole  being  to  God — the  body,  the  intel- 
lect, the  sensibility,  the  will.  This  is  our  reasonable 
service. 

Prayer  is  by  no  means  a  useless  service,  as  some  sup- 
pose. It  is  based  on  a  sense  of  our  weakness  and  igno- 
rance, and  of  our  dependence  on  God  as  our  Friend, 
who  is  wise  and  good  and  powerful.  Prayer  embraces 
invocation,  confession,  adoration,  thanksgiving,  and 
petition.  The  justification  of  prayer  is  that  it  is  the 
natural  expression  of  the  soul;  that  the  practice  is  al- 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  195 

most  universal;  that  those  who  declaim  against  it,  pray 
when  reduced  to  straits;  and  that  experience  testifies 
to  its  benefits. 

"Prayer  is  the  simplest  form  of  speech 

That  infant  lips  can  try; 
Prayer  the  sublimest  strains  that  reach 
The  Majesty  on  high." 

Objections  to  prayer  are  sometimes  made  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  a  request  that  God  would  suspend  his 
own  laws.  This  is  a  mistake.  We  do  every  day  what 
nature  would  not  do,  and  what  otherwise  would  not  be 
done.  Do  we  suspend  the  laws  of  nature?  If  we  can 
do  what  otherwise  would  not  be  done,  much  more  can 
God.  When  I  lift  a  body  from  the  ground  against  grav- 
ity, I  do  not  suspend  the  law  of  gravitation.  The  fact 
of  gravity  still  remains,  and  gives  the  body  weight;  but 
I  overcome  this  force  by  a  greater  force  in  the  opposite 
direction,  and  so  raise  the  body.  When  God,  in  answer 
to  prayer,  brings  something  to  pass  which  otherwise 
would  not  occur,  he  suspends  no  law,  and  throws  no 
more  confusion  into  the  operations  of  nature  than  I  do 
when  I  lift  a  stone  up  from  the  ground. 

Prayer,  then,  is  justified  by  the  fact  that  it  is 
prompted  by  a  universal  instinct;  that  it  elevates  the 
character  of  man;  and  that  it  is  a  means  of  obtaining 
great  blessings.  The  testimony  of  millions  of  Christians 
that  God  does  answer  prayer  can  not  be  impeached. 

b.  We  owe  duties  to  the  Church,  the  human  agency 
divinely  commissioned  to  carry  forward  God's  work  in 
the  world.  We  ought  to  support  the  Church  in  all  her 
benevolent  enterprises;  attend  the  services  of  the 


196  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Church;  uphold  the  principles  and  practice  of  religion  in 
the  community,  and  discourage  irreligious  principles  and 
immoral  practices. 

c.  We  owe  duties  to  the  world,  especially  to  those 
people  less  favored  than  ourselves,  in  sending  to  them  a 
higher  civilization  and  a  better  religion,  and  thus  help 
answer  the  Lord's  Prayer,  "Thy  kingdom  come;  thy 
will  be  done  in  earth  as  it  is  in  heaven." 


Chapter  IV 
REWARDS   AND    PUNISHMENTS 

T\EFINITION  of  reward.— Reward  is  utility  be- 
J~J  stowed  on  a  person,  for  his  benefit,  in  consideration 
of  service  rendered.  It  operates  as  an  incentive  to  use- 
ful conduct.  Thus,  wages  is  the  reward  of  labor;  and 
promotion  is  the  reward  of  distinguished  service. 

2.  Definition  of  punishment. — Punishment  is  evil  in- 
flicted by  authority  upon  a  transgressor  for  wrong,  as 
a  requital  for  guilt.  It  operates  as  a  restraint  from 
injurious  conduct.  Thus,  imprisonment  is  the  punish- 
ment for  forgery,  and  hanging  is  the  punishment  for 
murder. 

j.  Service  and  reward. — Service  is  favor  rendered  by 
one  party  to  another.  Service  deserves  reward.  The 
reward  expresses  the  satisfaction  and  obligation  of  the 
party  to  whom  the  service  is  rendered,  and  the  merit  of 
the  one  rendering  the  service.  Indirectly  it  is  an  incen- 
tive to  the  person  rewarded  to  render  another  service, 
and  to  others  to  perform  like  services.  It  thus  con- 
tributes to  the  general  welfare,  and  this  is  the  final  justi- 
fication of  reward. 

4.  hi  jury  and  punishment. — Injury  is  evil  brought  by 
one  party  upon  another.  Injury  deserves  punishment. 
The  punishment  expresses  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  party 

197 


198  SYSTEMS    OF   ETHICS 

injured,  the  demerit  of  the  one  doing  the  injury,  and 
what  is  due  ill-desert.  Indirectly  it  is  a  restraint  upon 
the  person  punished  against  repeating  the  offense,  and 
upon  others  against  committing  like  offenses.  It  thus 
contributes  to  the  general  welfare,  and  this  is  the  final 
justification  of  punishment. 

5.  Government  in  relation  to  reward  and  punishment.— 
Government  is  established  to  promote  the  general  wel- 
fare, which  is  accomplished  by  the  enactment  and  en- 
forcement of  laws.     Disobedience  to  law  is  an  act  of 
rebellion  against  Government.     If  disobedience  should 
become  general,  the  Government  would  be  overthrown, 
and  anarchy  and  untold  evils  would  be  the  consequence. 

The  criminal  defies  civil  law;  the  sinner  transgresses 
moral  law.  Both  introduce  discord.  Penalty  tends  also 
to  repentance,  to  restraint,  and  therefore  to  harmony. 
Punishment  is  due  the  criminal  on  behalf  of  society.  It 
is,  therefore,  the  duty  of  Government  to  enforce  the  laws 
by  appropriate  rewards  and  penalties.  Government  em- 
bodies civil  law;  God  moral  law. 

6.  Classification  of  services. — Service  is  ordinary  or 
extraordinary.     Ordinary  service  is  occasional  or  regu- 
lar.    Occasional  services  are  such  as  aid  in  capturing 
outlaws,  informing  against  criminals,  help  in  case  of 
fires,  cyclones,  earthquakes,  shipwrecks,  and  the  like. 
Regular  services  are  such  as  are  rendered  between  em- 
ployers and  employees,  official  or  professional  service, 
and  such  like. 

Extraordinary  services  are  such  as  discoveries,  in- 
ventions, improvements,  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the 
army  and  navy,  negotiations  of  foreign  ministers,  new 
methods  of  industry,  heroic  actions,  and  the  like. 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  199 

7.  Classification  of  rewards. — Rewards  may  be  classi- 
fied by  the  service  rendered,  or  more  simply,  as  occa- 
sional and  permanent.    Occasional  rewards  are  bestowed 
in  return  for  special  service,  and  are  stimulants  to  like 
services,  though  irregular  in  their  effects.     Permanent 
rewards    are    more    regular    in    their    effects.      Those 
awarded  by  Government  are  provided  for  from  a  general 
fund,  and  for  an  indefinite  number  of  persons  on  account 
of  a  succession  of  services. 

The  most  common  use  of  reward  occurs  in  the  trans- 
actions of  individuals.  Pay  is  the  reward  for  personal 
service.  In  trading  or  in  buying  and  selling  the  recip- 
rocal delivery  is  the  reward  of  the  mutual  transfer  of 
ownership. 

The  Government,  in  behalf  of  the  public,  has  like- 
wise a  demand  for  a  variety  of  services,  in  the  form  of 
work  or  goods,  for  which  it  returns  an  equivalent  reward 
to  the  persons  rendering  the  services. 

8.  Materials  of  reward. — These  are,  money  or  its 
equivalent,  honor,  power,  and  exemption.     These  are 
all  means  of  satisfaction. 

1 i)  Money  or  its  equivalent  is  the  usual  material  of 
reward,  and  is  that  given  as  wages,  salaries,  pensions, 
and  the  like.     Money  is  the  most  convenient  form  of 
reward,  as  it  is  the  universal  medium  of  exchange  and 
the  measure  of  value.    With  money  any  form  of  material 
good  can  be  purchased. 

(2)  Honor  is  the  distinction  due  to  merit,  and  is  con- 
ferred upon  the  recipient  in  the  form  of  office,  title,  deco- 
ration,  public   thanks,    diplomas,    medals,    prizes,    pre- 
miums.   A  graduated  scale  of  rank  marks  the  degree  of 
merit.    If  worthily  bestowed,  it  is  a  source  of  enjoyment 


200  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

to  the  recipient,  and  of  gratification  to  his  friends.  It 
adds  to  the  respect  the  people  have  for  their  Govern- 
ment as  a  source  of  benignity,  and  opens  up  new  sources 
of  hope.  Advance  in  rank,  according  to  merit,  is  a 
powerful  stimulus  to  faithful  service. 

(3)  Pozver  is  not  always  distributed  according  to 
merit,  as  in  monarchical  Governments  with  a  hereditary 
king  and  nobility;  but  in  such  a  Government  power 
should  be  so  distributed  when  it  can  be  done  without 
interfering  with  the  general  order.     This  is  done  in 
England,  whose  premier  is  often  selected  in  consider- 
ation of  distinguished  ability,  as  in  case  of  Disraeli  or 
Gladstone,  not  from  the  nobility,  but  from  the  great 
middle  class  of  society. 

In  the  United  States  the  President  has  often  been 
selected  in  consideration  of  distinguished  military  serv- 
ice, as  in  case  of  Washington,  Jackson,  Harrison,  Tay- 
lor, and  Grant. 

Men  love  power  for  a  triple  reason — it  gratifies  am- 
bition; it  gives  scope  for  the  exercise  of  ability;  it  gives 
the  honor  of  distinction.  There  are  all  grades  of  power 
from  the  highest  to  the  lowest,  thus  giving  scope  to 
every  variety  of  talent. 

(4)  Exemption  is  release  from  civil  or  military  bur- 
dens or  from  incurred  punishment.     A  certain  age  ex- 
empts all  persons  from  military  service  and  from  poll- 
tax,  and  sex  exempts  all  women.     But  in  these  cases 
exemption  is  not  a  reward  of  merit.     In  former  times 
the  clergy  were  exempt  from  military  service  and  from 
civil  prosecution  for  crime.     Exemption  from  service 
is  a  reward  proportioned  to  the  burdensomeness  of  the 
service. 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  2OI 

p.  Reivard  and  punishment  combined. — To  secure 
obedience  to  certain  regulations,  rewards  and  punish- 
ments are  sometimes  combined  with  good  effect.  For 
example,  to  aid  in  the  capture  of  a  fugitive  from  justice, 
for  the  sake  of  the  offered  reward,  often  encounters  the 
odium  of  public  prejudice;  but  this  prejudice  is  disarmed, 
if  with  the  reward  for  capture  is  coupled  a  punishment 
for  refusing  to  aid.  That  a  person  has  a  right  to  protect 
himself  from  punishment  is  admitted,  if  lawfully  done. 

The  combination  of  reward  and  penalty  is  seen  in 
school  work,  in  the  practice  called  challenging.  A  class 
is  arranged,  and  the  pupil  at  the  head  begins  the  reci- 
tation; then  the  next  recites;  and  so  on  as  long  as  no 
mistake  is  noticed.  If  any  pupil  makes  a  mistake,  the 
next  corrects  it  if  he  has  noticed  it  and  can  correct  it, 
and  takes  the  place  of  the  other,  who  goes  down  one 
position.  If  one  fails  to  correct  the  mistake,  the  next 
corrects  it  if  he  can,  and  takes  the  place  of  the  one  who 
first  made  the  mistake,  and  so  on.  Each  one  who  fails 
is  depressed  one,  if  any  one  below  is  able  to  make  the 
correction.  If  option  is  given  to  correct  the  mistake, 
or  not  to  correct  it,  without  passing  to  the  next,  there 
would  be  only  the  stimulus  of  reward;  and  by  correct- 
ing and  advancing  in  rank,  a  pupil  might  be  regarded 
as  selfish;  but  it  will  be  conceded  he  has  the  right  to 
protect  himself  from  degradation.  In  this  case,  penalty 
re-enforces  reward,  and  is  liable  to  all  except  the  one  at 
the  foot,  who  is  too  low  to  admit  of  further  degradation. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  important  to  re-enforce 
punishment  by  reward;  thus,  when  delinquency  in 
obedience  may  be  concealed  and  the  punishment 
avoided,  in  which  case  it  fails  of  its  purpose,  the  offer 


2O2  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

of  a  reward  is  a  positive  incentive  to  obedience,  and 
may  be  effective  when  the  penalty  alone  would  fail. 

10.  Union  of  interest  with  duty. — In  the  long  run, 
no  doubt,  it  is  the  interest  of  every  one  to  do  his  duty. 
This  arises  as  a  natural  consequence  of  obedience  to  the 
moral  law  on  the  one  hand,  and  of  disobedience  on  the 
other,  depending  ultimately  on  the  constitution  of  na- 
ture and  of  man  in  accordance  with  the  ordinance  of 
God.  The  good  and  evil  consequences  of  conduct  en- 
courage obedience  and  discourage  disobedience,  but  are 
not  strictly  positive  rewards  and  punishments,  as  they 
may  not  express  either  the  approval  or  disapproval  of 
any  lawgiver.  A  person  who  deliberately  thrusts  his 
hand  into  the  fire  feels  the  pain  from  the  burn.  The 
pain,  no  doubt,  tends  to  prevent  such  acts,  and  thus  to 
save  the  person  from  injury;  and  this,  in  the  wisdom  of 
God,  may  be  the  final  cause  or  purpose  of  pain;  but  it 
does  not  necessarily  signify  moral  displeasure  on  the 
part  of  the  Creator,  since  the  person  would  feel  a  like 
pain  from  a  similar  burn  received  in  rescuing  a  child 
from  the  fire. 

The  union  of  interest  and  duty  is  something  more 
than  a  duty  enjoined  by  law,  with  the  penalty  annexed 
for  disobedience.  It  signifies  such  a  provision  in  the 
law  that  conformity  thereto  shall  be  productive  of  cer- 
tain benefits,  which  shall  cease  when  the  law  is  no 
longer  observed,  as  is  the  case  in  regard  to  pensions 
or  annuities  given  under  certain  conditions. 

n.  Self-executing  laws. — An  isolated  law  does  not 
execute  itself,  but  it  may  be  so  enforced  by  another  law 
that  it  will  be  executed  without  further  intervention  on 
the  part  of  the  Government.  A  teacher,  for  example, 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  203 

is  required  to  have  a  certificate  of  qualification  before 
teaching  in  the  public  school.  This  law  is  executed  by 
another  requiring  him  to  present  his  certificate  when 
he  draws  his  pay.  The  law  requiring  prepayment  of 
postage  is  self-executing — a  letter  is  not  sent  unless 
it  is  stamped.  The  kind  treatment  of  others  is  more 
generally  practiced  because  of  the  trouble  that  will 
come  to  one  in  consequence  of  his  unkindness. 

12.  Reward  and  expenditure. — It  is  wrong  to  be  lav- 
ish in  bestowing  rewards;  for  they  are  always  given  at 
the  cost  of  expenditure.  Salaries,  bounties,  pensions, 
premiums,  prizes,  all  draw  on  some  source  of  revenue. 
Honor  gives  prominence;  but  the  elevation  of  one  is  the 
relative  depression  of  others.  Power  is  conferred  on 
one,  perhaps,  at  the  expense  of  the  liberty  or  security 
of  the  many.  Exemption  of  one  from  burdens  imposes 
greater  burdens  upon  others.  These  considerations 
do  not  condemn  rewards;  for  they  may  be  richly  de- 
served, and  to  withhold  them  would  be  to  discourage 
merit;  but  they  do  show  why  they  ought  to  be  judi- 
ciously bestowed. 

/j.  Reivards  ex  post  facto. — As  the  object  of  reward 
is  to  induce  service,  it  may  be  thought  that  the  reward 
should  always  be  offered  before  the  service  is  rendered, 
and  that  it  should  not  exceed  the  amount  promised. 
This  may  be  right  as  the  usual  rule;  but  it  would  exclude 
liberality  for  extraordinary  service,  or  for  heroic  service 
spontaneously  rendered,  and  would  withhold  a  powerful 
incentive  to  the  performance  of  like  services.  The  jus- 
tification of  ex  post  facto  rewards  is,  therefore,  the  gen- 
erosity it  develops  in  the  giver,  which  becomes  con- 
tagious, and  the  inducement  to  good  conduct  it  im- 


204  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

parts  to  others.  When  properly  bestowed,  an  ex  post 
facto  reward  is  a  bountiful  act,  fruitful  in  good  conse- 
quences. 

14.  Comparison  of  rewards  and  penalties. — Ordinary 
good  conduct  brings  it  own  reward;  hence  those  en- 
gaged in  their  own  business  need  no  other  reward  than 
that  which  naturally  follows.  Mismanagement  of  busi- 
ness brings  its  own  penalty,  and  ordinarily  receives  no 
other. 

Reward  is  the  proper  incentive  in  procuring  serv- 
ices, punishment  in  preventing  transgression;  reward  is 
the  spur,  punishment  is  the  rein.  A  threatened  punish- 
ment often  prevents  the  forbidden  transgression,  and 
the  punishment  is  not  required;  a  promised  reward  calls 
out  the  service,  and  the  reward  must  be  bestowed. 

The  source  of  reward  is  limited,  and  may  be  ex- 
hausted; the  source  of  punishment  is  unlimited,  and  can 
never  be  exhausted. 

The  occasions  for  special  rewards  are  comparatively 
few;  the  possible  transgressions  against  which  punish- 
ments are  denounced  are  many. 

Reward  appeals  to  hope,  and  calls  out  the  best  ef- 
forts; punishment  appeals  to  fear,  and  represses  bad 
tendencies. 

Reward  incites  to  higher  attainments;  punishment 
can  bring  up  only  to  the  ordinary  level. 

In  early  training,  punishment  may  be  the  beginning 
of  discipline;  then  a  mixture  of  reward  and  punishment; 
then,  by  degrees,  the  punishment  can  be  withdrawn,  and 
reward  alone  employed. 


Chapter  V 
REWARDS    AND    PUNISHMENTS.— CONTINUED 

1DEWARDING  and  punishing  as  arts. — The  great  art 
<L  V  in  distributing  rewards  and  punishments  is  to  ad- 
just the  reward  to  the  service  and  the  punishment  to 
the  transgression.  Several  principles  are  involved: 

(1)  Constant    connection. — If    possible,    a    constant 
connection  should  be  established  between  the  service 
and  the  reward  and  between  the  transgression  and  the 
penalty,  so  that  the  one  shall  follow  the  other.    A  serv- 
ice should  not  lose  its  reward,  nor  a  crime  fail  to  re- 
ceive its  punishment.     Under  the  Divine  government 
this  doubtless  is  true;  it  should  be,  at  least  approxi- 
mately, true  under  human  administration.    It  is  the  cer- 
tainty, or,  at  least,  the  high  probability  of  the  reward 
or  penalty  that  acts  as  an  incentive  to  duty  or  a  deter- 
rent from  crime,  rather  than  the  value  of  the  reward 
or  the  severity  of  the  punishment.     In  the  realm  of 
morals,  virtue  never  fails  of  its  reward,  nor  vice  of  its 
punishment. 

(2)  Proportionality. — The  reward  should  be  propor- 
tionate to  the  service,  and  the  punishment  to  the  trans- 
gression; that  is,  a  light  service  should  receive  a  small 
reward  and  a  greater  service  a  greater  reward;  a  slight 
transgression  should  receive  a  light  punishment,  and  a 

great  crime  a  heavy  penalty.     In  other  words,  the  re- 

205 


206  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

-ward  should  vary  directly  as  the  service,  and  the  punish- 
ment as  the  transgression.  This  is  justice  recognized 
by  the  judge  who  has  discretionary  power  in  passing- 
sentence  on  the  convicted  criminal. 

(3)  Natural  consequence. — As  far  as  possible,  the  re- 
ward should  be  the  natural  consequence  of  the  service 
and  the  punishment  of  the  transgression.  The  young 
man  who  has  made  a  good  drawing  with  imperfect  in- 
struments is  properly  rewarded  by  a  present  of  a  new 
set  of  instruments  of  finer  quality.  The  brigadier  who 
shows  his  ability  by  winning  a  battle  is  made  major- 
general.  The  boy  who  tries  the  quality  of  his  new  knife 
on  the  furniture  is  naturally  punished  by  being  de- 
prived of  his  knife  for  a  time.  "He  that  sheddeth  man's 
blood,  by  man  also  shall  his  blood  be  shed."  The  reason 
for  rewards  and  penalties  is  better  understood  when  they 
are  not  arbitrary,  but  follow  as  the  natural  consequences 
of  right  or  wrong  conduct. 

2.  Rewards  improperly  bestowed. — Rewards  are  per- 
nicious when  their  tendencies  is  to  produce  hypocrisy, 
or  to  encourage  mendacity,  or  to  excite  evil  passions, 
or  to  interfere  with  the  performance  of  duty.  To  grant 
privileges  on  condition  of  subscribing  to  a  certain  creed, 
whether  it  is  believed  in  or  not,  is  a  premium  on  hypoc- 
risy. To  give  a  reward  of  merit  on  the  testimony  of  the 
recipient  is  to  encourage  mendacity.  To  reward  in- 
formers, or  spies,  or  eavesdroppers,  is  to  encourage 
intermeddlers  and  to  excite  hatred  in  those  against 
whom  the  information  is  given.  To  offer  a  prize  for 
an  essay  of  such  high  character  that  its  production  in 
the  alloted  time  would  require  all  the  time  of  the  con- 
testants, would  interfere  with  other  duties. 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  207 

It  is  questionable  whether  it  is  right  to  offer  a  prize 
for  the  best  article  in  support  of  a  certain  opinion. 
Would  it  not  be  better  to  reward  the  investigator  who 
discovers  the  truth,  than  the  advocate  who  supports  an 
opinion?  Let  his  dissertation  be  an  impartial  investi- 
gation of  the  entire  subject  with  the  sole  aim  of  discov- 
ering the  truth.  To  love  the  truth,  to  seek  for  it,  and  to 
be  loyal  to  it,  mark  the  man  of  high  ethical  character. 
Such  a  man  is  mindful  of  his  own  fallibility,  considerate 
of  the  opinions  of  others,  open  to  convictions,  but  not 
hasty  in  accepting  new  doctrines. 

j.  Theories  as  to  the  object  of  punishment. — Several 
theories  have  been  proposed : 

(1)  The  retributive  theory. — This  theory  maintains 
that  the  person  who  has  violated  the  law  deserves  pun- 
ishment, and  that  he  ought  to  be  punished,  though  the 
punishment  results  in  no  good,  either  to  the  culprit  him- 
self or  to  any  other  person. 

It  is  true  enough  that  the  transgressor  is  guilty;  but 
the  question  is,  Why  inflict  pain,  which  is  itself  an  evil, 
if  the  infliction  does  no  good?  If  no  good  results  from 
punishment,  benevolence  forbids  its  infliction.  The  re- 
tributive theory  in  itself  can  not  be  justified.  Guilt 
marks  the  subject  of  punishment;  the  retribution  must 
fall  on  the  offender,  otherwise  punishment  fails  of  its 
object.  A  knowledge  that  the  guilty  is  punished  is  a 
restraint  to  crime,  and  this  good  result  is  a  justification 
of  punishment. 

(2)  The  deterrent  tJieory. — The  punishment  should 
be  made  so  severe  that  the  remembrance  of  it  will  deter 
the  offender  from  repeating  his  crime,  and  that  the  fear 
of  it  will  deter  others  from  similar  crimes.     This  view 


208  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

was  brought  out  by  the  judge  in  addressing  a  convicted 
horsethief  upon  whom  he  was  about  to  pass  sentence: 
"You  are  punished,  not  for  stealing  a  horse,  but  in 
order  that  horses  may  not  be  stolen."  Protection  to 
society  is  the  justification  of  punishment,  according  to 
this  view.  No  doubt,  punishment  is  justified  by  its  good 
consequences;  but  unless  there  is  ill-desert,  no  good  con- 
sequences follow  punishment;  it  should  fall  only  on  the 
guilty;  it  is  wrong  to  injure  the  innocent  for  the  sake  of 
society;  but  for  one  voluntarily  to  suffer  for  the  sake 
of  others  is  truly  noble.  The  judge  should  sentence  the 
horsethief  for  stealing  a  horse,  and  in  order  that  horses 
MAY  not  be  stolen. 

In  case  of  transgression,  the  offender  has  marked 
himself  as  the  one  who  ought  to  be  punished.  To  select 
the  innocent  for  punishment  would  not  deter  from  crime, 
since  one  under  temptation  could  say:  "There  is  no 
danger  of  my  punishment;  at  most  the  danger  is  next  to 
nothing,  since  punishment  is  inflicted,  not  because  de- 
served, but  to  prevent  crime,  and  some  other  person, 
though  innocent,  will  probably  be  selected."  To  select 
the  criminal  for  punishment  actually  serves  as  a  de- 
terrent; for  then  one  under  temptation  will  say:  "If  I 
commit  this  crime  I  shall  be  punished,  unless  I  can 
escape  detection."  He  then  weighs  the  supposed  good 
he  thinks  he  will  get  from  his  crime  against  the  evil  of  a 
possible  detection,  and  acts  according  to  the  sway  of  the 
balance,  either  to  retreat  for  fear  of  punishment,  or  for 
hope  of  gain  to  commit  the  crime,  and  relying  on  his 
cunning  takes  his  chances  of  escaping  from  the  pun- 
ishment. 

We  have  seen  that  punishment  is  attended  by  good 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  209 

results  only  when  the  subject  of  the  punishment  is  the 
culprit  himself.  For  the  selection  of  the  subject,  we  fall 
back  on  the  retributive  theory,  and  say  we  do  the  cul- 
prit no  wrong  since  he  deserves  his  punishment.  The 
deterrent  theory  justifies  the  punishment  by  the  pro- 
tection it  affords  society,  provided  the  criminal  is  the 
one  punished. 

To  be  deterrent,  and  hence  protective,  the  punish- 
ment must  be  sure  and  swift  and  severe  and  impartial. 
Even  the  vindictive  feeling  aroused  by  crime  tends  to 
make  the  punishment  sure.  Let  a  great  outrage  be  com- 
mitted in  a  community,  and  all  hands  turn  out  to  catch 
the  culprit.  The  increased  probability  which  the  vin- 
dictive feeling  gives  to  the  detection  of  crime  has  led 
certain  moralists  to  urge  this  as  a  justification  of  the 
retributive  theory  of  punishment. 

(3)  The  reformatory  theory. — This  means  more  than 
that  punishment  frightens  the  wrong-doer  from  repeat- 
ing his  offense;  for  it  gives  him  an  opportunity  for  re- 
flection and  religious  instruction,  and  it  may  lead  to  his 
reformation.  The  name  penitentiary  embodies  this  idea, 
and  that  punishment,  as  imprisonment,  merely  gives 
the  opportunity  for  the  other  forces  to  work  the  reforma- 
tion. The  prisoner  has  time  for  reflection. 

Punishment  itself  is  morally  efficient.  The  criminal 
is  a  moral  being;  and  if  punishment  will  lead  to  his 
reformation,  directly  or  indirectly,  he  ought  to  be  pun- 
ished for  his  own  sake,  though  he  would  not  demand 
it  as  his  right. 

Not  simply  restraint,  but  genuine  reformation,  is 
the  end  here  sought  for  in  punishment.  The  governing 
power,  whether  parent,  teacher,  or  State,  stands  as  the 
14 


210  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

embodiment  of  law,  and  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  its 
enforcement.  The  infliction  of  punishment  tends  to 
convey  to  the  mind  of  the  transgressor  a  due  sense  of 
the  righteousness  of  the  law  and  the  depth  of  his  guilt. 
This  is  the  first  step  towards  repentance.  He  must  be 
made  to  feel  his  guilt. 

If  a  person  is  punished  for  doing  what  he  believes 
to  be  his  duty,  he  will  regard  the  punishment  inflicted 
upon  him  as  persecution,  and  consider  himself  a  martyr, 
and  not  a  criminal. 

When  the  criminal  realizes  that  the  authority  which 
punishes  him  rightfully  embodies  the  moral  law,  and 
that  his  punishment  is  just,  his  attitude  is  changed,  and 
his  reformation  rendered  possible.  The  punishment  re- 
enforces  the  sense  of  his  obligation  to  obey  the  law, 
which  was  probably  felt  before,  though  too  feebly  to  pre- 
vent the  crime.  Realizing  that  he  was  guilty  in  breaking 
the  law,  thus  wronging  his  own  better  nature,  and  doing 
a  great  injury  to  society,  and  that  his  punishment  was 
inflicted,  not  from  malice,  but  from  a  sense  of  duty,  he 
may  possibly  listen  to  the  voice  of  conscience,  heartily 
repent  of  his  conduct,  and  become  a  better  man. 

(4)  Elements  of  truth  in  each  theory. — All  the  theories 
of  punishment  have  in  them  elements  of  truth.  The 
retributory  theory  emphasizes  the  ill-desert  of  the  of- 
fender, and  designates  him  as  the  one  who  ought  to 
receive  the  punishment.  The  deterrent  theory  looks  to 
the  general  welfare.  The  reformatory  theory  considers 
the  good  of  the  criminal. 

In  civil  government  the  punishment  has  especially 
for  its  object  the  protection  of  society,  and  only  inci- 
dentally the  reformation  of  the  criminal ;  but  the  punish- 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS  211 

ment,  if  possible,  should  be  made  certain,  otherwise 
lynch  law  will  take  the  matter  in  hand,  followed  by  all 
the  evils  attending  haste,  and  passion,  and  violence. 

In  family  government,  punishment  has  chiefly  for  its 
object  the  correction  of  the  offender  and  his  training  in' 
habits  of  virtue,  and  incidentally  the  protection  of  the 
other  members  of  the  family. 

In  school  government,  punishment  has  for  its  ob- 
ject the  co-ordinate  ends — the  correction  of  the  dis- 
obedient, and  the  welfare  of  all  the  pupils  of  the  school. 

In  many  cases  the  degree  of  punishment  should  not 
be  rigidly  fixed  by  the  law-making  power,  but  should 
be  left  within  certain  limits  to  the  discretion  of  the  court. 
The  sliding  scale  gives  liberty  to  adjust  the  degree  of 
penalty  to  the  mitigating  or  aggravating  circumstances 
of  the  crime.  The  legislative,  judicial,  and  executive 
powers  are  sometimes  united  in  the  same  person,  as  the 
parent  or  teacher. 

It  has  sometimes  been  thought  better  to  appeal  to 
the  hope  of  reward,  than  to  the  fear  of  punishment;  or 
if  punishment  is  employed,  to  emphasize  the  pain  rather 
than  the  disgrace,  on  the  consideration  that  disgrace 
is  degrading.  But  does  not  reward,  as  a  bribe,  appeal  to 
selfishness?  Is  not  the  appeal  to  the  pain  of  punishment 
also  an  appeal  to  selfishness?  An  appeal  to  the  dis- 
grace of  punishment  is  an  appeal  to  the  moral  nature, 
and  to  the  estimate  in  which  bad  conduct  is  held  by 
others.  The  delinquent  is  disgraced  by  the  punishment 
in  his  own  estimation  and  in  the  opinion  of  others;  but 
if  he  reform,  he  is  not  degraded  by  the  disgrace,  but 
elevated  by  being  made  ashamed  of  his  wicked  conduct. 
Even  the  obloquy  that  casts  contempt  on  a  profligate 


212  SYSTEMS    OF   ETHICS 

wretch  sometimes  causes  a  reaction  of  his  better  nature, 
and  leads  to  his  reformation. 

It  will  not  do  to  say  that  if  an  offender  is  ashamed  of 
his  conduct  and  promises  to  reform,  he  ought  to  be  re- 
leased from  punishment.  If  this  plan  was  adopted,  the 
wrong-doer  would  pretend  to  be  ashamed  and  promise 
reformation,  in  order  to  escape  punishment.  To  punish 
him  will  assist  him  to  be  ashamed,  and  will  help  him  to 
reform,  and  will  restrain  him  from  like  offenses,  and  per- 
haps from  other  offenses  in  the  future.  At  all  events, 
he  suffers  justly;  the  law  is  righteous.  Therefore  let  the 
punishment  fall  upon  the  transgressor  on  account  of  his 
ill-desert;  and  let  it  be  sure  and  swift  and  severe  and 
impartial. 


HISTORY  OF  ETHICS 


Chapter  I 
GREEK    ETHICS 

PRE-SOCRATIC.—Oi  the  pre-Socratic  philosophers, 
we  notice: 

1 i)  The  Ionic  philosophers  (600-400  B.  C.) — The  spec- 
ulations of  Thales  and  the  other  Ionic  philosophers  were 
cosmological,  not  ethical.    They  sought  for  the  principle 
of  the  physical  universe,  but  did  not  discuss  the  moral 
nature  of  man. 

(2)  The  Elcatic  philosophers  (550-450.) — The  Eleatic 
philosophers,  Xenophanes,  Panncmdes,  Zeno,  and  Melis- 
sns,  were  metaphysical  and  dialectical.     They  brought 
out  the  antitheses  of  the  one  and  the  many,  the  perma- 
nent and  the  changeable,  being  and  not-being,  rational 
knowledge  and  sense  knowledge.     They  ridiculed  the 
anthropomorphic  conception  of  the  gods,  but  did  not 
discuss  ethical  questions.    Their  system  afforded  logical 
training,  and  thus  prepared  the  way  for  ethical  specu- 
lations.    Their  principle  was  being — unchangeableness. 

(3)  Pythagoras  (circiter  580-500). — In  teaching  that 
virtue  is  expressed  by  a  square  number,  a  square  sym- 
bolizing the  proportion  of  requital  to  desert,  Pythagoras 
anticipated   the   doctrine  of  Plato   and  Aristotle,   that 
goodness  in  conduct  avoids  excess  and  defect,  and  thus 
secures   proportional    results.      Pythagoras    laid    great 

215 


2l6  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

stress  on  external  requirements  of  conduct.     His  prin- 
ciple was  number. 

(4)  Heraclitus  (cir.   460-370). — In  regarding  trust 
in  the  divine  order  of  nature  as  the  groundv  of  satisfac- 
tion,   Heraclitus   anticipated    the    Stoics.      He   recom- 
mended obedience  to  natural  law,  as  revealed  by  reason. 
The   complacency  attained  by  yielding   to   the   divine 
order,  Heraclitus  regarded  as  the  highest  good.     His 
philosophic  principle  was  becoming — unceasing  change 
according  to  law. 

(5)  Democritus   (cir.    460-370). — In    declaring   that 
delight  is  the  highest  good,  Democritus  anticipated  the 
Epicureans.     He  found  happiness,  not  in   sensational 
pleasures,  but  in  cheerfulness  and  tranquillity.     Democ- 
ritus was  the  originator  of  the  atomic  theory.      His 
principle  was  the  full  and  the  void — atoms  and  empty 
space. 

(6)  The   Sophists    (cir.    450-400). — Protagoras    and 
Gorgias,  the  most  distinguished  sophists,   taught  that 
there  are  no  universal  moral  principles;  that  man  is  a 
mere  creature  of  sensation,  including  under  that  term 
appetites,  desires,  and  the  experience  of  pleasure  and 
pain;  that  good  conduct  is  that  which  gives  agreeable 
sensations;  that  each  man  is  the  measure  of  truth  for 
himself;  that  one  opinion  is  as  good  as  another;  and  that 
the  rule  of  conduct  is  to  do  that  which  promotes  self- 
interest.     They  were  the  first  to  advocate  egoism.    "In 
teaching  for  pay,  they  encountered  prejudice  and  were 
regarded  as  mercenary.    Their  principles  were:  Man  is 
the  measure  of  the  universe;  Act  according  to  your  nature. 

2.  The  Socratic. — Under  this  head  we  shall  include 


HISTORY  OF  ETHICS  217 

for  ethical  consideration  Socrates,  the  Megaric,  the 
Cynic,  and  the  Cyrenaic  schools,  Plato  and  Aristotle. 

(i)  Socrates  (470-399). — Socrates  in  making  the 
good  of  the  individual  the  object  of  interest,  stood  on 
common  ground  with  the  Sophists;  but  he  differed  from 
them  in  holding  that  man  is  more  than  a  creature  of 
sensation,  in  that  he  is  endowed  with  reason,  whose 
function  is  thought  and  whose  aim  is  truth.  Of  the 
two  elements  of  the  good — the  transitory  pleasures  of 
sensation,  and  the  permanent  satisfaction  of  truth — 
Socrates  preferred  the  permanent^  _tp  the  transitory, 
though  he  did  not  deny  that  pleasures  have  a  certain 
value. 

A  sensation  is  felt,  or  rather  it  is  a  particular  feeling, 
and  nothing  else.  A  thought,  for  example  of  a  sensa- 
tion, is  an  idea  of  the  sensation  as  resembling  an  indefi- 
nite number  of  other  sensations,  and  thus  deals  with 
relations.  A  thought  of  a  sensation  may  be  present 
when  the  sensation  itself  is  absent.  The  truer  nature 
of  man  is  not  sensation,  his  lower  nature,  which  he  has 
in  common  with  the  brute;  but  thought,  his  higher 
nature,  which  is  characteristic  of  himself. 

With  the  Sophists,  Socrates  said,  Act  according  to 
your  nature.  But  what  is  the  true  nature  of  man?  The 
Sophists  said  sensation ;  Socrates  said  thought.  He  held, 
therefore,  that  thought,  the  true  nature,  the  higher  na- 
ture, should  hold  in  restraint  sensation,  the  lower  nature. 
The  permanent  has  more  value  than  the  transitory.  It 
is  the  good. 

Virtue  consists  in  the  choice  of  the  good;  but  to  dis- 
criminate the  good  requires  knowledge;  hence  virtue 


2l8  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

depends  on  knowledge.  If  it  is  not  resolvable  into 
knowledge,  it  is  at  least  resolvable  into  wisdom. 

The  reasoning  of  Socrates  in  substance  is  this :  Vir- 
tue results  in  happiness,  and  vice  in  misery;  but  every 
man  seeks  to  secure  his  own  happiness,  and  to  avoid 
misery;  therefore,  every  man  would  be  virtuous  if  he 
had  the  proper  knowledge.  Hence  virtue  may  be 
taught,  and  has  a  universal  value.  In  this  also  he  dif- 
fered from  the  Sophists,  who,  denying  universal  truth, 
made  each  man  the  sole  judge  of  his  own  good. 

The  good  that  Socrates  sought  after  was  eudemonic 
rather  than  hedonic,  though  he  did  not  altogether  despise 
the  latter;  yet  the  good  was  egoistic,  at  least  in  theory, 
rather  than  altruistic.  A  man  is  to  be  just  for  his  own 
sake,  rather  than  for  the  sake  of  others.  Benevolence 
finds  no  place  in  an  egoistic  system.  The  satisfaction 
a  man  has  in  the  consciousness  of  his  justice  is  a  perma- 
nent good,  much  to  be  preferred  to  the  transient  pleas- 
ures enjoyed  from  the  gratification  of  appetite. 

Socrates  for  himself  preferred  virtue  to  pleasure,  and 
chose  the  permanent  good  of  rational  thought,  instead 
of  the  transient  gratification  of  appetite  and  desire;  but 
did  he  realize  the  strength  of  the  enticement  to  immedi- 
ate gratification  for  the  average  man,  and  the  feeble 
hold  that  a  future,  though  a  more  permanent  good,  had 
upon  his  will?  Wisdom,  no  doubt,  dictates  that  every 
one,  for  his  own  sake,  should  pursue  virtue  instead  of 
vice;  but  it  is  not  true  that  every  one  will  do  this,  even 
when  he  knows  that  in  the  long  jun  it  will  be  to  his 
advantage;  hence  it  is  not  true  that  virtue  is  resolvable 
into  knowledge,  and  vice  into  ignorance.  A  vicious 
man,  knowing  full  well  that  the  permanent  good  of  vir- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  219 

tue  is  of  far  greater  value  than  the  immediate,  intense, 
transitory  pleasures  of  vice,  yet  yields  to  the  solicitations 
of  evil,  and  thus  forfeits  the  permanent  rewards  of  virtue. 
He  can  apply  to  himself  the  language  of  Ovid : 

"Video  meliora  proboque;  deteriora  sequor." 

Xenophon  tells  us  that  Socrates  declared  that  man 
to  be  most  praiseworthy  who  anticipated  his  enemies  in 
maleficence  and  his  friends  in  beneficence. 

Socrates  taught  obedience  not  only  to  the  inner 
moral  requirement,  but  to  the  external  legal  order,  and 
this  he  exemplified  in  submitting  to  the  sentence  of 
death  when  he  might  have  escaped. 

If  his  theory  was  egoistic,  his  example  in  instructing 
others  was  altruistic.  In  this  we  see  that  the  man 
Socrates  was  greater  than  his  system. 

(2)  The  Megarians. — The  founder  of  this  school  was 
Euclid,  a  disciple  of  Socrates.     He  is  not  to  be  con- 
founded with  the  more  famous  Euclid,  the  mathema- 
tician of  Alexandria.     Euclid  was  a  good  logician;  he 
employed  in  argument  chiefly  the  reductio  ad  absurdum 
method  of  reasoning. 

Euclid  held  with  Socrates  that  the  good  is  the  ulti- 
mate end  to  be  sought.  But  what  is  the  good?  Euclid 
replied  that  which  the  Electics  called  being,  what  truly  is, 
the  hidden  secret  of  the  universe;  perhaps,  to  adopt  a 
modern  statement,  the. power  in  nature  that  works  for 
righteousness.  He  thus  gave  to  ethics  a  metaphysical 
basis,  and  this  is  the  latest  modern  tendency. 

(3)  The  Cynics. — The  principal  philosophers  of  this 
school  were   Antisthenes   (444-371)   and   Diogenes  (cir. 


220  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

412-323),  who  was  a  pupil  of  Antisthenes.  They  were 
called  Cynics  from  Cynosarges,  the  name  of  the  gym- 
nasium in  which  Antisthenes  taught.  Diogenes  was 
often  called  the  dog,  o  KWOS,  from  which  fact  some  have 
derived  the  word  cynic.  The  word  cynical  is  used  to 
denote  a  snappish  disposition. 

The  Cynics  followed  Socrates  in  placing  a  low  esti- 
mate on  the  short-lived  pleasures  of  sensation;  but  they 
carried  his  doctrine  to  extremes  by  renouncing  the  com- 
forts of  life,  which  may  be  innocently  enjoyed.  It  is  not 
necessary  for  one  to  go  ragged  and  dirty  and  barefoot, 
like  Antisthenes,  or  to  live  in  a  tub,  as  did  Diogenes. 
The  Cynics  anticipated  the  Stoics. 

(4)  The  Cyrenaics. — The  chief  representative  of  this 
school  was  Aristippus  (435-356).  He  accepted  the  doc- 
trine of  Socrates  that  the  good  is  personal  enjoyment; 
and  not  distinguishing  between  the  transient  and  the 
permanent,  but  resolving  all  enjoyment  into  hedonic 
pleasure,  he  went  to  the  extreme,  opposite  to  that 
chosen  by  the  Cynics,  and  thus  anticipated  the  Epi- 
cureans. 

It  seems  strange  that  two  such  opposite  schools  as 
the  Cynics  and  the  Cyrenaics  could  find  the  root  of  their 
doctrines  in  the  teaching  of  Socrates,  yet  such  is  the  fact; 
it  proves  the  breadth  of  the  mind  of  Socrates.  The 
Cynics  seemed  to  be  never  so  completely  happy  as  when 
they  were  miserable;  and  the  Cyrenaics  resolved  happi- 
ness into  pleasure  of  the  lowest  sort. 

It  remained  for  Plato  and  Aristotle  to  develop  the 
doctrines  of  Socrates,  to  elucidate  the  virtues,  and  to 
place  the  science  of  ethics  on  a  solid  foundation. 

Plato  (427-347). — Plato  accepted  the  doctrine 


HISTORY   OF  ETHICS  221 

of  Socrates  that  virtue  is  identical  with  knowledge.  He 
makes  ethical  good,  or  virtue,  central  in  a  comprehensive 
theory  of  the  universe. 

Plato  recognized  four  virtues — wisdom,  courage, 
temperance,  and  justice;  but  he  finds  no  place  for  be- 
nevolence, unless  in  his  later  work,  the  Laws,  in  which 
he  insists  on  purity  in  the  marriage  relation,  and  the 
kind  treatment  of  slaves. 

Wisdom,  or  the  virtue  of  reason,  should  characterize 
the  higher  classes,  the  statesmen  who  make  the  laws, 
and  the  philosophers  who  develop  the  theory  of 
politics. 

Courage,  or  the  virtue  of  the  spirited  part  of  the  soul, 
should  be  possessed  by  the  soldier  who  fights  for  his 
country. 

Temperance,  or  moderation,  is  the  virtue  which 
should  regulate  the  appetites  and  desires  of  all  classes. 

Justice  grows  out  of  the  union  of  all  the  other  virtues, 
and  its  practice  and  enforcement  is  the  especial  duty  of 
the  rulers.  It  limits  and  regulates  the  conduct  of  all 
classes,  and  is  the  guardian  of  the  rights  of  all. 

The  higher  classes  require  their  appropriate  virtues 
and  all  other  virtues;  but  the  lower  classes  do  not  need 
the  higher  virtues.  Thus  soldiers  and  laborers  have  no 
need  of  wisdom. 

In  his  earlier  dialogues,  as  the  Republic,  Plato  is 
more  ideal,  and  assumes  the  union  of  all  the  virtues 
under  the  direction  of  wisdom,  giving  the  practical 
virtue  of  prudence.  In  the  later  dialogue,  the  Laws,  he 
supplements  the  four  divine  virtues — wisdom,  courage, 
temperance,  and  justice — by  the  four  human  utilities — 
health,  beauty,  strength,  and  wealth. 


222  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

In  the  world  of  ideas,  which  are  patterns  after  which 
material  objects  are  formed,  all  is  harmony;  but  in  the 
world  of  matter,  the  physical  objects,  which  are  only 
imperfect  copies  of  the  original  patterns,  often  conflict 
and  occasion  disorder.  But  matter  is  not  wholly  an 
evil;  for  beauty  clothes  itself  in  material  forms,  and  ad- 
dresses the  mind  through  the  senses.  ^Esthetics,  the 
science  of  beauty,  is  closely  allied  to  ethics,  the  science 
of  the  good.  Idea  in  Plato  is  nearly  equivalent  to  con- 
cept, only  it  has  an  objective  existence. 

To  comprehend  the  Platonic  ethics  we  must  under- 
stand that  of  the  Sophists,  to  which  it  was  especially 
opposed.  If  man  be  nothing  but  an  aggregate  of  sen- 
sations, as  the  Sophists  taught,  then  he  can  have  no 
other  purpose  than  sensational  pleasure,  and  selfishness 
is  the  sole  principle  of  action;  but  if  his  higher  and  truer 
nature  is  reason,  to  which  courage,  appetite,  and  desire 
are  subordinate,  then  other  and  higher  purposes  than 
selfish  gratification  ought  to  control  his  conduct. 

A  Sophist  would  say  to  a  Platonist,  If  what  you  call 
justice  and  virtue  bring  happiness,  then  by  all  means 
be  just  and  virtuous,  or  seem  to  be  so,  which  would  do 
just  as  well;  but  virtue  is  conformity  to  nature,  and  man 
is  nothing  but  a  bundle  of  sensations;  therefore  the  pur- 
suit of  pleasure  is  the  only  real  virtue,  though  the  pur- 
suit leads  to  what  you  call  vice  and  injustice. 

The  whole  discussion  turns  on  the  answer  to  the 
question,  What  is  true  human  nature?  If  man  is  noth- 
ing but  an  aggregate  of  sensations,  then  the  Sophists 
were  right,  that  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  is  the  true  moral- 
ity; but  if  man's  true  higher  nature  is  reason,  then  the 
polemic  of  Plato  against  the  Sophists  was  triumphant. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  223 

In  the  Republic,  Plato  illustrated  his  theory  of 
ethics  by  the  State,  which  is  made  up  of  rulers,  soldiers, 
artisans,  mechanics,  agriculturists,  and  the  like.  He 
showed  that  as  the  State  can  prosper  only  by  maintain- 
ing justice — that  is,  order  and  due  subordination  to  the 
rulers,  no  class  being  allowed,  by  an  act  of  injustice,  to 
encroach  on  the  rights  of  the  other  classes — so  the  soul 
of  man,  having  reason,  courage,  appetite,  and  desire,  can 
attain  to  its  highest  good  only  by  the  supremacy  of 
reason  in  directing  courage,  and  controlling  appetite 
and  desire.  The  true  morality  of  an  individual,  anal- 
agous  to  justice  in  the  State,  is  the  intentional  effort  so 
to  adjust  and  subordinate  his  powers,  and  to  order  his 
conduct,  as  to  realize  the  highest  possibilities  of  his  true 
nature.  In  this  realization  man  finds  his  satisfaction. 

Plato  is  richly  worthy  of  the  most  attentive  study, 
not  only  for  his  philosophy,  but  far  the  graces  of  his 
style.  Says  Frederick  Harrison: 

"I  never  doubt  that  the  greatest  master  of  prose  in 
recorded  history  is  Plato.  He  alone  (like  Homer  in 
poetry)  is  perfect.  He  has  every  mood,  and  all  are  fault- 
less. He  is  easy,  lucid,  graceful,  witty,  pathetic,  imagi- 
native, by  turns;  but  in  all  kinds  he  is  natural  and  inimi- 
tably sweet.  He  shows  us,  as  it  were,  his  own  Athena, 
wisdom  incarnate,  in  immortal  radiance  of  form." 


Chapter  II 

GREEK  ETHICS— CONTINUED 

(6)  Aristotle  (384-322). — Aristotle  was  more  real- 
istic and  less  supersensuous  than  Plato.  Instead  of 
idea,  which  Plato  considered  the  divine  pattern  after 
which  a  thing  is  made,  Aristotle  substituted  form,  or  the 
combination  of  all  the  common  qualities  of  all  the  ob- 
jects of  a  class.  The  form  can  be  found  by  passing  from 
individual  to  individual  of  a  class,  dropping  the  attri- 
butes peculiar  to  the  individual,  and  retaining  only  those 
not  found  wanting  in  any  individual  of  the  class.  Aris- 
totle also  called  the  form  the  formal  cause,  since  it  is  that 
combination  of  qualities  which  causes  an  object  to 
belong  to  a  certain  class. 

It  is  not  the  idea  of  virtue  that  Aristotle  discusses, 
but  virtue  itself  as  existing  in  man.  Ethics  thus  assumes 
a  realistic  character.  Aristotle  does  not  consider  ab- 
stract goodness — what  is  good  in  itself,  or  in  an  ideal 
world,  but  what  is  good  for  man  in  the  present  state  of 
existence,  as  a  member  of  society,  or  as  a  citizen  of  the 
State. 

With  Plato,  Aristotle  held  that  an  individual  can  not 
attain  to  his  highest  good  apart  from  others,  but  only  as 
a  citizen;  hence  politics  is  the  culmination  of  ethics,  and 

man  is  a  political  animal.     Yet  Aristotle  preferred  a 

224 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  225 

contemplative  to  a  practical  life,  and  ranked  the  philos- 
opher above  the  politician. 

The  identification  of  the  good  with  happiness,  Aris- 
totle regarded  as  self-evident.  Virtue  is  a  deliberate 
moral  choice  of  the  mean  between  the  two  extremes  of 
excess  and  defect;  it  is  moderation  under  the  guidance 
of  reason  and  the  control  of  the  will.  Virtue  is  the 
means  of  happiness. 

The  theoretical  virtues,  depending  on  reason,  are 
knowledge,  skill,  insight,  understanding,  wisdom;  the 
practical  virtues,  directing  morals,  are  courage,  temper- 
ance, prudence,  liberality.  These  moral  virtues,  relative 
to  ourselves,  are  means  between  two  extremes,  which 
are  the  vices  of  excess  and  deficiency.  Thus  courage 
is  the  mean,  relative  to  ourselves,  between  the  vices 'of 
foolhardiness,  an  excess  of  courage,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  of  cowardice,  a  deficiency  of  courage,  on  the  other. 
Relative  to  the  highest  good,  virtue  is  an  extreme;  it 
aims  at  the  highest  excellence. 

Justice  is  partly  a  theoretical  virtue  and  partly  a 
practical  one,  depending,  as  it  does,  both  on  the  reason 
and  on  the  will. 

Aristotle  combats  the  view  of  Socrates  that  virtue 
is  resolvable  into  knowledge,  and  that  no  one  will  do 
wrong  except  through  ignorance.  He  held  that  Soc- 
rates did  not  sufficiently  allow  for  the  strength  of  appe- 
tite and  desire.  Virtue  is  rather  good  will  than  accurate 
knowledge.  He,  however,  agrees  with  Socrates  in  re- 
garding reason  as  the  characteristic  attribute  of  man, 
and  this  fact  classes  him  with  the  Socratic  school.  The 
supreme  good  Aristotle  held  to  be  the  happiness  which 
springs  from  reason,  the  higher  or  true  nature  of  man. 
15 


226  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Virtue  is  to  be  strengthened  by  right  conduct. 
Youth  are  to  be  trained  in  the  practice  of  virtue  by  such 
conduct  as  will  lead  to  the  formation  of  right  habits. 
Hence  Aristotle  emphasizes  the  importance  of  right  con- 
duct. Virtue,  as  moral  character,  is  not  innate,  but  is 
acquired  by  conduct.  Now,  a  person  before  his  moral 
character  is  formed  may  be  taught  that  it  is  best  for  him 
to  be  just  and  temperate;  then  "'he  becomes  just  by 
doing  what  is  just,  and  temperate  by  conduct  that  is 
temperate;  and  if  one  did  not  so  act,  he  would  not  have 
so  much  as  a  chance  of  becoming  good."  Right  con- 
duct forms  right  habits;  right  habits  form  good  char- 
acter; and  good  character  is  a  perpetual  fountain  of 
genuine  satisfaction,  which  is  the  highest  good. 

In  rinding  virtue  in  moderation,  the  mean  between 
two  extremes,  Aristotle  makes  temperance,  or  self-con- 
trol, which  Plato  regarded  as  the  lowest  of  the  virtues, 
to  be  the  essence  of  all  virtue. 

Aristotle  held  that  an  undeveloped  human  being  had 
as  yet  no  moral  character;  that  he  has  no  principle 
within,  which  necessarily  makes  him  virtuous  or  vicious; 
but  that  he  has  a  nature  which  may  run  in  either  of  these 
directions.  The  direction  which  the  individual  takes, 
whether  towards  virtue  or  vice,  granting  all  due  influ- 
ence to  the  environment,  is  decided  by  his  own  free  will. 

The  merit  of  being  the  first  moralist  to  recognize 
the  function  of  the  will  belongs  to  Aristotle.  He  held 
that  the  essence  of  virtue  is  a  good  will — that  is,  a  will 
which,  seeking  the  guidance  of  wisdom,  chooses  the 
right,  but  is  neither  identical  with  reason  nor  independ- 
ent of  it.  Knowledge,  therefore,  though  not  identical 
with  virtue,  is  essential  to  success  in  the  pursuit  of  the 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  227 

objective  means  of  happiness.  We  have  seen  that  Aris- 
totle held  that  the  ultimate  good,  or  the  end  of  human 
pursuit,  is  happiness.  In  what  does  happiness  consist? 
Aristotle  gives  four  theories : 

1.  The  good  is  a  separate  entity  which  may  be  at- 
tained  by   participating  in   the   divine  ideas.     This   is 
Plato's  theory;  but  Aristotle  considers  it  too  vague  to 
be  of  any  practical  value. 

2.  The  good  is  sensual  pleasure.     This  will  do  for 
brutes,  but  not  for  man;  for  reason,  not  sensation,  is  the 
proper  nature  of  man. 

3.  The  good  is  honor.     Honor  is  good,  but  not  all 
good  nor  the  highest. 

4.  The  good  is  intellectual  contemplation.     This  is 
the  truest  of  all,  yet  incomplete.     Aristotle,  however, 
adopts  it,  and  supplements  it  by  other  ends,  thus  form- 
ing what  he  regarded  as  the  true  doctrine  of  happiness. 
To  ascertain  the  condition  of  happiness,  we  must  first 
find  man's  true  nature.     Man  is  an  organized  being;  so 
are  plants  and  animals.    Man  is  a  sensitive  being;  so  are 
animals.     Man  is  a  moral  being,  and  his  reason  is  his 
characteristic  or  proper  nature. 

Man's  proper  work  is  not,  therefore,  simply  to  main- 
tain his  organic  life,  which  is  the  work  of  the  plant;  nor 
is  it  man's  proper  work  to  obtain  pleasurable  sensations, 
which  is  the  work  of  a  brute;  but  his  proper  work  is  to 
develop  his  true  nature,  his  rational  powers,  and  to  live 
according  to  reason,  and  in  so  doing  he  attains  to  true 
happiness. 

It  was  a  great  merit  in  Aristotle  to  insist  on  the  prac- 
tice of  virtue.  By  the  practice  of  virtue,  by  the  choice 
of  the  good  by  the  will  under  the  guidance  of  wisdom, 


228  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

man  creates  and  makes  permanent  a  virtuous  character  for 
himself.  If  the  character  is  decisive  of  subsequent  con- 
duct, a  person  who  by  conduct  forms  character  can  con- 
trol his  subsequent  conduct.  Being  instructed  when  he 
is  yet  plastic,  before  his  character  is  crystallized,  he  is 
free  to  follow  reason  in  his  conduct.  From  right  con- 
duct follow  right  habits,  good  character,  right  subse- 
quent habits,  and  conduct,  and  the  highest  happiness, 
the  consciousness  of  rectitude. 

It  is  a  matter  of  surprise  that  Aristotle  took  no  notice 
of  benevolence,  unless  he  faintly  recognized  it  under  the 
head  of  liberality;  yet  he  spoke  of  the  affection  that 
binds  men  together.  What  he  calls  good  will,  was 
not  what  we  call  benevolence,  but  a  choice  of  all  the 
virtues. 

Aristotle  is  a  practical  moralist.  He  says :  "The  ob- 
ject of  our  inquiry  is  not  [only]  to  know  the  nature  of 
virtue,  but  to  become  ourselves  virtuous."  Aristotle's 
ethics  is,  even  at  this  day,  well  worthy  the  attention  of 
those  who  are  interested  in  ethical  questions.  It  reads 
like  a  modern  book. 

3.  Post-Soeratie. — Of  the  post-Socratic  schools  of 
ethics  we  have  the  two  principal  ones — the  Stoic  and  the 
Epicurean. 

(i)  The  Stoic  Philosophy. — Its  founder  was  Zcno 
(342-270).  This  school  of  philosophy  took  its  name 
from  o-roa,  the  porch  where  Zeno  taught.  The  Stoic 
philosophy  goes  back  to  the  Socratic  through  the 
Cynics,  who  taught  that  the  well-being  of  the  sage  is 
independent  of  such  things  as  health,  beauty,  wealth, 
pleasure. 

The  Stoics,  however,  insisted  on  serenity,  tranquil- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  229 

lity,  magnanimity,  and  wisdom,  that  secure  the  philoso- 
pher from  the  disturbing  accidents  of  life.  Their  maxim 
was,  Live  according  to  nature;  but  they  aimed  not  so 
much  to  state  maxims  of  duty,  as  to  exemplify  virtue  in 
character,  as  found,  for  example,  in  Socrates  and  Zeno. 

Health,  wealth,  good  birth,  fame,  and  the  like, 
though  good  in  a  good  man,  were  evil  in  a  bad  man,  and 
were,  therefore,  in  themselves  indifferent.  Pleasure,  de- 
sire, grief,  fear,  are  sources  of  evils.  The  good  man's 
character  must  be  secure  from  the  influence  of  these 
things,  and  such  maladies  must  be  eradicated  from  his 
soul. 

The  Stoic's  characteristic  was  neither  sympathy  non 
antipathy,  but  apathy — indifference  to  the  joys,  the  sor- 
rows, or  the  circumstances  of  life. 

It  is  a  curious  question,  why  in  certain  emergencies 
the  Stoics  encouraged  suicide  as  an  escape  from  the  ills 
of  life,  since  the  sage  is  to  be  indifferent  to  pain.  By 
suicide  he  seems  to  desert  his  post  of  duty,  assigned 
to  him  by  the  wisdom  of  God.  The  answer  is,  that  pain 
is  not  to  be  desired,  but  rather  to  be  avoided,  and  that 
certain  disabilities,  as  loss  of  health  or  limb,  were  indi- 
cations of  Providence  that  he  \vas  no  longer  on  duty, 
since  his  disability  to  perform  duty  was  a  providential 
indication  of  his  release;  and  by  the  act  of  suicide,  he 
proved  that  life  itself  is  regarded  as  one  of  the  indifferent 
things. 

The  unity  of  the  virtues  was  not  with  the  Stoics  the 
identity  of  the  virtues,  but  their  combination  in  the  unity 
of  a  moral  personality.  As  with  Plato,  so  with  the 
Stoics,  wisdom  was  the  principal  virtue. 

The  motto  of  the  Stoics,  Live  according  to  nature, 


230  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

or  more  definitely,  Live  in  conformity  to  the  laws  of 
your  own  nature,  the  laws  of  society,  and  the  laws  of 
God,  as  reason  reveals  them,  \vas  a  motto  adopted  by 
other  schools  of  philosophy,  and  is  still  in  vogue. 

So  the  Sophists  said,  Live  according  to  nature;  so 
said  Socrates;  but  in  one  case  nature  meant  sensation, 
in  the  other  case  thought. 

The  tendency  of  the  teaching  of  the  Stoics  was  ego- 
istic, but  cosmopolitan,  and  in  this  respect  they  took 
the  lead.  They  valued  their  friends,  and  advocated  the 
common  friendship  of  all  the  good.  Notwithstanding 
the  many  good  points  of  Stoicism,  it  was  still  a  one- 
sided system. 

The  great  teachers  of  Stoicism  were  Zeno  the 
founder,  Chrysippus,  Seneca,  Epictetus,  and  the  Em- 
peror Marcus. 

(2)  The  Epicurean  philosophy. — The  founder  was 
Epicurus  (341-2 70) . 

Just  as  the  Stoic  philosophy  was  an  improvement  on 
the  Cynic,  so  was  the  Epicurean  an  improvement  on  the 
Cyrenaic.  As  the  Cynics  were  forerunners  of  the  Stoics, 
so  were  the  Cyrenaics  of  the  Epicureans. 

Notwithstanding  their  extreme  divergence  in  the 
main,  yet  at  least  in  two  respects  the  Stoics  and  the 
Epicureans  ran  in  parallel  courses — in  the  prominence 
of  the  personal  element,  and  in  the  emphasis  placed  on 
the  negative  aspect  of  happiness,  the  absence  of  disturb- 
ing influences;  but  with  the  Stoics,  the  evil  or  disturbing 
influence  was  passion,  with  the  Epicureans  it  was  pain. 
The  Epicureans  maintained  with  Aristippus,  the  Cyre- 
naic, that  pleasure  is  the  sole  good  and  pain  the  sole 
evil;  that  a  pleasure  is  not  to  be  rejected  unless  it  results 


HISTORY   OF  ETHICS  231 

in  an  overbalancing  pain;  and  that  a  pain  is  not  to  be 
sought  unless  it  results  in  an  overbalancing  pleasure. 
Hence  a  philosopher  should  discriminate  between  the 
pleasures,  arid  seek  for  the  durable  that  do  not  give  final 
pain.  This  is  sound  teaching,  for  which  Epicurus  ought 
to  receive  due  credit. 

The  pleasures  of  friendship  and  of  society  are  much 
to  be  preferred  to  the  gratification  of  the  appetite  or  to 
any  form  of  sensual  indulgence.  The  pleasures  of  the 
intellect,  found  in  the  cultivation  of  science,  or  in  the 
study  of  philosophy,  are  far  superior  to  those  found  in 
the  gratification  of  ambition  or  in  the  success  attending 
any  public  career. 

Though  Epicurus  himself  was  temperate  in  his  en- 
joyments, yet  the  tendency  of  his  system,  as  shown  by 
its  history,  is  to  sensual  gratification. 

The  common  opinion  that  an  epicure  is  a  voluptuary, 
one  given  to  luxurious  living,  especially  to  the  pleasures 
of  the  table,  shows  the  drift  of  sentiment  in  regard  to 
the  tendency  of  the  system.  The  Epicureans  would  say, 
Let  us  eat  and  drink,  for  to-morrow  we  die. 

The  low  tendency  of  Epicureanism  is  also  seen  in  the 
teaching  that  the  only  restraint  from  crime  is  the  dread 
of  detection  and  punishment.  This  dread  is,  no  doubt, 
a  powerful  restraint  of  which  Government  must  avail 
itself,  especially  as  many  can  be  restrained  in  no  other 
way;  but  every  person  should  be  taught  to  heed  the 
voice  of  reason,  and  follow  the  dictates  of  his  better 
nature. 

As  the  serenity  of  the  mind  is  disturbed  by  the  fear 
of  the  gods,  and  by  the  fear  of  death,  Epicurus,  who 
seemed  desirous  to  remove  all  disturbing  influences, 


232  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

taught  that  the  gods  were  too  happy  in  their  own  sphere 
to  trouble  themselves  with  the  affairs  of  men;  that  the 
universe  is  not  the  creation  of  the  gods,  but  that  it  is  to 
be  explained  by  the  mechanical  interaction  of  atoms,  as 
taught  by  the  philosopher  Democritus;  and  that  the 
fear  of  death  is  needless,  since  when  we  are  alive  death 
is  absent,  and  when  death  is  present  we  no  longer  exist. 

Notwithstanding  certain  analogies  between  the  sys- 
tems, the  difference  between  Stoicism  and  Epicureanism 
is  radical.  It  is  the  distinction  between  feeling  and 
thought,  sensation  and  reason,  the  flesh  and  the  spirit. 
The  Stoic  assigns  superiority  to  thought,  reason,  and 
the  spirit;  the  Epicurean  to  feeling,  sensation,  and  the 
flesh.  It  is  easily  seen  that  both  systems  are  one-sided. 
Stoicism,  carried  to  the  extreme,  results  in  pride,  asceti- 
cism, apathy;  Epicureanism,  carried  to  the  extreme,  de- 
generates into  luxury,  sensuality,  debauchery.  We  can 
not  get  on  without  feeling,  sensation,  and  the  body; 
neither  can  we  succeed  without  thought,  reason,  and  the 
spirit.  Avoiding  the  extremes,  blending  the  systems, 
giving  the  control  to  thought,  reason,  and  the  spirit,  we 
are  not  far  from  the  true  system  of  ethics. 

The  contrast  between  Stoicism  and  Epicureanism 
is  also  brought  out  by  the  so-called  paradoxes  of  the 
Stoics : 

I.  Nothing  can  happen  contrary  to  the  will  of  a  wise 
man;  for  a  wise  man's  will  assents  to  the  will  of  God, 
and  nothing  can  happen  contrary  to  the  will  of  God. 
The  Stoic  seems  to  forget  that  sin,  or  moral  evil  in  gen- 
eral, is  a  violation  of  God's  law,  and  is,  therefore,  con- 
trary to  God's  will.  To  be  consistent,  the  Stoic  must 
deny  the  existence  of  sin,  but  this  view  conflicts  with 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  233 

fact.  The  Epicurean  would  say,  God  cares  nothing  at 
all  about  the  matter;  and  that,  therefore,  the  Stoic  can 
not  repose  on  the  Divine  will,  which,  in  the  case  sup- 
posed, does  not  exist. 

2.  Pain  is  no  evil.     The  only  meaning  that  can  be 
attached  to  this  is  that  pain  is  no  moral  evil.    The  Epi- 
curean would  say,  Pain  is  the  only  evil. 

3.  Apathy  is  the  only  proper  state  of  a  wise  man. 
This  can  be  true  only  when  we  mean  by  apathy  liber- 
ation from  perturbation,  or  excessive  passion  or  dis- 
turbance; but  with  the  Stoics  apathy  was  too  liable  to 
become,  as  it  was  held  to  be  in  the  popular  estimation, 
not  the  liberation  from  perturbation,  but  the  absence  of 
sympathy.    The  Epicureans  would  say,  Avoid  the  cause 
of  disturbance,  and  you  will  have  tranquillity. 

After  the  rise  of  the  two  schools — the  Stoic  and  the 
Epicurean — the  schools  of  Plato  and  Aristotle  did  not 
cease  to  exist,  but  they  were  no  longer  dominant.  Eth- 
ical philosophy  was  divided  into  four  branches.  The 
labors  of  Aristotle  were  so  great  and  so  diverse,  that 
little  was  left  for  his  disciples  to  accomplish.  Accord- 
ingly the  peripatetic  philosophers  made  little  progress, 
contenting  themselves  with  teaching  the  importance  of 
virtue  to  well  being.  The  Epicureans,  in  accepting  the 
dogmas  of  their  founder,  without  question,  ceased  to 
investigate,  and  sank  into  a  school  of  pleasure. 

The  Academics,  or  Platonists,  were  in  affinity  with 
the  Stoics,  yet  they  claimed  that  health,  wealth,  reputa-j 
tion,  and  power  were  good,  while  the  Stoics  only  al-| 
lowed  them  to  be  preferable  to  their  opposites.     Philos- 
ophy drifted  into  eclecticism,  and  finally  into  skepticism. 


Chapter  III 
ROMAN    ETHICS 

> " I^HE  Romans  as  philosophers. — The  Romans  were  not 
-*  original  in  ethics,  or  in  any  form  of  philosophy.  In 
fact,  the  Romans  at  first  resisted  the  introduction  among 
them  of  the  new  advance  in  thought.  Thus  the  Greek 
philosopher,  Carneades,  on  the  occasion  of  a  famous 
ambassy  to  Rome,  charmed  the  Roman  youth  by  his 
eloquent  vindication  of  justice;  but  the  next  day  he  as- 
tonished them  by  refuting  his  own  argument.  No  won- 
der that  Cato,  the  stern  old  Roman,  moved  that  the 
Greek  philosophers  be  banished  from  Rome,  as  they 
would  corrupt  the  young  Romans. 

2.  Lucretius  (94-55). — From  the  poet  Lucretius  we 
learn  that  Epicureanism  was  the  ethical  system  that  first 
gained  followers  at  Rome.  The  poem  of  Lucretius,  en- 
titled "De  Rerum  Natura,"  is  evidence  of  the  enthusiasm 
with  which  he  and  kindred  minds  hailed  the  doctrine  of 
Epicurus  as  a  deliverance  from  superstitious  fears.  The 
acceptance  of  the  atomistic  explanation  of  the  universe, 
proposed  by  Democritus,  as  the  teaching  of  science, 
would  banish  the  gods  from  the  world,  and  give  tran- 
quillity to  the  minds  of  men.  This  is  all  right,  so  long 
as  the  gods  are  regarded  as  wicked  and  hostile  to  man- 
kind; but  those  who  believe  that  God  is  wise  and  good 
and  all  powerful  have  no  desire  to  have  him  banished. 

234 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  23$ 

The  effort  of  Lucretius  was  to  overthrow  theology,  or 
rather  mythology,  by  the  facts  of  science,  and  his  effort 
has  its  parallel  in  modern  times. 

j.  Cicero  (106-43). — Cicero  accepted  the  doctrines 
of  the  Academy  in  its  skeptical,  or  rather,  perhaps,  in  its 
eclectic  phase.  The  works  of  Cicero,  especially  the  "De 
Officiis,"  are  valuable  in  conveying  to  us  a  knowledge 
of  ancient  thought;  but  as  an  original  ethical  philoso- 
pher, Cicero  did  little  of  importance.  Indeed,  he  claimed 
only  to  have  presented  the  philosophy  of  Greece  in  the 
language  of  Rome. 

\Yith  the  Stoic  Pansetius,  Cicero  distinguished  be- 
tween expediency  (ut He),  and  virtue  (honestnm).  Five 
virtues  were  recognized — wisdom,  justice,  beneficence, 
fortitude,  and  temperance,  each  of  which  he  character- 
ized and  advocated.  It  was,  however,  in  the  ethics  of 
jurisprudence  that  Cicero's  attainments  as  a  lawyer  gave 
to  his  writings  historical  importance. 

According  to  the  ancient  teaching,  the  notions  of 
the  good  and  virtue  were  self-evident  and  fundamental; 
but  according  to  the  later  view,  ethics  is  conceived  as  a 
knowledge  of  the  moral  code — a  law,  natural,  rational, 
and  divine,  binding  upon  man  as  a  member  of  the  com- 
munity of  moral  beings.  This  law  is  not  only  an  ob- 
jective code  to  be  obeyed,  but  a  subjective  principle 
rationally  apprehended,  and  serving  as  a  guide  in  the 
performance  of  duty — objectively,  it  is  the  law  of  equity; 
subjectively,  it  is  conscience. 

Cicero  states  the  case  of  a  fleet  laden  with  grain 
sailing  from  Egypt  to  Rome,  at  a  time  of  great  scarcity 
of  grain.  One  ship,  a  faster  sailer  than  the  rest,  arrives 
at  Rome  one  day  in  advance  of  the  others.  He  now 


236  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

raises  the  question  whether  the  master  of  the  ship,  who 
is  also  the  owner  of  the  grain,  should  exact  the  highest 
price  possible  for  his  wheat,  or  inform  the  Romans  that 
other  ships  laden  with  wheat  will  shortly  arrive,  and  so 
be  compelled  to  take  a  lower,  though  still  a  remuner- 
ative, price  for  his  grain.  After  discussing  the  case, 
Cicero  decides  that  the  ship-master  is  morally  bound 
to  inform  the  buyers  of  grain  that  other  ships  laden 
with  wheat  would  shortly  arrive  at  Rome;  and  in  this 
opinion  Cicero  was  right. 

4.  Roman  Stoicism. — Stoicism  had  a  closer  affinity 
with  the  Roman  mind  than  any  other  form  of  philos- 
ophy. The  elder  Stoics  were  employed  in  delineating 
the  characteristics  of  ideal  virtue.  The  actual  philos- 
opher was  not  always  the  ideal  sage.  After  answering 
the  speculative  questions:  What  is  wisdom?  What  is 
virtue? — then  come  the  practical  questions:  How  shall 
I  obtain  wisdom?  How  shall  I  attain  to  virtue?  The 
answer  is  to  be  looked  for,  if  not  found,  in  the  writings 
of  the  philosophers. 

(i)  Seneca  (3  B.  C.-65  A.  D.) — Seneca  did  not  claim 
to  be  a  sage,  but  only  that  he  was  making  progress  to- 
wards wisdom  and  virtue.  The  way  to  wisdom,  by  over- 
coming evil  tendencies,  he  held  was  not  difficult  to  find; 
but  to  obtain  victory  over  evil  requires  a  ceaseless 
struggle.  It  is  a  warfare  in  which  there  is  no  truce. 
Every  defeat  calls  for  stricter  discipline  in  the  practice 
of  self-denial  and  a  renewal  of  the  struggle.  Herein 
is  revealed  the  weakness  of  Stoicism  as  compared  with 
Christianity.  Following  the  teaching  of  Stoicism,  the 
aspirant  after  virtue  struggles  alone;  following  the 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  237 

teaching  of  Christianity,  he  seeks  help  from  God,  nor 
does  he  seek  in  vain. 

Seneca  taught  that,  though  the  struggle  for  virtue 
should  continue,  yet  no  general  perfection  is  attainable 
till  "it  seems  good  to  God  to  make  an  end  of  old  things, 
and  ordain  the  better;  then  shall  the  ancient  order  be 
revoked,  and  every  creature  be  generated  anew,  and  a 
race  ignorant  of  guilt  be  given  to  the  earth." 

(2)  Epictetus  (cir.  45-103). — Epictetus,  a  native  of 
Hieropolis,  in  Phrygia,  was  a  slave  of  Epaphroditus,  a 
freedman  and  favorite  of  Nero.  Though  a  bad  master, 
Epaphroditus  sent  Epictetus  to  attend  the  lectures  of 
C.  Mussonius  Rufus,  an  eminent  Stoic  of  Rome. 

After  the  expulsion  of  the  philosophers  from  Rome 
by  Domitian,  Epictetus  retired  to  Nicapolis,  in  Epirus, 
a  city  built  by  Augustus  in  commemoration  of  his  vic- 
tory at  Actium,  where  he  opened  a  school  and  lectured 
on  philosophy.  Epictetus  wrote  nothing  himself,  but 
his  lectures  were  reported  by  his  pupil,  Arrian,  who 
took  copious  notes  of  the  lectures  of  his  teacher  as  the 
words  fell  from  his  lips. 

The  philosophy  of  Epictetus  was  ethical,  and  his 
inquiry  was,  How  shall  I  live?  His  answer  was,  Live 
reasonably,  according  to  nature.  This  is  the  common 
answer  of  all  the  schools;  but  it  is  general  and,  conse- 
quently, vague. 

As  to  the  existence  of  God,  Epictetus  says:  "There 
are  some  who  say  a  Divine  Being  does  not  exist;  oth- 
ers say  that  he  exists,  but  is  inactive  and  careless,  and 
takes  no  thought  about  anything;  a  third  class  say  such 
a  Being  exists,  and  takes  forethought,  but  only  about 


238  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

great  things  and  heavenly  things,  and  not  about  any- 
thing on  the  earth;  a  fourth  class  hold  that  a  Divine 
Being  exercises  forethought,  both  about  things  on  the 
earth  and  heavenly  things,  but  in  a  general  way  only, 
and  not  about  things  severally.  There  is  a  fifth  class, 
to  whom  Ulysses  and  Socrates  belong,  who  say,  I  move 
not  without  His  knowledge.  .  .  .  The  wise  and  good 
man  then,  after  considering  all  these  things,  submits 
his  own  mind  to  Him  who  administers  the  whole,  as 
good  citizens  do  to  the  laws  of  the  State." 

Epictetus  held  that  the  essence  of  good  and  evil  is 
found  only  in  the  will.  Good  consists  in  doing  right 
and  avoiding  wrong;  evil  in  doing  wrong  and  avoiding 
right.  Hence  it  follows  that  things  uncontrollable  by 
us  are  to  us  neither  right  nor  wrong,  and  concerning 
such  things  we  should  not  be  fearful,  but  bold;  but 
things  controllable  by  us  are  to  us  either  right  or  wrong, 
and,  therefore,  concerning  such  things  we  should  be 
fearful,  lest  we  do  wrong  or  fail  to  do  right. 

This  is  the  reverse  of  ordinary  thinking;  for  one 
says,  I  will  take  care  of  things  controllable  by  myself, 
and  have  no  need  of  fear;  but  things  uncontrollable  by 
myself  may  happen  contrary  to  my  will,  and  therefore 
I  have  reason  to  fear  them. 

It  is  evident,  however,  that  the  good  or  evil,  as 
contemplated  by  Epictetus,  is  ethical  good  or  evil,  the 
right  and  wrong  in  choice  and  conduct;  but  that  the 
good  or  evil,  according  to  ordinary  thinking,  is  non- 
ethical,  consisting  in  pleasure  and  pain.  Adopting 
the  view  of  Epictetus,  that  good  is  identical  with  the 
ethically  right,  and  evil  with  the  ethically  wrong,  we 
would  say  with  him  that  we  should  fear  only  in  case 


HISTORY   OF  ETHICS  239 

of  things  controlled  by  ourselves,  lest  we  do  wrong  or 
fail  to  do  right;  but  in  things  uncontrollable  we  should 
be  bold,  since  we  can  do  neither  right  nor  wrong. 
Adopting  the  view  that  the  good  is  identical  with  pleas- 
ure, and  evil  with  pain,  we  should  be  bold  in  things 
controllable,  since  we  can  take  care  of  them;  but  we 
should  fear  concerning  things  uncontrollable,  since  we 
are  not  able  to  prevent  the  harm  that  may  come  to  us. 
Practically  Epictetus  was  right.  To  do  right  is  to  in- 
sure the  highest  good,  the  consciousness  of  being  right; 
but  this  consciousness  is  not  hedonic  pleasure,  but  eth- 
ical satisfaction,  which  is  eudemonic  good.  The  right- 
eousness of  will  and  conduct  is  the  ethical  element,  and 
is  all  we  should  be  anxious  about.  The  satisfaction 
from  the  consciousness  of  righteousness  is  the  great 
reward  and  is  the  final  justification  of  right  conduct. 
From  the  ethical  point  of  view,  all  other  things  are 
indifferent. 

Epictetus  did  not  claim  that  the  good  was  ever 
actually  attained  in  the  experience  of  any  sage,  but  that 
the  true  life  is  an  earnest  progress  towards  the  perfec- 
tion of  virtue.  The  ethical  satisfaction  is  in  the  prog- 
ress. 

(3)  Marcus  Aurdius  (120-180). — The  Stoic  Em- 
peror Marcus  thus  summed  up  his  creed:  "Everything 
is  harmonious  to  me  that  is  harmonious  to  thee,  O  uni- 
verse; nothing  is  too  early  or  too  late  for  me  that  is 
in  due  time  for  thee;  everything  is  fruit  to  me  that  thy 
seasons  bring  forth,  O  Nature;  from  thee  are  all  things, 
to  thee  all  things  return."  Thus  he  expresses  his  rule 
of  life,  "Reverence  the  gods,  and  help  men."  But  how 
is  this  confidence  in  the  Divine  wisdom  reconcilable 


240  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

with  the  Stoic  indifference  to  mundane  things?  All 
things  are  controlled  by  wisdom;  yet  all  things  are 
ephemeral,  and  all  changes  worthless. 

As  to  the  immortality  of  the  soul,  Marcus  seems 
undecided  whether  to  consider  death  the  extinction 
of  being  or  a  transition  to  another  state  of  existence. 
He  says  of  himself,  "In  a  little  while  thou  wilt  be  no- 
body and  nowhere,  like  Hadrianus  and  Augustus."  He 
also  adds:  "How  can  it  be  that  the  gods,  having  or- 
dained all  things  rightly  and  benevolently  towards  men, 
should  then  allow  good  men  to  perish?  Were  it  just 
they  should  survive,  it  would  also  be  possible;  were  it 
according  to  nature,  nature  would  have  it  so." 

Christianity  and  Stoicism  agree  in  asserting:  "It  is 
not  possible,  either  through  want  of  power  or  through 
want  of  wisdom,  that  good  or  evil  should  happen  in- 
discriminately to  the  good  and  bad."  The  solution  of 
Christianity  is  that  the  future  life  will  correct  the  in- 
equalities of  the  present.  The  solution  of  Stoicism  is 
that  the  inequalities  of  the  present  life  are  matters  of 
no  concern,  and  have  no  significance  for  the  sage,  whose 
attitude  towards  pleasure  or  pain,  affection  or  desire, 
satisfaction  or  grief,  hope  or  fear,  is  that  of  indiffer- 
ence. Of  more  value  than  all  the  positive  virtues  is 
that  of  apathy. 

5.  Plutarch  (cir.  48-120). — Plutarch  combined  the 
Pythagorean  and  the  Platonic  doctrines.  The  bad 
world  soul  strives  against  the  good,  just  as,  according  to 
Christianity,  Satan  strives  against  God.  The  wise  are 
sustained,  not  only  by  natural  religion,  but  by  dreams, 
oracles,  warnings,  for  which  the  soul  should  prepare 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  24! 

itself  by  abstinence  and  repose.  Here  we  find  an  ap- 
proach toward  mysticism. 

6.  Plotinus  (205-270). — Plotinus,  though  profess- 
ing great  reverence  for  Platonism,  yet  developed  a 
system  called  Neo-Platonism.  Plato  identified  the  per- 
fect, the  good,  with  the  real,  the  definitely  conceivable 
and  knowable;  and  the  imperfect,  the  bad,  with  the 
unreal,  the  inconceivable  and  unknowable.  The  real 
is  thinkable  in  proportion  as  it  is  real.  The  more  the 
mind  abstracts  from  particulars,  the  more  real  is  our 
knowledge. 

Plotinus  called  vXrj,  or  formless  matter,  the  first  evil, 
from  which  is  derived  o-oi/xa,  the  body,  the  second  evil. 

The  lowest  form  of  virtue,  the  civic,  as  delineated  in 
Plato's  republic,  is  employed  in  controlling  the  animal 
impulses  due  to  the  residence  of  the  soul  in  the  body; 
but  the  higher  virtues  of  wisdom,  justice,  courage,  and 
temperance  are  reached  when  the  soul,  uninfluenced 
by  the  body,  is  governed  by  reason  and  restored  to 
the  Divine  likeness. 

Plotinus  urges  that,  as  thought  involves  compari- 
son and  difference,  and  hence  duality,  it  can  not  be  a 
primary  fact.  Hence  God  is  the  essential  unity  prior  to 
this  duality.  Therefore  the  soul,  in  apprehending  God, 
must  transcend  all  thought,  and  lose  itself  in  Divine 
ecstasy.  This  is  the  essence  of  mysticism.  Accord- 
ing to  Porphyry,  Plotinus  attained  this  exalted  state 
four  times. 

Neo-Platonism  is  analogous  to  the  philosophy  of 
the  Jewish  Alexandrine  school,  as  taught  by  Philo  two 
hundred  years  before  in  expounding  the  doctrine  of 
16 


242  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

the  Logos,  which  took  on  a  Christian  form,  as  stated 
by  St.  John. 

/.  Porphyry  (cir.  233-306). — Porphyry,  diverging 
further  from  the  Platonic  doctrine  than  his  master,  Plo- 
tinus,  held  that  the  purification  of  the  soul  required 
the  absolute  mortification  of  the  bodily  appetites.  Por- 
phyry had  great  talent  for  historical  research.  He  pro- 
foundly studied  the  Christian  writings,  and  was  a  bit- 
ter opponent  of  the  Christian  religion. 

"That  man  shall  not  live  by  bread  alone  the  world 
had  learned  before  Neo-Platonism;  but  Neo-Platonism 
has  enforced  the  deeper  truth — a  truth  which  the  older 
philosophy  had  missed — that  man  shall  not  live  by 
knowledge  alone." 


Chapter  IV 
CHRISTIAN    ETHICS— PATRISTIC 

MEANING  of  patristic  ethics. — By  patristic  ethics 
we  mean  the  ethics  taught  by  the  Church  fathers 
from  the  days  of  the  apostles  to  the  development  of  the 
scholastic  philosophy  in  mediaeval  times. 

In  accepting  the  Jewish  Scriptures  as  inspired,  the 
Christian  fathers  accepted  the  ethics  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment as  authoritative. 

2.  Old  Testament  ethics. — Two  questions  arise:  What 
does  God  command?  What  does  God  forbid?  Why 
he  commands  or  forbids  is  a  question  of  secondary  im- 
portance, which  Jew  or  Christian  is  at  liberty  to  answer 
for  himself,  if  he  is  able;  but  the  answer  is  no  essential 
part  of  revelation. 

Disobedience  was  the  sin  that  caused  the  loss  of 
paradise;  violence  and  corruption  were  the  sins  pun- 
ished by  the  deluge;  and  unchastity  that  led  to  the  de- 
struction of  Sodom  and  Gomorrah.  The  law  against 
murder  was  a  definite  statement  after  the  flood :  "Who- 
soever sheddeth  man's  blood,  by  man  shall  his  blood 
be  shed." 

God  made  a  covenant  with  Abraham,  which  he 
sealed  with  the  rite  of  circumcision.  "Walk  before 
me,  and  be  thou  perfect.  I  will  make  my  covenant  be- 
tween me  and  thee,  and  will  multiply  thee  exceedingly." 

243 


244  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Esau  despised  the  covenant  of  promise,  and  lost  his 
birthright.  "What  profit  shall  this  birthright  do  to 
me?  .  .  .  And  he  sold  his  birthright  unto  Jacob." 
What  did  he  get?  A  mess  of  pottage. 

As  the  law  was  adapted  to  the  degree  of  civilization, 
polygamy  was  not  prohibited. 

The  Decalogue  enjoined  the  duties  due  both  to  God 
and  to  man;  but  the  ecclesiastical  law  gave  the  details 
of  the  religious  ritual  rather  than  ethical  rules. 

The  invasion  of  Canaan  under  Joshua  is  paralleled 
by  the  invasion  of  America  by  the  Europeans  in  mod- 
ern times.  The  same  thing  is  now  going  on  in  Africa. 
These  are  instances  of  the  survival  of  the  fittest.  We 
judge  the  Israelites,  and  do  the  same  thing. 

Prosperity,  as  shown  by  the  history  of  Israel,  fol- 
lowed obedience,  and  adversity  disobedience.  The  be- 
setting sin  of  the  Israelites,  that  into  which  they  were 
continually  falling,  was  the  sin  of  idolatry;  and  this  sin 
was  not  purged  till  the  Babylonian  captivity.  Another 
sin  was  avarice,  robbery,  and  the  consequent  blood- 
thirstiness,  as  shown  in  the  cry  of  the  prophets,  "Woe 
to  them  that  join  house  to  house,  that  lay  field  to  field." 
But  the  great  sin  which  brought  about  the  destruction 
of  Jerusalem  and  the  dispersion  of  the  nation  was  the 
rejection  of  their  promised  Messiah.  "It  shall  be  well 
with  the  righteous,  but  the  wicked  shall  not  go  un- 
punished." 

The  Old  Testament  ethics,  in  its  best  form,  is  of 
a  higher  type  than  it  is  usually  assumed  to  be.  Take 
Psalm  xv,  as  quoted  in  Part  I,  chapter  iv.  Take  also 
Psalm  xxiv,  3-5:  "Who  shall  ascend  into  the  hill  of 
the  Lord?  or  who  shall  stand  in  his  holy  place?  He 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  245 

that  hath  clean  hands  and  a  pure  heart,  who  hath  not 
lifted  up  his  soul  unto  vanity,  nor  sworn  deceitfully." 
Again,  Isaiah  i,  16,  17:  "Wash  you,  make  you  clean; 
put  away  the  evil  of  your  doings  from  before  mine  eyes; 
cease  to  do  evil,  learn  to  do  well;  seek  judgment,  re- 
lieve the  oppressed,  judge  the  fatherless,  plead  for  the 
widow." 

j.  New  Testament  ethics. — The  New  Testament 
strikes  the  highest  note  of  morality  in  purity  of  heart, 
love  to  God  and  man,  including  enemies,  in  the  law 
of  love  and  the  Golden  Rule,  and  devotion  to  the  cause 
of  Christ.  The  inner  life  is  to  manifest  itself  in  out- 
ward deeds  of  love  to  others. 

The  Church  fathers  taught  that  God,  the  common 
Father  of  mankind,  made  of  one  blood  all  the  nations 
of  the  earth,  and  thus  constituted  all  men  brethren  by 
the  ties  of  nature;  that  he  revealed  his  will  in  the  Holy 
Scriptures,  and  established  the  Church  as  the  com- 
munity of  the  faithful,  and  thus  organized  a  spiritual 
brotherhood,  whose  aim  should  be  to  bring  all  men 
into  one  common  fellowship;  and  that  he  promulgated 
a  new  system  of  ethics,  based  on  the  law  of  love,  to  be 
applied  in  practice  under  the  guide  of  the  Golden  Rule. 

The  basis  of  morality,  according  to  Christian  teach- 
ing, is  the  will  of  God  expressed  by  the  Divine  law  re- 
vealed in  the  Scriptures. 

Vague  notions  of  a  Divine  law,  eternal  and  immu- 
table, were  obscurely  expressed  in  the  ancient  systems 
of  philosophy,  from  Socrates  to  the  time  of  Christ. 
Hints  of  this  law  were  found  in  the  enacted  laws  and 
changing  customs  of  the  nations;  yet  it  was  but  ob- 
scurely apprehended  even  by  the  philosophers,  who 


246  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

• 

based  it  on  reason,  by  which  alone  they  thought  it  could 
be  discovered  and  reduced  to  an  intelligible  form. 

Christian  ethics,  on  the  other  hand,  is  based  on  the 
authority  of  God  and  enforced  by  the  sanction  of  re- 
wards and  penalties.  In  passing  from  pagan  to  Chris- 
tian ethics,  we  thus  find  an  entire  change  of  base  from 
reason  to  the  will  of  God,  as  expressed  in  his  revealed 
Word. 

In  the  early  Church  the  foundation  of  morals  is, 
therefore,  found  in  positive  law,  which,  so  far  as  the 
reason  of  the  law  could  not  be  found,  was  regarded  as 
expressive  of  the  will  of  God.  It  remained  to  the 
Christian  teachers  to  amplify  and  interpret  the  rules 
of  morality,  to  apply  them  to  the  details  of  conduct, 
and  to  enforce  obedience  by  the  hope  of  reward  and 
the  fear  of  punishment.  The  essence  of  the  law  is  love 
to  God  and  love  to  man;  but  the  details  of  conduct, 
under  the  law,  are  multiform. 

The  ceremonial  law  of  the  Levitical  economy  was 
rejected;  but  the  moral  precepts,  given  through  Moses 
and  the  prophets,  were  held  to  be  binding.  To  these 
were  added  the  commands  of  Christ  and  the  teachings 
of  the  apostles.  In  keeping  these  laws,  Christians  had 
faith  to  expect  Divine  assistance. 

Baptism,  the  type  of  regeneration  called  the  new 
birth,  was  administered  to  all  entering  the  Christian 
community. 

To  the  ultimate  sanctions  of  future  rewards  and 
punishments  were  added,  by  the  Church  authorities, 
the  temporal  sanctions  of  penance  and  excommuni- 
cation. The  gradation  of  the  punishment  corresponded 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  247 

to  the  estimated  degree  of  guilt.  This  led  to  a  detailed 
classification  both  of  offenses  and  of  ecclesiastical  sanc- 
tions. 

The  regulation  of  the  ceremonies  grew  more  elabo- 
rate till,  at  length,  the  Christian  ritual  rivaled  that  of  the 
Jewish  ceremonial  law,  which  had  been  cast  aside.  In 
the  meantime,  a  corresponding  emphasis  was  laid  on 
external  duties  or  good  works.  Both  inward  faith  and 
outward  works  have  their  value,  and  never  should  be 
divorced.  Without  the  inward  principles  of  faith,  hope, 
love,  the  outward  works  are  merely  perfunctory  per- 
formances, and  without  the.  outward  works  the  inward 
fire  goes  out.  Between  inward  holiness  and  external 
righteousness  there  is  essential  harmony;  but  conflict 
will  arise  whenever  either  is  insisted  on  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  the  other. 

The  advocates  of  faith  and  inward  holiness,  remem- 
bering that  Christ  insisted  on  purity  of  heart,  and  that 
Paul  opposed  Jewish  legalism,  placed  no  stress  on  good 
works,  and  thus  led  the  way  to  dangerous  antinomian- 
ism,  and  finally  to  gross  immorality.  The  other  ex- 
treme, emphasizing  good  works,  neglected  the  religion 
of  the  heart,  and  lapsed  in  legalism,  first  technical,  and 
finally  unfruitful.  To  bear  fruit  requires  a  living  plant; 
but  "every  tree  that  bringeth  not  forth  good  fruit  is 
hewn  down  and  cast  into  the  fire."  "By  their  fruits 
ye  shall  know  them." 

The  essence  of  religion  is  love.  Jt  requires  a  tran- 
scendent object  of  adoration  and  a  form  of  worship. 
Love  is  nourished,  and  good  works  are  stimulated  by 
faith.  Both  faith  and  love  are  sustained  by  hope,  that 


248  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

anchor  of  the  soul  sure  and  steadfast.  Christian  moral- 
ity, based  on  faith  in  God,  is  the  outward  expression  of 
an  inward  life. 

4.  Pagan  and  Christian  conceptions  of  morality  com- 
pared.— Morality  was  conceived  by  pagan  philosophers 
as  wisdom;  but  by  Christian  teachers  it  was  conceived 
as  beneficent  deeds  flowing  from  a  benevolent  heart. 
The  pagan  philosophers  had,  in  their  list  of  virtues,  no 
place  for  benevolence.  The  nearest  approach  they  made 
to  it  was  in  liberality  or  in  friendship.  Of  love  for  ene- 
mies they  had  no  conception.  Socrates  taught  that 
a  wise  man  will  anticipate  both  his  enemy  and  his 
friend — his  enemy  in  striking  first,  and  his  friend  by 
doing  first  an  act  of  kindness.  The  precept  of  Christ 
reached  the  heart  of  the  matter:  "Love  your  enemies; 
bless  them  that  curse  you;  do  good  to  them  that  hate 
you,  and  pray  for  them  that  despitefully  use  you  and 
persecute  you." 

The  Socratic  philosophers  identified  virtue  with 
wisdom,  because  it  seemed  to  them  inconceivable  that 
one  should  do  that  which  he  believed  would  injure 
him,  or  refuse  to  do  that  which  would  contribute  to 
his  welfare;  yet  we  know  that,  to  obtain  present  gratifi- 
cation, or  to  escape  present  pain,  men  refuse  to  do 
right,  or  choose  to  do  wrong,  knowing  that,  in  the  long 
run,  they  will  be  greatly  the  losers. 

Sin  is  not  ignorance,  but  wickedness.  It  is  always 
unreasonable.  This  unreasonable  action  is,  in  part,  ac- 
counted for  by  the  greater  intensity  of  the  present  mo- 
tive and  by  the  force  of  habit.  It  also  springs  from  a 
corrupt  heart  and  from  a  will  that  consents  to  the  evil 
for  the  sake  of  the  selfish  gratification  anticipated.  The 


{    UNIVERSITY   ) 

' 
HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  249 


heart — that  is,  the  affections  and  the  desires — is  the 
common  fountain  of  good  and  evil.  "Out  of  the  heart 
are  the  issues  of  life." 

The  ethics  of  Christianity  requires  repentance  for 
sin  and  obedience  to  the  Divine  law.  The  fruits  are 
unworldliness,  purity  of  heart,  love  to  God  and  to  man, 
patience  in  tribulation,  and  a  life  of  beneficent  activity. 

The  effects  of  Christianity  on  society  were  seen  in 
checking  the  evils  of  slavery,  restraining  all  forms  of 
immorality,  in  the  use  of  wealth  in  providing  for  the 
poor  and  the  sick,  and  in  disseminating  the  principles 
and  practices  of  brotherhood.  Many  Christians  erred 
on  the  side  of  asceticism  in  regarding  hermits  and 
monks  as  typical  saints,  or  in  becoming  such  them- 
selves; and  so  monasticism  spread. 

Seven  deadly  sins  were  specified:  Pride,  avarice, 
anger,  gluttony,  unchastity,  envy,  and  vanity.  Other 
sins  were  regarded  as  venial;  that  is,  as  faults  capable 
of  forgiveness. 

5.  Pclagiiis  (cir.  385-435). — The  Pelagian  contro- 
versy and  the  discussion  concerning  the  freedom  of  the 
will  led  to  the  consideration  of  the  relation  of  human 
and  Divine  agency  in  the  salvation  of  man.  The  procla- 
mation of  the  gospel  to  men  for  their  acceptance  pre- 
supposes free  will,  since  they  receive  the  reward  of  ac- 
ceptance or  the  consequence  of  rejection;  but  this 
seemed  inconsistent  with  the  doctrine  of  the  absolute 
dependence  of  man,  for  salvation,  on  Divine  grace. 
Pelagius  contended  for  the  freedom  of  the  will,  and 
taught  that,  with  the  assistance  of  the  light  of  revela- 
tion, and  by  the  aid  of  Divine  grace,  it  was  possible 
for  a  Christian  completely  to  avoid  sin.  The  Church, 


2^0  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

however,  did  not  indorse  this  doctrine,  and  it  was  re- 
pudiated as  a  heresy. 

6.  Augustine  (354-430). — Augustine  pressed  the 
doctrine  of  the  inability  to  keep  the  law  of  God  to  such 
a  length  as  to  make  it  irreconcilable  with  the  freedom 
of  the  will,  and  with  Divine  benevolence;  but  this  would 
release  man  from  responsibility.  Augustine  deemed 
that  these  difficulties  were  sufficiently  met,  if  freedom  of 
choice  between  good  and  evil  was  bestowed  on  Adam. 
In  Adam,  therefore,  humanity  chose  evil  once  for  all; 
and  hence  all  men  are  condemned  to  actual  sin  and  con- 
sequent punishment,  except  those  whom  God  elected, 
by  his  sovereign  grace,  to  share  the  benefits  of  redemp- 
tion through  Christ. 

The  remarkable  abilities  of  Augustine  gave  to  these 
opinions  great  weight,  and  led  to  their  acceptance  by 
at  least  a  portion  of  the  Church,  notwithstanding  the 
difficulties  involved  in  identifying  a  depraved  nature 
inherited  from  Adam  with  actual  sin,  and  in  reconciling 
the  goodness  of  God  with  the  condemnation  of  a  large 
portion  of  mankind  to  hopeless  ruin. 

According  to  Augustine,  faith  springs  from  the  germ 
of  love  graciously  imparted ;  and  from  the  union  of  faith 
and  love  arises  hope,  looking  to  the  fruition  of  eternal 
blessedness  in  the  presence  of  God.  Following  the  es- 
sential virtues  of  faith,  love,  and  hope  were  the  four- 
fold virtues  of  prudence,  temperance,  fortitude,  and 
justice;  but  these  virtues  were  to  be  regarded  only  as 
various  forms  of  love  to  God. 

Prudence  is  sagacity  in  choosing  the  things  pleas- 
ing to  God,  and  in  rejecting  those  displeasing;  temper- 
ance is  love  to  God,  avoiding  excess;  fortitude,  spring- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  251 

ing  from  the  love  of  God,  is  the  endurance  of  hardships; 
justice  is  the  rendering  to  all  their  due,  because  pleasing 
to  God. 

The  love  of  God,  from  which  springs  love  to  man 
and  respect  for  self,  is  the  true  wisdom  and  the  source 
of  enjoyment  to  the  redeemed  soul.  This  love  is  the 
result  of  the  mystic  union  of  the  soul  with  God,  and 
is  true  religion. 

7.  Ambrose  (cir.  340-397). — According  to  Ambrose 
and  the  early  Church  fathers,  wisdom  has  for  its  root 
faith  in  God.  Fortitude  is  endurance  in  tribulation, 
firmness  in  temptation,  and  courage  in  the  conflict  with 
wickedness.  Temperance  is  moderation  in  all  conduct; 
and  justice  not  only  renders  to  others  their  due,  but 
rises  to  the  height  of  benevolence.  Augustine  traced 
all  these  virtues  to  one  source — the  love  of  God. 

The  Christian  ideal  of  the  highest  good  is  not  sim- 
ply eternal  existence,  but  eternal  rectitude,  involving 
the  blessedness  of  eternal  satisfaction — not  simply  eter- 
nal self-realization,  but  the  eternal  realization  of  stead- 
fast righteousness,  which  is  the  highest  good.  Chris- 
tian ethics,  therefore,  is  concerned  not  only  with  the 
life  that  now  is,  but  also  with  that  which  is  to  come. 


Chapter  V 
CHRISTIAN    ETHICS— SCHOLASTIC 

\TATURE  of  scholastic  ethics.— The  scholastic  ethics 
4  V  was  an  attempt  made  by  the  mediaeval  theologians 
to  justify  Christian  ethics  to  the  eye  of  reason,  by  trans- 
forming dogmatic  precepts  into  rational  principles. 

The  triad  of  virtues — faith,  hope,  love — along  with 
wisdom,  justice,  fortitude,  temperance,  the  four  car- 
dinal virtues  of  the  old  philosophers,  formed  the  frame- 
work for  the  treatment  of  ethics  by  the  ecclesiastical 
writers.  Over  against  the  seven  virtues  were  arrayed 
the  seven  deadly  sins — murder,  lust,  covetousness,  glut- 
tony, pride,  envy,  idleness.  The  seven  gifts  of  the  Spirit 
(Isa.  xi,  2)  were  also  considered. 

The  separation  of  the  monastic  and  common  duties, 
as  higher  and  lower,  also  the  distinction  between  deadly 
and  venial  sins,  applicable  both  to  the  clergy  and  laity, 
made  the  scheme  of  practical  ethics  very  complicated. 
The  deadly  sins  required  special  penance,  but  the  venial 
might  find  forgiveness  through  prayer,  fasting,  and 
almsgiving.  Penitential  books  were  prepared  as  guides 
in  the  confessional,  based  partly  on  traditional  practice 
and  partly  on  the  decrees  of  synods;  and  thus  was  laid 
the  basis  for  casuistry,  which  reached  its  development 
in  the  fifteenth  century.  These  rules,  though  useful, 

252 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  253 

promoted  an  external  view  of  morality,  which,  how- 
ever, found  a  counterpoise  in  the  mystic  piety  taught 
by  St.  Augustine,  and  later  by  Bonaventura,  Eckhart, 
Tauler,  and  others. 

2.  Joannes  Scotns  Erigena  (cir.  810-877). — The  sys- 
tem of  Erigena,  the  earliest  distinguished  philosopher 
of  the  Middle  Ages,  was  derived  from  Plato  and 
Plotinus,  transmitted  through  an  unknown  author  who 
styled  himself  Dionysius  the  Areopagite.  The  ethics 
of  Erigena  shows  the  same  ascetic  characteristics  as  that 
of  Neo-Platonism.  He  held  that  the  existence  of  the 
world  is  illusory,  and  that  the  true  aim  of  life  is  perfect 
union  with  God.  This  view  led  naturally  to  the  mysti- 
cism of  succeeding  centuries.  It  did  not,  however,  meet 
with  general  approval,  and  was  finally  condemned  by 
Pope  Honorius  III. 

j.  Anselm  (1033-1109). — Anselm  taught  that  the 
freedom  of  the  will  was  not  strictly  lost  by  the  fall  of 
man,  but  that,  in  consequence  of  sin,  it  exists  only  po- 
tentially, as  sight  in  the  dark.  The  potential  freedom 
inherent  in  man's  rational  nature  is  made  actual  by  the 
grace  of  God,  as  sight,  which  is  only  potential  in  the 
darkness  of  night,  is  made  actual  by  the  light  of  day. 

4.  Abclard  (1079-1142). — Abelard  distinguished  sin 
as  conscious  consent  to  evil.  He  made  righteousness 
of  conduct  depend  solely  on  the  intention,  and  regarded 
all  outward  acts  as  morally  indifferent.  Involuntary 
propensities,  though  bad,  are  not  sins;  but  we  ought  to 
overcome  the  seductions  to  evil. 

There  is  danger  in  regarding  external  actions  as 
morally  indifferent,  so  long  as  a  person  believes  his  in- 
tentions to  be  right,  since  it  tends  to  make  him  careless 


254  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

of  his  conduct.  But  Abelard  explained  that  by  good 
intentions  he  meant  intentions  to  do  what  is  actually 
right,  and  not  merely  what  seems  to  be  right.  How 
does  a  person  always  know  what  is  actually  right?  He 
must  act,  in  many  cases,  on  what  seems  to  be  right;  but 
one  meets  his  obligations  if  he  seeks  earnestly  for  light 
and  acts  according  to  his  best  ability.  Abelard  laid 
great  stress  on  disinterestedness,  and  considered  even 
love  to  God  pure  only  when  free  from  the  desire  for 
happiness  which  it  will  bring. 

5.  Hugo  of  St.  Victor  (1077-1141). — In  opposition 
to  Abelard,  Hugo  taught  that,  since  love  involves  a  de- 
sire of  union  with  the  beloved,  it  is  necessarily  inter- 
ested; and  since  union  with  God  involves  eternal  happi- 
ness, the  desire  for  God  can  not  exist  apart  from  the 
desire  for  happiness.     The  truth  is,  it  is  right  to  desire 
happiness  and  to  seek  for  it,  if  in  so  doing  we  do  not 
wrong  any  other  person. 

6.  Peter  the  Lombard  ( — 1164). — In  his  manual,  en- 
titled "Libri  Sententiarum,"  Peter  attempted,  by  subtle 
distinctions,   to   reconcile  conflicting  authorities.      He 
endeavored  to  give  a  complete  exposition  of  Christian 
doctrine  by  stating  with  each  proposition  the  arguments 
pro  and  con,   drawn  from   Scripture   and   the  writings 
of  the  fathers.     These  scholastic  distinctions,   though 
showing  acuteness,  were  drawn  out  at  such  length  as 
to  become  matters  for  ridicule. 

7.  Thomas  Aquinas  (1225-1274). — Accepting  Aris- 
totle as  authority  in  philosophy,  and  Augustine  in  the- 
ology,  Thomas   Aquinas   elaborated   a   comprehensive 
system. 

He  taught  that  all  conduct  is  directed  to  some  end, 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  255 

which,  in  case  of  rational  beings,  is  represented  in 
thought  and  aimed  at  by  the  will  under  the  guidance  of 
reason.  The  ordinary  ends,  riches,  power,  honor,  pleas- 
ure, fail  to  give  satisfaction.  Happiness  can  be  found 
only  in  God,  the  highest  good;  hence  the  desire  for 
the  knowledge  of  God  is  justified  as,  in  the  highest 
sense,  rational;  but  as  such  knowledge  is  beyond  the 
reach  of  reason,  it  can  be  gained  only  by  those  who 
are  right  in  heart  and  moral  in  life.  The  morality  of  an 
act  is  determined,  in  part,  by  its  end  or  motive,  and,  in 
part,  by  its  harmony  or  conflict  with  the  rational  order 
of  the  universe.  In  acts  objectively  indifferent  the 
morality  is  determined  by  the  motive. 

Following  Aristotle,  he  divides  the  natural  virtues 
into  intellectual  and  moral,  and  the  intellectual  into 
speculative  and  practical — the  speculative  dealing  with 
principles,  as  the  right  use  of  reason,  and  the  practical 
dealing  with  others,  as  justice,  and  dealing  with  our- 
selves, as  prudence,  temperance,  fortitude.  Above  these 
rank  the  Pauline  triad :  faith,  love,  hope.  Free  will  im- 
plied by  duty  is  supplemented  by  Divine  grace. 

Thomas  distinguished  the  passions  as  concupiscible 
and  irascible — the  concupiscible  those  excited  at  once 
by  their  objects,  as  love,  hate,  desire,  aversion,  joy,  sor- 
row; and  the  irascible  those  aroused  by  obstacles,  as 
hope,  fear,  boldness,  anger,  despair.  The  sins  are  those 
against  God,  our  neighbor,  and  ourselves,  mortal  and 
venial  sins,  sins  of  omission  and  of  commission,  sins  of 
heart,  speech,  and  act,  and  the  vices  of  excess  and  defect. 

Thomas  distinguished  law  as  fourfold :  The  eternal 
law  or  regulative  reason  of  God;  natural  law,  relating 
to  rational  creatures;  human  law,  adapting  natural  law 


256  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

to  the  various  wants  of  society;  and  Divine  law,  given 
by  special  revelation.  As  natural  law  is  vague,  it  needs 
to  be  re-enforced  by  human,  regulating  the  detail  of 
conduct;  and,  as  neither  considers  the  state  of  the  heart, 
the  seat  of  good  and  evil,  they  require  to  be  supple- 
mented by  the  Divine  law.  The  discussion  of  law  led 
to  modern  independent  ethical  speculations. 

8.  Duns  Scotus  (1266-1308). — Scotus  held  that,  if 
the  will  is  bound  to  reason,  it  can  not  really  be  free,  and 
that  a  truly  free  choice  is  indeterminate,  bound  neither 
to  reason  nor  to  folly.  He  maintained  the  thorough- 
going freedom  of  the  will  by  declaring  it  independent 
of  reason,  as  likewise  is  the  Divine  will;  hence  the  order 
of  the  universe  is  to  be  regarded  as  arbitrary. 

Though  right  in  holding  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
Scotus  does  not  account  for  the  usual,  but  not  strict, 
uniformity  of  its  decisions  in  case  of  actions  clearly  rea- 
sonable. The  usual  uniformity  proves  that  the  will, 
for  the  most  part,  takes  the  advice  of  reason.  The  ex- 
ceptions show  that  the  will  is  not  bound  by  reason,  but 
is  free.  The  explanation  is  that  motives  are  not  strictly 
causes  compelling  volition,  but  reason  soliciting  rational 
decision.  The  will — that  is,  the  ego  using  its  will- 
power— decides  freely  in  view  of  reasons.  The  ego, 
not  the  motive,  decides  or  causes  the  volition. 

As  just  stated,  the  very  fact  that  the  decision  of  the 
will  is  not  strictly  uniform  in  all  similar  cases  is  an  in- 
dication that  it  is  free;  for  if  not  free,  it  would  be  bound 
by  reason,  and  its  decision  would  be  uniform,  and  could 
be  predicted,  as  other  events  governed  according  to 
law,  which  is  not  the  case. 

A  man  is  not  necessarilv  a  fool  because  he  is  free. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  257 

If  he  is  a  reasonable  being,  he  will  act  reasonably,  not 
from  necessity,  but  freely.  It  is  reasonable  to  believe 
that  the  Divine  Being  has  decided,  once  for  all,  that 
in  every  case  he  will  act  reasonably,  and  that  he  always 
does  so  act,  freely,  but  not  by  constraint. 

p.  William  of  Occam  (—  --1347). — Following  Duns 
Scotus,  William  of  Occam  advocated  the  doctrine  of 
the  arbitrary  nature  of  free  will,  though  such  a  doctrine 
seems  fatal  to  the  moral  government  of  God. 

He  was  a  stanch  advocate  of  nominalism — a  theory 
which  held  that  universals  have  no  objective  existence 
independent  of  the  individuals  of  the  class,  making  the 
name  of  the  class  the  only  universal,  and  hence  the 
name,  nominalism.  It  was  opposed  to  realism,  the  doc- 
trine of  ideas  taught  by  Plato.  Another  theory  was 
proposed  to  account  for  universals,  based  on  the  fact 
that  there  is  in  every  individual  of  a  class  a  combination 
of  attributes  which  entitles  the  individual  to  be  consid- 
ered a  member  of  the  class.  The  notion  of  this  com- 
bination of  qualities  is  called  a  concept,  and  the  theory, 
conceptualism. 

These  disputes  somewhat  shook  faith  in  scholasti- 
cism, and  theologians  began  to  talk  about  the  reason- 
ableness of  faith  rather  than  of  the  doctrine. 

10.  The  mystics. — Along  with  scholasticism,  if  not 
a  part  of  it,  was  mysticism,  whose  seeds  were  in  the  Pla- 
tonic and  Neo-Platonic  philosophy. 

(i)  Hugo  of  St.  Victor,  mentioned  before,  held  that 
when,  by  Divine  grace,  the  soul  has  reached  that  point 
where  it  loves  itself  and  its  neighbor  only  for  God's  sake, 
then  the  eye  of  the  soul  is  opened,  and  God  is  seen  in 
his  true  nature. 
'7 


258  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

(2)  Bernard    of    Clairvaux    (1091-1153). — Bernard 
discriminated   four  stages   through   which   the   soul   is 
led  in  seeking  after  God :  Desire  for  God's  aid  in  trouble, 
gratitude  for  his  help,  love  for  his  goodness,  and  love 
for  God  himself.     He  held  that  the  ascent  to  the  higher 
life  is  through  love  and  humility,  and  that,  in  the  con- 
templation of  Divine  truth,  moments  of  ecstatic  vision 
will  be  granted  the  soul  as  anticipations  of  what  it  will 
hereafter  enjoy. 

(3)  Bonaventura    (1221-1274). — Bonaventura    gives 
six  stages:  Contemplating  the  power  and  wisdom  of 
God,  as  displayed  in  the  external  world;  considering  the 
relation  of  the  world  to  man;  reflecting  on  its  own  facul- 
ties, and  seeing  in  itself,  as  a  mirror,  the  true  Being  of 
God;  receiving,  by  Divine  impartation,  through  the  su- 
pernatural virtues  of  faith,  hope,  and  charity,   such  a 
sense  of  the  Divine  nature  as  creates  ecstatic  adoration 
and  unspeakable  joy;  then  apprehending  God,  no  longer 
in  a  mirror,  but  in  his  true  essence;  finally  God  is  con- 
templated as  absolute  goodness,  whose  essence  is  com- 
municated to  the  soul,  which  enters  into  its  rest  of  in- 
effable union  with  God. 

(4)  Eckhart  (cir.  1260-1327). — Eckhart  taught  that, 
apart  from  God,  there  could  be  no  true  being,  and,  of 
course,  no  true  morality. 

(5)  Tauter   (1300-1361). — Tauler   insisted   on    per- 
sonal relationship  to  God,  freedom  from  the  thralldom 
of  authority,  and  the  worthlessness  of  mere  good  works 
without  the  renewal  of  the  inward  life.     Tauler-  how- 
ever, understood  that  true  love  means  not  only  ecstasy 
of  feeling,  but  the  glad  performance  of  duty;  for  when 
the  black  death  visited  Strasburg,  he  remained  at  his 


HISTORY    OF   ETHICS  259 

post,  and  encouraged  his  terror-stricken  fellow-citizens. 

Mysticism,  in  advocating  freedom  from  the  thrall- 
dom  of  authority,  prepared  the  way  for  the  release  of 
ethical  investigation  from  the  shackles  of  theological 
dogmas,  and  was  the  initial  step  to  the  Reformation, 
which  was  the  emancipation  of  human  thought. 

//.  Casuistry. — The  application  of  ethical  principles 
to  the  endless  details  of  practical  life  called  out  manuals 
of  casuistry,  which  aimed  to  settle  disputed  points  and 
to  answer  doubtful  questions.  It  was  called  for  to  set- 
tle difficult  questions,  when  there  was  an  intention  to 
obey  the  laws,  or  when  there  was  a  desire  to  evade  them, 
and  in  case  of  conflict  of  desires.  It  was  cultivated  also 
by  Jews  and  Mohammedans. 

A  layman  could  not  be  supposed  to  understand  all 
the  minute  distinctions  of  theological  jurisprudence,  in 
respect  to  which  even  doctors  did  not  agree.  He  was 
considered  to  be  sufficiently  freed  from  the  charge  of 
immorality,  if  the  authority  of  a  single  doctor  could  be 
found  in  his  favor.  The  tendency  of  this,  however, 
was  to  relax  the  strictness  of  individual  conduct  by  seek- 
ing the  support  of  authority  when  a  certain  gratification 
was  desired. 

12.  The  Reformation  brought  the  principle  of  reli- 
ance on  private  judgment  into  sharp  conflict  with  that 
of  obedience  to  authority.  It  was  a  reaction  against  the 
elaborate  system  of  the  Church,  and  a  return  to  the 
primitive  simplicity  of  Christianity;  it  substituted  the 
teaching  of  the  Scriptures  for  the  traditions  of  the 
Church;  it  held  to  individual  responsibility,  and  denied 
priestly  control  over  purgatorial  fires;  it  emphasized 
the  antagonism  between  the  way  of  salvation  by  faith, 


260  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

and  absolution  through  gifts  and  penances;  it  consid- 
ered all  Christian  duties  imperative,  and  denied  not  the 
duty,  but  the  merit  of  obedience,  and  the  reality  of  the 
works  of  supererogation;  it  denied  that  the  code  of 
morality  was  lower  for  the  laity  than  for  the  clergy. 

Though  differing  in  these  respects  from  Catholicism, 
yet  Protestantism  was  scholastic,  and  its  ethics  in  deal- 
ing with  the  details  of  conduct  still  to  some  extent  em- 
ployed the  methods  of  casuistry.  Both  Catholics  and 
Protestants  based  the  obligations  to  morality  on  au- 
thority— ultimately  the  authority  of  God;  but  in  the 
one  case  the  authority  was  communicated  to  the  people 
through  the  Church,  and  in  the  other  through  the  Holy 
Scriptures. 

^The  Reformation,  however,  gave  a  stimulus  to  the 
attempt  to  find  an  independent  basis  for  the  moral  code, 
founded  not  on  external  authority,  but  on  reason  and  the 
moral  experience  of  mankind.  The  development  of 
rational  ethics  was  also  stimulated  by  the  renaissance  of 
classical  learning  and  the  advance  of  the  natural  sciences. 


Chapter  VI 

MODERN    ETHICS— ENGLISH 
FROM  BACON  TO  LOCKE — EMPIRICAL  OR  RATIONAL 

/.  Bacon  (1561-1626). — In  the  emphasis  he  placed 
on  the  inductive  method  of  investigation.  Bacon  effected 
the  transition  from  mediaeval  to  modern  thought.  His 
influence  has  been  great,  both  in  science  and  in  phi- 
losophy. He  completely  separated  morality  from  re- 
ligion, and  considered  it  the  business  of  ethics,  not  to 
discuss  the  ultimate  good  or  to  classify  the  virtues,  but 
to  investigate  the  sources  and  motives  of  accepted  mo- 
rality and  to  determine  the  details  of  its  application. 

The  natural  law  dwelling  in  every  man  as  the  light 
of  nature,  Bacon  regarded  as  the  source  of  morality, 
but  did  not  decide  whether  the  knowledge  of  this  law 
is  rationally  apprehended  or  is  due  to  experience — a 
distinction  involving  the  opposite  tendencies  and  meth- 
ods of  the  intuitional  and  empirical  schools. 

The  estimate  placed  upon  the  forms  of  moral  good 
arises  from  the  experience  of  their  utility.  The  good, 
according  to  Bacon,  is  identical  with  the  useful,  which 
has  for  its  end  the  happiness  of  the  individual  and  the 
welfare  of  society.  The  good  and  the  useful  are,  how- 
ever, not  identical.  The  good  is  the  end,  the  happi- 
ness, satisfaction,  or  welfare  sought;  the  useful  is  the 

means  to  the  end. 

261 


262  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Which  is  to  be  preferred,  the  welfare  of  the  individ- 
ual, or  that  of  society?  Bacon  says  that  nature  herself 
has  answered  the  question,  by  striving  to  preserve  the 
species,  often  at  the  expense  of  the  individual.  It  fol- 
lows, therefore,  that  true  morality  is  action  for  the  com- 
mon good. 

Four  points  are  to  be  noted  in  Bacon's  view  of 
ethics : 

(1)  The  secularization  of  ethics,  or  the  separation 
of  morals  from  religion. 

(2)  The  disuse  of  metaphysical  presuppositions,  and 
the  search  for  the  motives  of  conduct. 

(3)  The  exaltation  of  the  welfare  of  society  over  that 
of  the  individual. 

(4)  The  identification  of  the  good  with  the  useful, 
the  moral  with  the  beneficial. 

2.  Hobbes  (1588-1679). — Hobbes  held  that  self-satis- 
faction is  the  motive  of  all  action;  and  that  satisfaction  is 
best  secured,  not  in  a  condition  of  anarchy,  but  in  social 
order.  Law,  whether  natural,  civil,  or  divine,  is  or- 
dained to  secure  order,  and  tends  to  promote  the  com- 
mon welfare,  which  is  the  welfare  of  all  the  individuals. 
A  breach  of  the  law  is,  therefore,  due  to  ignorance, 
since  no  one  intentionally  disregards  his  own  interests. 
In  this  we  recognize  the  doctrine  of  Socrates. 

In  case  of  apparent  conflict  of  the  laws,  natural,  civil, 
divine,  which  is  to  be  regarded  as  supreme,  and  who  is 
to  be  the  arbiter?  Hobbes  answers,  The  civil  law  is 
supreme,  and  the  civil  government  the  final  court  of 
appeal.  Civil  law  has  in  view  the  common  welfare, 
while  the  individual  is  seeking  his  own  satisfaction;  but 
individual  opinion,  blinded  as  it  often  is  by  apparent 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  263 

self-interest,  is  more  likely  to  be  in  error  than  the  con- 
sensus of  opinion  expressed  in  the  law  and  interpreted 
by  the  courts.  Religious  opinion,  not  sanctioned  by  the 
law,  is  superstition.  Morality,  therefore,  consists  in 
obedience  to  law,  and  ultimately  to  civil  law.  Men  obey 
law,  because  by  obedience  they  secure  the  greatest  good 
for  themselves. 

This  egoistic  conception  leads  to  the  view  that  the 
state  of  nature  is  a  state  of  war;  that  every  man  by 
nature  is  an  Ishmaelite,  whose  hand  is  against  every 
man's  hand,  and  every  man's  hand  against  his.  Hence 
the  only  safety  for  the  individual  is  in  a  society  governed 
by  laws  for  the  common  protection. 

Though  ignorant  egoism  leads  to  anarchy,  enlight- 
ened egoism  seeks  security  by  political  order  regulated 
by  law;  but  as  this  is  attained  most  effectively  where 
many  wills  are  subject  to  one,  it  follows  that  absolute 
monarchy  is  the  best  form  of  government.  The  political 
crisis  of  1640,  no  doubt,  led  Hobbes  to  regard  the  indi- 
vidual conscience  as  anarchical  in  its  tendencies,  and 
the  civil  law  as  the  final  test  of  morals,  and  monarchy 
as  the  best  form  of  government,  and  absolute  monarchy 
as  the  best  form  of  monarchy;  hence  the  doctrine  of  the 
divine  right  of  kings. 

Hobbes  regarded  the  Golden  Rule,  which  he  stated 
in  the  negative  form,  Do  not  that  to  another  which  thou 
wouldst  not  have  done  to  thyself,  as  the  immutable  law 
of  nature.  Natural  law  seems,  therefore,  to  be  inde- 
pendent of  civil  enactment,  and  cognizable  by  reason, 
or  the  light  of  nature.  It  is  worthy  of  remark  that 
Grotius  makes  this  natural  law,  which  ought  to  be  ob- 
served, the  basis  of  international  law.  The  civil  law 


264  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

theory  of  Hobbes  conflicts  with  his  statement  that  the 
Golden  Rule  is  the  immutable  and  eternal  law  of  nature. 

According  to  Hobbes,  the  theoretical  basis  of  ethics 
is  egoism;  that  is,  it  is  reasonable  each  individual  should 
aim  at  his  own  advantage;  but  to  secure  his  own  advan- 
tage, reason  dictates  that  he  should  obey  law,  since  the 
law  in  determining  what  is  good  for  society  determines 
also  what  is  good  for  the  individual,  and  the  opposition 
between  the  common  welfare  and  the  welfare  of  the  in- 
dividual is  removed. 

Hobbes's  intellect  was  logical,  keen,  pentrating; 
and  his  language  clear  and  precise.  A  life  of  feeling 
had  no  existence  for  him.  His  great  work  was  rightly 
named  "Leviathan." 

j.  Cudworth  (1617-1688). — Cudworth  was  Platonic 
and  rationalistic. 

In  his  treatise  on  "Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality," 
Cudworth  endeavored  to  prove  the  eternal  and  essential 
distinctions  of  good  and  evil;  and  hence  that  these  dis- 
tinctions were  not  dependent  on  any  will,  human  or 
divine.  He  held  that  ethical  principles  have  an  objective 
existence,  and,  like  mathematical  axioms,  are  intuitively 
apprehended  by  human  reason. 

With  Cudworth,  feeling  has  no  place  in  ethics,  reason 
alone  determining  duty.  His  system  was  not  empiri- 
cism, based  on  contingent  facts  known  by  experience, 
but  intuitionism,  based  on  necessary  truth  known  by 
reason. 

If  distinction  is  made,  as  should  be  done,  between 
good  and  evil  as  ends,  and  right  and  wrong  as  means, 
it  is  evident  that  conduct,  as  means,  is  right  or  wrong, 
because  involving  good  or  evil  ends  as  consequences. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  265 

We  judge  the  subjective  Tightness  or  wrongness  of 
conduct  by  the  intention,  but  the  objective  aghtness  or 
wrongness  by  the  consequences;  but  conduct  whose 
character,  as  right  or  wrong,  has  been  firmly  established 
by  the  consensus  of  opinion,  must  not  be  hastily  judged 
from  supposed  consequences.  \Ye  must  beware  of  doing 
evil  that  good  may  come;  but  it  is  probable,  if  not  cer- 
tain, that  in  the  long  run  the  supposed  good  conse- 
quences of  a  wrong  act  would  be  more  than  overbal- 
anced by  evil  results.  There  is  something  in  man, 
whether  called  instinct,  reason,  or  faith,  that  assures 
him  that  there  is  a  power  in  the  universe  that  makes 
for  righteousness,  and  to  that  power  we  can  trust  the 
consequences  of  doing  right  and  avoiding  wrong. 

Cudworth's  system  is  opposed,  not  only  to  that  of 
Hobbes,  who  based  morality  on  the  enactment  of  civil 
law,  but  to  those  systems  that  regarded  morality  as  de- 
pendent on  the  will  of  God. 

4.  Hcnr\  More  (1614-1687). — In  his  "Enchiridion 
Ethicum,"  More  supplies  Cudworth's  lack  of  a  sys- 
tematic exposition  of  ethical  principles.  He  gives  a 
list  of  principles: 

Good  things  differ  in  quality,  as  well  as  in  quantity 
and  duration.  It  is  better  to  be  deprived  of  good  than 
to  suffer  an  equal  amount  of  evil.  Future  good  or  evil, 
if  certain,  or  even  probable,  is  to  be  regarded  as  well  as 
present  good  or  evil.  The  amount  of  good  varies  as 
the  number  receiving  the  benefit. 

The  systems  of  Cudworth  and  More  may  be  re- 
garded as  reactions  against  that  of  Hobbes,  whose  funda- 
mental principle  was:  Self-interest  is  the  justification  of 
conduct;  and  self-interest  is  best  secured  by  civil  law. 


266  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Why  should  one  conform  to  an  ethical  principle, 
when  he  believes  that  in  so  doing  he  acts  contrary  to 
his  own  interests?  Hobbes  answers  that  his  belief  is  due 
to  ignorance,  and  that  in  the  end  it  will  be  best  for  the 
individual  to  obey  the  law.  More  answers  that  though 
the  obligation  to  do  right  is  apprehended  by  the  reason, 
yet  the  sweetness  and  flavor  of  right  conduct  and  of  the 
resulting  good  is  appreciated  by  the  boniform  faculty; 
that  it  is  in  this  sweetness  that  the  motive  to  virtuous 
conduct  is  found;  and  that  ethics  is  the  art  of  living  hap- 
pily, since  true  happiness  consists  in  the  satisfaction 
from  a  consciousness  of  virtue. 

More  does  not  give  a  distinct  place  among  the  vir- 
tues to  benevolence,  but  his  nearest  approach  to  it  is 
liberality. 

Hobbes  and  More  agree  in  making  happiness  the  aim 
of  virtue;  in  this  respect  they  differ  from  Cudworth, 
who  allows  no  place  in  ethics  to  feeling.  Right  conduct, 
the  means  to  happiness,  is,  according  to  Hobbes,  known 
through  civil  law;  but  according  to  More,  by  the  in- 
tuition of  reason. 

5.  Cumberland  (1632-1718). — In  his  treatise,  "De 
Legibus  Naturae,"  Cumberland  has  the  honor  of  being 
4  the  first  to  lay  down  the  principle  that  the  common  good 
of  all  is  the  ultimate  end  of  all  moral  action.  He  thus 
states  his  principle,  which  he  calls  the  Law  of  Nature: 
''The  greatest  possible  benevolence  of  every  rational 
agent  towards  all  the  rest  constitutes  the  happiest  state 
of  each  and  all,  so  far  as  depends  on  their  own  power, 
and  is  necessarily  required  for  their  happiness;  accord- 
ingly, the  common  good  is  the  supreme  law." 

Cumberland  deserves  great  credit  for  giving  benevo- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  267 

lence  its  due  prominence  among  the  list  of  virtues.  He 
also  includes  under  the  term  good  not  only  happiness, 
but  perfection.  The  truth  is,  however,  that  strictly 
speaking,  perfection  sustains  the  same  relation  to  happi- 
ness that  right  does  to  good,  or  means  to  end.  His 
system  was  not  especially  intended  for  deducing  rules 
of  conduct,  but  for  the  support  of  accepted  morality. 
In  opposition  to  Hobbes,  he  held  that  peace,  not  war, 
was  the  primitive  state  of  man.  In  common  with  More, 
he  found  place  for  emotion,  in  opposition  to  Hobbes 
and  Cudworth. 

The  principle  that  the  common  good  is  the  supreme 
law  he  does  not  assume  as  an  a  priori  principle,  but 
proves  it  inductively,  and  refers  it  to  God  as  the  law- 
giver, who  supports  the  law  by  the  sanctions  of  rewards 
and  penalties.  The  sanctions  act  on  the  will  of  man 
as  incentives  in  the  form  of  internal  and  external  rewards 
of  virtue  and  punishment  of  vice.  Cumberland  was  an 
original  thinker,  and  his  system  was  not  without  influ- 
ence on  the  speculations  of  subsequent  moralists;  but 
the  prolixity  of  his  style,  and  the  lack  of  clearness  in  his 
views,  have  hindered  the  general  usefulness  of  his  work. 

6.  Locke  (1632-1704). — In  his  great  work  on  the 
Human  Understanding,  Locke  opposed  the  doctrine  that 
moral  principles  are  innate;  but  he  regarded  them  as 
maxims  "which  require  reasoning  and  discourse  and 
some  exercise  of  the  mind  to  discover  the  certainty  of 
their  truth."  He  undertook  to  disprove  the  innateness 
of  moral  ideas  by  showing  the  diversity  of  opinions  en- 
tertained by  different  persons  in  regard  to  them. 

Locke  held  self-love  to  be  the  ultimate  motive  of 
moral  conduct,  and  derived  the  moral  instincts  from  the 


268  SYSTEMS    OF   ETHICS 

susceptibility  of  feeling  to  pleasure  or  pain.  To  assume  a 
primary  benevolence  is  superfluous,  since  moral  actions 
are  accounted  for  by  reflection  on  the  consequences  of 
moral  conduct.  The  endeavor  of  individuals  to  secure 
happiness  has  resulted  in  the  general  welfare.  Every 
one  in  wisely  seeking  his  own  good  promotes  the  com- 
mon good.  The  motive  to  moral  action  is  self-satis- 
faction, the  consequence  is  the  welfare  of  society. 

Locke  classifies  law  as  natural  law,  including  divine 
law,  civil  law,  and  social  law,  or  public  opinion.  The 
knowledge  empirically  obtained  concerning  what  con- 
duct is  useful  or  hurtful,  Locke  regards  as  natural  law, 
the  guide  to  moral  action.  This  is  God's  law,  which  we 
have  learned  by  experience:  "Moral  good  or  evil  is  the 
conformity  or  disagreement  of  our  voluntary  actions  to 
some  law  whereby  good  or  evil  is  drawn  upon  us  from 
the  will  and  power  of  the  law-maker."  But  in  oppo- 
sition to  Hobbes,  he  held  that  ethical  rules  are  obliga- 
tory, irrespective  of  civil  law,  and  that  they  may  be 
scientifically  constructed  on  principles  known  by  com- 
mon sense  acquired  by  experience. 

In  making  pleasure  and  pain  the  only  springs  of 
action,  Locke  lays  stress  on  feeling;  still  the  intellect 
performs  the  important  part  of  selecting  ends  and  de- 
vising means,  while  the  anticipation  of  pleasure  or  pain 
supplies  the  condition  or  motive  of  moral  action. 
Though  the  gifts  of  nature  were  originally  free,  yet  they 
became  private  property  in  consequence  of  labor  which 
has  been  bestowed  upon  them,  and  morality  requires 
that  we  respect  the  right  of  others  to  enjoy  the  fruits  of 
their  own  labor. 


Chapter  VII 

MODERN    ETHICS— FRENCH   AND    GERMAN 
FROM  DESCARTES  TO  WOLFF — METAPHYSICAL 

T^ESCARTES  (1596-1650).— Ethical  systems  on  the 
-*~S  Continent,  more  than  those  of  England,  were  sub- 
ordinated directly  to  metaphysics,  and  indirectly  to 
theology. 

Descartes  held  to  the  freedom  of  the  will — the  hu- 
man will  as  well  as  the  Divine.  The  requirements  of 
morals  he  regarded  as  God's  commands,  but  that  man 
is  free  to  obey  or  to  disobey. 

Descartes  included  all  mental  processes  under  the 
term  thought;  hence,  with  him,  clear  thinking  and  clear 
willing  are  identical.  If  man  were  a  pure  spirit,  his 
thinking  would  be  clear  and  his  moral  conduct  correct. 
Man's  divergence  from  moral  rectitude  is  to  be  traced 
to  the  interaction  of  the  mind  and  body,  as  shown  in 
the  feelings.  Clear  thinking  is  thus  thwarted,  so  that 
we  desire  what  clear  knowledge  would  show  to  be  un- 
desirable. 

The  moral  and  the  immoral  have  each  a  twofold 
relation — to  the  intellect  and  to  the  sensibility.  The 
moral  coincides  with  clear  knowledge  and  with  the  su- 
premacy of  the  will  over  the  feelings;  the  immoral  is 
identical  with  the  obscure,  or  with  the  abdication  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  will  over  the  sensibility.  Since  the 

269 


270  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

feelings  arise  from  the  union  of  the  soul  and  body,  their 
disturbing  influence  can  not  be  wholly  suppressed;  but 
the  emotion  of  wonder — that  is,  curiosity,  or  desire  for 
knowledge — aids  the  will  in  directing  moral  pursuits. 
Since  Descartes  held  that  matter  has  no  dynamic 
properties,  its  sole  attribute  being  extension,  it  is  not 
clear  what  he  means  by  the  interaction  of  soul  and  body, 
or  how  the  mind  can  perceive  external  material  objects. 
He  refers  to  the  intervention  of  God,  making  percep- 
tion a  miracle;  but  this  view  was  dealt  with  by  his  suc- 
cessors, Geulinx  and  Malebranche.  It  is  more  in  ac- 
cord with  Cartesianism  to  speak  of  the  union  of  soul 
and  body  than  of  their  interaction.  Descartes's  style 
was  clear  and  beautiful,  simple,  limpid,  and  direct. 

2.  Geulinx  (1625-1669). — To  meet  the  difficulties  of 
the  relation  of  matter  and  mind,  Geulinx  proposed  a 
theory  called  occasionalism.     On   the   occasion   of  the 
presence  of  a  body,  God  intervenes  and  gives  us  a  sen- 
sation, thus  exciting  our  attention,  and  then  presents 
us  with  the  idea  of  the  body.    The  body  and  soul  then 
are  passive  under  the  control  of  God;  hence  free  will 
does  not  belong  to  man,  at  least  absolute  free  will;  but, 
granting  the  will  a  relative  freedom,  its  surrender  to 
the  Divine  will  is  a  duty  which  man  cheerfully  per- 
forms as  soon  as  he  understands  his  true  relation  to 
God.     The  right  moral  attitude  is  the  result  of  true 
insight  and  the  feeling  of  humility. 

3.  Malebranche  (1638-1715). — The  theory  of  occa- 
sionalism was  adopted  by  Malebranche,  who  extended 
it  farther  than  Geulinx  had  done.    He  refers  every  event 
in  nature  to  the  direct  agency  of  the  Divine  will.     In 
such  a  system  human  freedom  can  find  no  place.    Even 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  271 

the  Divine  will  itself  is  restricted  by  identifying  it  with 
the  order  of  nature.  God  could  have  left  the  world 
uncreated;  but,  having  willed  to  create  it,  no  other 
world  order  was  possible.  Being  a  manifestation  of 
God,  the  world  is  necessarily  good. 

What  account  does  Malebranche  give  of  sin,  an  evil 
that  can  not  be  ignored?  It  was  contemplated  in  the 
Divine  plan  of  the  world  order;  but  the  incarnation  of 
Christ,  outweighing,  on  the  side  of  righteousness,  the 
fact  of  sin  on  the  side  of  evil,  was  more  than  a  com- 
pensation. As  an  effect  of  obscure  knowledge,  grow- 
ing out  of  the  finite  nature  of  man,  sin  was  inevitable. 
It  was  permitted  because  the  compensation  involved 
a  greater  good.  It  is  only  our  faulty  knowledge  that 
impels  us  to  evil;  but  as  we  come  to  know  God  more 
perfectly,  we  are  drawn  to  him  by  an  irresistible  at- 
traction. 

Malebranche  distinguished  between  the  intellect 
and  the  will,  which  were  identified  in  the  system  of 
Descartes.  To  know  God  is  the  function  of  the  intel- 
lect; to  love  him  is  that  of  the  will.  Here  Malebranche 
confounds  will  and  affection.  Our  attitude  towards 
others  should  be  that  of  respect  and  benevolence,  be- 
cause of  their  relation  to  God. 

In  referring  all  events  to  God,  Malebranche's  doc- 
trine bordered  on  pantheism;  but  he  was  restrained 
from  crossing  the  border  by  his  training  as  a  theologian. 

Malebranche's  analysis  of  perception  was  in  advance 
of  any  preceding  attempt.  He  was  a  fine  writer,  and 
has  justly  been  called  the  Plato  of  French  philosophy. 

4.  Spinoza  (1632-1677). — Spinoza  based  his  ethics 
on  his  metaphysics. 


272  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

As  with  Plato,  so  with  Spinoza,  the  problems  of  phi- 
losophy are  the  problems  of  religion.  To  both  philos- 
ophers God  is  the  fundamental  reality.  By  Plato,  God 
was  thought  as  the  good;  by  Spinoza  as  the  sole  sub- 
stance. The  mystic  element  of  religious  consciousness 
Plato  did  not  assimilate  by  his  dialectical  method;  but 
Spinoza  rationalized  it  by  transforming  it  into  the  con- 
cept of  God.  Locke  disregarded  the  mystical  element, 
and  resolved  religious  experience  into  the  practice  of 
utilitarian  ethics. 

In  Spinoza's  system  there  is  no  room  for  free  will. 
Since  God,  the  Infinite  Being,  is  a  necessary  substance, 
his  attributes  and  modes,  the  determining  factors  of 
things,  are  likewise  necessary,  and  so  are  the  determined 
things  and  events.  The  terms  moral  and  immoral  have 
signification  only  in  the  realm  of  the  finite,  and  chiefly 
in  the  relation  of  feeling  to  thought;  but  in  the  totality 
of  the  universe  their  distinction  disappears.  Morality 
is,  therefore,  not  based  on  the  direct  command  of  God; 
but  the  sphere  of  spiritual  freedom  or  slavery  for  man 
is  found  in  the  chain  of  particular  causes  and  events, 
in  consequence  of  his  relation  to  finite  things  and  to 
God,  the  Infinite  Substance. 

Morality  is  identical  with  adequate  knowledge  and 
active  emotions,  and  immorality  with  inadequate  knowl- 
edge and  passive  emotions.  As  soon  as  clear  knowl- 
edge of  passive  emotion  is  gained,  it  ceases  to  be  pas- 
sive, and  the  suffering  vanishes.  The  man  then  recog- 
nizes that  he  is  one  with  God,  that  the  affections  of  his 
body  and  soul  are  only  modifications  of  the  Infinite 
Being,  and  that  his  love  for  finite  beings  is  but  a  mani- 
festation of  the  love  of  God.  Knowledge  of  God  is  the 


HISTORY   OF    ETHICS  273 

highest  knowledge,  and  man's  love  of  God  is  a  part  of 
the  infinite  love  of  God  for  himself.  Nothing  in  nature 
can  overcome  this  love,  since  it  is  active  emotion  in 
consequence  of  the  soul's  self-knowledge. 

Virtuous  action  is  directed  by  reason;  and  virtue  in- 
volves, as  its  own  reward,  that  highest  blessedness 
identical  with  the  love  of  God.  Virtue  is  not  gained 
by  controlling  impulses,  but  by  rational  insight,  which 
is  the  only  source  of  power  to  control  impulses.  To 
follow  the  guide  of  reason  is  to  be  virtuous,  and  thus 
to  maintain  oneness  with  God,  which  is  the  purest  en- 
joyment. The  virtuous  man  is  friendly  to  others,  not 
from  sympathy,  which,  as  a  passive  emotion,  is  not 
good,  but  at  the  behest  of  reason. 

Spinoza's  identification  of  God  with  substance  and 
the  manifestation  of  God  with  nature  gave  great  offense 
to  his  contemporaries,  who  regarded  him  as  an  atheist 
under  the  guise  of  a  pantheist.  Spinoza,  however,  was, 
no  doubt,  in  his  way,  deeply  religious. 

5.  Leibnitz  (1646-1716). — Leibnitz  was  ambitious  to 
reconcile  philosophy  and  theology,  and,  by  a  compre- 
hensive philosophy,  to  harmonize  conflicting  creeds, 
and  to  unite  the  hostile  Churches  of  Christendom.  He 
was  a  man  of  vast  learning  and  great  influence,  and, 
though  endowed  with  deep  penetration  of  mind  and 
wonderful  originality  of  thought,  his  method  was  ec- 
lectic and  his  spirit  conciliatory.  He  did  not  escape 
the  danger  which  besets  all  eclectics,  of  combining  in- 
congruous elements  in  his  system. 

Like  Spinoza,  Leibnitz  based  his  ethics  on  his  meta- 
physics, and  constructed  his  metaphysics  for  the  sake 

of  his  ethics,  so  as  to  justify  his  ethical  postulates.     He 
18 


274  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

differed  from  Spinoza  in  his  view  of  substance.  As  a 
pantheist,  Spinoza  conceived  substance  as  the  absolute 
unity  of  infinite  existence.  As  an  individualist,  Leibnitz 
conceived  substance  as  the  absolutely  independent  in- 
dividual monads  in  their  gradations  from  lowest  to 
highest,  constituting  the  infinite  diversity  of  existence. 

Leibnitz  accounted  for  the  apparent  interaction  of 
matter  and  mind  by  the  hypothesis  of  pre-established 
harmony;  that  is,  the  world  of  matter  and  the  world  of 
mind  were  so  constructed  and  adjusted  that,  though 
each  runs  its  course  independently  of  the  other,  there 
is  always  a  correspondence  between  their  states,  like 
two  clocks  so  perfectly  made  and  adjusted  that,  though 
they  run  independently,  yet  their  hands  point  out  the 
same  time,  and  they  strike' at  the  same  instant.  Thus, 
I  will  to  move  my  hand,  and  it  moves;  for  the  two 
worlds  of  matter  and  of  mind  are  so  adjusted  that  the 
hand  moves  according  to  the  laws  of  the  world  of 
matter,  just  as  I  will  it  to  move  according  to  the  laws 
of  the  world  of  mind. 

On  the  hypothesis  of  pre-established  harmony,  how 
can  one  man  be  responsible  for  striking  another?  If 
it  is  answered,  Because  he  wills  to  strike,  it  can  be  asked, 
How  can  he  be  responsible  for  willing  to  strike?  The 
volition  itself  is  caused  by  antecedent  conditions,  ac- 
cording to  the  laws  of  mind,  over  which  he  has  no 
control.  It  is  perfectly  evident  that,  in  such  a  case, 
there  can  be  no  blame,  no  responsibility.  The  true  an- 
swer is,  The  volition  was  caused  by  the  man  himself 
acting  freely,  though,  perhaps,  not  without  reason.  It 
does  not  require  great  metaphysical  acumen  to  dis- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  275 

tingtiish  between  motive  as  a  reason  and  cause  as  effi- 
ciency. 

Leibnitz  held  that  since  God  is  perfect,  he  would 
produce  the  best  possible  world;  hence,  the  present 
world  order  is  the  best  possible,  and  God  could  have 
produced  no  other;  and  though  the  creation  of  a  dif- 
ferent world  was  metaphysically  possible,  it  was  mor- 
ally impossible. 

The  question  now  arises,  How  can  the  present  world, 
so  full  of  evil,  be  the  best  possible  world?  Leibnitz  an- 
swers that  a  world  of  finite  things  is  impossible  with- 
out evil,  otherwise  there  would  have  been  no  evil,  since, 
from  the  character  of  God,  we  are  warranted  in  affirm- 
ing that  he  would  create  the  best  possible  world.  One 
effect  of  evil  is  that  the  good,  by  contrast,  seems  more 
excellent  than  it  otherwise  would,  and  is  better  appre- 
ciated. Again,  evil  is  a  defect  necessary  in  all  degrees 
of  development  till  perfection  is  reached,  which  it  never 
is  by  finite  beings.  God  is  not  the  author  of  evil,  only 
in  the  sense  that  he  is  the  Author  of  a  system  in  which 
evil  is  necessarily  involved. 

Spinoza's  ethics  is  egoistic.  The  knowledge  of  God 
is,  for  the  individual,  the  highest  virtue,  and  the  accom- 
panying emotion  of  love  its  supreme  reward.  Love 
to  man  is  an  inferior  virtue.  The  ethics  of  Leibnitz  is 
altruistic.  Though  the  love  of  God  is  a  duty,  yet,  as 
we  can  not  show  beneficence  towards  God,  since  he 
does  not  need  anything  we  can  do,  love  to  man,  shown 
by  our  efforts  to  do  good,  is  the  chief  requirement  of 
practical  morality. 

Virtue  includes  all  excellence;  but  the  highest  vir- 


276  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

tucs  are  those  of  reason  and  love,  so  cultivated  that  we 
have  an  increasing  knowledge  and  love  of  God,  of  our- 
selves, and  of  our  fellow-men.  Virtue  and  blessedness 
are  attainable  in  their  richness  only  in  society;  but  the 
personal  excellencies  are  first  to  be  cultivated,  since 
they  are  the  necessary  conditions  for  the  exercise  of 
the  altruistic  virtues  of  justice  and  benevolence.  Hence 
individual  excellence  is  the  ideal  end  which  moral  ef- 
fort should  first  strive  to  realize;  yet  perfection,  the 
goal  of  moral  effort,  can  only  be  approximated  by  suc- 
cessive degrees  of  advancement. 

The  idea  of  development  does  not  appear  in  Spi- 
noza's system;  but  in  the  system  of  Leibnitz  the  idea  of 
development  or  progress  towards  perfection  is  central 
and  fruitful  in  its  practical  effects. 

The  ethics  of  Leibnitz  may  justly  be  called  pro- 
gressive perfectionism. 

6.  Wolff  (1679-1754).— Wolff  collected  the  scattered 
thoughts  of  Leibnitz,  and  formed  them  into  a  compre- 
hensive system.  Leibnitz's  perfectionism,  known  chiefly 
through  the  writings  of  Wolff,  became,  for  more  than 
a  generation,  the  watchword  of  the  ethical  philosophy 
of  Germany. 

With  both  Leibnitz  and  Wolff  perfectionism  was  re- 
stricted to  the  individual.  The  question  was  not  con- 
sidered whether  progress  towards  moral  perfection  is 
not  also  a  law  of  the  development  of  the  race. 

Under  the  influence  of  the  principle  of  utility  the 
intellectualism  of  Leibnitz  became  transformed  into  the 
utilitarianism  of  common  sense,  according  to  which 
perfection  was  valued  in  proportion  to  its  utility. 


Chapter  VIII 

MODERN    ETHICS— ENGLISH 
FROM  SHAFTESBURY  TO  ADAM  SMITH—  PSYCHOLOGICAL, 

(^HAFTESBURY  (1671-1713).— In  the  harmony  of 
^  the  social  affections  and  the  self-regarding  elements 
of  human  nature,  Shaftesbury  sought  for  the  principle 
of  morality.  The  center  of  ethical  interest  was  trans- 
ferred from  abstract  reason,  where  it  was  placed  by  Cud- 
worth  and  the  intuitionists  generally,  to  the  affections 
and  desires. 

Man  is  not  exclusively  selfish;  for  a  large  part  of 
his  satisfaction  comes  from  the  consciousness  of  kindly 
affection  for  others  and  in  lending  them  a  helping  hand; 
but  disinterested  affection  needs  the  guidance  of  reason. 
The  overindulgence  of  a  fond  mother  is  likely  to  spoil 
her  child. 

Goodness  consists  in  the  various  affections  and  de- 
sires, in  due  proportion,  the  egoistic  and  the  altruistic 
impulses  working  together  in  harmony  under  the  con- 
trol of  the  will,  guided  by  reason. 

Shaftesbury  distinguishes  three  classes  of  impulses — 
natural  affections:  sympathy,  complacency,  good-will, 
love;  self-affection:  love  of  life,  of  pleasure,  ease,  praise, 
affluence,  society,  and  the  resentment  to  aggression; 
unnatural  affection:  malevolence,  barbarity,  depraved 

appetites,  abnormal  affections  and  desires. 

277 


278  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

The  natural  affections,  or  altruistic  impulses,  aim 
directly  at  the  happiness  of  others,  yet  indirectly  yield 
abundant  satisfaction  to  the  individual  manifesting  them 
in  the  pleasurableness  of  the  benevolent  emotions  them- 
selves, in  the  sympathy  with  the  happiness  of  others, 
and  in  the  enjoyment  of  their  friendship. 

The  self-regarding  affections  aim  directly  at  per- 
sonal enjoyment,  and,  in  their  place,  are  useful,  but, 
unless  kept  within  due  bounds  by  regarding  the  rights 
of  others,  they  degenerate  into  selfishness,  avarice,  sen- 
suality, and  bring  upon  the  person  exhibiting  them 
the  ill-will  and  resentment  of  those  who  otherwise  would 
be  friends.  They  fail  to  benefit  the  individual  when  they 
begin  to  injure  society. 

The  unnatural  affections  should  be  repressed  or  ban- 
ished altogether,  since  they  not  only  do  not  tend  to 
either  individual  or  social  welfare,  but  are  injurious 
both  to  the  subject  and  to  others  affected  by  them. 

Shaftesbury's  principle,  which  he  called  moral  sense, 
was  the  keystone  of  his  ethical  system.  The  cultivation 
of  the  natural  affections  and  the  control  of  the  self-affec- 
tions develop  an  affection  towards  the  virtues  them- 
selves— a  love  of  goodness  for  its  beauty  and  intrinsic 
excellence,  and  an  aversion  to  the  malevolent  affections 
because  of  their  ugliness  and  intrinsic  badness.  The 
iesthetical  element  in  Shaftesbury's  system  shows  the 
affinity  between  beauty  and  goodness.  Shaftesbury 
says,  "No  speculative  opinion  is  capable  immediately 
and  directly  to  exclude  or  destroy  the  moral  sense;  yet 
this  sense  may,  in  a  measure,  be  weakened  by  immoral 
habits  or  perverted  by  a  false  religion." 

Shaftesbury  marks  the  beginning  of  a  new  era  in 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  279 

ethical  method.  Thenceforward  the  current  of  investi- 
gation was  psychological  rather  than  metaphysical,  as 
seen  in  the  discussions  of  Butler,  Hutcheson,  and  Hume. 

Shaftesbury's  system,  however,  was  acceptable 
neither  to  the  radical  freethinker,  as  Mandeville,  who 
held  that  private  vices  are  public  benefits,  nor,  on  ac- 
count of  its  Deistical  tendencies,  to  Christian  theolo- 
gians. 

2.  Butler  (1692-1752). — The  view  of  Hobbes,  that 
"the  natural  state  of  man  is  non-moral,  unregulated," 
and  that  "moral  rules  are  means  to  the  end  of  peace, 
which  is  a  means  to  the  end  of  self-preservation,"  brings 
the  natural  instincts  and  the  necessity  of  order  into  con- 
flict, in  which  safety  is  found  in  civil  law. 

The  view  of  Hobbes,  that  the  natural  state  is  one 
of  unregulated  selfishness,  but  that  submission  to  civil 
law,  on  account  of  its  utility,  is  binding  on  man  as  a 
reasonable  being,  Butler  regarded  as  dangerous,  since 
those  who  hold  uncontrolled  egoism  to  be  natural  are 
quite  likely  to  assume  that  it  must  be  reasonable,  and 
therefore  right,  that  nature  should  have  the  preference 
over  arbitrary  civil  law.  Butler  guarded  against  this 
danger  by  showing  that  the  deepest  impulse  of  human 
nature  is  not  to  seek  selfish  gratification.  He  showed 
that  the  social  or  altruistic  affections  are  no  less  natural 
than  the  egoistic  appetites,  desires,  and  affections,  and, 
accepting  the  Stoic  view,  he  maintained  that  pleasure 
and  pain  are  not  primary  ends,  but  only  incidental  re- 
sults attending  the  attainment  of  the  objects  of  desire. 
Hunger  leads  to  the  eating  of  food,  the  object  of  which 
is  the  nourishment  of  the  body.  Hunger  is  allayed  as 
a  consequence,  and  pleasure  is  the  accompaniment. 


280  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

For  selfish  gratification  men  often  sacrifice  what  they 
know  to  be  their  true  interest;  yet  such  conduct  is  re- 
garded as  immoral,  since  a  reasonable  being  should  con- 
trol his  wayward  impulses. 

The  supposed  psychological  fact  that  man,  by  na- 
ture, is  simply  a  selfish  savage,  is  a  fiction;  and  there- 
fore the  deduction  that  the  civil  law  is  the  only  stand- 
ard and  basis  of  morality  is  false.  Neither  does  it  fol- 
low that  nature,  if  given  preference  over  law,  would 
lead  to  the  subversion  of  society;  for  man's  primary 
impulses  are  not  all  egoistic,  and  those  that  are  egoistic 
are  not  all  hedonic,  as  men  also  seek  rational  enjoy- 
ment for  themselves,  as  well  as  the  good  of  others. 

Human  nature  is  not,  as  maintained  by  Shaftes- 
bury,  a  system  of  forces  in  which,  to  secure  the  best 
results,  equilibrium  is  to  be  preserved  between  the 
egoistic  and  altruistic  tendencies,  but  one  in  which  the 
moral  powers — reason,  conscience,  and  will — have  the 
rightful  supremacy.  The  lower  impulses,  properly 
regulated  by  the  higher  powers,  are  useful  and  even  in- 
dispensable. Thus  resentment  against  injury  and  in- 
justice leads  to  self-protection,  and  renders  effective  the 
administration  of  justice. 

Butler  recognizes  benevolence  as  one  of  the  regulat- 
ing virtues,  though  he  does  not  regard  it  as  all  of  vir- 
tue; but  he  seems  rather  to  give  preference  to  self-love 
and  conscience  as  the  chief  regulating  principles.  He 
says:  "Reasonable  self-love  and  conscience  are  chief  or 
superior  principles  in  the  nature  of  man;"  and  between 
these  "it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  any  incon- 
sistence.  Our  ideas  of  happiness  and  misery  are,  of  all 
our  ideas,  the  nearest  and  most  important  to  us.  .  .  . 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  281 

We  can  justify  to  ourselves  neither  this  nor  any  other 
pursuit  till  we  are  convinced  it  will  be  for  our  happi- 
ness, or  at  least  not  contrary  to  it."  But  self-love  needs 
the  check  of  conscience.  Even  a  "skeptic  not  convinced 
of  the  happy  tendency  of  virtue,"  who  nevertheless  rec- 
ognizes the  authority  of  conscience,  can  see  that  duty 
is  to  be  preferred  to  self-interest,  since  the  dictates  of 
conscience  are  clear  and  certain,  while  the  calculation 
of  self-interest  gives  only  probable  consequences;  and 
in  case  of  conflict  "the  more  certain  must  entirely  super- 
sede and  destroy  the  less  certain." 

The  dictates  of  self-interest  and  conscience  must, 
however,  be  held  to  harmonize,  till  it  is  shown  that 
they  conflict,  which  can  never  be  done,  because  of  the 
uncertainty  of  all  egoistic  calculations.  The  final  union 
of  virtue  and  happiness  and  of  vice  and  misery  is  an- 
ticipated in  the  good  and  ill  desert  we  attach  to  virtue 
and  vice;  and  in  this  belief  we  are  more  and  more  con- 
firmed as  experience  enlarges,  thus  affording  a  progress- 
ive verification.  The  duality  of  the  regulating  prin- 
ciples, self-love  and  conscience,  as  recognized  by  But- 
ler, is  in  striking  contrast  with  the  sole  regulating  prin- 
ciple of  reason  in  the  Greek  and  Roman  systems  of 
ethics.  This  dualism  is  obscurely  noticed  in  Clarke's 
reasonable  conduct,  in  Shaftesbury's  obligation  to  virtue, 
and  more  distinctly  in  Wollaston's  moral  good  and  natural 
good. 

As  to  the  justification  of  considering  self-love  a  regu- 
lating principle,  Butler  remarks,  it  "belongs  to  man 
as  a  reasonable  creature,  reflecting  on  his  own  interest 
and  happiness."  It  is  man's  duty  to  look  after  his  own 
interest  and  happiness;  for  in  so  doing  he  is  in  better 


282  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

condition  to  help  others.  The  view  that  benevolence 
is  ultimately  a  desire  for  one's  own  pleasure,  Butler 
showed,  is  the  same  mistake  as  to  consider  hunger  a 
desire  for  the  pleasure  of  eating.  The  appetite  precedes 
and  conditions  the  pleasure,  which  consists  in  the  grati- 
fication of  the  appetite,  which  is  the  exciting  cause,  not 
the  pleasure.  The  case  is  clear  in  regard  to  reason  and 
conscience.  What  reason  shows  to  be  right,  conscience 
dictates  to  be  done. 

The  justification  of  conduct  from  its  benevolent  in- 
tent, or  its  supposed  fitness  to  do  good,  Butler  regards 
as  dangerous,  and  liable  to  lead  even  to  immoral  action— 
to  do  evil  that  good  may  come.  We  should  rather  fol- 
low conscience  in  conforming  to  established  moral  prin- 
ciples, assured  by  a  rational  faith  that  the  consequences 
will  be  good.  The  ultimate  justification  of  any  conduct 
is,  theoretically,  the  good  that  comes  of  it;  but  practi- 
cally, as  we  can  not  always  estimate  the  good,  we  must 
take  for  our  guide  the  established  rules  of  morality, 
guided  by  conscience,  our  own  common  sense,  and  the 
consensus  of  opinion. 

j.  Hutcheson  (1694-1747). — In  his  treatise,  styled 
"Inquiry  Concerning  the  Original  of  Our  Ideas," 
Hutcheson  identifies  virtue  with  benevolence. 

He  distinguishes  between  the  calm  and  the  turbulent 
passions,  whether  private  or  social.  The  most  excel- 
lent disposition  "is  either  the  calm,  stable,  universal, 
.  .  .  or  the  desire  of  moral  excellence,  which,  in 
man,  is  inseparable  from  universal  good  will." 

In  a  secondary  sense,  certain  other  virtues  merit 
approval,  as  candor,  veracity,  honor,  fortitude.  Still 
others  are  commendable,  though  scarcely  ethical,  as 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  283 

knowledge,  intelligence,  skill,  talent,  genius,  decency, 
suavity,  dignity,  courtesy. 

Self-love,  though  not  strictly  virtue,  which  is  dis- 
interested benevolence,  yet,  if  enlightened,  seeks  the 
harmony  of  public  and  private  good.  In  this  way  a 
reflex  of  pleasure  is  realized,  which  is  no  small  source 
of  enjoyment;  but  if  we  do  good  for  the  sake  of  the 
pleasure,  it  becomes  a  refined  selfishness,  and  the  pleas- 
ure is  lost.  Disinterested  beneficence  brings  pleasure, 
so  much  the  more  exquisite,  because  unsought.  What 
of  beneficent  acts  done  from  selfish  motives?  Such 
acts  are  objectively,  but  not  subjectively,  good.  They 
are  beneficial  to  society;  but  the  doer  loses  his  highest 
reward,  yet  he  may  receive,  with  others,  the  external 
benefit  which,  though  good,  is  not  the  reward  of  virtue. 

4.  Hume  (1711-1776). — Hume  held  that  the  duty  of 
allegiance  to  government  can  not  be  based  on  the  obli- 
gation of  fidelity  to  compact,  since  Governments  were 
not  formed  by  compact,  but,  in  general,  by  usurpation 
or  conquest.  Even  if,  in  a  few  cases,  an  ancient  com- 
pact had  been  made,  the  present  generation  of  civilized 
people  can  not  be  considered  bound  by  an  agreement 
made  long  ago  by  a  savage  or  half-civilized  ancestry. 
The  duty  of  fidelity  to  Government  grows  out  of  the 
present  service  it  renders  society  by  affording  protec- 
tion to  the  people. 

Reason  alone  does  not  furnish  the  principle  of  ap- 
proval or  disapproval  whereby  we  judge  moral  action. 
Nor  is  it  found  in  self-interest;  for  when  no  self-interest 
is  involved  we  approve  or  condemn  actions  that  oc- 
curred in  distant  times  or  at  remote  places,  according 
as  they  excite  in  us  sympathy  or  antipathy.  Moral 


284  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

sense  is  a  social  sentiment  of  satisfaction  or  uneasiness, 
without  regard  to  personal  advantage  or  loss.  Consid- 
erations of  public  interest  alone  determine  the  approval 
we  render  to  justice,  veracity,  integrity,  and  fidelity,  or 
the  disapprobation  we  bestow  upon  injustice,  mendacity, 
hypocrisy,  and  dishonesty. 

Utility  is  the  justification  of  law.  The  protection 
of  property  encourages  industry.  Enforcement  of  con- 
tracts begets  confidence.  Laws  are  enacted,  amended, 
or  repealed,  according  as  the  changes  are  deemed  use- 
ful. Private  utility  is  approved  as  well  as  public.  By 
utility,  Hume  means  tendency  to  ulterior  good,  and  not 
simply  conduciveness  to  present  happiness. 

Though  utility  is  the  justification  of  certain  virtues, 
yet  there  are  other  virtues,  such  as  courtesy,  cheerful- 
ness, and  the  like,  that  are  esteemed,  not  so  much  on 
account  of  their  utility,  as  from  the  agreeable  feelings 
they  excite  in  us  through  sympathy.  Even  benevolence, 
which  is  approved  on  account  of  its  utility,  is  also  ap- 
proved through  the  sympathy  we  have  for  this  amiable 
affection.  We  even  admire  benevolence  when  we  cen- 
sure it  because  carried  to  excess;  and  this  admiration 
is  seen  even  in  the  terms  of  censure,  as  when  we  say  of 
an  excessively  benevolent  man,  "He  is  too  good."  Con- 
science is  explained  by  moral  sense  and  sympathy. 

Hume  scarcely  finds  a  place  for  disinterestedness. 
He  says:  "In  general  it  may  be  affirmed  that  there  is 
no  such  passion  in  the  human  mind  as  the  love  of  man- 
kind, merely  as  such,  independent  of  personal  qualities, 
or  services,  or  relation  to  ourselves;  public  benevo- 
lence, therefore,  or  a  regard  for  the  interests  of  man- 
kind, can  not  be  the  original  notion  of  justice." 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  285 

Hume  held  that  "reason  is  no  motive  to  action,  nei- 
ther is  moral  sentiment,  unless  it  gives  pleasure  or  pain, 
and  thereby  constitutes  our  happiness  or  misery.  But 
all  duties,  which  true  ethical  theory  require,  are  for 
"the  true  interest  of  the  individual."  The  moral  man 
derives  happiness  from  "peaceful  reflection  on  his  own 
conduct."  This  is  the  approval  of  conscience.  The 
essence  of  moral  approval  is  the  pleasure  which  is  a  con- 
sequence of  right  doing  from  disinterested  motives. 
Hume  does  not  always  distinguish  intellectual  endow- 
ments from  moral  virtues. 

5.  Adam  Smith  (1723-1790). — Adam  Smith  held  that 
sympathy  is  the  ultimate  element  of  moral  sentiment; 
that  no  qualities  of  mind  are  virtues  save  those  agree- 
able to  the  person  himself  or  pleasing  to  others;  that 
it  is  propriety  that  first  enlists  our  sympathy;  and  that 
utility  and  the  virtues  of  justice  and  benevolence  en- 
hance the  sentiment  of  approval. 

Fellow-feeling  is  agreeable,  even  in  sympathy  with 
suffering;  but  immoral  qualities  awake  in  us  antipathy 
and  disapprobation.  We  approve  a  beneficent  act  for 
the  reason  that  it  is  beneficial  to  the  recipient,  and  awak- 
ens in  him  sentiments  of  gratitude.  We  find  merit  in 
the  generous  benefactor,  good  in  the  benefaction,  and 
gratitude  in  the  recipient.  In  witnessing  an  injurious 
act  we  feel  antipathy  towards  the  aggressor,  find  evil  in 
the  aggression,  and  sympathize  with  the  injured  person. 

Conscience  is  blinded  by  appetite,  passion,  affection, 
and  desire;  but  against  these  the  rules  of  morality  af- 
ford protection. 

The  principles  of  morality  are  the  laws  of  God,  dis- 
covered by  induction,  and  adopted  by  the  common 


286  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

sense  of  mankind.  That  these  principles  are  salutary, 
experience  has  abundantly  shown;  and  their  ultimate 
justification,  in  the  eye  of  reason,  is  the  good  conse- 
quences that  attend  their  observance.  Every  man,  by 
helping  himself,  by  a  providential  order,  helps  his  neigh- 
bors. 


Chapter  IX 

MODERN    ETHICS— GERMAN 
FROM  KANT  TO  HARTMANN — IDEALISTIC  AND  CRITICAL. 

TfANT  (1724-1804).— In  his  "Critique  of  Pure  Rea- 
-***  son,"  Kant  undertook  to  demolish  the  prevailing 
system  of  metaphysics,  and  to  limit  all  knowledge  at  the 
border  of  experience.  He  admits  that  Hume  awoke 
him  from  his  dogmatic  slumbers;  yet  he  could  not  ac- 
cept Hume's  view  that  utility  and  sympathy  form  an 
adequate  basis  for  morals,  or  explain  the  phenomena 
of  conscience.  Kant's  method  is  critical. 

Denying  any  transcendental  knowledge  of  God  or 
of  the  world,  such  as  Plato,  the  theologians,  or  modern 
metaphysicians  had  assumed,  Kant  attempted  to  elab- 
orate a  system  of  idealistic  ethics,  without  any  support 
from  metaphysical  systems  of  philosophy  or  the  dogmas 
of  theology. 

According  to  Kant,  the  sole  moral  motive  is  respect 
for  the  moral  law,  which  is  a  categorical  imperative,  "Thou 
shalt,  or  thou  shalt  not."    The  command  does  not,  like  a 
law  of  nature,  express  a  necessity,  a  must,  but  an  obliga-  j 
tion,  an  ought.    It  therefore  implies  freedom  to  obey  or' 
to  disobey. 

Kant  states  the  law  thus,  "So  act  that  the  maxim  of 
thy  conduct  might  serve,  at  the  same  time,  as  a  principle 
of  universal  legislation," 

287 


288  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Though  the  law,  as  a  categorical  imperative,  re- 
quires unconditional  obedience,  yet  it  does  not  follow 
that  the  law  is  arbitrary,  without  reason,  or  that  the 
reason  is  not  the  good  consequences  of  obedience. 
When  the  law  is  applied  to  any  particular  case,  the  rea- 
son for  the  law  is  found  in  the  consequences  of  obedi- 
ence or  of  disobedience.  Take  the  command,  Thou  shalt 
not  lie.  Kant  says:  "I  can  not  will  lying  to  become  a 
universal  law,  for  then  I  myself  would  not  be  believed." 
Again,  "Hate  can  not  be  taken  as  a  universal  principle, 
since  then  no  one  could  hope  to  obtain  the  assistance 
he  needed."  The  law  has  a  reason;  hence  the  duty  of 
obedience,  though  we  may  not  know  the  reason. 

The  fact  is,  the  moral  law  does  not  require  us  to 
disregard  egoistic  or  utilitarian  considerations.  Even 
hedonic  aims  have  a  place.  It  is  not  wrong  for  a  hun- 
gry man  to  desire  a  good  dinner.  It  would,  however, 
be  wrong  for  him  to  steal  another  hungry  man's  dinner. 

Many  questions  in  morals  we  may,  no  doubt,  decide 
immediately  or  by  intuition,  or  by  the  generally-received 
maxims  of  morality,  without  considering  the  conse- 
quences; yet  in  other  cases,  a  regard  for  the  conse- 
quences is  the  only  means  we  have  of  reaching  a  right 
decision. 

Kant  says,  "Nothing  can  possibly  be  conceived  of 
in  the  world,  or  even  out  of  it,  which  can  be  called  good, 
without  qualification,  except  a  good  will."  The  decision 
to  obey  the  moral  law  is  good  will;  but  why?  Because 
of  the  good  result  in  making  our  own  perfection  and 
the  happiness  of  others  the  end  of  our  volitions  and  of 
our  conduct.  Good  will  is  goodness;  the  result  is  the 
good. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  289 

Kant  deduced  the  doctrine  of  immortality  from  our 
aspiration  after  perfect  goodness.  Exact  conformity 
of  the  will  to  the  moral  law  can  not  be  attained  in  this 
life,  owing  to  the  disturbing  influence  of  the  sensibility; 
therefore  we  are  justified  in  the  hope  of  the  continuance 
of  our  existence,  that  we  may  forever  approach  the  ideal 
of  perfect  holiness. 

Again,  belief  in  the  existence  of  God  is  justified  by 
the  requirement  of  due  proportion  between  virtue  and 
happiness,  which  can  be  secured  only  under  the  ad- 
ministration of  a  being  infinite  in  power,  wisdom,  and 
goodness. 

2.  Fichte  (1762-1814). — According  to  Fichte,  moral- 
ity is  based  on  the  effort  of  the  ego  to  attain  complete 
autonomy  by  extending  the  advancing  limit  of  its  action 
to  a  goal  infinitely  removed.  All  moral  action  is  a  striv- 
ing towards  the  ideal  which  may  be  indefinitely  approxi- 
mated, though  never  fully  attained.  The  practical  ego 
is  active,  the  knowing  ego  is  contemplative. 

Fichte  stated  the  moral  law  thus,  "Always  strive  to 
fulfill  thy  mission."  A  new  element  is,  therefore,  added 
to  ethical  thought — the  idea  of  development,  or  moral 
progress.  By  striving  to  actualize  the  moral  world,  the 
ego  realizes  itself,  in  successive  stages  of  development, 
as  a  conscious  personality,  related  to  other  personali- 
ties by  the  mutual  obligations  of  the  moral  law. 

The  external  world  is  the  self-limitation  of  the  ego, 
the  medium  of  its  activity,  and  the  theater  of  its  power. 

In  regard  to  freedom,  Fichte  says,  "I  now  believe  in 
freedom  with  all  my  heart,  and  am  convinced  that  only 
on  this  supposition  duty  and  virtue  of  any  kind  are  pos- 
sible." Freedom  is  an  attribute  of  each  person;  and  the 
19 


290  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

chief  function  of  the  State  is  to  guarantee  this  freedom 
to  all  the  people.  The  State  thus  becomes  a  new  unity, 
and  all  the  nations  of  the  world  are  destined  to  form  the 
still  larger  unity  of  humanity. 

In  opposition  to  the  lower  pleasures  of  selfishness 
we  have  the  higher  reward  of  rational  satisfaction.  En- 
joyment arises  from  moral  activity  striving  to  transcend 
the  limitations  of  our  nature.  Deliberate  action,  from 
a  sense  of  duty,  is  the  highest  form  of  conduct.  A  moral 
act  is  marked,  not  by  pleasure,  but  by  the  approval  of 
conscience,  which  is  a  higher  enjoyment  or  rational  satis- 
faction. 

Thought  approved  by  reason  we  regard  as  true; 
conduct  approved  by  conscience  as  right.  What,  then, 
is  right?  That  which  conscience  recognizes  as  duty; 
hence  the  rule:  Do  that  which  your  conscience  requires. 
Conscience  is  not  infallible,  but  it  is  to  be  followed  as 
our  best  light,  just  as  in  other  matters  we  follow  judg- 
ment, which  is  not  infallible. 

We  should  strive  to  give  morality  a  visible  form,  for 
which  the  world  supplies  the  material.  We  are  a  part  of 
the  universal  order  which  Fichte  identified  with  God. 
He  says :  "The  living  and  operative  moral  order  is  itself 
God;  we  need  no  other,  and  can  conceive  no  other." 
In  proportion  to  our  progress,  the  universal  being,  which 
Fichte  should  have  called  the  moral  power,  the  cause  of 
moral  order,  rises  into  prominence,  and  we  are  over- 
shadowed in  the  infinitude  of  God,  in  whom  we  live, 
move,  and  have  our  being. 

The  idealism  of  Fichte,  at  first  individual  and  sub- 
jective, becomes  more  and  more  pantheistic  and  relig- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  291 

ions,  and  the  ethics  of  the  individual  transforms  itself 
into  the  ethics  of  history. 

j.  Hegel  (1770-1831). — Regarding  nature  and  spirit 
and  physical  life  as  movements  in  a  logical  development, 
Hegel  disregards  the  antithesis  between  the  active  and 
the  passive  ego,  as  held  by  Fichte,  and  blends  the  prac- 
tical and  theoretical  realms  into  one,  which  he  calls  the 
rational.  The  natural  world  and  the  moral  are,  in  a 
lower  and  a  higher  form,  the  manifestations  of  the  world 
soul  in  a  series  of  concepts  logically  developed.  Hence 
the  opposition  between  the  natural  and  the  moral  dis- 
appears; there  is  no  distinction  between  what  ought  to 
be  and  what  is;  the  real  is  the  rational,  and  the  rational 
is  the  real. 

With  Hegel  reason  is  the  true  reality — the  absolute, 
whose  modes  are  nature  and  spirit,  and  whose  manifesta- 
tions are  being  and  thought.  Philosophy  is  logical  ideal- 
ism dealing  with  the  concept  as  its  subject  and  goal,  a 
system  of  identity  of  thought  and  being,  a  doctrine  of 
development  of  the  threefold  rhythm  of  thesis  or  posit- 
ing, antithesis  or  opposition,  and  a  synthesis  or  union  of 
the  two  in  a  higher,  a  comprehensive,  a  richer  concept. 
In  this  view  of  philosophy,  Hegel  combines  Kant  and 
Schelling. 

Hegel  differs  from  Spinoza  in  essential  respects: 
Spinoza  takes  for  his  problem  the  ethics  of  the  individ- 
ual; Hegel  takes  for  his  the  ethics  of  the  race — the  fam- 
ily, society,  the  State,  humanity.  Spinoza's  problem  is 
subjective;  Hegel's  objective.  Spinoza  derives  every- 
thing from  one  unchangeable  substance;  Hegel  intro- 
duces the  idea  of  development,  not  with  Fichte,  the  sub- 


292  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

jective  development  of  the  individual;  but  the  objective 
development  of  the  world  soul,  as  exhibited  in  universal 
history. 

Subjective  ethics  assumes  that  society  and  the  State 
are  for  the  sake  of  the  individual;  objective  ethics  as- 
sumes that  they  are  ends  in  themselves.  It  is  a  great 
question  whether  the  State  is  for  the  individual,  or  the 
individual  for  the  State.  Taking  this  question  from  the 
human  point  of  view,  it  seems  clear  that  the  State  is  for 
the  individual — that  is,  for  all  the  individuals.  The  in- 
terests of  all  outweigh  the  interests  of  any  one,  and  that 
is  the  reason  why  one  is  justified  in  laying  down  his  life 
for  his  country  when  duty  calls  for  the  sacrifice,  or  why 
the  country  should  demand  or  even  receive  so  great  a 
sacrifice.  From  the  human  point  of  view,  the  State  has 
no  interests  apart  from  the  people  who  constitute  it. 
From  God's  point  of  view,  as  the  world  reason,  the 
family,  society,  the  State,  humanity,  have  a  value  as  a 
realization  of  a  divine  ideal,  and  to  mar  this  realization 
is  to  injure  the  Divine  Creator.  It  therefore  becomes 
the  duty  of  the  individual  to  contribute  to  the  realization 
of  the  perfection  of  the  divine  ideal  in  the  development 
of  humanity.  If  this  is  really  Hegel's  thought,  he  has 
indeed  formed  a  lofty  conception.  The  development  oi 
human  organizations,  to  the  neglect  of  individual  inter- 
ests, unless  they  partake  of  a  universal  world-reason, 
however,  detracts  from  the  interest  with  which  ordinary 
minds  regard  the  subject  of  ethics;  yet  to  minds  highly 
imaginative,  or  endowed  with  great  power  of  generaliza- 
tion, it  possesses  the  fascination  of  ideal  aesthetics,  or 
the  sublimity  of  the  creations  of  lofty  genius. 

4.  Schleiermacher  (1768-1834). — A  reaction  against 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  293 

the  extreme  objective  view  of  Hegel  was  inevitable.  It 
found  expression  in  Schleiermacher,  who  set  reason  over 
against  nature,  and  placed  the  content  of  morality  in 
the  operation  of  reason  upon  nature.  The  union  of 
reason  and  nature  constitutes  the  good.  Every  different 
form  of  reason,  externally  operative  upon  nature,  is  a 
different  kind  of  good.  The  summnm  bonum  is  the  total- 
ity of  all  the  forms  of  the  good.  Virtue  is  the  power 
which  reason  has  over  nature.  Duty  is  the  conformity 
of  reason  to  the  law,  which  gives  reason  dominion  over 
nature.  The  good,  duty,  and  virtue,  are,  according  to 
Schleiermacher,  the  three  leading  moral  ideas. 

These  views  differ  from  Fichte's  in  this:  that  with 
Fichte  nature  is  a  limitation  which  the  moral  will  strives 
to  transcend,  but  without  success,  save  in  extending  the 
horizon  of  moral  vision;  but  with  Schleiermacher  nature 
is  necessary  to  the  moral  activity  of  reason.  The  two, 
reason  and  nature,  constitute  the  factors  of  which  sub- 
jective moral  development  is  the  product. 

The  unification  of  reason  and  nature  begins  with  the 
inorganic  kingdom,  as  seen  in  chemistry,  physics,  geol- 
ogy, and  astronomy;  it  is  continued  in  the  organic  king- 
doms, vegetable  and  animal,  as  seen  in  biology,  or  in  the 
special  forms  of  botany  and  zoology;  it  has  fuller  devel- 
opment in  man,  in  whom  the  divine  reason  is  reflected, 
by  the  greatest  fact  found  in  all  nature — the  reason  of 
man. 

In  man,  reason  in  its  lower  form  is  impulse;  in  its 
higher  it  is  will.  Will  is  subdivided  into  organizing 
power  and  symbolizing  power.  The  organizing  power 
of  will  strives  to  actualize  the  law  of  reason  in  the  exter- 
nal world,  as  in  accumulating  property.  The  symboliz- 


294  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

ing  power  of  the  will  resorts  to  nature  for  sensuous  sym- 
bols of  action,  as  in  speech  and  art. 

Corresponding  to  these  four  activities,  one  in  nature 
and  three  in  man,  are  the  four  organizations — the  State, 
society,  the  school,  the  Church,  respectively  related  to 
the  four  cardinal  virtues — prudence,  perseverance,  wis- 
dom, and  love,  and  to  the  four  spheres  of  obligation- 
legal,  professional,  social,  spiritual. 

Kant  gave  no  content  to  his  ethical  formula,  Let 
your  act  be  fit  for  universal  imitation.  Schleiermacher 
gave  the  contents  of  moral  action  with  complete  fullness. 

Fichte  regards  the  subject  of  moral  law  as  ever  the 
same;  Schleiermacher  regards  each  person  as  peculiar, 
and  emphasizes  the  necessity  of  individualizing  morals. 
He  held  that  morality  is  universal  only  so  far  as  human 
nature  is  the  same;  but  the  application  of  the  moral  law 
to  individual  cases  must  vary  with  the  characteristics 
and  circumstances  of  the  subject.  Shleiermacher,  how- 
ever, does  not  treat  morality  from  an  exclusively  indi- 
vidual standpoint.  But  each  person  has  his  peculiarities, 
his  talents,  his  vocation;  and  it  is  his  duty  to  act  well  his 
part,  and  thus  fulfill  his  mission  in  the  world.  A  higher 
importance  is  attached  to  the  duty  of  the  individual  than 
simply  to  provide  for  his  own  welfare,  for  he  has  duties 
to  society,  to  the  State,  to  humanity. 

5.  Krause  (1781-1835). — The  philosophy  of  identity, 
as  advocated  by  Schelling,  dominated  the  thinking  of 
Krause,  who  also  accepted  the  doctrine  of  intellectual 
intuition,  in  the  form  of  Neo-Platonism,  or  theosophic 
ecstasy.  Influenced  by  the  revelations  of  Swedenborg, 
he  inquires  into  the  condition  of  humanity  in  other 
worlds.  He  calls  his  philosophy  Pantheism,  signifying 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  295 

that  he  did  not  lose  sight  of  God  in  the  universe,  nor  of 
man  in  the  union  of  God  and  nature. 

Good  originates  by  the  action  of  the  divine  will 
through  human  wills,  and  is,  therefore,  a  universal  law, 
and  ought  to  be  willed  for  its  own  sake.  Evil  is  the 
result  of  individual  limitation,  and  is,  therefore,  a  tem- 
porary disorder,  destined  gradually  to  disappear  with 
the  progress  of  the  race,  when  the  social  life  is  in  har- 
mony with  the  moral  law. 

From  God  proceeds  the  historic  life  of  humanity, 
the  organization  and  classification  of  society,  and  the 
peculiarities  and  callings  of  individuals.  The  individual 
is  subordinate  to  society,  society  to  the  State,  the  State 
to  humanity. 

Law  regards  not  only  external  conditions,  but  also 
internal;  its  office  is  to  enable  every  person,  by  a  full 
development  of  his  powers,  to  fulfill  his  mission  in  the 
world.  The  historic  life  of  humanity  reproduces,  on  a 
larger  scale,  the  life-periods  of  the  individual — germina- 
tion, growth,  maturity,  decline,  transition  to  a  higher 
plane,  and  so  on  in  an  endless  repetend. 

Krause,  like  Hegel,  attached  great  importance  to 
the  problems  of  objective  morality,  in  society,  in  the 
State,  in  humanity,  regarding  law  as  the  organic  unity 
of  all  the  conditions  of  life  related  to  human  freedom. 

6.  Schopenhauer  (1788-1860). — Attaching  little  im- 
portance to  the  individual,  Schopenhauer  assumes  that 
morality  is  objective  in  the  State  and  in  the  history  of 
humanity.  The  individual  is  transitory,  and  exists  only 
for  the  race,  though  stimulated  by  the  delusion  that  he 
is  promoting  his  own  welfare.  Schopenhauer's  philos- 
ophy is  pessimistic. 


296  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

The  life  of  the  race  oscillates  between  generation 
and  extinction,  and  the  only  constant  is  pain  and  mis- 
conception. The  State,  by  punishing  crime,  holds  in 
check  the  selfish  tendencies  of  individuals.  Every  one 
strives  to  overreach  others,  but  he  only  deludes  himself. 
Satisfaction  comes  only  by  self-renunciation  and  a  cessa- 
tion of  all  effort;  but  the  pleasure  is  merely  a  relief  from 
pain.  There  is  no  other  source  of  morality  than  the 
universal  world-will,  in  which  individual  distinctions  are 
disregarded. 

Sympathy  is  Schopenhauer's  moral  principle,  but  its 
origin  is  a  mystery.  Its  essence  consists  in  imagining 
ourselves  in  the  place  of  others,  and  consequently  realiz- 
ing their  joys  and  their  sorrows  as  our  own,  thus  losing 
the  personal  in  the  social. 

7.  Hartmann  (1842--  — ). — The  actual  world,  Hart- 
mann  maintains,  is  due  to  an  irrational  act  of  the  uncon- 
scious will  or  intelligence.  He  rejects  the  view  of 
Schopenhauer  that  pleasure  is  only  release  from  pain, 
but  still  holds  that  such  pleasure  greatly  preponderates 
over  positive  pleasures,  and  that  they  are  greatly  in- 
ferior in  intensity  to  the  pains  from  which  they  are  the 
relief. 

Hartmann  enters  more  fully  into  the  empirical  proof 
of  the  miseries  of  life  than  Schopenhauer.  He  shows 
that  the  fatigue  of  the  nerves  from  prolonged  action  in- 
creases the  pain  and  diminishes  the  pleasure;  that  pleas- 
ure is  always  brief,  while  the  unrest  of  desire  is  lasting; 
that  regret,  chagrin,  envy,  jealousy,  hatred,  are  painful; 
that  health,  wealth,  youth,  freedom,  are  valued  only  as 
the  negatives  of  sickness,  poverty,  old  age,  slavery;  that 
business  pursuits,  family  relationships,  are  simply  the 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  297 

less  of  two  evils;  that  riches,  power,  honor,  are  unsatis- 
factory; that  the  only  thing  that  brings  more  pleasure 
than  pain — the  cultivation  of  science,  literature,  or  art — 
can  be  enjoyed  only  by  a  few,  whose  superior  intelli- 
gence and  sensibility  expose  them  to  the  envy  and  hatred 
of  rivals. 

Hartmann  hence  concludes  that  the  pain  in  the  world 
greatly  preponderates  over  the  pleasure;  and  that  -there 
is  no  reasonable  hope  for  improvement,  but  rather  the 
reverse.  His  ethical  conclusion  is,  therefore,  that  we 
should  endeavor  to  bring  about  the  extinction  of  the 
human  race. 


Chapter  X 

MODERN    ETHICS— ENGLISH 
FROM  CLARKE:  TO  MARTINEAU — INTUITIONAL 

SAMUEL  CLARKE  (1675-1729).— We  now  go  back 
to  Clarke,  whom  we  omitted  from  his  chronological 
position,  that  he  might  be  considered  with  the  intuition- 
ists,  with  whom  he  is  properly  classed.  Cudworth, 
More,  and  Cumberland  were  left  in  their  positions  as 
links  between  Hobbes  and  Locke. 

A  few  years  only  after  the  publication  of  Locke's 
treatise,  Clarke  made  an  attempt  to  "place  morality 
among  the  sciences  capable  of  demonstration,  from  self- 
evident  propositions,  as  incontestable  as  those  of  mathe- 
matics." The  obligations  of  morality,  Clarke  held  to  be 
eternal  and  immutable  and  "incumbent  on  man  from 
the  very  nature  and  reason  of  things  themselves."  From 
the  "necessary  and  eternal  different  relations  that  dif- 
ferent things  bear  to  one  another,  there  result  fitness  and 
unfitness  of  the  applications  of  different  things  or  differ- 
ent relations  to  one  another." 

As  self-evident  obligations,  Clarke  mentions  piety 
towards  God,  equity  and  benevolence  towards  others, 
and  sobriety  towards  self.  By  sobriety,  or  care  for  self, 
we  are  better  able  to  care  for  others,  and  this  ability  is 
enhanced  by  piety  towards  God.  The  rule  of  justice 

298 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  299 

Clarke  states:  "Whatever  I  judge  reasonable  or  unrea- 
sonable for  another  to  do  for  me,  that  by  the  same  judg- 
ment I  declare  reasonable  or  unreasonable  that  I,  in 
like  cases,  should  do  for  him."  Also,  "A  greater  good  is 
to  be  preferred  to  a  less,  whether  it  be  my  good  or 
another's." 

Clarke  could  say  that  a  rational  being  ought  always 
to  act  in  conformity  to  his  rational  intuitions,  not  that 
he  always  does  so  act;  for  he  often  acts  contrary  to 
reason.  Therefore  reason  does  not  always  determine 
moral  action.  Spinoza,  and  perhaps  Leibnitz,  would 
say  that  the  irrational  action  is  due  to  inadequate  knowl- 
edge, as  Socrates  also  said;  but  the  fact  is,  a  man  with  a 
clear  knowledge  of  duty  often  acts  contrary  to  reason, 
as  he  himself  will  admit,  and  he  does  this  knowing  the 
consequences.  What,  then,  determines  the  wrong  act? 
Is  it  appetite,  or  passion,  or  desire?  If  so,  how  can  the 
man  be  responsible?  If  he  is  responsible,  the  motives 
are  not  strictly  causes;  they  solicit,  but  do  not  compel 
action.  The  man  makes  the  decision  himself,  though 
he  makes  it  at  the  solicitation,  but  not  at  the  compul- 
sion, of  motives.  To  predicate  responsibility  requires 
that  we  postulate  freedom. 

The  sanctions  of  morality,  the  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, no  doubt,  re-enforce  the  will,  and  aid  it  in  making 
a  right  decision ;  but  in  the  long  run  righteousness  is  for 
the  interest  of  every  one,  and  adequate  knowledge  is  a 
powerful  support,  if  not  an  unfailing  guarantee,  to  a 
righteous  life.  Faith  in  God  is  a  mighty  power  for  good 
whenever  we  find  that  the  requirements  of  duty  conflict 
with  present  pleasure. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  abandon  egoism  to  establish 


300  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

morality.  Selfish  egoism  that  seeks  gratification,  even 
if  at  the  expense  of  another,  or  at  the  expense  of  a  higher 
good  to  self,  is  clearly  immoral;  but  it  is  perfectly  right 
to  seek  pleasure  if  in  securing  it  no  greater  good  is  sac- 
rificed or  no  overbalancing  evil  is  incurred.  Enlight- 
ened egoism  does  not  conflict  with  rational  altruism. 
They  are  opposite  sides  of  a  life  of  duty. 

The  fitness  or  unfitness  which  Clarke  urges  are  too 
wide  in  extent,  taking  in  sesthetical  considerations  as 
well  as  ethical;  they  are  too  meager  in  content,  and  do 
not  necessarily  take  in  the  element  of  obligation.  It 
may  be  fit  that  an  artist  should  add  a  new  feature  to  his 
picture,  but  he  is  not  under  obligation  to  do  it.  It  is 
not  only  fit  that  a  man  should  rescue  his  friend  from 
drowning,  but  he  ought  to  do  it,  if  possible. 

Clarke  speaks  of  moral  obligation  as  concerned  with 
eternal  relations,  like  those  of  mathematics.  Eternal  re- 
lations can  exist  only  between  eternal  things.  Geometry 
deals  with  the  forms  of  space,  which  are  eternal.  Space 
is  the  empty  condition  of  body  and  motion;  but  is  neces- 
sary in  itself,  and  would  be,  though  body  and  motion 
had  no  existence.  The  relations  of  the  forms  of  space 
are  eternal  truths,  and  are  not  dependent  on  contingent 
facts.  But  moral  obligations  relate  to  moral  beings,  and 
have  no  existence  apart  from  those  beings.  In  morals, 
good  and  bad,  right  and  wrong,  relate  to  the  will,  to  the 
character,  to  the  conduct  of  moral  beings.  They  admit 
of  degrees,  and  are  not  reducible  to  truth  and  falsity, 
which  admit  of  no  degrees.  We  approve  of  the  right; 
we  assent  to  the  truth. 

Perhaps  Clarke  would  have  justified  his  eternal  obli- 
gations thus :  It  is  eternally  true  that  whenever  there  be 


HISTORY   OF   E'THICS  301 

moral  beings,  they  are  under  obligations  to  act  with  the 
fitness  justified  by  their  relations  to  one  another. 

2.  Price  (1723-1791). — Price. published  his  ''Review 
of  the  Questions  and  Difficulties  of  Morals"  two  years 
before  the  publication  of  Adam  Smith's  "Theory  of  the 
Moral  Sentiments;"  but  Price,  as  an  intuitionist,  belongs 
to  the  group  we  are  now  considering. 

Price's  system  is  analagous  to  Cudwortlrs  and 
Clarke's.  He  does  not  find  the  basis  of  his  system  in 
the  general  development  of  ethical  thought,  but  regards 
the  conception  of  right  and  wrong  as  intuitive  and  in- 
capable of  analysis,  and  at  once  clearly  apprehended  by 
reason  as  self-evident,  though  he  does  not  insist  on  the 
analogy  of  mathematical  and  ethical  truth. 

Price  recognized  the  emotional  element  emphasized 
by  Shaftesbury,  yet  he  regarded  it  as  subordinate  to  the 
intuition  of  right  and  wrong.  He  held  right  and  wrong 
to  be  real  objective  qualities  of  action,  but  that  moral 
beauty  and  deformity  are  subjective  ideas,  representing 
feelings  due  to  the  intuitions  of  right  and  wrong,  but 
springing  from  emotional  sensibility.  The  intuition  is 
paramount,  though  co-operating  with  instinct  in  sup- 
plying the  motives  to  virtuous  conduct. 

Merit  and  demerit  are  accompaniments  of  right  and 
wrong  conduct,  and  deserve  reward  and  punishment. 
Yet  the  merit  or  the  demerit  does  not  depend  on  the 
objective  Tightness  or  wrongness  of  the  act,  but  upon 
the  intention  to  do  what  is  conceived  to  be  right  or 
wrong.  A  person  is  not  blameworthy  for  an  unintended 
evil,  unless  ignorance  of  the  facts  is  the  result  of  willful 
neglect  to  seek  accurate  information.  An  act  may  be 
subjectively  right,  though  objectively  wrong. 


302  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Price  does  not  question  the  obligations  to  self-love 
and  benevolence.  He  says:  "There  is  not  anything-  of 
which  we  have  more  undeniably  an  intuitive  perception 
than  that  it  is  right  to  pursue  and  promote  happiness, 
whether  for  ourselves  or  for  others;"  yet  he  held  that 
there  are  other  principles  at  once  intuitively  apprehended 
by  reason.  Honesty,  veracity,  gratitude,  and  justice  are 
obligatory,  without  reference  to  their  tendency  to  pro- 
mote happiness.  These  virtues  being  accepted,  we  now 
ought  to  exhibit  them,  and  need  not  think  of  their  ten- 
dency to  produce  happiness,  yet  without  this  tendency, 
which  is  their  final  justification,  they  would  never  have 
been  virtues. 

Finding  it  difficult  to  show  that  the  moral  maxims 
are  self-evident,  Price  appeals  to  common  sense,  which 
differs  from  rational  intuition  in  being  the  consensus 
of  opinion,  however  acquired.  Thus,  in  regard  to  verac- 
ity, referring  to  common  sentiment,  he  says,  "We  can 
not  avoid  pronouncing  that  there  is  an  intrinsic  recti- 
tude in  sincerity."  In  regard  to  justice,  he  accepts  the 
traditional  opinions  which  base  the  right  of  property  on 
first  possession,  labor,  inheritance,  donation. 

J.  Reid  (1710-1796). — In  his  essay  on  the  active 
powers  of  the  human  mind,  Reid  distinguished  between 
the  rational  or  governing  principles  of  action,  and  the 
non-rational  impulses.  The  governing  principles  are 
self-love  and  conscience — self-love  seeks  the  good,  or 
perfection  and  happiness  for  ourselves;  and  conscience 
forbids  injustice,  inculcates  justice,  and  approves  of  be- 
nevolence. The  testimony  of  a  good  conscience  is  the 
purest  and  most  valuable  of  human  enjoyments.  Reid 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  303 

says,  "No  act  can  be  morally  good  in  which  regard  for 
what  is  right  has  not  some  influence." 

The  non-rational  impulses  need  regulation,  but  are 
legitimate,  and  in  fact  indispensable.  They  are  divided 
into  mechanical  instincts,  or  habits,  that  operate  with- 
out will  or  thought,  and  the  animal  principles  which 
operate  upon  the  will,  but  do  not  imply  any  act  of  judg- 
ment in  determining  their  ends.  The  original  principles 
are: 

J.  Appetites,  distinguished  as  periodical,  and  accom- 
panied with  a  sensation  of  uneasiness  when  unsatisfied, 
and  of  pleasure  when  gratified. 

2.  Desires,  as  for  pleasure,  power,  superiority,  es- 
teem, knowledge,  wealth. 

j.  Affections,  both  benevolent  and  malevolent,  as 
love  and  hatred. 

Neither  Butler  nor  Reid,  though  admitting  benevo- 
lence as  amiable  and  praiseworthy,  regarded  it  as  the 
whole  of  virtue.  Even  the  malevolent  affections,  as  in- 
dignation, anger,  hatred,  Reid  regarded  as  not  without 
utility.  They  resist  aggression,  afford  protection,  and 
aid  in  bringing  criminals  to  justice. 

Reid  held  that  the  moral  faculty  is  not  innate,  except 
in  germ.  It  needs  "education,  training,  and  habit"  to 
enable  it  to*  fulfill  its  function.  He  does  not  object  to 
the  term  moral  sense,  as  employed  by  Shaftesbury,  to 
denote  the  moral  faculty,  provided  we  mean  by  this 
term  a  source,  not  of  mere  feeling,  but  of  ultimate  moral 
truth.  The  moral  sense  is  common  sense  applied  to 
morals.  He  says :  "In  order  to  know  what  is  right  and 
what  is  wrong  in  human  conduct,  we  need  only  listen 


304  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

to  the  dictates  of  conscience.  A  person  is  morally  justi- 
fied in  acting  according  to  his  conscience,  though  its 
dictates  are  based  on  mistaken  views.  In  this  case  the 
act  is  subjectively  right,  though  objectively  wrong.  It 
is,  however,  assumed  that  the  individual  did  not  willfully 
neglect  to  inform  himself  concerning  the  truth  which 
should  guide  his  conduct." 

Reid  lays  down  certain  maxims  relating  to  virtue 
in  general ;  that  there  is  a  right  and  a  wrong  in  voluntary 
conduct;  that  we  ought  to  be  careful  in  ascertaining  our 
duty;  and  that  we  ought  to  strengthen  ourselves  against 
the  temptation  to  deviate  from  the  path  of  duty.  He 
states  five  axioms:  That  we  ought  to  prefer  a  greater 
to  a  lesser  good;  that  we  ought  to  prefer  a  lesser  to  a 
greater  evil;  that  no  one  is  born  for  himself  alone;  that 
right  and  wrong  must  be  the  same  to  all  in  all  circum- 
stances; that  we  owe  veneration  and  submission  to  God. 

Reid  argues  that  injuries  to  others,  abridgment  of 
liberty  without  cause,  attacks  on  reputation,  breach  of 
contract,  are  intuitively  known  to  be  violations  of  natural 
rights,  without  reference  to  consequences;  that  the  right 
of  property  is  the  consequence  of  the  natural  right  to 
life  or  to  liberty.  Justice  and  social  customs  are  based 
on  public  utility. 

4.  Dugald  Stewart  (1753-1828). — In  the  '"Philosophy 
of  the  Active  and  Moral  Powers  of  Man,"  Stewart  fol- 
lowed, in  the  main,  the  system  of  Reid,  modified  some- 
what by  the  theories  of  Shaftesbury,  Butler,  Adam 
Smith,  and  Price. 

Stewart  classified  duties  under  three  heads — duties 
to  God,  duties  to  our  fellow  creatures,  arid  duties  to  our- 
selves. He  emphasized  the  obligation  of  justice,  as  dis- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  305 

tinct  from  that  of  benevolence.  Under  justice  he  in- 
cluded integrity  and  honesty,  but  he  did  not  discuss 
them  in  detail. 

The  right  to  property  Stewart  based  on  the  prin- 
ciple, that  the  laborer  is  entitled  to  the  fruit  of  his  own 
labor.  In  treating  of  veracity  and  fidelity  to  promises, 
he  strove  to  prove  that,  aside  from  their  utility,  there  is 
in  human  nature  an  intuitive  love  of  truth  and  a  sense  of 
obligation  to  keep  our  promises,  and  a  natural  expecta- 
tion that  the  promises  of  others  to  us  will  not  be  broken. 
The  efficient  cause  of  morality  is  conscience,  the  final 
cause  is  happiness. 

Stewart  surpassed  Reid  in  psychological  analysis, 
and  though  he  did  not  make  any  original  contribution 
to  the  science  of  morals,  yet  he  expounded  the  ethics 
of  common  sense  with  a  precision  of  statement  and  an 
elegance  and  finish  of  style  not  approached  by  any  of 
the  preceding  writers  of  the  intuitional  school. 

5.  Whewcll  (1794-1866). — In  his  "Elements  of 
Morality,"  Whewell  adopted,  in  the  main,  the  views  of 
his  predecessors  of  the  intuitional  school,  save  that  he 
rejects  self-love  as  a  fundamental  principle,  and  conse- 
quently refuses  to  accept  happiness  as  an  ethical  end. 
Here  we  trace  the  influence  of  Kant,  who  held  that  to 
aim  at  happiness  detracts  from  the  purity  of  the  motives 
of  moral  conduct. 

According  to  Whewell,  five  ultimate  ethical  virtues 
are  left,  from  which  deductions  can  be  made  which  may 
serve  as  moral  guides.  These  virtues  are  benevolence, 
justice,  veracity,  purity,  and  order,  corresponding  re- 
spectively to  personal  security,  property,  contract,  mar- 
riage, and  government.  The  five  virtues  are  supple- 
so 


306  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

merited  by  two  general  principles — earnestness  and 
moral  purpose. 

There  is  no  need  of  discarding  happiness  as  an  end 
of  moral  action.  Of  course,  the  aim  and  the  effort 
should  be  to  be  worthy  of  happiness;  but  the  very  ex- 
pression, worthy  of  happiness,  implies  that  happiness  is 
desirable.  What  is  the  wrong  of  injustice?  It  makes 
some  one  unhappy.  But  let  it  be  remembered  that  the 
lower  pleasures  should  be  subordinated  to  the  higher, 
and  that  the  highest  satisfaction  is  a  consciousness  of 
rectitude. 

6.  Martineau  (1809-1900). — In  his  "Types  of  Ethical 
Theory/'  Martineau  classed  himself  with  the  intuition- 
ists.  His  masterful  work  is  so  complete  that  a  consider- 
ation of  it  will  suffice  for  what  remains  to  be  said  of  this 
school.  Besides  reviewing  and  criticising  other  systems, 
Martineau  discussed  the  grounds  and  developed  the  sys- 
tem of  intuitional  ethics.  He  also  did  a  good  work  in 
grading  the  motives  or  springs  of  action. 

Martineau  holds  that,  "As  to  moral  quality,  we  judge 
persons,  not  things;  that  instead  of  measuring  the  worth 
of  goodness  by  the  scale  of  external  benefits,  our  rule 
requires  that  we  attach  no  moral  value  to  these  benefits 
except  as  signs  and  exponents  of  the  goodness  whence 
they  spring;  and  that  we  graduate  our  approval  by  the 
purity  of  the  source,  not  by  the  magnitude  of  the  result." 
That  is,  morality  is  found  not  in  the  good  or  bad  as 
ends,  but  in  the  right  or  wrong  as  means,  yet  the  end 
as  good  or  bad  determines  the  means  as  right  or  wrong. 

In  opposition  to  the  mass  of  English  moralists, 
Martineau  taught  that  we  learn  our  first  moral  lesson 
by  reflection,  and  not  by  observation.  He  says :  "That 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  307 

in  which  we  discern  moral  quality  is,  we  have  found,  the 
inner  spring  of  action;  and  that  this  is  not  apprehensible 
by  any  external  observation,  but  can  be  known,  in  the 
first  instance,  only  by  internal  self-consciousness.  Of 
other  men's  actions,  the  visible  part  which  follows  the 
mental  antecedents  is  the  first  element  that  comes  before 
our  view;  all  that  precedes  is  beyond  the  reach  of  eye 
and  ear,  and  is  read  off  only  by  inference  from  the  ex- 
ternal sign.  That  sign  would  be  unmeaning  were  not 
the  thing  signified  already  familiar  by  our  owrn  inner 
experience."  Yet  moral  judgments  are  completely 
formed  only  in  society.  "I  learn  my  own  moral  or 
human  affection  in  the  mirror  of  a  kindred  nature,  and 
from  the  natural  language  of  a  brother  man  read  off  at 
once  his  passion  and  my  own." 

As  to  the  conditions  of  morality,  Martineau  says: 
"A  plurality  of  inner  principles  is  an  indispensable  con- 
dition of  a  moral  judgment;"  also,  "A  plurality  of  simul- 
taneous possibilities."  Again :  "Either  free  will  is  a  fact 
or  moral  judgment  is  a  delusion.  We  never  could  con- 
demn one  turn  or  act  of  thought,  did  we  not  believe  the 
agent  to  have  command  of  another;  and  just  in  propor- 
tion as  we  perceive  in  his  temperament  or  education  or 
circumstances  the  certain  preponderance  of  particular 
suggestion,  and  the  near  approach  to  an  inner  necessity, 
do  we  criticise  him  rather  as  a  natural  than  as  a  respon- 
sible being,  and  deal  with  his  aberrations  as  maladies 
instead  of  sins.  The  ordinary  rule,  which  in  awarding 
penalties  of  wrong  takes  into  consideration  the  presence 
or  absence  of  violent  temptation,  assumes  a  personal 
power  of  resistance,  never  wholly  crushed,  but  some- 
times severely  strained." 


308  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

"Were  we,  in  our  moral  problems,  as  much  at  the 
mercy  of  the  laws  of  association  as  we  are  in  our  efforts 
to  remember  what  we  have  forgotten,  or  to  invent  what 
is  wanting  in  a  design,  we  ought  surely  to  look  on  the 
guilty  with  the  same  neutrality  as  on  the  failing  memory 
or  the  infertile  imagination.  This  is  indeed  prevailingly 
admitted  by  those  who  reduce  the  human  being  to  the 
dominion  of  natural  law.  The  application  they  acknowl- 
edge is  in  itself  as  absurd  as  to  applaud  the  sunrise  or 
to  be  angry  at  the  rain;  and  the  only  difference  is,  that 
men  are  manageable  for  the  future,  and  are  susceptible 
to  the  influence  of  our  sentiments  regarding  them,  while 
the  elements  are  not;  so  that  it  may  be  judicious,  with  a 
view  of  benefits  to  come,  to  commit  the  absurdity  of 
praising  what  is  not  praiseworthy,  and  censuring  what 
is  not  to  blame.  Thus  to  reduce  the  moral  sentiments 
to  a  policy  providing  for  the  future,  instead  of  a  sentence 
pronounced  upon  the  past,  is  simply  to  remove  them, 
and  amounts  to  a  confession  that  they  can  not  coexist 
with  a  theory  of  necessary  causation." 

"It  is  not  till  two  incompatible  impulses  appear  in 
our  consciousness  and  contest  the  field  that  we  are 
made  aware  of  their  difference,  and  are  driven  to  judge 
between  them.  One  is  higher  and  more  worthy  than 
the  other,  and  in  comparison  with  it  has  the  clear  right 
to  us.  .  .  .  We  can  not  follow  both,  and  we  can  not 
doubt  the  rights  and  place  of  either.  Their  moral  valu- 
ation intuitively  results  from  their  simultaneous  appear- 
ance. ...  If  the  first  pair  of  impulses  that  compete  for 
our  will  disclose  their  relative  worth,  by  simply  assuming 
that  attitude,  it  is  the  same  with  all  the  rest." 

Dr.  Martineau  presents  the  following  table  of  mo- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  309 

tives,  beginning  with  the  lowest  and  gradually  rising 
to  the  higher.  In  case  of  conflict,  the  higher  should 
have  the  preference.  In  this  way  only  can  conscience 
be  satisfied : 

1.  Secondary    passions — censoriousness,    vindictive- 
ness,  suspiciousness. 

2.  Secondary  organic  propensions — love  of  ease  and 
sensual  pleasure. 

3.  Primary  organic  propensions — appetites. 

4.  Primary    animal    propensions — spontaneous    ac- 
tivity. 

5.  Love  of  gain — reflectively  derived  from  appetite. 

6.  Secondary  affections — Sentimental  indulgence  of 
sympathy. 

7.  Primary  passions — antipathy,  fear,  resentment. 

8.  Causal  energy — ambition  or  love  of  power,  love 
of  liberty. 

9.  Secondary»sentiments — love  of  culture,  love  of  the 
beautiful. 

10.  Primary  sentiments — wonder  and  admiration. 

11.  Primary  affections — domestic  and  social  affec- 
tions. 

12.  Sympathetic  affections — pity  and  compassion. 

13.  Primary  sentiments — reverence  for  God,  for  law, 
and  for  truth. 


Chapter  XI 

MODERN    ETHICS— ENGLISH 
FROM  HARTLEY  TO  SIDGWICK — UTILITARIAN 

T  TARTLEY  (1705-1757). — It  is  necessary  to  go  back 
J-  •!•  to  Hartley,  in  order  to  treat  in  connection  the 
group  of  writers  advocating  utilitarian  ethics.  Accord- 
ing to  Hartley,  benevolence  is  the  primary  virtue.  We 
ought,  therefore,  to  "direct  every  action  so  as  to  pro- 
duce the  greatest  happiness  and  the  least  misery  in  our 
power." 

Hartley  applied  the  laws  of  association  in  explaining 
the  complex  processes  of  thought  and  feeling.  He 
showed  how,  out  of  the  elementary  pleasures  and  pains 
of  sensation,  are  developed  by  association  the  more  com- 
plex pleasures  and  pains  of  imagination — such  as  result 
from  ambition,  self-interest,  sympathy,  antipathy,  the- 
opathy,  and  moral  sense.  Other  philosophers,  as  Locke 
and  Hume,  had  noticed  the  effect  of  association  in  modi- 
fying mental  phenomena,  but  Hartley  was  the  first  to 
make  a  systematic  use  of  the  principle  to  explain  the 
psychology  of  ethics.  The  associated  facts,  in  Hartley's 
view,  were  not  mere  conglomerates,  but  were  com- 
pounds in  which  the  elements  coalesce  and  modify  one 
another — not  like  a  mere  mixture,  but  like  a  chemical 
union. 

Sensations,  according  to  Hartley,  constitute  the  pri- 
310 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  31! 

mary  facts  of  all  psychical  phenomena.  Coexisting  sen- 
sations form  cohering  groups  of  complex  emotions  or 
ideas,  higher  in  grade  than  the  diverse  sensations  of 
which  they  are  the  products.  Thus  the  higher  moral 
sentiments  and  the  higher  moral  pleasures  become  more 
involved  as  we  ascend  the  scale,  and  the  higher  becomes 
the  pleasure,  and  the  further  the  reach  of  consequences 
for  good.  Similar  consequences,  though  with  down- 
ward tendencies,  apply  to  vices. 

Hartley  held  that  the  very  fact  that  sensation  forms 
the  foundation  of  moral  sentiments,  is  proof  that  bodily 
pleasures  are  inferior  to  the  satisfaction  arising  from  the 
consciousness  of  moral  rectitude,  and  that  as  we  ascend 
the  scale  of  virtues,  the  higher  the  reward.  Hence,  one 
aiming  at  his  own  happiness  would,  if  he  acted  ration- 
ally, aim  at  the  higher  virtues.  Socrates  said  that  he 
would,  if  he  knew,  and  that  vice  is  a  consequence  of 
ignorance.  He  would,  if  he  acted  rationally;  but  the 
fact  is,  people  sometimes  act  irrationally,  with  their  eyes 
open  to  the  consequences.  Is  it  possible  for  one  to  aim 
at  his  own  happiness,  and  at  the  same  time  aim  to  attain 
to  that  highest  virtue  of  disinterested  benevolence?  Do 
not  the  two  aims  clash?  Let  one  aim  at  disinterested 
benevolence,  and  his  own  happiness  will  follow. 

Hartley  does  not  make  self-love  the  primary  basis 
of  moral  conduct,  or  self-interest  the  primary  object  of 
pursuit,  but  holds  that  to  do  so  detracts  from  the  higher 
pleasure  of  love  to  God  and  to  man.  We  must  begin, 
however,  with  our  own  development,  and  by  securing 
our  own  interests,  otherwise  we  shall  not  be  in  condition 
to  help  our  fellow  beings;  yet  Hartley  thinks  that  the 
function  of  self-love  in  human  development  is  for  the 


312  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

purpose  of  "begetting  in  ourselves  the  dispositions  of 
benevolence,  piety,  and  moral  sense,  which  virtues  are 
not  likely  to  be  excessive."  Therefore,  our  ideal  aim 
should  be  to  carry  the  subordination  of  self-interest 
further  and  further,  till  we  reach  "perfect  self-annihila- 
tion and  the  pure  love  of  God."  This  approaches  the 
Buddhistic  teaching:  Strive  to  attain  Nirvana,  or  un- 
conscious repose. 

The  general  rule,  Produce  the  greatest  happiness  and 
the  least  misery  possible,  needs  to  be  supplemented  by 
the  maxim:  Conform  to  the  received  virtues  and  prin- 
ciples of  morality.  In  case  of  conflict  between  motives, 
let  the  lower  be  subordinated  to  the  higher. 

2.  Palcy  (1743-1805). — In  his  "Principles  of  Moral 
and  Political  Philosophy,"  Paley  says:  "Obligation  sig- 
nifies to  be  urged  by  a  violent  motive  resulting  from  the 
command  of  another."  In  the  case  of  moral  obligation, 
the  command  is  from  God;  the  motive  to  obedience  is 
the  belief  in  future  rewards  and  penalties.  Paley's  sys- 
tem seems  to  be  a  compound  of  theistic  and  utilitarian 
ethics.  He  says  that  "Virtue  is  the  doing  good  to  man- 
kind, in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  for  the  sake  of 
everlasting  happiness."  The  commands  of  God  are  to 
be  learned  both  "from  Scripture  and  the  light  of  na- 
ture." But  Scripture  enforces  morality  chiefly  by  the 
sanctions  of  future  rewards  and  punishments. 

Moral  conduct  is  tested  by  its  tendency  to  promote 
or  diminish  happiness.  At  the  same  time,  Paley  urges 
the  importance  of  general  rules  as  guides  to  conduct, 
and  thus  evades  the  difficulty  of  calculating  the  conse- 
quences, which  utilitarianism  seems  to  require,  and 
which  is  the  most  formidable  objection  to  the  system; 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  313 

nevertheless,  good  final  consequences,  fairly  made  out, 
constitute  the  ultimate  justification  of  conduct. 

Paley  did  not  distinguish  pleasures  as  higher  and 
lower,  but  estimated  them  by  their  quantity — that  is,  by 
their  degree  of  intensity  and  duration.  The  criterion 
of  a  moral  rule  is  its  conduciveness  to  general  happiness. 
The  universal  incentive  to  action  is  to  secure  happiness 
for  one's  self  or  to  avoid  misery.  The  rule  for  the  guid- 
ance of  conduct  is  the  will  of  God;  but  the  motive  to 
obedience  is  the  sanction  of  rewards  and  punishments  to 
be  realized  in  a  future  life.  Paley's  system  in  brief  is 
this :  Be  good,  because  it  pays. 

5.  Bcntha-m  (1748-1842). — In  regard  to  morality, 
Bentham  held  that  actions  are  estimated  solely  in  refer- 
ence to  pleasurable  or  painful  consequences.  He  says: 
"In  making  these  estimates,  we  consider  the  intensity 
and  duration  of  the  pleasure  or  pain,  also  their  cer- 
tainty or  uncertainty,  and  their  propinquity  or  remote- 
ness." We  see  that  Bentham  advanced  beyond  Paley, 
by  introducing  additional  elements;  but  he  did  not  con- 
sider quality  apart  from  quantity.  He  says :  "The  quan- 
tity of  pleasures  being  equal,  push-pin  is  as  good  as 
poetry."  Though  Hartley  was  the  originator  of  asso- 
ciational  philosophy,  Bentham  was  the  originator  of 
systematic  utilitarian  ethics.  His  motto  was,  The  great- 
est good  to  the  greatest  number. 

Having  summed  up  the  pleasures  and  pains  of  any 
line  of  conduct  of  a  given  individual,  the  difference  on 
the  side  of  pleasure  or  pain  will  give  us  the  total  good 
or  bad  tendency  of  that  conduct  with  respect  to  that 
individual.  Then  consider  the  same  conduct  with  re- 
spect to  other  individuals  affected,  and  we  shall  ascer- 


314  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

tain  the  total  tendency  of  the  act  for  good  or  evil.  The 
difficulty  with  this  ingenious  theory  is,  that  the  first 
consequences  become  causes  of  second  consequences, 
and  these  of  the  third,  and  so  on,  in  endless  series,  so 
that  it  becomes  impossible  to  estimate  all  the  conse- 
quences, especially  when  applied  to  other  people. 

As  to  motives,  Bentham  held  that  men  are  induced 
to  pursue  a  certain  line  of  conduct  by  the  expectation 
of  the  pleasures  or  pains  to  themselves  from  natural, 
civil,  or  social  causes.  He  says :  "It  is,  in  fact,  very  idle 
to  talk  about  duties;  the  word  itself  has  in  it  something 
disagreeable  and  repulsive;  and  talk  about  it  as  we 
may,  the  word  will  not  stand  for  a  rule  of  conduct.  A 
man,  a  moralist,  gets  into  an  elbow  chair,  and  pours 
forth  pompous  dogmatisms  about  duty  and  duties.  Why 
is  he  not  listened  to?  Because  every  man  is  thinking 
about  his  interests.  It  is  a  part  of  his  very  nature  to 
think  about  interests;  and  with  these  the  will-judging 
moralist  will  find  it  his  interest  to  begin.  Let  him  say 
what  he  pleases — to  interest,  duties  must  and  will  be 
subservient."  Bentham  certainly  has  the  merit  of  frank- 
ness. He  gives  the  following  lines  to  aid  the  memory: 

"Intense,  long,  certain,  speedy,  pure, 
Such  marks  in  pleasures  and  in  pains  endure ; 
Such  pleasures  seek,  if  private  be  thy  end, 
If  it  be  public,  wide  let  them  extend. 
Such  pains  avoid,  whichever  be  thy  view; 
If  pains  must  come,  let  them  extend  to  few." 

Bentham's  utilitarianism  is  primarily  egoistic,  and 
secondarily  altruistic.  Egoism  for  diet;  altruism  for  des- 
sert. The  test  of  right  and  wrong  is  the  greatest  happi- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  315 

ness  of  the  greatest  number.  Justice  is  not  the  end 
of  government,  but  the  means  to  the  end — happiness. 

4.  John  Stuart  Mill  (1806-1873). — The  untilitarian- 
ism  of  Mill  differs  from  that  of  Bentham,  chiefly  in  two 
respects — Mill  is  more  altruistic,  and  he  considers  the 
quality  of  pleasures  as  well  as  the  quantity.  Pain,  as  the 
negative  of  pleasure,  he  dismisses  from  the  discussion 
of  utilitarianism,  as  understood  wrhenever  implied. 

Mill  holds  that  each  man  desires  pleasure;  that  the 
strength  of  the  desire  varies  directly  as  the  magnitude 
of  the  pleasure;  that  the  only  proof  that  anything  is  de- 
sirable is  that  people  actually  desire  it;  that  each  per- 
son's happiness  is  desirable  to  himself;  that  each  individ- 
ual, whose  moral  nature  is  properly  cultivated,  desires 
the  general  happiness;  that  he  has  a  feeling  of  unity  with 
his  fellow-creatures,  which  makes  it  natural  that  his  aims 
should  be  in  harmony  with  theirs. 

Mill  says :  "The  desire  for  the  general  happiness  is, 
in  most  individuals,  much  inferior  in  strength  to  their 
selfish  feelings,  and  is  often  wanting  altogether;  but  by 
those  who  have  this  feeling  of  unity  with  others  it  is 
taken  as  an  attribute  which  it  would  not  be  well  to  be 
without.  This  conviction  is  the  ultimate  sanction  of 
the  greatest  happiness,  morality.  That  is,  it  is  better 
for  each  individual  to  desire  and  strive  to  promote  the 
general  happiness." 

This  looks  like  finding  in  egoism  the  basis  of  altru- 
ism. But  how  does  the  desire  for  the  general  happiness 
benefit  the  individual  who  desires  this  happiness?  The 
benefit  may  come  in  two  ways:  Subjectively,  the  desire 
for  the  general  welfare  promotes  the  perfection  of  the 
individual  who  entertains  this  desire;  objectively,  each 


316  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

person  is  benefited  by  the  prosperity  of  others,  and  the 
desire  for  the  general  prosperity  naturally  leads  to  efforts 
to  bring  it  about.  The  subjective  reason  seems  more 
ennobling,  but  it  has  force  only  with  those  who  aim  at 
a  higher  character.  The  objective  reason  is  self-interest; 
but  it  is  not  without  justification,  since  it  is  right  for 
every  one  to  look  out  for  his  own  interest,  especially 
when  in  so  doing  he  also  promotes  the  interests  of  others. 

When  Mill  says  that  they  who  have  altruistic  feeling 
are  convinced  that  it  would  not  be  well  for  them  to  be 
without  it,  he  does  not  assert  that  they  believe  that  their 
own  happiness  is  proportionate  to  their  desire  for  the 
general  happiness;  for  he  says:  "One  does  sometimes 
best  serve  the  happiness  of  others  by  the  absolute  sacri- 
fice of  his  own.  The  conscious  ability  to  do  without 
happiness  gives  the  best  prospect  of  realizing  such  hap- 
piness as  is  attainable." 

In  asserting  that  happiness  is  the  good,  Mill  is  an 
Epicurean;  but  in  commending  the  conscious  ability 
to  do  without  happiness,  and  the  absolute  sacrifice  of 
one's  own,  he  is  a  Stoic.  He  was  broad  enough  to  take 
in  both  views. 

According  to  Mill,  the  quality  of  pleasure  is  to  be 
considered  as  well  as  the  quantity.  In  fact,  compared 
with  the  claims  of  quantity,  those  of  quality  are  superior. 
The  pleasure  taken  in  the  happiness  of  others,  or  that 
found  in  making  sacrifices  for  our  friends,  is  certainly 
superior  in  quality  to  that  derived  from  the  indulgence 
of  appetite,  or  from  any  form  of  sensual  pleasure.  The 
higher  quality  is  more  than  a  counterpoise  to  the  greater 
quantity.  Whether  it  admits  of  strict  proof  or  not,  it 
is  reasonable  to  believe  that  in  the  end  the  choice  of  the 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  317 

higher  satisfaction  of  virtue  will,  in  dignity,  be  more 
than  a  recompense  for  all  that  is  lost  in  the  intensity  of 
the  lower  pleasures. 

The  principle  that  the  ultimate  aim  of  moral  con- 
duct should  be  to  promote  the  highest  welfare  of  the 
greatest  number,  often  becomes  a  guide  when  the  com- 
mon maxims  fail,  as  in  the  choice  of  a  calling  for  life 
work,  the  distribution  of  property,  or  the  choice  of  our 
political  or  ecclesiastical  affiliations.  Public  and  private 
interests  limit  and  modify  one  another,  and  the  balance 
of  interests  decides  the  course  of  conduct.  We  estimate 
the  conduct  of  other  people  by  its  bearing  on  the  public 
welfare.  In  making  general  happiness  the  ultimate  aim, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  overlook  private  interests.  To  do 
the  greatest  possible  amount  of  good  requires  that  we 
develop  our  own  powers,  and  conserve  or  increase  our 
own  resources.  Benevolence  may  be  the  leading  prin- 
ciple, yet  it  needs  the  direction  of  sound  judgment.  By 
securing  our  own  cultivation  and  guarding  our  own  in- 
terests, we  are  in  better  condition  to  be  of  service  to 
others.  Having  the  disposition,  the  will,  the  energy, 
the  industry,  then  the  work  is  done. 

Without  claiming  for  it  infallibility,  the  consensus 
of  opinion  has  great  weight,  and  is,  to  the  majority,  the 
standard  of  appeal.  Mill  says:  "Through  all  depart- 
ments of  human  affairs,  regard  for  the  sentiments  of  our 
fellow-creatures  is,  in  one  shape  or  other,  in  nearly  all 
characters  the  prevailing  motive.  And  we  ought  to  note 
that  this  motive  is  naturally  strongest  in  the  most  sensi- 
tive natures,  which  are  the  most  promising  material  for 
the  formation  of  great  virtues." 

Mill  holds  that  virtue  is  more  than  benevolence  or 


318  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

sympathy  with  our  fellow-beings.  He  says:  "The  mind 
is  not  in  a  state  comformable  to  utility,  unless  it  loves 
virtue  as  a  thing  desirable  in  itself."  Virtue  in  conduc- 
ing to  pleasure,  or  in  avoiding  pain,  comes,  by  the  law  of 
association,  to  be  esteemed  for  its  own  value.  By  habit 
the  tendency  to  virtue  may  become  so  strong  that  the 
practice  will  be  continued,  even  though  great  sacrifices 
are  required  to  satisfy  the  conscience  in  regard  to  the 
obligation. 

Heredity  is  the  transmission  of  tendencies  from  an- 
cestors, through  the  customs  of  society,  till  the  tenden- 
cies become  instinctive,  and  the  corresponding  ideas  or 
beliefs  apparently  intuitive.  They  are  really  intuitive 
to  the  individual,  though  evolved  by  the  experience  of 
the  race. 

The  social  feelings  are  a  compound  of  sympathy  with 
the  pains  and  pleasures  of  others,  and  the  habit  of  con- 
sulting their  welfare,  enforced  by  the  knowledge  of  mu- 
tual dependence.  Our  sense  of  justice  and  injustice 
involves  extended  sympathy,  and  a  desire  for  personal 
and  general  security. 

Utilitarian  and  intuitive  ethics  supplement  each 
other,  each  doing  service  in  the  failing  case  of  the 
other — one  giving  the  expedient,  the  other  the  right. 

5.  Sidgwick  (1838-1900). — In  his  great  work,  "The 
Methods  of  Ethics,"  Sidgwick  discusses  critically  and 
so  fairly  the  various  methods,  as  to  seem  for  the  time 
their  special  advocate;  yet  by  just  criticism  he  shows  his 
independence.  His  final  summing  up,  however,  proves 
him  to  be  a  utilitarian. 

To  follow  Sidgwick  through,  step  by  step,  would  re- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  319 

quire  a  book  as  large  as  his  own.  We  shall  content  our- 
selves, therefore,  with  recommending  all  students  of 
ethics  carefully  and  critically  to  study  "The  Methods  of 
Ethics."  He  has  also  published  a  volume  called  ''Prac- 
tical Ethics,"  made  up  of  essays  and  lectures  which  are 
well  worth  the  reading. 


Chapter  XII 

MODERN    ETHICS— EVOLUTIONARY 
SPENCER  AND  OTHERS 

SPENCER  holds  that  the  control  of  certain  feelings 
by  other  feelings  is  the  essential  trait  of  moral  con- 
sciousness. As  experience  makes  manifest  the  evils  of 
yielding,  without  consideration,  to  the  impulse  for  pres- 
ent gratification,  and  exhibits  the  advantages  in  provid- 
ing for  the  future,  human  beings  learn  to  subordinate 
the  lower,  simpler  feelings  to  the  higher  and  more 
complex. 

Inductions  from  experience  become  the  basis  for 
deductions,  which  serve  as  guides  to  conduct.  The 
voluntary  relinquishment  of  immediate  and  special  pleas- 
ures, for  the  sake  of  remote  and  general  good,  is  a  fact 
of  profound  significance,  and  has  important  applications 
to  social  conduct  and  ethical  life.  Surrender  of  present 
pleasure  may  be  made,  not  only  for  the  hope  of  greater 
future  good,  but  through  fear  of  civil  punishment,  social 
ostracism,  or  divine  retribution. 

Habitual  decisions,  in  view  of  ethical  considerations, 
result  in  the  confirmation  of  moral  character.  Ideas  and 
trains  of  association  affect  the  nervous  system  and  pro- 
duce changes  in  the  brain,  which  continued  for  succes- 
sive generations  permanently  change  the  organism,  and 
this  change  of  organic  structure,  with  the  correspond- 

320 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  32! 

ing  mental  states,  are  transmitted,  and  the  tendency  to 
act  in  the  same  way  becomes  instinctive,  and  the  corre- 
sponding ideas  intuitive  to  the  individual,  though  they 
have  been  developed  in  the  race  by  the  processes  of 
evolution. 

Beings  with  organs  adapted  to  their  environment 
survive;  others  perish.  The  utilitarian  makes  happiness 
the  end  of  ethical  conduct;  the  evolutionist,  health.  The 
preservation  and  perfection  of  the  individual  and  society 
may  be  regarded  as  the  proximate  end,  and  happiness 
the  ultimate  end  of  rational  effort. 

Spencer,  however,  regards  conduct  tending  to  pre- 
serve life  to  be  good  only  on  condition  that  life  has  a 
"surplus  of  agreeable  feeling."  This  is  evident,  for  life 
without  enjoyment  is  a  matter  of  indifference  to  its  pos- 
sessor. It  might,  however,  bring  enjoyment  to  other 
beings;  but  if  so,  enjoyment  to  these  beings  would  be 
the  end;  hence  the  enjoyment  of  somebody  is  the  end, 
which  is  the  principle  of  utilitarianism.  Those  who 
make  something  else  than  happiness  the  end,  as  perfec- 
tion or  the  efficiency  of  the  social  organism,  forget  that 
these  things  afford  satisfaction,  and  if  they  did  not,  no 
one  would  care  for  them.  When  Spencer  shows  that 
good  or  bad  consequences  are  not  accidental,  but  result 
from  the  constitution  of  things,  he  transforms  utilitarian 
ethics  from  an  empirical  to  a  rational  system.  The  out- 
come of  evolutionism  is  utilitarianism;  that  is,  evolution 
is  the  philosophy  of  utility;  it  is  the  explanation  of  ethical 
progress. 

To  take  the  efficiency  of  the  social  organization  as 
the  end,  as  Leslie  Stephen  does,  is  good  and  wholesome; 
but  this  efficiency  is  only  the  proxvtnatc,  not  the  ultimate, 

21 


322  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

end.  This  is  implied  in  the  word  efficiency  itself;  it 
signifies  capability  of  accomplishing  a  result.  Efficiency 
of  social  organism  or  even  perfection  would  have  no 
value,  if  it  did  not  give  some  one  satisfaction.  It  is  evi- 
dent, therefore,  that  the  good  in  some  form  for  some 
one,  whether  that  good  be  called  pleasure,  happiness, 
satisfaction,  enjoyment,  righteousness,  holiness,  or 
blessedness,  must  be  the  end  of  all  ethical  action.  The 
objection  to  this  view  is,  that  it  will  run  into  hedonism; 
but  if  made  eudemonic  and  altruistic,  it  satisfies  all  reason- 
able demands.  Mr.  Fiske  says :  "The  consummate  prod- 
uct of  a  world  of  evolution  is  the  character  that  creates 
happiness,  that  is  replete  with  dynamic  possibilities  of 
fresh  life  and  activity  in  directions  forever  new.  Such  a 
character  is  the  reflected  image  of  God,  and  in  it  are 
contained  the  promise  and  potency  of  life  everlasting." 
The  highest  satisfaction  of  the  greatest  number  stands 
against  all  assaults  as  the  ultimate  end  of  moral  conduct. 
Let  it  be  remembered  that  happiness,  pursued  too 
directly  for  egoistic  purposes,  loses  much  of  its  value. 
It  comes  as  an  accompaniment  of  altruistic  action, 
prompted  by  benevolence.  It  has  been  objected  by 
Hyslop  that  happiness  can  not  be  the  end,  since  it  can 
not  be  directly  pursued  without  loss;  but  the  manner  of 
pursuit,  whether  direct  or  indirect,  is  a  question  of 
means,  not  of  end.  A  good  will  seeks  to  realize  perfec- 
tion for  self,  and  to  secure  it  for  others.  Happiness  will 
take  care  of  itself;  it  will  come  without  being  directly 
sought,  and  will  be  all  the  more  enjoyable  when  it  comes 
as  the  unexpected,  or  at  least  the  unsought,  reward  of 
beneficent  deeds.  Mill  said:  "I  do  not  attempt  to 
stimulate  you  with  the  prospect  of  direct  rewards,  either 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  323 

earthly  or  heavenly;  the  less  we  think  about  being  re- 
warded in  either  way,  the  better  for  us." 

If  in  average  cases  pleasure  and  pain  are  in  equi- 
librium, the  value  of  life  is  zero.  If  pleasure  overbal- 
ances pain,  life  is  desirable;  if  pain  overbalances  pleasure, 
it  is  undesirable.  A  recent  writer  has  suggested  the 
word  meliorism  as  indicating  an  improving  condition, 
neither  the  best  nor  the  worst  possible — a  middle-of-the- 
road  position  between  optimism  and  pessimism. 

If  evolution  is  progress  towards  the  goal  of  a  higher 
condition,  the  chief  excellency  in  man  is  not  to  be  found 
in  what  is  common  to  him  and  the  brute,  but  in  what 
is  peculiar  to  him  as  man  and  in  his  most  advanced  stage 
of  progress.  "On  earth  there  is  nothing  great  but  man; 
in  man  nothing  great  but  mind." 

How  is  conscience  evolved?  In  savage  communities 
a  check  upon  aggression  is  found  in  the  fear  of  retali- 
ation. Also  the  chief  discovers  that  quarrels  within  his 
own  tribe  weaken  its  power  to  contend  successfully  with 
other  tribes.  He  therefore  endeavors  to  prevent  aggres- 
sion by  penalties.  Disobedience  to  the  chief  comes  to 
be  regarded  as  a  great  crime,  and  is  severely  punished. 
After  the  death  of  the  chief  his  ghost  is  supposed  to 
avenge  disobedience  to  his  will.  The  transition  to  the 
fear  of  supernatural  beings  is  easy.  Superstitious  fear 
of  imaginary  beings,  or  even  reverence  for  God,  is  a  re- 
straint against  crime.  The  threefold  restraint — social, 
political,  and  religious — co-operate  in  the  evolution  of 
conscience.  It  is  thought  that  crime  which  is  so  re- 
strained must  be  wrong.  A  man  with  undeveloped  con- 
science may  be  kept  from  murder  by  the  fear  of  the 
halter  or  the  dread  of  future  punishment;  but  to  the 


324  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

moral  man,  the  wrong  to  the  victim,  to  his  friends,  to 
society,  to  himself,  is  a  sufficient  restraint. 

In  a  letter  to  Mill,  Spencer  says :  "To  make  my  po- 
sition fully  understood,  it  seems  needful  to  add  that 
corresponding  to  the  fundamental  position  of  a  devel- 
oped moral  science,  there  have  been  and  still  are  de- 
veloping in  the  race  certain  fundamental  moral  intu- 
itions; and  that  though  these  moral  intuitions  are  the 
results  of  accumulated  experiences  of  utility  gradually 
organized  and  inherited,  they  have  come  to  be  quite  in- 
dependent of  conscious  experience.  Just  in  the  same  way 
that  I  believe  the  intuition  of  space,  possessed  by  any 
living  individual,  to  have  arisen  from  organized  and  con- 
solidated experiences  of  all  individuals  who  bequeathed 
to  him  their  slowly  developed  nervous  organization- 
just  as  I  believe  that  this  intuition,  requiring  to  be  made 
definite  and  complete  by  personal  experience,  has  prac- 
tically become  a  form  of  thought  apparently  quite  inde- 
pendent of  experience;  so  do  I  believe  that  the  experi- 
ences of  utility,  organized  and  consolidated  through  all 
past  generations  of  the  human  race,  have  been  produc- 
ing corresponding  nervous  modifications,  which  by  con- 
tinued transmission  and  accumulation  have  become  in 
us  certain  faculties  of  moral  intuition — certain  emotions 
responding  to  right  and  wrong  conduct,  which  have  no 
apparent  basis  in  the  individual  experience  of  utility.  I 
also  hold  that  just  as  the  space  intuition  responds  to  the 
exact  demonstrations  of  geometry,  and  has  its  rough 
conclusions  interpreted  and  verified  by  them,  so  will 
moral  intuitions  respond  to  the  demonstrations  of  moral 
science,  and  will  have  their  rough  conclusions  inter- 
preted and  verified  by  them," 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  325 

It  will  be  seen  that  evolution  reconciles  utilitarian 
and  intuitional  ethics,  as  it  reconciles  empirical  and 
rational  psychology.  Conduct  considered  obligatory, 
because  of  its  service  to  society,  is  enforced  by  con- 
science, by  public  sentiment,  and  sometimes  by  civil 
law.  There  is  a  moral  force  in  the  social  will,  or  the 
consensus  of  opinion,  which  an  individual  can  violate 
only  at  his  peril.  The  social  will  is,  however,  something 
more  than  the  sum  of  individual  wills,  which  would  be 
a  conglomerate  of  discordant  volitions.  It  is  these  wills 
brought  into  harmony  on  some  point,  by  discarding  dis- 
crepancies and  uniting  on  agreements. 

Pleasure  is  an  object  of  pursuit,  a  stimulus  to  action; 
but  pleasure  in  possession  satisfies,  and  effort  ceases. 
Pleasure  in  prospect  begets  a  craving  for  it,  which  is  a 
stimulus  to  action.  If  pain  exists,  there  is  a  desire  to 
get  rid  of  it,  and  this  stimulates  activity,  which  ceases 
with  the  pain. 

Pure  selfishness  leads  to  strife,  to  warfare,  which 
brings  us  face  to  face  with  extermination.  The  necessity 
of  union  for  the  preservation  of  the  race  is  apparent. 
Preservation  with  its  possibilities  of  happiness  being  de- 
sirable, the  duty  of  co-operation,  mutual  helpfulness,  and 
obedience  to  law  becomes  evident,  and  is  enforced  by 
public  opinion  and  the  sanction  of  penalty  for  its  viola- 
tion. Morality  is  evolved  whenever  people  begin  to  act 
in  concert. 

Right  is  the  means  to  a  good  end — an  end  truly  de- 
sirable; wrong  is  the  means  to  a  bad  or  undesirable  end. 
To  do  right  or  wrong  is  to  work  for  a  good  or  a  bad  end. 

Assuming  matter  and  motion  and  force,  also  space 
and  time,  and  nothing  else,  can  we  account  for  knowing, 


326  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

feeling,  and  willing?  Atoms  respond  to  the  presence 
of  other  atoms.  Is  this  due  to  forces  in  the  atoms,  or 
to  external  forces?  If  the  force  is  within,  is  it  blind  or 
conscious?  If  blind,  there  is  no  knowledge  or  volition 
or  feeling.  Blind  means  no  knowledge;  hence  no  vo- 
lition, for  volition  is  based  on  knowledge;  also  no  feeling, 
for  feeling  implies  consciousness  of  feeling,  and  con- 
sciousness is  knowledge.  In  the  case  supposed,  there 
can  be  no  new  facts  not  derivable  from  blind  atoms; 
hence  no  knowledge,  for  neither  a  combination  of  atoms 
nor  their  interaction  is  knowledge.  But  as  knowledge, 
feeling,  and  volition  are  manifest  along  with  matter, 
as  in  a  living  human  being,  and  not  derivable  from  blind 
matter,  either  matter  is  not  blind,  or  these  phenomena 
have  some  other  source  than  the  atoms. 

According  to  Huxley,  the  cosmic  process  reaches  its 
results  without  mercy  and  without  remorse.  It  has  no 
pity,  no  conscience.  The  ethical  progress  combats  the 
cosmic  by  endeavoring  to  save  what  the  cosmic  would 
destroy.  The  cosmic  process  lets  those  live  that  are  fit 
to  live;  the  ethic  endeavors  to  make  all  fit.  The  one  is 
heartless;  the  other  is  ruled  by  heart.  If  the  forces  are 
fundamentally  the  same  in  the  two  cases,  it  takes  a  new 
direction,  guided  by  conscience,  in  the  second  case.  In 
the  moral  realm  the  ruling  principle  is  benevolent  fore- 
sight. Fit  to  survive  means  not  only  naturally  fit,  but 
morally  fit.  Man,  as  lord  of  creation,  can  adapt  nature 
to  moral  purposes. 

The  endeavor  to  make  the  unfit  fit  is  itself  a  factor 
in  the  process  of  evolution.  To  save  the  unfortunate  is 
better  than  to  destroy;  it  develops  foresight,  incites  to 
new  activity,  and  strengthens  the  benevolent  impulses. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  327 

As  conditions  are  continually  changing,  fitness  means 
progressive  fitness,  keeping  pace  with  progressive  evo- 
lution. The  struggle  for  existence  under  progressively 
favoring  conditions  becomes  a  struggle,  not  with  a 
doubtful  issue,  but  one  with  assured  victory.  All  this 
implies  a  care  for  self,  and  a  preparation  for  altruistic 
action,  which  brings  the  highest  rewards.  The  natural 
impulses  and  instincts  are  not  opposed  to  the  higher 
ethical  development,  but  constitute  its  necessary  basis 
of  action.  First  that  which  is  natural,  afterwards  that 
which  is  spiritual;  first  the  egoistic,  then  the  altruistic. 
The  struggle  for  existence  would  not  be  continued  were 
existence  not  desirable;  and  so  long  as  life  is  desirable 
the  struggle  will  continue,  but  it  will  be  more  and  more 
a  pleasant  exercise  till  it  becomes  a  delightful  effort,  in 
a  manner  increasingly  worthy,  attended  by  still  higher 
consequences  for  good.  Man  is  the  crowning  glory  of 
evolution.  A  worthy  man  is  nature  at  her  best.  Efforts 
will  never  cease.  In  fact,  happiness  consists  not  in  rest, 
but  it  comes  as  a  reflex  of  rightly  directed  energy;  but 
energy  to  be  rightly  directed  requires  wise  forethought. 
Progressive  morality  therefore  requires  progressive 
knowledge. 

Natural  selection,  or  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  work- 
ing through  many  generations,  modifying  the  structure 
to  meet  the  demands  of  function,  is  supplemented  by 
skill  in  the  invention  and  application  of  tools,  machines, 
and  engines  for  the  performance  of  work  which  the  natu- 
ral powers  of  man  can  not  accomplish,  and  this  in  part 
obviates  the  necessity  of  change  of  structure,  since  man 
with  his  present  structure  by  proper  tools  can  accom- 
plish what  was  before  impossible.  Man  not  only  adapts 


328  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

himself  to  his  environment,  but  he  adapts  his  environ- 
ment to  his  needs,  as  seen  in  shelter,  food,  clothing, 
light,  and  warmth. 

The  evolution  of  environment  is  as  much  a  fact  as 
the  evolution  of  organism,  and  has  much  more  to  do 
with  ethics,  since  in  the  evolution  of  environment  the 
will,  the  moral  executive  factor,  is  directly  concerned. 
Human  selection,  as  well  as  natural  selection,  is  a  factor 
most  potent  in  its  influence.  Man  is  not  an  alien  in 
nature;  he  is  its  crown  and  its  glory.  The  co-operation 
of  the  human  with  the  cosmic  gives  the  grandest  results. 
The  end  of  the  cosmic  is  the  moral.  Under  the  realm  of 
nature,  underlying  the  sphere  of  intelligence,  is  "the 
power,  not  of  us,  that  works  for  righteousness."  Evo- 
lution itself  is  under  the  guidance  of  divine  wisdom;  and 
conscience  in  man  is  God's  voice  telling  him  he  ought 
to  do  right,  but  not  what  is  right;  for  that  is  left  for  man 
to  discover  by  his  own  reason. 

What  is  the  pedigree  of  conscience?  Suppose  we 
say  that  "men  have  been  scared  into  a  sense  of  moral 
obligation  by  the  baton  of  the  primitive  policeman,  the 
ostracism  of  primitive  society,  and  the  hell  of  primitive 
priests;"  that  conscience,  whose  components  are  soci- 
ability and  intelligence,  has  been  made  obligatory  be- 
cause the  claims  of  society  are  greater  than  those  of  the 
individual,  and  are  enforced  by  more  powerful  sanctions. 
This  may  explain  the  way  a  sense  of  obligation  has  been 
developed  in  the  race,  since  conscience  is  largely  a  mat- 
ter of  education;  but  it  does  not  explain  conscience  itself, 
or  the  ground  of  obligation.  Why  ought  I  to  do  this, 
or  ought  not  to  do  that,  when  the  doing  or  the  not 
doing  seems  detrimental  to  my  own  interests?  Is  it 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  329 

because  God  has  commanded  it?  But  God's  commands 
are  not  without  reason.  Postulating  the  wisdom  and 
goodness  of  God,  we  must  admit  that  he  commands  in 
the  interest  of  the  universe.  The  interests  of  the  many 
outweigh  the  interest  of  the  individual;  hence  in  case 
of  conflict  his  interests  ought  to  give  way  to  theirs.  In 
such  a  case,  is  it  unreasonable  to  believe  that  a  surrender 
of  self  for  the  common  good  does  not  escape  the  notice 
of  God?  The  individual  may  not  realize,  and  it  is  per- 
haps better  that  he  should  not  realize,  that  he  who  sacri- 
fices his  interests  for  others  reaps  a  higher  reward.  He 
that  loses  his  life  for  consicence'  sake  shall  find  life 
eternal. 

In  every  conscientious  person's  soul  the  voice  of 
conscience  is  heard  saying,  Thou  shalt  not  do  wrong;  thon 
shalt  do  right. 


Chapter  XIII 
GREEN'S   "PROLEGOMENA  TO    ETHICS" 

THOMAS  H.  GREEN  (1836-1882). —  Professor 
Green,  of  Oxford,  England,  in  his  "Prolegomena 
to  Ethics,"  made  a  profound  impression  on  the  ethical 
writers  of  his  time.  He  endeavored  to  find  for  ethics 
an  independent  philosophical  justification,  not  based 
either  on  dogmatic  theology  or  on  natural  science. 

Green  found  the  ultimate  end  of  moral  conduct  in 
self-realisation — that  is,  the  realization,  in  actual  experi- 
ence, of  the  normal  possibilities  of  human  nature,  with 
their  attendant  satisfactions.  He  distinguished  sharply 
between  self-realization  and  pleasure,  and  held  that  what 
one  really  seeks  is  self-realization,  and  not  pleasure. 
Elsewhere  he  says,  "Self-satisfaction  is  what  one  seeks." 
Yet  evidently  self-satisfaction  is  not  identical  with  self- 
realization,  but  is  a  result  of  it,  and  that  only  if  self  be 
realized  as  worthy.  Self-realization  would  not  be 
sought,  but  rather  avoided,  if  it  afforded  dissatisfaction, 
which  would  be  the  case  if  self  were  found  unworthy. 
It  is  not,  therefore,  self-realization  as  such  that  we  seek, 
but  such  self-realization  in  the  exercise  of  our  powers 
that  yields  self-satisfaction,  and  because  it  yields  self- 
satisfaction,  or  ultimately,  it  is  self-satisfaction.  Is  not 
this  self-satisfaction  what  Mill  calls  higher  pleasure?  It 

330 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  331 

is  not  sensation;  it  is  not  hedonic  pleasure;  it  is  the  en- 
joyment of  the  consciousness  of  self-worthiness. 

Green  objects  to  the  consideration  of  the  quality  of 
pleasure,  and  holds  that  on  utilitarian  grounds  one  pleas- 
ure is  better  than  another,  only  because  it  is  greater  in 
quantity.  He  says:  "It  is  altogether  against  utilitarian 
principles  that  one  pleasure  should  be  of  more  value 
than  another,  because  the  man  who  pursues  it  is  better." 
One  pleasure  is  of  more  value  than  another,  though 
equal  in  degree,  since  the  pleasure  is  better,  because 
more  worthy  of  the  man.  Granting  that  two  pleasures 
of  equal  quantity  are  not  immoral,  and  that  either  may 
be  legitimately  chosen,  but  that  one  exerts  on  the  man 
a  more  elevating  influence  than  the  other,  is  it  not  a 
higher  pleasure,  and  is  it  not  to  be  preferred?  Green 
admits  that  this  is  valid  reasoning,  if  self-realization,  and 
not  pleasure,  is  the  end  of  action;  but  we  have  seen  that 
self-realization  is  the  end  of  action,  only  when  yielding 
self-satisfaction.  Self-realization,  when  painful,  or  sim- 
ply not  pleasant,  is  not  sought.  It  is  sought  only  when 
enjoyable  and  because  of  the  enjoyment;  that  is,  it  is 
the  self-satisfaction  resulting  from '  worthiness  that  is 
sought.  It  is  clear  that  satisfaction  is  the  end,  and  that 
personal  worth  is  the  means  to  the  end.  If  self  is  worthy, 
self-realization  with  its  attending  satisfaction  may  be 
regarded  the  end  of  action. 

If  now  it  be  asked  whether  people  do  not  often  pur- 
sue a  course  which  because  of  demerit  affords  self-dis- 
satisfaction, it  must  be  confessed  that  they  do;  but  they 
do  not  pursue  that  course  for  the  sake  of  the  demerit 
or  dissatisfaction,  but  for  the  sake  of  some  hedonic 
pleasure  or  lower  gratification.  The  ethical  requirement 


332  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

is,  that  they  choose  personal  worthiness,  the  motive  for 
which  is  self-satisfaction,  or  pure  enjoyment.  The 
higher  end  ought  to  be  chosen  in  preference  to  the  lower, 
because  it  yields  better  results. 

It  is  now  clear  that  self-realization  alone,  as  such, 
can  not  be  the  proper  end;  for  self-realization  may  be 
brought  about  through  demerit  as  well  as  through 
merit;  the  way  to  self-realization  divides  into  two 
branches — one  way  of  attaining  it,  the  way  of  merit, 
is  right,  since  it  reveals  a  worthy  self,  worthy  because 
choosing  the  right;  and  the  other  way,  the  way  of  de- 
merit, wrong,  since  it  reveals  an  unworthy  self,  un- 
worthy because  choosing  the  wrong  in  preference  to 
the  right. 

Realization  of  a  worthy  self  is  found,  as  Green  says, 
in  "some  perfection  which  is  to  be  attained,  some  voca- 
tion which  is  to  be  fulfilled,  some  law  which  is  to  be 
obeyed,  something  absolutely  desirable,  whatever  the 
individual  may  for  the  time  desire." 

Realization  of  a  guilty  self  affords  self-dissatisfac- 
tion; its  language  is: 

"Had  I  but  died  an  hour  before  this  chance, 
I  had  lived  a  blessed  time ;  for,  from  this  instant, 
There 's  nothing  serious  in  mortality ; 
All  is  but  toys:  renown,  and  grace,  is  dead; 
The  wine  of  life  is  drawn,  and  the  mere  lees 
Is  left." 

Practically,  it  is  best  to  keep  the  satisfaction  out  of 
view,  and  to  make  the  ideal  of  personal  worth  the  penul- 
timate end  of  our  aim — an  ideal  still  in  advance — "not 
as  though  I  had  already  attained,  either  were  already 


HISTORY    OF   ETHICS  333 

perfect."  Dwelling  on  our  excellencies  begets  spiritual 
pride,  and  that  is  odious  in  the  sight  of  God  and  man. 
It  is  true  that  man  is  the  image  of  God,  and  exists  in 
him  and  for  him.  So  far  as  possible  man's  aim  should 
be  to  realize  the  divine  ideal;  for  God  is  the  being  "with 
whom  we  are  in  principle  one;  with  whom  the  human 
spirit  is  identical  in  the  sense  that  in  excellence  he  is  all 
which  the  human  spirit  is  capable  of  becoming."  God 
is,  in  fact,  the  spiritual  principle  in  nature  and  in  knowl- 
edge. It  is  Green's  merit  to  emphasize  this  fact. 

A  perfect  development  is  possible  only  in  common 
with  our  fellow-beings.  The  notion  of  a  common  good 
is  more  than  a  gregarious  instinct,  as  in  brutes;  it  de- 
sires, not  only  to  be  with  others,  but  to  do  them  good. 
It  has  a  distinctive  altruistic  character,  which  is  as  much 
an  original  element  of  our  nature  as  the  egoistic  in- 
stinct. It  is  the  good  of  others  that  we  seek  and  enjoy; 
and  this  very  fact  is  a  witness  to  our  own  goodness.  If 
we  did  not  enjoy  the  good  of  others,  we  would  not 
only  not  seek  it,  but  we  would  not  be  good.  The  true 
ethical  procedure  is,  therefore,  to  seek  directly  the  good 
of  others;  and  in  so  doing  we  reap  our  reward.  For 
ourselves,  we  should  aim  at  perfection  rather  than  at 
happiness.  Of  course,  we  know  that  personal  worthi- 
ness is  the  surest  road  to  happiness;  but  this  fact  need 
not  be  kept  constantly  in  mind.  The  common  inter- 
ests are  our  interests;  the  common  good  is  our  good. 
The  two  are  joined  in  ethical  wedlock;  and  "What  God 
hath  joined  together,  let  no  man  put  asunder." 

If  we  know  that  our  own  good  is  secured  by  pro- 
moting the  good  of  others,  it  may  be  asked,  Is  not  our 
object  in  promoting  the  good  of  others  to  secure  our 


334  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

own?  It  may  be  so,  and  doubtless  sometimes  is  so;  but 
then  the  richness  of  the  reward  is  lost.  Yet  the  pro- 
ceeding is  not  immoral.  In  seeking  the  common  good, 
we  are,  if  enlightened,  conscious  of  the  truth  that  our 
own  good  is  involved.  It  is  best,  however,  to  with- 
draw, for  the  time,  our  thoughts  from  that  feature,  and 
let  that  consideration  sink  into  an  indistinct  vagueness, 
approaching  the  vanishing  limit,  while  the  good  of  oth- 
ers is  made  vivid,  and  is  pursued  with  ardor.  Herein 
is  our  reward.  It  comes  unsought,  and  perhaps  unex- 
pected, giving  it  a  value  which  we  more  highly  appre- 
ciate and  enjoy. 

Green  thus  presents  his  doctrine  of  the  will :  "A  man, 
we  will  suppose,  is  acted  on,  at  once,  by  an  impulse  to 
avenge  an  affront,  by  a  bodily  want,  by  a  call  of  duty, 
and  by  fear  of  certain  results  incidental  to  his  aveng- 
ing the  affront  or  obeying  the  call  of  duty,  each  passion 
suggesting  a  different  line  of  action.  So  long  as  he  is 
undecided  how  to  act,  no  moral  effect  ensues.  It  en- 
sues when  the  man's  relation  to  these  influences  is  altered 
by  his  identifying  himself  with  one  of  them,  by  his  tak- 
ing the  object  of  one  of  these  tendencies,  for  the  time, 
as  his  good.  This  is  to  will,  and  is,  in  itself,  a  moral 
action,  though  circumstances  may  prevent  its  issuing 
in  that  sensible  effect  which  we  call  an  overt  act.  .  .  . 
Whether  its  object — the  action  to  which  the  moral  act 
is  directed — be  the  attainment  of  revenge,  or  the  satis- 
faction of  a  bodily  want,  or  the  fulfillment  of  a  call  of 
duty,  it  has  equally  this  characteristic,  the  object  is  one 
with  which  the  man  identifies  himself,  so  that,  in  being 
determined  by  it,  he  is  consciously  determined  by  him- 
self." 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  335 

Green  makes  responsibility  come  in  when  a  man 
identifies  himself  with  the  desire.  This  is  choice,  or  vo- 
lition, or  decision,  which  the  man  freely  makes  for  him- 
self. The  preceding  desire  is  not  choice;  it  is  a  solici- 
tation, a  craving  of  the  sensibility.  The  choice  is  an 
act  of  will  made  by  the  man  himself.  The  person  makes 
the  choice,  and,  if  wise,  he  will  make  a  right  choice, 
in  view  of  reasonable  motives,  which  are  not  causes 
compelling  action,  but  reasons  for  volition. 

Again,  Green  says:  "An  act  is  an  effort  by  which 
a  self-conscious  individual  directs  himself  to  the  reali- 
zation of  some  idea  as  to  an  object  in  which,  for  the 
time,  he  seeks  self-satisfaction."  Here  Green  makes, 
not  self-realization,  but  self-satisfaction,  the  end.  Again : 
"Self-satisfaction  is  the  form  of  every  object  willed; 
but  the  filling  of  that  form,  the  character  of  that  in 
which  self-satisfaction  is  sought,  ranging  from  sensual 
pleasure  to  the  fulfillment  of  a  vocation  conceived  as 
given  by  God,  makes  the  object  really  what  it  is.  It  is 
on  the  specific  difference  of  the  object  willed,  under  the 
general  form  of  self-satisfaction,  that  the  quality  of  the 
will  must  depend.  It  is  here,  therefore,  that  we  must 
look  for  the  basis  of  distinction  between  goodness  and 
badness  of  will."  A  good  will  seeks  a  good  object,  and 
a  bad  will  a  bad  object. 

Again:  "When  the  idea  of  which  the  realization  is 
sought  is  not  that  of  enjoying  any  pleasure,  the  fact  that 
the  self-satisfaction  is  sought  in  the  effort  to  realize  the 
idea  of  the  desired  object  does  not  make  pleasure  the 
object  of  desire.  It  may  very  well  be  that  a  man  pur- 
sues an  object  in  which  he  seeks  self-satisfaction  with 
the  clear  consciousness  that  no  enjoyment  of  pleasure 


336  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

can  yield  him  satisfaction,  and  that  there  must  be  such 
pain  in  the  realization  of  the  idea  to  which  he  devotes 
himself,  as  can  not  be  compensated  in  any  scale  where 
pleasure  and  pain  alone  are  weighed  by  any  enjoyment 
of  an  end  achieved.  So  it  is  in  the  more  heroic  form 
of  self-sacrifice.  Self-satisfaction  is  doubtless  sought 
in  such  sacrifice.  The  man  who  faces  a  life  of  suffering 
in  the  fulfillment  of  what  he  conceives  to  be  his  mission 
could  not  bear  to  do  otherwise.  So  to  live  is  his  good." 
It  is  not  sensational  pleasure  he  seeks,  but  the  accom- 
plishment of  a  worthy  purpose  in  which  he  finds  his 
satisfaction. 

In  speaking  of  Mill's  theory,  Green  says:  "Every 
one  must  feel  that  the  utilitarian  theory  receives  a  cer- 
tain exaltation  from  his  treatment  of  it."  That  is,  by 
making  a  distinction  in  the  quality  of  pleasures,  Mill 
elevates  utilitarianism.  But  Green  goes  on  to  say :  "Just 
so  far  as  cool  self-love,  in  the  sense  of  a  calculating 
pursuit  of  pleasure,  becomes  dominant,  and  supersedes 
particular  interests,  the  chances  of  pleasure  are  really 
lost,  which  accounts  for  the  restlessness  of  the  pleasure- 
seeker  and  for  the  common  remark  that  the  right  way 
to  get  pleasure  is  not  to  seek  it."  The  right  aim  is  to 
be  worthy.  The  consciousness  of  worthiness  is  the 
highest  satisfaction.  "If,  then,  the  presentation  of  vir- 
tue, as  an  ultimate  object,  and  not  merely  as  a  means, 
does  determine  desire,  there  are  desires  which  are  not 
excited  by  anticipations  of  pleasure."  That  is  true 
of  sensational  pleasure.  The  attainment  of  virtue  af- 
fords satisfaction.  If  it  did  not,  virtue  would  not  be  an 
object  of  desire.  This  satisfaction  Mill  calls  higher 
pleasure.  If  the  word  "pleasure"  is  to  be  restricted  to 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  337 

agreeable  sensations,  then  Green's  criticism  is  just;  but 
Mill  extends  its  application  to  the  higher  form  of  happi- 
ness. 

A  lower  and  a  higher  motive  sometimes  conflict, 
and  a  man,  knowing  that  he  should  choose  the  higher, 
prefers  the  lower.  His  will  does  not  harmonize  with 
his  reason;  in  choosing  the  lower  motive,  he  misses  the 
higher  good.  "Unless  a  man  could  think  of  himself 
as  capable  of  governing  his  actions  by  the  consideration 
of  his  desires,  some  should,  while  others  should  not,  be 
gratified,  the  distinction  of  praiseworthy  and  blame- 
worthy would  be  unmeaning  to  him." 

Green  objects  to  pleasure  as  the  good  on  account 
of  its  fleeting  character.  He  says:  "Could  a  person, 
while  reflecting  on  himself,  so  far  as  to  conceive  the 
need  of  a  lasting  good,  fail  to  reflect  also  on  the  fleet- 
ing nature  of  the  pleasures  of  which  he  contemplates  the 
succession?"  Pleasure  may  not  be  the  good,  but  it  is 
a  good.  The  fact  that  pleasures  are  fleeting  and  suc- 
cessive does  not  detract  from  their  value.  In  this  way 
richness  and  variety  are  secured,  and  the  ennui  of  mo- 
notony avoided.  Does  it  detract  from  the  value  of 
a  panorama  or  the  interest  that  we  take  in  it,  because 
the  scenes  pass,  one  by  one,  each  succeeded  by  another? 
To  some  extent,  the  same  is  true  of  the  highest  good — 
a  consciousnss  of  personal  worth.  Though  personal 
worth  ought  always  to  abide,  yet  we  do  not  wish  to  be 
forever  making  it  an  object  of  contemplation. 

The  fullness,  the  variety,  the  unceasing  change  of 
our  thoughts,  feelings,  and  volitions,  for  a  single  day, 
is  a  more  marvelous  panorama  than  any  ever  painted 

on  canvas. 
22 


338  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

We  ought  not  to  be  satisfied  with  the  pleasures  of 
sensation,  which  satisfy  the  brute,  nor  say  with  Pope, 

"Reason's  whole  pleasure,  all  the  joys  of  sense, 
Lie  in  three  words:  Health,  peace,  and  competence." 

We  find  a  higher  enjoyment  than  pleasure  in  the 
satisfaction  taken  in  our  own  success  or  in  the  success 
of  our  friends,  in  possessions,  attainments,  achieve- 
ments, in  the  deserved  good  opinion  of  our  fellows,  in 
the  contemplation  of  the  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the 
good. 

What,  then,  should  be  sought?  The  highest  moral 
character,  a  thoroughly  trained  intellect,  and  good 
health,  as  subjective  conditions;  then,  as  objective  con- 
ditions, a  competence  of  wealth,  satisfactory  social  rela- 
tions, and,  above  all,  a  oneness  with  God  and  co-opera- 
tion with  him  in  the  great  work  of  lifting  humanity  to 
the  high  plane  of  righteousness.  So  much  for  the 
preparation,  and  now  for  action.  In  moral  effort  we 
are  to  consider  not  only  the  immediate  end,  but  so  far 
as  we  can  the  remote  consequences;  then  scan  the  mo- 
tives, make  a  right  decision,  direct  the  aim,  execute  the 
act  with  energy  and  skill.  In  doing  this  we  attain  the 
ultimate  good,  and  may  call  it,  with  Green,  self-realiza- 
tion, in  actual  experience,  of  the  normal  possibilities  of  hu- 
man nature,  with  their  attendant  satisfactions. 


Chapter  XIV 
MODERN   ETHICS.— OTHER   MORALISTS 

T)ENJAMIN  FRANKLIN  (1706-1790).— Perhaps  no 
-LJ  attempt  to  reach  moral  perfection  has  ever  sur- 
passed that  made  by  Benjamin  Franklin.  He  says:  "I 
wished  to  live  without  committing  any  fault  at  any  time, 
and  to  conquer  all  that  either  natural  inclination,  cus- 
tom, or  company  might  lead  me  into.  As  I  knew,  or 
thought  I  knew,  what  was  right  and  wrong,  I  did  not 
see  why  I  might  not  always  do  the  one,  and  avoid  the 
other.  But  I  soon  found  I  had  undertaken  a  task  more 
difficult  than  I  had  imagined.  While  my  attention  was 
taken  up,  and  care  employed  in  guarding  against  one 
fault,  I  was  often  surprised  by  another;  habit  took  the 
advantage  of  inattention;  inclination  was  sometimes  too 
strong  for  reason." 

The  intensely  practical  turn  of  Franklin's  mind  is 
seen,  not  only  in  desiring  to  make  ideal  perfection  actual, 
but  in  the  plan  whereby  he  attempted  to  realize  his  ideal. 
He  says:  "I  concluded  at  length  that  mere  speculative 
conviction  that  it  was  our  interest  to  be  completely  vir- 
tuous was  not  sufficient  to  prevent  our  slipping;  and 
that  the  contrary  habits  must  be  broken,  and  good  ones 
acquired  and  established  before  we  can  have  any  depend- 
ence on  a  steady  uniform  rectitude  of  conduct.  For  this 
purpose  I  therefore  tried  the  following  method/* 

339 


340  SYSTEMS    OF    KTTTICS 

Franklin  gives  the  following  list  of  virtues  with  their 
precepts : 

(1)  Temperance. — Eat  not  to  dullness;  drink  not  to 
elevation. 

(2)  Silence. — Speak  not  but  what  may  benefit  others 
or  yourself;  avoid  trifling  conversation. 

(3)  Order. — Let  all  your  things  have  their  places; 
let  each  part  of  your  business  have  its  time. 

(4)  Resolution. — Resolve     to     perform     what     you 
ought;  perform  without  fail  what  you  resolve. 

($)  Frugality. — Make  no  expense  but  to  do  good 
to  others  or  yourself;  that  is,  waste  nothing. 

(6)  Industry. — Lose  no  time;  be  always  employed 
in  something  useful;  cut  off  all  unnecessary  actions. 

(7)  Sincerity. — Use  no  hurtful  deceit;  think  inno- 
cently and  justly;  and  if  you  speak,  speak  accordingly. 

(8)  Justice. — Wrong    none    by    doing    injuries,    or 
omitting  the  benefits  that  are  your  duty. 

(9)  Moderation. — Avoid   extremes;   forbear   resent- 
ing injuries  so  much  as  you  think  they  deserve. 

(10)  Cleanliness.  —  Tolerate    no    uncleanliness     in 
body,  clothes,  or  habitation. 

(n)  Tranquillity. — Be  not  disturbed  at  trifles  or  at 
accidents  common  or  unavoidable. 

(12)  Chastity.  .  .  . 

(13)  Humility. — Imitate  Jesus  and  Socrates. 

Of  his  plan  of  acquiring  all  these  virtues,  he  says: 
"My  intention  being  to  acquire  the  habitude  of  all  these 
virtues,  I  judged  it  would  be  well  not  to  distract  my 
attention  by  attempting  the  whole  at  once,  but  to  fix 
it  on  one  of  them  at  a  time;  and  when  I  had  mastered 
that,  then  to  proceed  to  another." 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  34! 

Franklin  kept  a  book  account  of  his  progress.  He 
says:  "Though  I  never  arrived  at  the  perfection  I  had 
been  so  ambitions  of  obtaining,  but  fell  far  short  of  it, 
yet  I  was  by  the  endeavor  a  better  and  a  happier  man." 

2.  George  Combe  (1788-1858). — Combe  was  the  first 
advocate  in  Great  Britain  of  the  phrenological  doctrines 
of  Gall  and  Spurzheim.  The  work  by  which  he  is  best 
known  is  entitled  "The  Constitution  of  Man  Considered 
in  Relation  to  External  Objects." 

Combe  was  a  highly  gifted  man.  His  writings  are 
attractive  in  style  and  elevated  in  thought.  As  a  phi- 
lanthropist, he  took  great  interest  in  education  and  in 
the  treatment  of  the  criminal  classes.  The  doctrines 
which  he  advocated,  though  unpopular  at  the  time,  have 
become  to  be  more  favorably  regarded. 

His  "Moral  Philosophy"  was  published  in  1840.  His 
fundamental  principle  is,  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  at 
once  independent  and  harmonious,  and  that  man  best 
fulfills  God's  will  and  subserves  his  own  interest  by  dis- 
covering the  laws  of  nature  and  those  relating  to  man — 
the  physical,  the  intellectual,  and  the  moral — and  by 
conducting  himself  in  harmony  with  their  requirements. 
If  an  unseaworthy  vessel,  old  and  leaky,  should  put  to 
sea,  the  passengers  would  probably  not  be  saved  from 
the  natural  consequences,  though  some  of  them  were 
missionaries  to  a  foreign  land.  Whatever  law  we  obey, 
we  receive  the  reward  of  that  obedience;  whatever  law 
we  violate,  we  receive  the  penalty  of  that  violation. 
Combe  argued  against  the  injustice  of  punishing  one 
as  an  example  to  deter  others  from  crime. 

j.  Francis  Wayland  (1796-1865). — Wayland  defines 
ethics  thus:  "Ethics,  or  moral  philosophy,  is  the  science 


342  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

of  moral  law."  What  is  law?  Wayland  says:  "Law  is 
a  form  of  expression  denoting  either  a  mode  of  exist- 
ence or  an  order  of  sequence.  ...  A  moral  law  is, 
therefore,  a  form  of  expression  denoting  an  order  of 
sequence  established  between  the  moral  quality  of 
actions  and  their  results."  Does  Wayland  mean  by 
"a  form  of  expression"  the  language  expressing  the 
law?  If  so,  there  would  be  no  law  till  the  expression 
was  formed;  if  not,  it  would  be  better  to  say,  A  moral 
law  is  the  order  of  sequence.  The  law  of  falling  bodies 
existed  before  it  was  discovered  and  formulated.  The 
laws  of  nature  existed  before  they  were  discovered  and 
stated  by  men  of  science. 

Wayland  lays  emphasis  on  the  word  established,  and 
hence  concludes  that  an  order  of  sequence  established 
supposes  an  establisher.  His  ethics  is  therefore  theistic, 
and  as  seen  in  the  sequel,  Christian. 

What  is  moral  action?  Wayland  says :  "It  is  a  volun- 
tary action  of  an  intelligent  agent  who  is  capable  of  dis- 
tinguishing between  right  and  wrong,  or  of  distinguish- 
ing what  he  ought  from  what  he  ought  not  to  do."  Is 
every  voluntary  act  of  such  a  being  moral?  A  moral 
being  may  perform  actions  morally  indifferent,  as 
whether  one  goes  to  town  on  horseback  or  in  a  buggy. 
It  would  be  better  to  say,  A  moral  action  is  the  voluntary 
action  of  an  intelligent  being,  performed  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  it  is  right  or  wrong.  Wayland  says,  "The  right 
or  wrong  of  an  action  exists  in  the  intention." 

Wayland  asks  the  question,  "Whence  do  we  derive 
our  notion  of  the  moral  quality  of  action?  ...  I  think 
it  is  not  proved  that  an  action  is  right  because  it  is  pro- 
ductive of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness.  It  may  be 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  343 

so,  or  it  may  not,  but  we  ought  not  to  believe  it  without 
proof."  What  is  the  force  of  the  words  ought  not  in  the 
above  sentence?  Wayland  goes  on  to  say:  "To  me  the 
Scriptures  seem  explicitly  to  declare  that  the  will  of 
God  alone  is  sufficient  to  create  the  obligation  to  obedi- 
ence in  all  his  creatures,  and  that  this  will  precludes 
every  other  inquiry."  God's  will  is  undoubtedly  always 
right,  and  a  knowledge  of  his  will  is  a  guide  to  conduct; 
but  there  is  a  reason  for  God's  will,  and  it  is  not  un- 
reasonable to  believe  that  the  reason  is  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness,  and  Wayland  was  not  warranted 
in  saying,  "We  ought  not  to  believe  it  to  be  so  without 
proof."  What  of  those  who  through  all  the  ages  have 
neither  had  the  Scriptures  nor  known  the  will  of  God? 

Wayland  discusses  the  nature,  function,  and  author- 
ity of  conscience,  and  the  law  by  which  it  is  governed; 
he  gives  rules  for  moral  conduct,  treats  of  virtues  in 
imperfect  beings,  discourses  on  happiness,  self-love,  the 
necessity  of  enlightening  the  conscience,  treats  of  natu- 
ral religion  and  its  relation  to  revealed  religion,  and 
argues  for  the  authenticity  of  the  Holy  Scriptures. 

Under  Practical  Ethics,  Wayland  treats  of  our  obli- 
gations to  God  and  to  man;  he  maintains  that  in  the 
relation  of  things,  as  God  has  constituted  them,  is  found 
the  rule  of  duty,  as  in  the  relation  of  parent  and  child, 
the  benefactor  and  the  beneficiary,  the  Creator  and  the 
creature.  To  know  these  relations  is  to  know  the  will 
of  God  and  our  duty. 

4.  Laurens  P.  Hickok  (1798-1888). — Hickok  classes 
the  theories  relating  to  the  rule  of  right  as  objective  and 
subjective.  Under  objective  theories  he  includes  the  au- 
thority of  the  State,  the  revealed  will  of  God,  the  in- 


344  SYSTEMS   OF   ETTITCS 

herent  nature  of  things,  and  the  highest  happiness. 
Under  subjective  theories  he  places  self-satisfaction, 
mutual  sympathy,  conscience,  or  the  inner  sense  of  right 
and  wrong,  and  immediate  intuition. 

The  rule  of  right  is  to  aim  at  the  good.  "We  find 
two  distinct  kinds  of  good — one  as  it  ministers  to  animal 
gratification,  the  other  as  it  fills  the  sentiment  of  reason. 
One  good  is  a  means  to  be  used  for  an  end,  and  is  thus  a 
utility;  the  other  good  is  an  end  in  itself,  and  not  ad- 
mitting of  use  to  any  further  end  is  thus  a  dignity." 
What  gratifies  the  animal  nature  is,  of  course,  a  means; 
the  gratification  is  an  end,  yet  certainly  not  the  highest 
end.  What  fills  the  sentiment  of  reason,  which  Hickok 
calls  a  dignity,  is  also  a  means;  it  gives  satisfaction, 
which  is  the  end. 

Of  rational  good,  Hickok  considers  the  gratification 
of  the  taste  for  the  beautiful,  the  satisfaction  from  the 
cultivation  of  science,  the  imperatives  of  the  spirit's  own 
excellence,  and  concludes  that  "the  highest  good — the 
summwi  bonnm — is  worthiness  of  spiritual  approbation." 
This  is  the  proximate  form  of  the  highest  good,  and  is 
that  which  should  be  sought  after,  the  ultimate  form 
is  the  self-satisfaction  from  a  consciousness  of  personal 
worthiness.  If  personal  worthiness  did  not  involve  satis- 
faction, it  would  not  be  an  object  of  desire. 

Hickok  maintains  that  the  essential  attributes  of  the 
ultimate  right  are  simple,  immutable,  universal;  that 
rights  never  conflict;  that  only  a  person  can  have  rights; 
that  right  in  mathematics  and  right  in  morals  are  not 
identical,  but  analagous;  that  the  will  is  free  when  it 
keeps  in  subjection  every  colliding  appetite;  that  the 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  345 

will  is  enslaved  when  it  makes  the  gratification  of  the 
appetite  the  ultimate  end;  that  the  moral  disposition  is 
indicated  by  the  choice,  according  as  it  decides  for  ani- 
mal gratification  or  for  spiritual  worthiness. 

Hickok  shows  that  pure  morality  involves  pure 
mindedness,  decision,  and  independence;  that  duties  are 
personal  when  relating  to  self-control  and  self-culture, 
or  relative  when  including  kindness  and  respect  for 
others,  and  that  we  owe  duties  to  nature  and  to  God. 
Hickok's  ethics  revised  by  President  Seelye  is  an  ex- 
cellent book. 

5.  Mark  Hopkins  (1802-1887).*— Hopkins  makes 
Love,  or  Benevolence,  the  fundamental  principle  of  ethics, 
as  the  title  of  his  book,  "The  Law  of  Love  and  Love  as 
Law,"  definitely  signifies. 

He  thus  accounts  for  the  different  systems  of  ethics : 
"A  striking  fact,  as  association,  or  a  powerful  principle, 
as  self-love,  is  seized  upon  and  made  to  account  for 
everything."  Again:  "The  moral  problem  is  made  by 
some  an  inquiry  concerning  the  moral  nature;  by  some, 
concerning  the  nature  of  virtue;  by  some,  concerning 
the  source  and  nature  of  right;  by  some,  after  an  ulti- 
mate rule;  and  by  some,  the  nature  and  foundation  or 
ground  of  obligation.  This  last  I  think  preferable." 

Hopkins  contends  that  it  is  impossible  to  construct 
a  complete  ethical  system  "that  is  wholly  intuitional  or 
wholly  teleological.  Intuitional  systems  have  their  basis 
in  the  moral  reason;  teleological  systems  have  their  basis 
in  the  sensibility;  it  is  clear  that  the  ideas  from  each 
must  be  inseparably  intertwined  in  every  system." 

Again,  Hopkins  holds  that  we  find  the  good  in  the 


346  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

sensibility,  and  goodness  in  the  will.  "Nothing  that  pro- 
ceeds from  the  sensibility  can  be  goodness;  nothing  that 
proceeds  from  the  will  can  be  a  good.''  It  requires  both 
to  form  a  moral  system;  neither  alone  is  sufficient.  "It 
has  been  supposed  that  either  goodness  or  a  good — holi- 
ness or  happiness — must  be  ultimate  in  a  moral  system. 
The  truth  is,  each  is  ultimate.  Goodness  is  wholly  from 
the  will,  and  is  ultimate  for  that.  A  good  is  wholly  from 
the  sensibility,  and  is  ultimate  for  that."  But  goodness 
consists  in  willing  to  do  right,  which  issues  in  the  good — 
the  satisfaction  in  the  consciousness  of  rectitude.  With- 
out the  good  there  can  be  no  goodness,  and  without  an 
act  of  goodness  the  highest  good  can  never  be  realized. 
Virtue  is  found  in  the  goodness,  not  in  the  good;  and 
it  is  with  virtue  that  ethics  is  chiefly  concerned.  The 
ultimate  for  ethics  is  goodness;  the  end  of  goodness 
is  the  good. 

The  controversy  between  Hopkins  and  McCosh  on 
the  ground  of  obligation,  as  printed  in  the  Appendix  of 
the  "Law  of  Love,"  is  a  matter  of  no  small  interest.  Its 
reading  is  to  be  recommended. 

6.  James  H.  Fairchild  (1817 ). — Fairchild  de- 
fines moral  philosophy  as  the  science  of  obligation.  The 
meaning  of  the  term  obligation  is  illustrated  by  the  syno- 
nyms, ought,  duty,  right.  "A  moral  being  is  a  being  to 
whom  obligation  pertains."  The  attributes  of  moral 
agency  are  intellect,  sensibility,  and  free-will. 

Fairchild  distinguishes  good  as  absolute  and  relative. 
Relative  good  is,  however,  better  termed  utility.  "Well- 
being,  satisfaction,  happiness,  then,  is  the  true  good— 
the  summiim  bonum" 

Fairchild  makes  benevolence  the  cardinal  virtue,  or 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  347 

rather  all  the  virtues  to  be  only  special  modification  of 
the  one  virtue — benevolence.  In  this  respect  he  is  in 
accord  with  Hopkins. 

He  insists  on  the  simplicity  of  moral  action,  by  which 
is  meant  that  virtue  and  sin  can  not  coexist  in  the  same 
heart;  but  where,  as  in  many  instances,  good  and  bad 
conduct  follow  in  quick  succession,  does  not  this  doc- 
trine involve  an  incredibly  rapid  change,  back  and  forth, 
of  the  moral  character? 

The  practical  duties  are  well  treated.  It  is  indeed 
true,  that  whatever  theory  of  morals  is  adopted,  ethical 
writers  are  one  in  regard  to  the  duty  of  practical 
morality. 

7.  D.    S.    Gregory    (1832 ). — Gregory    defines 

ethics  as  the  science  of  man's  life  of  duty.     In  his  work 
entitled  "Christian  Ethics,"  he  takes  the  position  that 
"the  will  of  God,  as  the  expression  of  his  perfect  char- 
acter, is  the  ultimate  ground  or  reason  why  the  require- 
ments of  the  supreme  rule  are  right  and  binding." 

Gregory's  system  is  therefore  hetcronomous  or  author- 
itative, as  the  ultimate  is  not  human  reason,  but  the  will 
of  God;  but  as  Gregory  holds,  the  will  of  God  may  be 
inferred,  not  only  from  the  Sacred  Scriptures,  but  also 
from  the  constitution  of  nature  and  of  man,  as  seen  by 
the  light  of  reason. 

Gregory  divides  ethics  into  theoretical  and  practical, 
and  has  made  a  minute  classification  of  his  work.  In 
fact,  he  has  carried  out  his  divisions  and  subdivisions  to 
such  an  extent  that  the  reader  becomes  bewildered.  His 
book,  however,  is  both  able  and  wholesome,  and  will  well 
reward  the  perusal. 

8.  John  Basconi  (1827-  -     — ). — Bascom  defines  ethics 


348  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

as  the  science  of  duty;  duty  the  law  of  conduct;  and  con- 
duct the  action  of  a  rational  being,  springing  from  char- 
acter on  which  it  reacts,  and  which  it  thus  modifies,  de- 
velops, and  establishes. 

Bascom  discusses  the  relative  merits  of  utilitarianism 
and  intuitionism,  and  decides  in  favor  of  the  latter. 
He  maintains  the  superiority  of  intuitionism  for  these 
reasons:  That  it  gives  clearness  and  distinctness  to  the 
sense  of  obligation;  that  it  solves  the  riddles  which  beset 
utilitarianism;  that  it  furnishes  an  earlier  and  more 
authoritative  law;  that  it  affords  more  favorable  con- 
ditions for  growth;  that  it  better  combines  theory  and 
practice;  that  it  adopts,  for  practical  guidance,  the  veri- 
fied principles  of  utility,  uniting  them  in  a  coherent 
theory  under  the  guidance  of  reason;  that  it  assigns  a 
higher  principle  of  integrity  to  the  individual;  that  it 
makes  the  sense  of  obligation  inherent  in  human  nature; 
that  it  raises  the  meaning  of  the  expressions,  right,  duty, 
obligation,  righteousness,  holiness,  from  the  plane  of 
prudential  calculation  to  that  of  rational  intuition,  where 
the  voice  of  reason  is  in  harmony  with  the  voice  of  God. 
These  are  extensive  claims  for  intuitionism.  But  all 
these  things  are  for  the  sake  of  the  individual,  that  he 
may  enjoy  the  satisfaction  that  comes  as  the  reward  of  a 
righteous  life. 

Bascom's  treatment  of  ethics  can  not  be  regarded  as 
complete,  since  he  considers  only  the  two  systems— 
utilitarianism  and  intuitionism,  ignoring  theistic,  evo- 
lutionary, and  eclectic  ethics. 

9.  Archibald  Alexander  (1772-1851).  —  Alexander 
holds  that  conscience  intuitively  perceives  that  some 
actions  are  right  and  others  wrong;  that  the  moral  fac- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  349 

ulty  is  original  and  universal;  and  that  moral  ideas  can 
be  derived  from  no  other  source. 

He  thus  objects  to  utilitarianism :  "Virtuous  conduct 
leads  to  happiness,  and  is  always  beneficial,  yet  our  idea 
of  its  moral  character  is  not  derived  from  this  consider- 
ation, but  from  the  nature  of  the  action  itself." 

The  objection  to  intuitionism,  that  there  is  no  agree- 
ment between  different  nations  as  to  what  is  moral  or 
immoral,  he  answers  by  saying:  "Moral  differences  are 
perceived  by  all,  and  total  disagreement  is  not  found. 
All  think  the  will  of  God  ought  to  be  done,  but  some, 
in  killing  children  or  in  burning  widows,  are  mistaken 
as  to  his  will." 


Chapter  XV 
MODERN  ETHICS— OTHER  MORALISTS- 

CONTINUED 

TJENRY  CALDERWOOD.—ln  his  "Moral  Philos- 
JL- Z  ophy,"  Calderwood  "offers  an  exposition  and  de- 
fense of  the  intuitional  theory  of  morals,  with  a  criticism 
of  utilitarianism." 

He  discusses  the  intuitional  and  development  the- 
ories of  knowledge;  the  impulses  and  restraints  belong- 
ing to  the  nature  of  man;  the  nature  of  the  will;  the 
moral  sentiments;  the  disorders  of  man's  moral  nature; 
the  metaphysics  of  ethics;  and  the  application  of  ethics 
to  the  practical  problems  of  society.  Calderwood's  work 
is  able  and  worthy  of  study. 

2.  John  Stuart  Blackie  (1809-1895). — In  his  book,  en- 
titled "Four  Phases  of  Morals,"  Blackie  discusses  the 
ethics  of  Socrates,  Aristotle,  Christianity,  and  utilita- 
rianism. 

(i)  Socrates  is  considered,  next  to  the  Founder  of 
Christianity,  as  the  preacher  of  righteousness.  The  main 
difference  between  Socrates  and  the  sophists  was  that 
he  was  positive  and  constructive,  and  they  negative  and 
destructive.  The  aim  of  Socrates,  says  Blackie,  "was 
nothing  less  than  the  establishment  of  a  firm  philosophy 
of  human  life,  a  sure  guide  for  human  conduct,  and  a 
strong  regulator  of  society." 

350 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  351 

Blackie  shows  that  Socrates  laid  the  foundation  of 
philosophy  in  definition  and  induction;  that  he  taught 
that  man  is  a  sympathetic  being,  and  though  his  selfish 
instincts  would  lead  him  to  isolation,  hostility,  and  ex- 
termination, yet  sympathy,  love,  and  fellowship  would 
finally  gain  the  ascendency;  that  man  is  a  reasoning 
being,  a  discoverer  of  truth,  a  seeker  of  happiness;  and 
that  as  wickedness  unavoidably  leads  to  misery  and 
virtue  to  happiness,  men  would  do  right  if  they  knew 
what  right  is,  and  therefore  wickedness  is  to  be  identified 
with  ignorance,  and  virtue  with  knowledge.  Socrates 
did  not  consider  that  men  often  choose  the  present  in- 
tense pleasure  of  vice,  rather  than  the  remote  and  milder 
reward  of  virtue. 

(2)  Aristotle  is  commended  for  his  good  sense  in 
recommending  men  to  seek  their  highest  good,  not  in 
what  is  common  to  them  and  brutes,  but  in  what  is  pe- 
culiarly human,  that  is,  in  reason  and  the  moral  nature; 
he  is  also  commended  for  his  doctrine  that  virtue  is  a 
mean  between  the  two  extremes — excess  and  deficiency. 
Generosity  is  neither  prodigal  nor  miserly. 

(3)  Christianity  is  discussed  from  two  points  of  view : 
"The  strong  conviction,  the  fervid  passions  by  which  the 
moral  machinery  is  set  in  motion,  and  the  particular  vir- 
tues which  its  method  of  operation  brings  on  the  stage." 

The  Christian  moral  system  is  the  practical  part  of 
a  religion.  The  Church  is  the  kingdom  of  heaven  on 
earth;  it  does  not  reason,  it  commands  in  the  name  of 
God :  "Repent  ye,  for  the  kingdom  of  heaven  is  at  hand." 
God  is  the  center  of  the  system;  immorality  is  a  depart- 
ure from  God;  morality  is  a  return.  By  the  preaching  of 
repentance  men  are  pricked  in  their  hearts,  turn  to  God, 


352 


SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 


and  are  saved  from  their  sins.  The  power  which  regen- 
erates the  moral  nature  is  not  reason,  but  the  Divine 
Spirit  sent  down  from  heaven.  Morality  is  re-enforced 
by  motives  drawn  from  the  doctrine  of  a  future  life. 

The  aggressiveness  of  Christianity,  in  its  attempt  to 
convert  the  world,  keeps  the  fire  burning  on  its  altars, 
and  is  thus  essential  to  its  very  life. 

The  struggle  between  the  flesh  and  the  spirit,  the 
higher  and  the  lower  natures,  has  with  fidelity  promise 
of  victory  for  the  spirit,  and  the  truth  of  the  promise  is 
verified  by  facts  such  as  no  other  system  of  morality  can 
show.  It  has  delivered  thousands  from  the  thralldom 
of  sin. 

The  virtues  inculcated  are  not  merely  external,  ritu- 
alistic, ceremonial,  but  the  inner  virtues  of  the  heart- 
humility,  self-denial,  self-control,  purity,  love.  There  is, 
however,  danger  of  carrying  certain  virtues  to  extremes, 
as  when  self-denial  runs  into  asceticism  or  monasticism ; 
but  in  becoming  Christians  we  need  not  cease  to  be  men. 

(4)  Utilitarianism  is  taken  to  task  for  two  faults — 
ignoring  the  past,  and  exaggerating  its  own  importance. 

The  maxim  of  utilitarianism,  the  greatest  good  to  the 
greatest  number,  is  a  taking  rallying  cry.  Blackie  asks, 
"Who  ever  doubts  it?"  He  regards  it  as  an  "appropriate 
war-cry  for  an  oppressed  democracy  fighting  against  an 
insolent  oligarchy;  to  this  praise  it  is  justly  entitled,  and 
in  this  sphere  it  has,  no  doubt,  been  extensively  useful ; 
but  as  a  maxim  pretending  to  enunciate  a  fundamental 
principle  of  ethical  philosophy,  it  has  neither  novelty 
nor  pertinence."  An  assertion  is  not  proof. 

"To  say  that  morality  consists  in  happiness"  meets 
Blackie's  decided  objection;  but  no  utilitarian  ever  as- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  353 

serted  that  morality  is  identical  with  happiness,  only  that 
morality  consists  in  an  endeavor  to  promote  happiness. 

What  is  the  distinctive  feature  of  utilitarianism? 
Blackie  replies,  c.i'tenmlism.  He  quotes  Bentham: 
''What  one  expects  to  find  in  an  ethical  principle  is  some- 
thing that  points  to  some  external  consideration."  He 
quotes  Bain :  "Conscience  is  molded  on  external  author- 
ity as  its  type;"  and  again:  "Utility  sets  up  an  outward 
standard  in  the  room  of  an  inward,  being  the  substitution 
of  a  regard  for  consequences  for  a  mere  unreasoning  senti- 
ment or  feeling."  He  quotes  Mill :  "The  contest  between 
the  morality  which  appeals  to  an  external  standard,  and 
that  which  grounds  itself  in  an  internal  conviction,  is  the 
contest  of  progressive  morality  against  stationary;  of 
reason  and  argument  against  the  deification  of  mere 
opinion  and  habit." 

To  the  above  Blackie  replies:  "Utilitarians  assume 
that  the  advocates  of  innate  morality  hold  it  to  be  a 
thing  that  acts  apart  from  or  contrary  to  reason;  that 
moral  progress  is  possible  only  under  the  action  of  an 
ethical  system  founded  on  the  doctrine  of  consequences, 
whereas  experience  has  proved  that  a  morality  of  mo- 
tives such  as  Christianity  contains,  is  as  much  capable  of 
expansion  and  of  new  application  as  any  other  morality; 
that  all  our  sentiments  and  feelings,  that  is,  the  whole 
emotional  part  of  our  nature,  is  to  be  supposed  false  till 
its  right  to  exist  and  energize  shall  have  been  approved 
by  reason."  The  truth  seems  to  be  that  each  side  in  this 
controversy  sees  no  good  in  the  other.  Formal  right- 
ness  is  the  will  to  do  right;  material  Tightness  is  deter- 
mined by  the  consequences,  which  when  known  deter- 
mine formal  Tightness. 


354  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

j.  Paul  Janet  (1823--  — ). — Janet's  fundamental 
principle  is  that  moral  good  presupposes  natural  good, 
which  serves  as  its  foundation. 

He  finds,  with  Schleiermacher,  three  fundamental 
moral  facts — the  good  to  be  pursued,  the  pursuit,  and 
virtue  acquired  by  the  pursuit.  Contrary  to  these  are 
the  three  opposites — evil,  interdiction,  vice.  Virtue  pre- 
supposes duty,  and  duty  presupposes  the  good.  Hence 
the  three  problems:  What  is  good?  What  is  duty? 
What  is  virtue? 

(1)  What  is  good? — Janet  admits  that  pleasure  is  a 
good,  but  denies  that,  as  sensation,  it  is  the  sole  good; 
yet  he  distinguishes  pleasure  by  quality  as  well  as  by 
quantity,  as  John  Stuart  Mill  has  done.     In  this  sense, 
pleasure  includes   not  only  agreeable   sensations,   but 
happiness,  the  satisfaction  that  comes  from  intellectual 
activity,  the  pursuit  of  virtue,  and  the  consciousness  of 
rectitude. 

Janet  would  accept  Kant's  assertion,  "There  is  but 
one  thing  which  is  absolutely  and  unequivocally  good, 
and  that  is  a  good  will"  if  by  good  Kant  means  morally 
good,  which  no  doubt  he  does;  but  he  holds  that  other 
things  may  be  naturally  good,  as  intelligence,  resolu- 
tion, self-control,  moderation,  which  are  good  things  in 
themselves,  though  a  bad  use  may  be  made  of  them,  in 
which  case  it  is  the  use  that  is  bad,  not  the  things. 

(2)  What  is  duty? — Janet  objects  to  the  utilitarian 
theory  of  duty,  because  it  gives  no  rule,  save  the  general 
one,  Be  guided  by  the  consequences;  but  as  the  conse- 
quences can  not  always  be  foreseen,  this  rule  is  often 
vague  and  uncertain.    There  are,  however,  certain  cases, 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  355 

as  in  making  laws,  or  in  practical  affairs,  where  the  con- 
sequences are  the  only  guide.  In  case  of  the  ordinary 
virtues  or  vices  follow  the  rules  of  accepted  morality.  In 
all  cases  the  good  is  the  foundation  of  the  right. 

Janet  approves  Kant's  principle  of  duty — that  "the 
sole  legitimate  root  of  morality  springs  from  the  idea 
of  law,"  yet  he  complains  that  Kant  gives  neither  motive 
nor  reason  for  his  categorical  imperative,  "Act  in  the 
manner,  that  in  like  circumstances  you  would  be  willing 
others  should  act."  The  truth  is,  when  Kant  applies  his 
imperative  he  falls  back  on  utilitarian  principles.  Thou 
shalt  not  lie;  for  if  lying  should  become  universal,  the 
result  would  be  disastrous;  hence  the  virtue  of  veracity. 
The  categorical  imperative  is  made  imperative  because 
of  the  consequences  in  avoiding  evil  and  securing  good. 

(3)  What  is  virtue? — Janet's  theory  may  be  con- 
densed thus :  Virtue  is  the  fixed  purpose  to  will  and  to  do 
according  to  the  dictates  of  wisdom.  It  chooses  good; 
it  avoids  evil ;  it  seeks  the  guidance  of  reason. 

Janet,  however,  is  not  responsible  for  the  following: 
Motives  solicit  a  choice  of  ends;  the  choice  is  the  selec- 
tion of  the  end  in  view  of  motives;  the  intention  is  the 
decision  to  realize  the  choice;  the  execution  of  the  in- 
tention is  the  overt  act  or  external  conduct.  A  motive 
is  good  or  bad  according  to  the  end;  a  choice  is  right  or 
wrong,  according  as  the  motive  is  good  or  bad;  the  in- 
tention and  the  conduct  are  right  or  wrong  in  agree- 
ment with  the  choice.  In  judging  conduct,  we  go  back 
to  the  intention  as  directed  by  the  choice  as  character- 
ized by  motive  as  distinguished  by  the  end.  Respon- 
sibility attaches  to  the  person  for  his  conduct,  since  he 


356  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

is  free  in  making  his  choice  of  motive.  The  whole  pro- 
cess needs  the  guidance  of  wisdom — a  compound  of 
knowledge,  skill,  and  rectitude. 

4.  W.  L.  Courtney. — In  the  Preface  to  his  "Con- 
structive Ethics,"  Courtney  says  that  his  object  is  two- 
fold: "To  exhibit,  in  a  fairly  popular  form,  the  chief 
characteristics  of  the  different  stages  through  which 
modern  moral  philosophy  has  passed,  ..."  and  "to 
suggest  the  proper  basis  on  which  alone  a  satisfactory 
ethical  system  can  be  reared."  He  holds  that  ethics 
must  be  rationalistic  with  a  metaphysical  basis,  involving 
the  absolute,  which  he  calls  God. 

He  declares  that  the  quarrels  of  thought,  in  its  pro- 
gressive march,  can  be  resolved  into  three  invariable 
elements  —  interpretation,  criticism,  reconstruction. 
Thus  the  systems  of  Thales,  Heraclitus,  the  Pythago- 
reans, and  the  atomists  were  interpretations,  that  of 
the  sophists  was  criticism,  those  of  Plato  and  Aristotle 
were  reconstructions.  From  Bacon  and  Descartes, 
through  Locke  to  Leibnitz,  \ve  have  interpretation;  Kant 
is  critical,  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel  are  reconstruc- 
tive. The  order  of  history  is  also  the  order  of  an  indi- 
vidual mind. 

Courtney  combats  subjective  idealism:  The  sensa- 
tions have  an  alien  source;  for  they  are  thrust  upon  us; 
we  can  recall  their  ideas,  but  not  the  sensations  them- 
selves. If  the  ego  creates  its  own  objects,  it  creates 
other  egos;  if  it  does  not,  if  there  are  other  independent 
egos,  there  may  be  other  things,  at  least  idealism  has 
not  proved  that  there  are  not,  and  upon  it  the  burden 
of  proof  lies.  Again,  why  should  several  egos  create 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  357 

the  same  object,  or  why  should  an  object  of  sight  be 
also  an  object  of  touch? 

Courtney  says:  "We  must  assume  some  universal 
consciousness,  or  absolute  Spirit,  or  God,  which  can  ac- 
count for  the  fact  that  my  world  is  essentially  identical 
with  yours,  and  mine  and  yours  share  with  all  other  in- 
telligences. .  .  .  The  absolute  principles  which  ethics 
presuppose,  and  on  which  they  rest,  can  not  be  the  con- 
scious personal  ego."  Here  Courtney  passes  beyond  the 
obvious  necessity  of  an  external  universe,  apprehended 
by  rational  intuition,  as  the  condition  of  the  phenomenal, 
to  the  hypothesis  of  a  universal  consciousness  or  abso- 
lute Spirit,  and  thus  enters  the  region  of  absolute  ideal- 
ism, which  is  the  metaphysical  basis  of  his  system  of 
constructive  ethics.  Do  we  need  a  transcendental  sys- 
tem of  ethics?  Is  not  the  ultimate  basis  of  morals  the 
obligation  to  secure  the  highest  possible  good  for  our- 
selves and  for  those  within  our  influence? 

Courtney  criticises  hedonic  egoism :  "To  do  an  action 
because  of  the  pleasure  it  brings  is  precisely  the  way  to 
lose  the  pleasure.  Pleasure,  therefore,  which  is  that  we 
are  told  to  aim  at,  is  exactly  that  we  must  not  aim  at 
if  we  desire  to  secure  it — a  paradox  indeed."  This  is 
not  the  only  paradox  which  expresses  a  truth.  It  is  a 
question  of  method,  not  of  end.  Pleasure  comes  as  a 
consequence  of  right  conduct;  it  is  the  conduct  which 
requires  attention;  the  pleasure  will  follow. 

Courtney  criticises  the  higher  form  of  utilitarianism : 
"If  virtue  be  in  reality  only  the  means  to  happiness,  and 
men  are  wrong-headed  enough  to  invert  this  relation, 
then  the  increase  of  intelligence  should  enable  us  to 


358  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

clear  ourselves  from  this  logical  error.  As  knowledge 
widens  we  ought  to  be  able  to  estimate  virtue  at  its 
proper  worth,  and  subordinate  it  to  that  happiness 
which  is  the  only  rational  end  of  human  activity.  The 
course  of  human  history  and  the  development  of  the 
civilization  of  a  people  prove  an  opposite  conclusion. 
Growth,  progress,  improvement  of  all  kinds  increase  in 
a  nation  in  proportion  as  men  learn  to  estimate  virtue 
above  happiness,  and  find  in  self-sacrificing  industry  the 
only  secret  of  a  nation's  welfare."  This  is  forcibly  put. 
But  do  men  engage  in  self-sacrificing  industry  for  the 
sake  of  the  self-sacrificing  industry?  They  engage  in 
it  for  the  welfare  that  follows.  Suppose  men  did  not 
appreciate  virtue  as  beautiful  and  right,  and  did  not  find 
satisfaction  in  it,  would  they  make  it  an  object  of  pur- 
suit? They  find  satisfaction  in  the  pursuit  and  attain- 
ment of  virtue  and  in  other  consequences  which  follow, 
and  were  it  not  for  the  satisfaction,  it  is  needless  to  say 
virtue  would  never  be  an  object  of  pursuit.  It  may  be 
asked,  then,  why  not  pursue  satisfaction  directly,  and 
by  itself?  It  does  n't  exist  by  itself;  it  is  a  consequence 
of  virtue,  and  can  be  secured  only  by  the  virtuous. 

Courtney  makes  a  great  concession  to  utilitarian- 
ism in  saying:  "When  we  approach  the  considerations 
of  human  action  from  the  political  and  social  side,  the 
utilitarian  view  is,  perhaps,  the  only  practical  one." 
As  ethics  is  pre-eminently  a  social  science,  is  not  utility, 
therefore,  the  truly  practical  test?  Again,  he  says: 
"We  may  further  grant  that  questions  of  casuistry, 
questions  of  conflict  of  duties,  are  best  settled  by  an 
appeal  to  utility.  There  is  no  better  test  than  experi- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS 

ence  of  the  consequences  of  actions  to  decide  the  issue 
when  duties  collide." 

In  closing  his  remarks  on  Kant's  system,  Courtney 
says :  "I  do  not  care  to  do  injustice  to  a  noble  and  sym- 
metrical work  of  art  by  insisting  on  the  commonplace 
criticisms  which  any  facile  historian  of  philosophy  would 
be  eager  to  urge.  There  are  systems  of  philosophy, 
just  as  there  are  human  characters,  which  ought  to  be 
judged  by  their  strongest,  and  not  by  their  weakest, 
features." 

Courtney  notices  the  works  of  Jacobi,  Schelling, 
Fichte,  Hegel,  the  scientific  systems  of  Spencer,  Stephen, 
Sidgwick,  Clifford,  and  others,  and  the  pessimistic  the- 
ories of  Schopenhaur  and  Hartmann. 

Courtney  closes  by  saying:  ''Morality  requires  the 
supposition,  not  only  of  an  absolute,  but  of  an  abso- 
lute and  self-conscious  spirit.  .  .  .  The  ethics  which 
are  based  on  God  are  safe  against  the  pessimistic  sug- 
gestion that  life  is  naught  and  moral  action  absurd." 

Courtney  might  have  added,  with  great  force,  that 
the  ultimate  end — the  highest  good — is  neither  self- 
realization  nor  self-satisfaction,  but  the  satisfaction  that 
comes  from  fellowship  with  God. 


Chapter  XVI 
MODERN  ETHICS— OTHER  MORALISTS- 

CONTINUED 

TOTZE  (1817-1881).— Lotze's  views  on  ethics  are 
•*-*  found  in  a  small  volume  entitled  "Practical  Philos- 
ophy," translated  and  edited  by  Professor  George  T. 
Ladd.  The  Practical  Philosophy  includes  not  only 
"those  general  propositions  according  to  which  the 
praiseworthiness  or  blameworthiness  of  the  disposition 
is  estimated,"  but  "the  rules  of  that  prudence  of  life 
which  secures  the  acquisition  of  different  forms  of  out- 
ward good." 

By  an  analysis  of  human  nature  we  find  the  "su- 
preme laws  of  moral  conduct,  which  are  obligatory  on 
every  person  in  relation  to  every  other.  .  .  . 
Fundamental  ethical  laws,  if  they  are  to  have  any  value, 
must  be  immediately  obvious  and  certain  to  the  indi- 
vidual man.  .  .  .  Benevolence  is  the  supreme  prin- 
ciple of  moral  conduct." 

Certain  maxims,  accepted  by  the  wise  and  good  of 
all  ages,  may  now,  as  their  soundness  is  unquestioned, 
be  acted  upon  by  the  individual  independently  of  all 
consequences;  yet  these  very  maxims  have  their  final 
justification  in  their  consequences — that  is,  in  the  very 
fact  that  their  observance  is  essential  to  the  good  of 
the  moral  universe. 

360 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  361 

With  regard  to  pleasure  as  an  end,  Lotze  says :  "Im- 
portant as  the  connection  of  pleasure  with  the  principles 
of  ethics  undoubtedly  is,  it  is  hardly  sufficiently  so  to 
put  in  its  appearance,  without  further  ceremony,  as 
the  chief  principle;"  and  yet  he  says:  "Whatever  may 
be  the  more  intimate  mode  of  the  still  obscure  connec- 
tion between  the  ethical  laws  and  pleasure  and  pain,  this 
much  is,  at  this  stage  of  discussion,  already  made  cer- 
tain, that  an  indissoluble  connection  exists,  and  that  all 
talk  of  absolutely  obligatory  form  of  conduct,  which 
should  have  no  reference  at  all  to  resulting  consequences, 
is  perhaps  very  nobly  meant,  but  is  a  formal  service  that 
arises  from  a  complete  misunderstanding."  Again: 
"There  is  nothing  at  all  in  all  the  world  which  would 
have  any  value  until  it  has  produced  some  pleasure  in 
some  being  or  other  capable  of  enjoyment.  Everything 
antecedent  to  this  is  naught  but  an  indifferent  kind  of 
factor  to  which  a  value  of  its  own  can  be  ascribed  only 
in  an  anticipatory  way,  and  with  reference  to  some 
pleasure  that  is  to  originate  from  it." 

It  is  not  absolute  pleasure,  or  pleasure  in  the  abstract, 
that  is  enjoyed,  but  this  or  that  pleasure.  "Just  as  we 
do  not  see  color  in  general,  but  only  red  or  green,  or 
some  other,  so  there  is  never  any  pleasure  absolutely 
which  is  merely  greater  or  less;  but  every  actual  pleas- 
ure is  besides  distinguished  qualitatively  from  every 
other,  just  as  green  is  from  red."  Pleasures  are  concrete, 
and  differ  in  quality  as  well  as  in  quantity.  The  satis- 
faction from  doing  a  kind  deed  is  higher  than  that  from 
the  gratification  of  appetite. 

The  fleeting  character  of  pleasure  is  no  disparage- 
ment, but  rather  an  advantage,  since,  like  kaleidoscopic 


362  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

views,  it  avoids  monotony,  and  gives  richness  and  va- 
riety to  life. 

The  criticism  is  sometimes  made  that  personal 
worthiness  is  not  a  fact,  but  rather  personal  unworthi- 
ness,  and  that  the  supposed  consciousness  of  worthiness 
is  the  self-deception  springing  from  pride.  Is  it  not 
possible  to  strive  to  do  right  and  to  avoid  wrong,  and 
with  rectitude  of  aim  to  endeavor  to  live  a  righteous 
life?  Genuine  rectitude  of  character  is  possible,  and 
may  be  actual,  and  its  realization  is  the  highest  good. 

Lotze  takes  up  the  question  of  the  freedom  of  the 
will,  and  says:  "We  have  an  idea  of  different  modes  of 
conduct,  and,  further,  an  idea  of  their  different  values, 
and  finally  have  made  a  decision  between  them,  the 
last  of  which  we  attribute — no  matter  now,  whether 
rightly  or  wrongly — to  the  free  determination  of  our 
will;"  that  is,  to  the  ordinary  view  the  will  and  the 
consequent  conduct  are  free. 

Again:  "Moral  judgment  imputes  our  conduct  to 
us,  not  merely  as  having  perfectness  and  deficiency,  but 
merit  and  guilt;  and  that,  therefore,  it  is  not  the  neces- 
sary consequence  of  our  spiritual  states,  but  has  orig- 
inated through  a  free  act  of  the  will." 

"That  quite  decided  form  of  determinism,  which 
makes  all  the  actions  of  animate  beings,  proceed,  ac- 
cording to  general  laws,  from  their  inner  spiritual  states, 
with  the  same  necessity  as  physical  effects  do  from  their 
blind  causes,"  is  inconsistent  with  the  feeling  of  peni- 
tence and  self-condemnation,  unless  these  feelings  can 
be  resolved  into  that  of  discomfort;  but  remorse  is  more 
than  discomfort — it  is  a  sense  of  guilt.  A  man  injured 
by  the  fall  of  a  limb  has  discomfort,  but  no  remorse.  By 


HISTORY    OF   ETHICS  363 

a  selfish  act  he  brings  a  calamity  upon  his  neighbor,  and 
his  conscience  upbraids  him.  If  determinism  is  true, 
conscience  is  an  anomaly  in  human  nature,  and  the 
words  ought  and  ought  not,  which,  to  an  unsophisticated 
mind,  have  the  most  indubitable  and  incontrovertible 
significance,  lose  their  distinctive  meaning. 

The  fact  that  an  act  is  willed  does  not  give  it  moral 
quality,  unless  the  person  is  free  in  willing  the  act.  "It 
is  erroneous  to  say  that  true  freedom  is  identical  with 
necessity,"  because  there  is  no  external  compulsion 
when  the  person  acts  of  necessity  according  to  his  own 
nature.  This  is  not  moral  freedom,  which  implies  that 
the  agent  "must,  at  every  moment,  be  able  to  turn  about, 
step  out  of  this  path,  break  off  the  consecutiveness  of 
its  development  with  an  entirely  new  beginning." 

It  is  not  consistent  with  freedom  "to  condition  all 
subsequent  acts  upon  an  earlier  one,"  nor  "to  ascribe 
to  the  spirit  itself  a  quondam  freedom  of  self-determina- 
tion, by  which  it  fixed  for  itself  that  character  which 
now  discharges  itself  forth  unalterably  into  its  conse- 
quences." The  loss  of  freedom  in  the  present  state  is 
not  compensated  for  by  an  unknown  quondam  free  act. 
Conscience  upbraids  us  for  a  wrong  act  in  the  present 
state,  which  we  are  conscious  of  performing,  and  not 
for  a  previous  hypothetical  act  in  a  former  state  of  which 
we  know  nothing. 

Is  not  freedom  forestalled  by  the  reign  of  law,  by 
the  antecedent  certainty  of  the  law  of  causation  that 
every  event  must  have  a  cause?  Lotze  replies,  "It  can 
not  be  asserted  that  experience  alone  teaches  the  validity 
of  the  law  of  causation  for  all  parts  of  the  course  of  na- 
ture; for  many  regions  are  unknown." 


364  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Again :  "If  two  motives,  a  and  b,  have  been  weighed 
in  mind,  and  thereupon  an  action,  fr  is  executed,  which 
corresponds  to  b,  then,  of  course,  afterwards  the  appear- 
ance always  originates,  for  our  point  of  view,  as  though 
ft  were  naturally  brought  about  by  6,  and  its  ascendency 
over  a  with  a  strict  necessity.  But  for  the  intensities 
of  the  motives,  a  and  b,  we  possess  no  measure  at  all 
by  which  we  might  be  able  to  measure  them  off  previous 
to  the  occurrence  of  the  action.  That  b  has  been  the 
stronger  of  the  two  is  one  hypothesis  which  we  make 
ex  post.  ...  If  there  has  been  an  act  of  free  will 
which  decided  for  /?,  then  everything  will  appear  exactly 
the  same  in  the  procedure." 

"The  causal  connection,  such  as  makes  any  freedom 
impossible,  gives  the  infinite  regress,  and  that  makes  us 
suspect  the  absolute  validity  of  the  law  of  causation. 
.  .  .  We  are  compelled  to  admit  that  motion  does 
not  attain  to  actuality  as  the  result  of  any  cause  what- 
ever, but  it  is  motion,  without  cause  and  from  the  be- 
ginning. .  .  .  Then  there  is  no  reason  why  per- 
fectly new  beginnings  of  a  subsequent  origin,  that  have 
no  foundation  in  what  is  prior,  should  not  also  show 
themselves  within  the  course  of  things."  It  is  certainly 
not  good  metaphysics  to  say  a  new  beginning — that  is, 
an  event  that  has  no  foundation  in  what  is  prior,  can 
show  itself  in  the  course  of  things;  for  that  would  mean 
that  nothing  can  spring  into  existence,  but  the  event 
may  be  caused,  not  by  a  preceding  event,  but  by  a 
being. 

Again:  "Another  question  is  whether  a  will  thus 
free  answers  our  ethical  demands.  ...  As  soon  as 
the  knowledge  of  the  value  of  different  forms  of  con- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  365 

duct  exists,  it  is  precisely  by  this  means  that  the  will 
of  the  spirit  who  decides  for  the  one  form  or  the  other 
becomes  responsible." 

For  the  following  discussion  of  the  bearing  of  the 
law  of  causation  on  the  freedom  of  the  will,  Lotze  is 
not  responsible.  The  law  of  causation  is  certainly  true, 
otherwise  nonentity  can  jump  into  being;  but  non- 
entity, being  nothing,  can  not  jump.  Now,  a  volition 
is  an  event,  and  is,  therefore,  caused,  but  caused 
by  the  person,  not  by  the  motive.  It,  however,  does 
not  follow  that,  because  a  person  caused  the  volition, 
he  was  caused  to  cause  it.  The  cause  of  the  volition 
being  a  person,  not  an  event,  requires  no  further  appli- 
cation of  the  law  of  causation. 

The  writer  who  has  exerted  a  greater  influence  than 
perhaps  any  other  in  regard  to  the  question  of  necessity 
and  free  will  is  Jonathan  Edwards.  Three  objections, 
at  least,  bear  against  Edwards's  views:  He  confounds 
desire,  a  state  of  the  sensibility,  with  volition,  an  act 
of  the  will;  he  makes  motives  causes  of  volition,  instead 
of  reasons  in  view  of  which  the  person  causes  the  voli- 
tions; he  confounds  liberty  of  execution,  or  the  conduct 
which  is  consequent  upon  the  volition,  with  the  free- 
dom of  the  person  in  causing  the  volition.  A  person 
may  desire  an  object  very  greatly,  yet  because  it  belongs 
to  another,  he  may  not  will  to  take  it;  therefore  desire 
is  not  volition. 

To  the  question,  What  causes  the  volition?  the  an- 
swer is,  The  person.  To  this  answer  Edwards  objects 
that,  if  the  person  causes  his  volition,  he  must  act  in 
order  to  cause  it;  that  is,  he  must  act  in  order  to  act, 
and  act  in  order  to  cause  that  previous  act,  and  so  on, 


366  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

which  involves  an  infinite  number  of  acts,  an  impossi- 
bility in  finite  time,  and,  therefore,  a  person  does  not 
cause  his  volitions.  But  the  above  reasoning  applies  to 
any  other  act,  as  well  as  to  a  volition;  and  therefore  a 
person  does  not  act  at  all!  Edwards's  argument,  in 
proving  too  much,  proves  nothing.  The  fact  is,  a  per- 
son does  not  have  to  act  in  order  to  act;  he  simply 
acts.  Of  course,  he  has  to  be  in  order  to  act. 

Edwards  knows  no  other  freedom  than  for  a  man 
to  do  as  he  pleases;  but  the  freedom  to  do  is  external 
liberty  to  act  in  order  to  carry  out  his  will.  It  is  not 
the  freedom  of  the  will. 

It  is,  however,  legitimate  to  inquire  why  the  person 
wills  as  he  does,  but  not  zvhat  causes  him  thus  to  will. 
To  answer  this  we  go  to  the  motive,  which  is  the  reason 
why  the  person  wills  in  that  way,  but  not  the  cause 
compelling  him  to  will.  The  person  wills.  The  energy 
which  makes  the  choice,  directs  the  aim,  forms  the  in- 
tention, performs  the  act,  proceeds  from  the  person 
himself.  The  choice,  the  aim,  the  intention,  the  act, 
are  all  right  or  wrong  according  as  the  motive  is  good 
or  bad.  The  conscience  of  the  person  acquits  or  con- 
demns him,  since  he  is  assured  that  he  freely  made  his 
choice  of  end,  though  not  without  the  motive,  as  a 
reason,  yet  without  compelling  cause.  The  law  of 
causation,  though  affirming  that  every  event  has  a 
cause,  does  not  affirm  that  every  actor  is  caused  to  act. 
No  amount  of  sophistry  can  make  a  person  believe  that, 
when  his  conscience  smites  him  for  making  a  certain 
choice  he  was  compelled  to  make  it,  and  is,  therefore 
innocent.  As  an  actor,  he  begins  a  series  of  causes  and 
events  which  may  run  on  indefinitely. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  367 

Statistics  showing  the  number  of  crimes  of  various 
kinds  committed  in  a  year  in  a  population,  say  of  one 
hundred  thousand,  reveal  the  state  of  society,  and  show 
what  may  be  expected  the  next  year;  and  the  expecta- 
tion would  be  met,  whether  the  crimes  were  necessi- 
tated or  freely  committed.  They  reveal  the  fact,  not 
the  cause. 

2.  Bordcn  P.  Bourne  gives  several  reasons  for  the 
confusion  of  tongues  which  the  history  of  moral  science 
presents.  First,  irrelevant  psychological  questions; 
secondly,  a  very  general  desire  to  deduce  moral  life 
from  a  theory,  instead  of  deducing  a  theory  from  moral 
life.  .  .  .  The  chief  source  of  the  confusion  is  the 
failure  to  bring  our  abstractions  to  the  test  of  concrete 
applications. 

The  practical  part  of  Bowne's  work  has  two  leading 
thoughts:  One  is  the  necessity  of  uniting  the  intuitive 
and  the  experience  schools  of  ethics,  in  order  to  reach 
any  working  system.  The  other  is  that  the  aim  of  con- 
duct is  not  abstract  virtue,  but  fullness  and  richness  of 
life.  With  good  will  alone  "the  moral  life  is  carried 
on  in  a  vacuum,  and  loses  all  real  substance  and  value. 
And  when  we  abstract  conduct  from  the  personality  in 
which  it  originates,  and  which  it  expresses,  we  have  a 
base,  sordid  externalism."  A  true  union  of  good  will 
and  right  conduct  "will  stand  fast  and  bear  fruit  in  the 
earth." 

Bowne  adopts  the  fruitful  view  of  Schleiermacher, 
that  there  are  three  leading  moral  ideas :  The  good,  duty, 
and  virtue.  "Where  there  is  no  good  to  be  realized 
by  action,  there  can  be  no  rational  duty;  and  with  the 
notion  of  duty  vanishes  also  that  of  virtue.  Again, 


368  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

where  there  is  no  sense  of  duty,  but  only  a  calculation 
of  consequences,  we  have  merely  a  system  of  prudence. 
This  may  be  well  enough  in  its  way,  but  it  lacks  moral 
quality."  Nevertheless,  to  gain  power  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  good,  no  wrong  being  allowed,  it  is  right 
to  be  prudent,  it  is  ethical  to  regard  the  expedient. 

"The  three  leading  ideas  are  alike  necessary;  but 
historically  there  has  been  a  tendency  to  recognize  some 
one  of  these  ideas  and  to  ignore  the  others." 

"In  much  ancient  ethics  the  idea  of  the  good  was 
fundamental."  Hence  the  rules :  Live  according  to  na- 
ture. Follow  the  golden  mean.  "In  modern  times  this 
view  generally  appears  as  utilitarianism.  Not  infre- 
quently, through  failure  to  emphasize  the  notion  of  duty, 
this  view  becomes  a  system  of  calculating  prudence  and 
practical  shrewdness,  and  falls  below  the  moral  plane 
altogether." 

"The  vagueness  and  one-sidedness  of  this  view  led 
to  a  very  general  desire  to  make  the  notion  of  duty 
or  obligation  the  basal."  Justice,  good  will,  truthful- 
ness, and  the  like,  ought  to  rule.  This  is  the  doctrine 
of  intuitionists.  But  duty  does  not  stand  alone.  Its 
business  is  to  realize  the  good.  Were  it  not  for  the 
good,  there  could  be  no  duty. 

"The  third  idea,  that  of  virtue,  has  been  less  promi- 
nent as  the  basis  of  a  system."  Virtue  is  not  self-sub- 
sisting; it  is  the  steadfast  performance  of  duty  in  the 
pursuit  of  the  good.  Perfection  is  the  ideal  towards 
which  indefinite  approximations  can  be  made.  Satis- 
faction arises  from  a  consciousness  of  progress  towards 
the  ideal. 

Bowne  distinguishes  two  standpoints :  The  induttive 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  369 

and  the  theoretical.  The  first  describes  moral  experi- 
ence; the  second  forms  a  rational  system.  "One  seeks 
to  find  the  notion  of  duty  in  the  good  to  be  reached; 
the  other  seeks  to  make  duty  an  absolute  self-sufficing 
imperative." 

Action  may  be  considered  in  its  consequences  as 
wise  or  unwise,  or  in  its  motive  as  moral  or  immoral. 
An  act  may  be  objectively  sagacious,  yet  subjectively  it 
•may  lack  moral  quality.  "Right  action  may  or  may 
not  have  external  success,  but  it  must  have  a  right  in- 
ternal spring.  .  .  .  The  morality  of  a  person  de- 
pends upon  his  motives;  but  the  morality  of  a  code  de- 
pends on  its  consequences." 

The  external  act  is  right  or  wrong,  according  to  the 
motive;  but  a  good  will  can  not  be  abstracted  from  the 
end.  "Abstract  good  will  is  an  empty  figment.  With- 
out doubt,  the  good  will  is  the  center  of  moral  life;  but 
the  good  will  must  will  something."  We  are  to  regard 
both  the  form  and  the  outcome  of  conduct.  "If  there 
should  be  irreconcilable  opposition,  the  law  of  well- 
being  has  precedence  of  the  law  of  form.  .  .  .  The 
two  must  be  combined  before  we  reach  any  complete 
moral  system.  .  .  .  The  good  will  must  aim  at 
well-being,  and  well-being  is  realized  in  and  through 
good  will." 

One  consequence  of  moral  action  should  not  be 
overlooked — its  reaction  and  effect  upon  the  actor. 
The  aim  at  a  good  end  and  the  effort  to  realize  it,  from 
the  prompting  of  a  good  motive,  invariably  contribute 
to  the  progress  of  the  actor  towards  perfection. 

If  one  does  the  best  he  knows  how,  he  is  formally 
right,  but  he  may  be  materially  wrong.  "Formal  right- 
24 


370  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

ness,  of  course,  is  ethically  the  more  important,  as  it 
involves  good  will;  but  material  Tightness  is  only  less 
important,  as  without  it  our  action  is  out  of  harmony 
with  the  universe.  .  .  .  Our  leading  moral  judg- 
ments are  of  the  will.  .  .  .  We  demand  not  only 
that  the  will  be  right,  but  that  the  affections  and  emo- 
tions be  harmonious  therewith." 

What  is  the  good?  Is  it  the  desirable?  Is  it  pleas- 
ure? Is  it  happiness?  Is  it  virtue?  We  may  say  the 
good  is  the  desirable,  if  by  desirable  we  mean  the  truly 
desirable,  or  what  ought  to  be  desired.  "Some  have 
found  the  good  in  pleasure  (hedonism);  others  have 
found  it  in  happiness  (eudemonism) ;  still  others  have 
found  it  in  superiority  to  both  pleasure  and  happiness 
(cynicism  and,  to  some  extent,  Stoicism);  and  others 
again  in  personal  dignity  and  excellence  of  virtue  (cur- 
rent intuitive  systems)." 

Pleasure,  as  a  passive  sensation,  has  its  value. 
"With  the  child,  as  with  the  cattle,  simple  passive  gratifi- 
cations are  the  leading  form  of  experience." 

It  is  rational  and  right  to  seek  happiness,  whether  in 
external  success  or  in  the  reaction  of  the  personality 
upon  itself. 

Virtue  is  central,  and  never  to  be  left  out.  The  will 
to  do  right,  which  is  the  best  thing,  is  within  the  reach 
of  all.  But  virtue  in  the  abstract  is  barren.  "For  man, 
as  a  dependent  being,  the  attainment  of  his  highest  good 
will  always  depend  on  something  besides  virtue,  on 
something  beyond  himself."  Virtue  requires  a  field  of 
operation.  We  are  to  do  right  in  relation  to  others. 
Special  aims  are  to  be  realized.  Individual  development, 
public  improvement,  the  restraint  of  evil,  the  elevation 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  371 

of  the  moral  standard,  afford  ample  scope  for  effort; 
and  in  successful  effort  we  find  our  reward.  ''Nothing 
can  outrank  a  morality  whose  aim  is  the  attainment  of 
the  largest  and  the  fullest  life." 

Bowne  proceeds  to  the  discussion  of  the  need  of  a 
subjective  standard.  The  individual  calculating  ethics 
make  every  one  a  law  unto  himself;  it  is  the  ethics  of 
the  Greek  sophists.  Who  is  to  judge  another?  Taking 
in  conscience,  we  improve  the  situation.  Still  we  have 
a  calculating  prudence.  We  are  still  after  the  loaves 
and  the  fishes.  Sin  is  imprudence.  "In  such  a  scheme 
we  miss  one  essential  element  of  moral  character — the 
love  of  goodness  for  itself,  and  not  for  its  extrinsic  or 
adventitious  character."  We  love  goodness  because  to 
do  so  harmonizes  with  our  own  higher  nature,  and  at- 
tunes us  in  harmony  with  the  universal  law  which  works 
for  righteousness.  Pleasure  may  be  innocently  enjoyed, 
and  happiness  the  more.  We  are  not  to  indulge  in 
degrading  pleasures,  nor  to  seek  enjoyment  at  the  ex- 
pense of  our  neighbor.  We  may  innocently  plan  for 
pleasure,  as  in  a  picnic  or  an  excursion  party. 

The  utilitarian  school  has  its  place.  "The  most  im- 
portant work  of  this  school  has  been  done  in  the  field 
of  legislation  and  political  reform." 

"The  true  ethical  aim  is  to  realize  the  common  good; 
but  the  contents  of  this  good  have  to  be  determined 
in  accordance  with  an  inborn  ideal  of  human  worth  and 
dignity.  .  .  .  Every  ethical  system  has  to  fall  back 
upon  some  form  of  moral  insight  to  interpret  its  prin- 
ciples." 

Bowne  takes  up  subjective  ethics,  and  shows  that 
conscience  is  not  an  oracle,  ready  always  "infallibly  to 


372  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

discriminate  between  right  and  wrong,  and  to  issue  in- 
fallible commands.  .  .  .  Few  atrocities  are  so  great 
and  few  absurdities  are  so  grotesque  as  not  to  have 
the  sanction  of  conscience  at  one  time  or  another." 

Whence,  then,  is  the  idea  of  obligation?  "The  best 
derivative  account  of  the  idea  of  obligation  is  that 
which  regards  it  as  the  expression  of  a  hypothetical 
necessity.  ...  If  I  wish  to  teach,  I  must  pass  an 
examination.  ...  I  may  escape  the  obligation  by 
declining  the  end." 

"If  there  be  an  end  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  forego 
some  good  we  are  obliged  to  seek,  a  law  we  may  never 
transgress,  then  we  have  no  longer  a  hypothetical  ne- 
cessity, but  a  categorical  and  absolute  one."  Whence 
does  this  obligation  arise?  "The  idea  of  moral  obliga- 
tion arises  within  the  mind  itself.  .  .  .  The  right 
to  which  obligation  refers  is  simply  a  perceived  good. 
.  .  .  The  free  spirit  thus  imposing  duty  upon  itself 
gives  us  the  only  meaning  and  experience  of  moral 
obligation.  Instead  of  being  an  opaque  mystery,  it  lies 
in  the  full  light  of  self-consciousness.  .  .  .  The  idea 
may  be  attached  to  unwise  or  mistaken  conceptions 
of  duty,  but  its  presence  is  just  that  which  lifts  the  in- 
stinctive life  of  impulse  to  the  moral  plane." 

But  what  is  the  guide  to  objective  right  action? 
Bowne  answers:  "Benevolence,  or  good  will,  and  re- 
quital, or  the  good  desert  of  good  will  and  the  ill  desert 
of  the  evil  will;"  that  is,  benevolence  and  justice.  Of 
these  the  duty  of  benevolence  is  clear  and  fundamental. 
Justice  is  for  the  general  welfare,  and  is,  therefore,  ap- 
plied benevolence. 

Having  taken  so  much  space  with  the  foundation 


373 

principles,  we  can  now  only  say  that  Bowne  discusses 
the  development  of  morals,  moral  responsibility,  merit 
and  demerit,  ethics  and  religion,  ethics  of  the  individual, 
ethics  of  the  family,  ethics  of  society,  and  closes  by  say- 
ing: "The  abstract  ethics  of  the  closet  must  be  replaced 
by  the  ethics  of  life,  if  we  would  not  see  ethics  lose  itself 
in  barren  contentions  and  tedious  verbal  disputes." 

Bowne's  system  is  one  of  the  very  best  of  all  those 
we  have  reviewed. 


Chapter  XVII 
MODERN    ETHICS— OTHER    MORALISTS 

T^RIEDRICH  PAULS  EN,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in 
J-  the  University  of  Berlin,  divides  his  treatise  into 
four  books.  The  first  traces  the  history  of  Ethics  from 
the  times  of  the  Greek  philosophers  to  the  present;  the 
second  discusses  fundamental  principles;  the  third  ap- 
plies these  principles  to  the  virtues  and  duties  of  life; 
the  fourth  treats  of  social  and  political  questions.  The 
work,  except  the  fourth  book,  has  been  translated  into 
English  by  Professor  Thilly,  of  the  University  of  Mis- 
souri; and  this  translation  is  taken  as  the  text  for  this 
review. 

Paulsen  considers  that  the  conception  towards  which 
the  thought  of  the  age  is  tending  is  teleological,  and 
says :  "It  is  limited  and  defined  by  a  double  antithesis— 
on  the  one  side,  by  hedonistic  utilitarianism,  which  teaches 
that  pleasure  is  the  thing  of  absolute  worth,  to  which 
virtue  and  morality  are  related  as  means.  In  opposi- 
tion to  this,  teleological  ethics  contends  that  not  the  feel- 
ing of  pleasure,  but  the  objective  content  of  life  itself, 
which  is  experienced  with  pleasure,  is  the  thing  of  worth. 
Pleasure  is  the  form  in  which  the  subject  becomes  im- 
mediately aware  of  the  object  and  its  value. 

tllntuitionalistic  formalism  is  the  other  antithesis.  This 
regards  the  observance  of  a  system  of  a  priori  rules,  of 

374 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  375 

the  moral  laws,  as  the  thing  of  absolute  worth.  In  op- 
position to  this,  teleological  ethics  contends  that  the 
thing  of  absolute  worth  is  not  the  observance  of  moral 
laws,  but  the  substance  which  is  embraced  in  these  for- 
mulae— the  human  historical  life,  which  fills  the  outline 
with  an  infinite  wealth  of  manifold  concrete  forms." 

Ethics  is  a  practical  science.  "Its  function  is  to  show 
how  human  life  must  be  fashioned  to  realize  its  pur- 
pose, what  forms  of  social  life  and  what  modes  of  indi- 
vidual conduct  are  favorable  or  unfavorable  to  the  per- 
fection of  human  nature,  to  determine  the  end  of  life, 
or  the  highest  good,  and  to  point  out  the  ways  or  means 
of  reaching  it.  ...  The  highest  good  is  a  perfect 
life.  .  .  .  The  way  to  reach  the  highest  good  is 
by  the  cultivation  of  the  virtues  and  the  performance 
of  the  duties  of  life.  .  .  .  The  nature  of  the  highest 
good  is  in  reality  not  determined  by  the  intellect,  but 
by  the  will." 

As  to  method,  Paulsen  says:  "Ethics  does  not  de- 
duce and  demonstrate  propositions  from  concepts,  but 
discovers  the  relations  which  exist  between  facts  and 
which  may  be  established  by  experience;"  that  is,  ethics 
employs  the  method  of  the  natural  sciences. 

Is  reason  or  feeling  the  source  of  moral  life?  Paul- 
sen  answers,  "Both  are  involved;"  yet  he  says:  "What 
is  a  good  life  will,  in  the  last  analysis,  be  decided  by  im- 
mediate incontrovertible  feeling,  in  which  the  inner- 
most essence  of  the  being  manifests  itself.  ...  It 
will  not,  therefore,  be  possible  to  give  a  scientific  defi- 
nition of  the  highest  good  which  shall  be  valid  for  all." 

Ethics  is  a  normative  science.  "Its  propositions  be- 
come primary  principles  of  judgment  and  rules  of  con- 


376  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

duct  in  so  far  as  they  represent  the  conditions  of  human 
experience."  It  does  not  aim  to  reduce  all  men  to  one 
uniform  pattern.  Allowance  must  be  made  for  indi- 
vidual idiosyncrasies.  "Nature  and  inclination  will  take 
care  that  the  individual  receives  his  rights;  but  whatever 
be  the  peculiarities  of  the  individual,  "anger,  envy,  false- 
hood, inconsiderateness,  produce  certain  disturbances 
in  life,  while  prudence,  politeness,  modesty,  uprightness, 
amiability,  tend  to  produce  good  effects  on  the  life  of 
the  individual  and  that  of  his  surroundings." 

Paulsen  gives  a  historical  sketch  of  ancient,  Chris- 
tian, and  modern  ethics,  which  we  pass  over  as  not  ma- 
terial to  a  knowledge  of  his  system. 

Paulsen  introduces  Part  II  by  laying  down  certain 
psychological  and  metaphysical  principles,  which  we 
pass,  and  proceeds  to  discuss  the  good  and  the  bad;  but 
for  the  sake  of  brevity  we  shall  aim  to  do  justice  to  his 
system  in  more  condensed  language.  He  asks,  What 
is  the  ultimate  ground  of  moral  distinctions?  What 
is  the  ultimate  end  of  will  and  action?  The  first  ques- 
tion has  received  two  answers — the  teleological  and  the 
formalistic.  The  teleological  answer  explains  the  dif- 
ference between  good  and  bad  by  the  effects  which 
modes  of  conduct  produce  upon  the  agent  and  upon 
others.  Acts  are  good  or  bad  as  they  tend  to  promote 
or  destroy  human  welfare.  The  formalistic  answer  is 
that  the  terms  good  and  bad,  in  their  moral  sense,  desig- 
nate an  absolute  quality  of  the  will,  as  it  respects  or  does 
not  respect  the  law  of  duty,  without  regard  to  conse- 
quences. 

Paulsen  accepts  the  teleological  view,  but  discards 
the  name  utilitarianism,  which  he  had  used  in  former 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  377 

editions  of  his  book,  as  inseparably  connected  with 
hedonism,  and  employs,  instead,  telcologic  cncrgism,  which 
suggests  the  Platonic-Aristotelian  theory  of  the  universe, 
from  which  this  form  of  ethics  takes  its  rise.  Every 
man  has  his  purpose  in  life;  and  in  finding  this  purpose 
ethics  will  afford  him  aid  by  unfolding  the  powers  and 
possible  attainments  of  human  beings. 

Paulsen  affirms  that  the  end  of  the  will  is  not  feeling, 
but  action.  But  is  action  ultimate?  Action  is  for  the 
good  it  will  bring,  and  that  good  is  human  welfare.  No 
one  acts  merely  for  the  sake  of  acting.  Formalistic  eth- 
ics holds  that  action  is  good  or  bad  in  itself,  irrespective 
of  consequences.  It  is  true  that  action  is  not  to  be 
judged  by  its  immediate  consequences,  but  by  its  nat- 
ural tendency.  Rest  evidently  is  not  the  end.  The  func- 
tion of  rest  is  to  recruit  our  energies,  and  to  prepare 
them  for  renewed  action. 

A  man  is  not  to  be  judged  solely  by  what  he  does,  but 
by  what  he  would  do  if  he  were  well  informed  and  had 
the  opportunity  of  doing;  but  he  is  under  obligation  to 
inform  himself.  An  act  is  objectively  right  or  wrong 
as  it  tends  to  good  or  evil;  it  is  subjectively  right  or 
wrong  as  it  is  believed  to  tend  to  good  or  evil,  the  agent 
having  taken  due  care  to  inform  himself.  In  the  first 
case,  we  inquire  into  the  effects;  in  the  second,  into  the 
motive. 

It  is  said  that  St.  Crispin  stole  leather  of  a  rich  mer- 
chant to  make  shoes  for  poor  children.  What  of  his 
moral  conduct?  What  would  be  its  effect  on  public 
welfare?  The  objective  value  of  conduct  is  determined 
by  its  relation  to  the  highest  good.  But  does  not  this 
mean  that  the  end  justifies  the  means?  Yes,  if  rightly 


378  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

understood.  It  is  not  any  supposed  good  end  you 
please,  but  the  end,  the  highest  good,  the  welfare  of  the 
human  race.  It  does  not  mean  that  we  are  to  violate 
an  established  principle  for  a  supposed  good  that  would 
be  realized.  The  evil  resulting  from  the  violation,  in 
bewildering  the  common  mind  in  regard  to  moral  dis- 
tinctions, and  the  habit  it  would  engender,  of  seeking 
for  sophistic  reasons  for  immoral  conduct,  would  more 
than  overbalance  any  supposed  good  consequence.  But 
when  any  new  measure  is  proposed,  not  in  violation  of 
any  moral  principle,  the  consequences,  so  far  as  they 
can  be  determined,  are  the  only  guide  to  action.  As 
no  one  can  estimate  all  the  consequences,  good  and  bad, 
near-  and  remote,  subjective  and  objective,  we  ought 
to  beware  of  doing  evil  that  good  may  come.  The  temp- 
tation to  do  this  is  strong  when  partisan  feeling  is  in  the 
ascendant. 

A  boy  stole  potatoes  from  a  rich  neighbor,  and,  roast- 
ing them,  shared  with  his  hungry  brothers  and  sisters. 
His  grandmother,  who  was  at  the  point  of  death,  could 
not  die  in  peace  till  he  confessed  to  his  neighbor,  and 
was  forgiven.  The  loss  of  the  potatoes  was  a  trifle  to 
the  rich  man;  but  what  would  have  been  the  probable 
effect  of  the  theft  on  the  boy  had  he  not  confessed?  He 
had  learned,  by  the  theft,  a  way  of  supplying  his  wants, 
and,  in  case  of. a  new  want,  would  likely  have  stolen 
again,  and  yet  again,  until  he  had  become  a  confirmed 
thief.  What  should  the  boy  have  done  when  his  broth- 
ers and  sisters  were  hungry? 

The  highest  good  is  not  pleasurable  sensations,  but 
the  perfect  development  and  exercise  of  living  powers, 
with  their  attendant  satisfactions.  There  is  an  impulse 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  379 

for  activity  as  well  as  a  desire  for  pleasure;  but  pleas- 
ure is  a  sign  that  the  will  has  reached  its  object.  The 
artist  wills  to  finish  his  work,  and  with  the  finished  work 
he  is  satisfied.  Would  he  finish  the  work  if  it  afforded 
no  satisfaction?  The  completion  of  the  work  is  the 
proximate  end  for  which  he  strives.  The  ultimate  end 
is  the  satisfaction  of  which  he  is  assured.  It  need  not  be 
the  object  of  immediate  attention,  and  the  idea  of  it 
may  even  disappear  from  consciousness. 

To  be  rid  of  pain  or  discomfort  is  an  aim  of  action. 
Not  pleasure  or  pain  in  the  abstract,  but  special  pleas- 
ures and  pains  are  incentives  to  action,  and  play  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  economy  of  nature.  Pain  is  a  warn- 
ing; pleasure  is  a  bait.  Their  ends  are  to  arouse  those 
energies  which  tend  to  the  preservation  of  the  individual 
and  the  progress  of  the  race;  but  when  sought  as  ends 
they  bring  punishment  for  the  perversion  of  nature's 
purpose.  We  need  something  to  arouse  our  strongest 
passions,  and  to  excite  us  to  make  our  best  efforts; 
hence  the  interest  we  take  in  the  heroic  and  the  tragic. 

Virtuous  activity  is  the  thing  of  absolute  worth.  The 
high  pleasure,  or,  if  you  please,  satisfaction  taken  in  such 
activity,  is  at  once  its  evidence  and  its  reward.  What, 
then,  is  the  highest  good?  "The  goal  at  which  the 
will  of  every  living  creature  aims  is  the  normal  exer- 
cise of  the  vital  functions  which  constitute  its  nature. 
.  .  .  Man  desires  to  live  a  mental,  historical  life,  in 
which  there  is  room  for  the  exercise  of  all  human  pow- 
ers and  virtues."  Such  a  life  affords  the  highest  satis- 
faction. The  life  is  the  means,  the  satisfaction  is  the 
outcome  and  the  reward.  The  moral  worth  is  the  life. 
Would  man  desire  such  a  life  were  there  no  accompany- 


380  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

ing  satisfaction?  Hence  we  conclude  that  the  highest 
good  in  man  is  found  in  the  possession,  normal  develop- 
ment, and  proper  exercise  of  all  human  faculties  and  vir- 
tues, especially  the  highest — reason,  wisdom,  justice,  be- 
nevolence. The  highest  good  in  man  we  may  believe  to 
be  in  harmony  with  the  highest  good  of  the  universe, 
and  therefore  pleasing  to  God. 

Paulsen  states  the  propositions  of  pessimism  thus : 
(i)  The  total  value  of  life  is  below  zero.  (2)  Life  has 
more  pain  than  pleasure.  (3)  That  life  is  as  worthless  as 
it  is  unhappy.  (4)  The  unhappiness  increases  as  civili- 
zation advances.  After  discussing  these  propositions, 
Paulsen  concludes  that  virtue  and  welfare  overbalance 
vice  and  failure.  Life  is  not  to  be  deemed  worthless  be- 
cause it  does  not  reach  absolute  perfection  and  happi- 
ness; for  the  value  of  life  is  not  only  to  be  found  at  the 
goal,  but  in  the  entire  race.  Opposition  and  trouble 
are  incentives  to  action,  and  hence  conditions  of  prog- 
ress. 

Paulsen  takes  up  evil,  and  declares  that  "it  supplies 
us  with  the  appropriate  conditions  of  growth,  furnishes 
our  capablities  with  the  necessary  tasks,  and  gives  to 
our  life,  if  we  only  wish  it,  a  rich  and  beautiful  content." 
He  adds,  however,  that  evil  can  be  justified  only  in  a 
general  way.  Natural  evil  may  possibly  be  thus  justi- 
fied, but  it  is  difficult  to  justify  moral  evil;  yet  Paulsen 
makes  the  attempt.  "If  it  were  wholly  eliminated,  hu- 
man historical  life  would  lack  an  indispensable  element. 
.  .  .  The  social  virtues  presuppose  the  natural  self- 
ishness of  the  sensuous  man.  Justice  and  benevolence 
imply  self-denial."  Self-love  is,  no  doubt,  beneficial; 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  381 

but  can  we  justly  defraud?  A  world  abounding  with 
wicked  people  may  be  a  favorable  place  for  the  exercise 
of  virtue;  but  does  this  justify  the  wicked  in  their  evil 
deeds?  Wickedness  in  others  may  not  hurt  the  good; 
it  may  even  be  a  means  of  developing  their  virtues.  But 
is  wickedness  good  for  the  wicked? 

Duty  and  inclination  are  frequently  in  conflict,  in 
which  case  conscience,  like  the  voice  of  God,  supports 
the  claims  of  duty.  The  social  claims  are  seen  to  be 
superior  to  those  of  the  individual.  As  the  claims  of 
the  many  overbalance  those  of  one,  conscience,  which 
has  been  artificially  developed  by  custom,  rightly  sub- 
ordinates the  original  selfish  impulses  and  instincts,  and 
works  to  an  end,  not  blindly,  like  original  instincts, 
but  consciously,  as  transformed  instinct,  and  with  a 
sense  of  obligation.  Custom  forms  the  original  content 
of  duty;  hence  duty  first  appears  as  an  external  act 
enforced  by  authority.  In  the  outcome,  individual  inter- 
ests are  promoted  by  conforming  to  the  claims  of  duty, 
and,  as  this  is  seen,  the  individual  will  cheerfully  con- 
forms to  the  social,  and  the  incentive  to  duty  is  the  com- 
bined force  of  custom,  conscience,  and  personal  will. 
But  when,  in  exceptional  cases,  duty  and  interest  ap- 
pear to  conflict,  conscience  asserts  the  claims  of  duty 
by  saying,  Thou  shalt  not  follow  inclination;  but  when 
there  is  no  inclination  opposing  duty,  conscience  says, 
Thou  shalt  perform  duty.  The  rule  of  duty  is  found 
in  the  unconscious  growth  of  custom.  It  is  not  a 
rational,  axiomatic  principle,  though,  when  developed 
by  social  experience,  it  will  have  the  support  of  reason, 
as  a  true  ideal  of  life  is  created.  Conscience,  which  at 


382  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

first  estimated  duty  by  custom,  now  measures  it  by  its 
ideal.  Duty  at  first  conforms  to  justice,  but  finally  to 
benevolence. 

Paulsen  rightly  rejects  the  opinion  that  egoism  and 
altruism  are  mutually  exclusive.  What  one  does  for 
himself  has  an  influence  on  others,  and  what  he  does  for 
others  affects  himself;  and  these  secondary  effects  are 
generally  recognized  by  the  agent  and  taken  into  con- 
sideration before  the  action;  but  the  altruistic  acts  are 
more  distinctly  ethical.  With  the  evolution  of  morals, 
the  altruistic  tendencies  increase  at  the  expense  of  the 
egoistic  impulses. 

The  relation  of  virtue  to  happiness  is  not  accidental. 
Virtue  gives  internal  peace,  and  tends  to  external  pros- 
perity. The  pessimistic  view  is  that  evil-doers  are  they 
who  prosper  in  the  world,  and  have  more  than  heart  can 
wish;  but  a  little  that  a  righteous  man  hath  is  better 
than  the  riches  of  many  wicked.  Outward  success,  if 
considered  paramount,  is  a  menace  to  character  and  to 
ultimate  welfare.  The  wicked  stand  on  slippery  places; 
their  footing  is  insecure,  their  fall  probable. 

The  relation  of  morality  to  religion  is  intimate.  This 
is  seen  as  a  historic  fact;  but  superstition,  or  religion  in 
its  lowest  form,  as  fetichism  or  idolatry,  has  no  connec- 
tion with  morality.  The  great  religions,  Judaism,  Brah- 
manism,  Buddhism,  Christianity,  Mohammedanism,  all 
have  their  systems  of  morality.  Religion  and  morality 
have  the  same  root  in  human  nature — the  yearning  for 
perfection.  The  doctrine  of  immortality,  with  its  hopes 
and  fears,  has  had  a  powerful  influence  on  morals,  as 
well  as  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  theistic  views. 
The  science  of  ethics  will  have  its  independent  develop- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  383 

ment,  but  the  practice  of  morality,  especially  among 
the  masses,  is  both  extended  and  confirmed  by  religion. 
Science  deals  with  phenomena  and  their  laws,  but  does 
not  reveal  efficient  causes,  nor  final  causes  or  purposes, 
thus  leaving  room  for  metaphysics  and  theology;  it  frees 
us  from  superstition,  but  does  not  destroy  faith  in  God, 
which  is  the  basis  of  theistic  ethics. 

In  regard  to  the  problem  of  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
Paulsen  distinguishes  between  psychological  and  meta- 
physical freedom;  that  is,  the  freedom  to  cause  one's 
own  decisions  and  acts,  and  the  freedom  of  particular 
decisions  from  any  cause  whatever.  As  evil  came  into 
the  world,  not  from  God  or  outside  necessity,  it  origi- 
nated from  man  himself,  who  freely  made  choice  of  evil 
instead  of  good,  though  not  without  the  permission  of 
God.  As  no  event  can  happen  without  a  cause,  the 
metaphysical  view  may  be  dismissed  without  further 
consideration. 

As  to  the  psychological  view,  we  should  distinguish 
between  will  as  the  power  of  choice  and  will  as  an  act, 
more  properly  called  volition.  As  an  event,  volition 
is  not  free  from  the  action  of  cause;  but  what  is  its 
cause?  Is  it  the  motive,  or  is  it  the  person  himself? 
The  motive  is  the  reason  for  the  choice;  the  person  is 
the  cause  of  the  choice.  Without  constraint  or  re- 
straint, the  person  chooses  between  certain  ends;  but 
he  chooses  in  view  of  motives,  which  are  reasons  solicit- 
ing choice,  but  not  causes  compelling  decisions.  The 
person  is  not  compelled  to  make  the  choice,  but  as  a 
free  cause  freely  makes  the  choice,  not  without  reason, 
but  without  compulsion. 

If  it  is  asked,  Does  not  the  character  of  the  person 


384  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

decide  his  choice?  the  answer  is,  The  person  with  such 
a  character  makes  the  choice;  but  the  character  of  the 
person,  though  the  consequent  of  many  antecedents,  is 
largely  made  by  the  person  himself;  and  he  has  power  to 
modify  his  character  by  changing  his  conduct.  By  con- 
sciousness and  reflection  he  can  ascertain  his  peculiar- 
ities of  character;  and  if  he  is  dissatisfied  with  these  pe- 
culiarities, he  can  by  his  conduct  so  change  his  character 
as  to  make  it  more  satisfactory  to  himself.  It  is  mere 
sophistry  to  attempt  to  justify  wrong-doing,  or  to  throw 
off  responsibility  under  the  plea  of  necessity. 

As  ethical  writers  are  in  substantial  agreement  as 
to  practical  morals — the  virtues  and  vices  and  duties — 
this  part  of  Paulsen's  treatise  is  passed  over  with  the 
remark  that  he  has  discussed  the  subject  in  an  able  and 
interesting  manner. 

2.  Wilhelm  Wundt,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the 
University  of  Leipzig,  opens  his  first  volume  on  the 
"Facts  of  the  Moral  Life,"  by  referring  to  the  distinc- 
tion between  the  explicative  and  the  normative  points  of 
view  in  the  treatment  of  scientific  problems,  and  classes 
ethics  with  those  sciences  regarded  as  normative  disci- 
plines. In  the  normative  sciences  certain  facts  are  dis- 
tinguished as  having  special  value.  The  explicative  sci- 
ences treats  of  what  is;  ethics  treats  not  only  of  what  is, 
but  what  ought  to  be. 

Wundt's  method  is  largely  historical.  He  first 
brings  forward  language  as  the  oldest  witness  of  the 
course  of  development  of  all  human  ideas.  The  deriva- 
tion of  ethics  from  ^0i/ca,  from  ?0os,  character,  disposi- 
tion, as  related  to  Z0os,  custom,  points  clearly  to  the  sub- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  385 

ject-matter  of  ethics,  the  inward  character  or  disposi- 
tion, and  the  outward  conduct. 

In  language,  the  antithetical  terms,  good  and  bad, 
right  and  wrong,  praiseworthy  and  blameworthy,  mark 
distinctions  of  profound  significance.  A  religious  refer- 
ence is  often  found  in  words  expressing  moral  approval 
or  disapproval.  Language  leads  us,  by  various  paths, 
to  the  conclusion  that  moral  ideas,  as  now  known,  are 
the  products  of  a  long  course  of  development,  and  have 
gained  their  specific  contents  gradually,  as  they  have 
freed  themselves  from  the  intermixture  of  foreign  ele- 
ments. 

A  question  now  arises,  Were  the  germs  of  later 
morality  included  in  the  primitive  ethical  conceptions? 
The  history  of  the  ethical  vocabulary  can  not  directly 
answer  this  question;  but  the  fact  that  the  physical 
endowments  of  health  and  strength  have  for  all  time 
been  associated  with  certain  moral  conceptions  indi- 
cates that,  like  the  laws  of  thought,  these  conceptions 
have  found  a  general  acceptance.  The  principal  sources 
of  evidence  are,  however,  found  in  religious  conceptions 
and  social  phenomena  governed  by  custom  and  legal 
norms. 

As  to  the  meaning  of  the  word  religion,  Wundt 
gives  three  hypotheses: 

(i)  The  autonomous  theory  that  "religion  is  an  in- 
dependent domain,  above  and  beyond  those  of  meta- 
physics and  ethics,  ...  an  immediate  consciousness  of 
the  universal  existence  of  all  finitude  in  infinity,  of  all 
temporal  things  in  things  eternal;  a  feeling  of  absolute 
dependence." 
25 


386  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

(2)  The  metaphysical  theory  that  "identifies  religion 
with  the  speculative  knowledge  of  the  universe;  or  that 
religion  is  the  knowledge  possessed  by  the  finite  of  its 
nature  as  absolute  mind;  or  that  religion  is  a  belief  in 
supernatural  beings." 

(3)  The  ethical  theory  that  "religion  is  the  realization 
of  ethical  postulates;"  or  that  "religion  is  the  realization 
of  our  duties  as  divine  commands." 

The  autonomous  theory  subordinates  morals  to  re- 
ligion; the  ethical  theory  subordinates  religion  to 
morals;  the  metaphysical  theory  demands  proof  where 
the  ethical  theory  is  satisfied  with  the  conceivable. 

Wundt  says:  "All  ideas  and  feelings  are  religious 
which  refer  to  an  ideal  existence  that  fully  corresponds 
to  the  wishes  and  requirements  of  the  human  mind." 
Myths  contain  religious  elements  as  well  as  other  com- 
ponents not  directly  religious.  The  relation  of  morality 
to  religion  is  like  that  of  religion  to  the  myth.  The 
myth  originally  includes  theories  of  nature,  religion, 
and  morals,  in  undifferentiated  unity.  The  religious 
elements  of  the  myth  include  the  ethical,  which  become 
partly  detached  from  them  later  on,  when  the  time  of 
the  myth  is  nearing  its  end.  Not  till  then  can  morality 
be  regulated  by  law  and  custom  independently  of  re- 
ligious superstitions. 

The  sources  of  myths  are  various — a  desire  to  inter- 
pret nature,  a  belief  in  spirits,  and  linguistic  analogies. 
The  mythology  of  a  people  is  a  combination  of  many 
separate  myths,  formed  by  poetic  imagination.  It  may 
take  the  form  of  fetichism  or  polytheism.  The  worship 
of  ancestors,  heroes,  and  the  gods  is  prompted  by  in- 
stinct and  the  desire  for  protection  and  help.  The  belief 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  387 

in  a  future  life,  with  its  rewards  and  punishments,  could 
not  fail  to  have  a  powerful  moral  influence. 

"The  world  of  sense  is  the  world  of  moral  action. 
The  supersensible  world  is  the  world  of  rewards  and 
punishments.  .  .  .  There  is  a  gradual  purification 
within  the  thoughts  that  center  round  the  ideas  of  re- 
wards and  punishments.  .  .  .  The  development  of  the 
idea  of  purification  reaches  its  climax  in  the  idea  of  a 
universal  spiritual  life  continued  with  an  ideal  cosmic 
order." 

The  ideas  of  reward  and  punishment  disappear  from 
the  ideal  future  life,  only  to  appear  in  the  present.  The 
severest  punishment  is  the  remorse  of  a  guilty  con- 
science; and  the  highest  reward  is  the  consciousness  of 
uprightness  of  character.  The  ascription  of  the  moral 
order  to  divine  regulation  resolves  moral  precepts  into 
religious  commands.  These  are  the  findings  of  investi- 
gation so  long  as  morality  looks  to  religion  for  its  sup- 
port. In  their  original  forms  religion  and  morality  were 
closely  connected;  but  in  their  more  advanced  stages 
their  separation  seems  possible.  Some  motives,  how- 
ever, must  be  discovered  for  moral  conduct,  and  these 
may  be  found  in  the  customs  of  social  life  and  the  sanc- 
tions of  civil  law. 

"The  line  of  demarkation  between  man  and  brute  is 
drawn  on  the  side  of  consciousness  by  the  connection 
of  individual  with  general  thought,  just  as  it  is  drawn 
on  the  side  of  the  will  by  the  plurality  of  incentives  and 
the  freedom  of  choice."  Instinct  is  ingrained,  custom  is 
voluntary,  and  is  largely  modified  by  circumstances, 
though  having  its  root  in  religious  and  social  instincts. 
"Mankind  is  prepared  for  the  adoption  of  new  ends  of 


388  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

life,  by  modes  of  conduct  already  existent.  Customs 
may  have  a  legal  standing,  or  may  be  estimated  by  com- 
mon opinion  as  good,  bad,  or  indifferent. 

Habit  is  personal  or  individual,  and  hence  peculiar; 
usage  relates  to  the  family,  the  community,  or  the  mu- 
nicipality; custom  pertains  to  the  tribe  or  nation;  fashion 
is  a  conventional  mode  or  style,  temporarily  prevalent. 
Usage  and  custom  induce  habits;  but  habit  can  not 
create  custom.  Fashion  is  fickle,  while  usage  and  cus- 
tom are  conservative.  An  individual  may  modify,  but 
he  can  not  create  language,  myth,  or  custom. 

Wundt  shows  how  custom  conserves  certain  forms 
of  action,  as  the  conduct  of  the  individual  for  his  own 
sake  or  for  that  of  society,  also  the  action  of  a  social 
group  for  the  welfare  of  society  in  their  own  vicinity  or 
of  humanity. 

The  requirements  of  food,  shelter,  and  clothing, 
when  the  climate  makes  it  a  necessity,  are  primary  wants 
demanding  activities  which  take  the  recurring  form  of 
custom.  Work  is  required;  class  distinctions  appear, 
especially  with  the  agricultural  mode  of  life,  and  division 
of  labor  begins.  The  labor  originating  in  the  compul- 
sory work  of  the  slave  develops  into  the  skilled  work- 
manship of  the  free  artisan,  which,  with  the  introduction 
of  machinery,  becomes  less  a  drudgery,  and  like  the 
play  of  children,  more  an  agreeable  exercise  of  bodily 
or  mental  powers. 

Along  with  these  activities  are  evolved  forms  of 
social  intercourse,  the  usages  of  polite  society,  the  culti- 
vation of  the  arts  and  sciences,  and  the  regulation  of 
national  life  by  legislative  enactments.  Family  interests 
and  religious  belief  give  to  social  customs  the  force  of 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  389 

moral  obligations,  which  are  enforced  by  common  opin- 
ion, and  in  certain  cases  by  civil  law. 

In  heroic  ages  the  aspiration  of  the  nobler  charac- 
ters is  after  honor  or  fame,  and  their  maxim  is,  "Act 
unselfishly  from  selfish  motives;"  but  the  transfer  of  the 
controlling  influence  from  egoistic  motives  to  altruistic 
leads  to  the  maxim,  "Act  unselfishly  from  unselfish 
motives."  The  punitive  power  of  the  State  enforces 
the  cardinal  virtue  of  justice.  Despotic  power  is  over- 
thrown by  the  establishment  of  constitutional  govern- 
ment, and  the  liberty  of  the  citizen  is  secured.  The 
State,  directing  its  activities  to  the  realization  of  the 
common  welfare,  becomes  the  supreme  teacher  of 
morals.  Public  spirit  is  necessarily  altruistic;  but  at  the 
same  time  the  State  affords  opportunities  for  the  pursuit 
of  egoistic  interests.  The  development  of  a  sense  of 
justice  and  the  consensus  of  opinion  act  as  a  check  to 
abuses,  and  guard  the  well-being  of  the  people.  The 
perfection  of  the  State  prepares  the  way  for  the  union 
of  humanity. 

The  humane  sentiments  are  cultivated  through  the 
forms  of  friendship,  hospitality,  and  charity.  The  neces- 
sity for  labor  has  been  a  restraint  on  evil  tendencies; 
but  with  the  improvement  in  the  means  of  industry  the 
hard  necessities  of  labor  have  relaxed,  the  cultivation 
of  the  mind  has  gone  forward,  and  man  has  been 
brought  more  fully  into  sympathy  with  nature.  With 
the  march  of  intellect,  the  social  and  moral  standards 
have  been  elevated,  and  the  claims  of  human  brother- 
hood more  fully  recognized.  The  logical  result  is  in 
harmony  with  the  principles  of  Christianity — reverence 
for  God  and  good  will  to  men. 


390  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

We  pass  over  Wundt's  history  of  ethics,  given  in  his 
second  volume,  though  well  worthy  of  careful  study, 
and  give  only  his  classification  of  ethical  systems. 

The  systems  of  ethics  may  be  classified  as  to  motives 
and  as  to  ends. 

i.  As  to  motives,  we  have  ethics  of  feeling,  ethics  of 
understanding,  ethics  of  reason. 

The  ethics  of  feeling  is  based  on  an  original  dispo- 
sition; the  ethics  of  understanding  on  reflection  awak- 
ened by  experience;  the  ethics  of  reason  on  an  innate 
power  whose  ethical  function  rests  either  on  an  em- 
pirically developed  insight  into  the  most  general  ends 
of  human  action,  or  on  innate  ideas.  Hence, 

Ethical  Intuitionism.  Ethical  Empiricism. 


Ethics  of  Feeling.  Ethics  of  Reason.     Ethics  of  Understanding- 

2.  As  to  ends,  we  have  heteronomons  or  authoritative 
systems  resting  on  external  commands,  and  autonomous 
systems  arising  from  original  disposition  and  natural 
conditions  of  development.  The  distinction  is  not  in 
the  end  itself,  but  in  the  way  it  is  given.  The  heterono- 
mous  systems  rather  avoid  stating  the  end,  but  empha- 
size obedience  to  the  law,  without  any  question  as 
to  end. 

Only  autonomous  systems  yield  a  systematic  classi- 
fication as  to  ends.    Here  we  have  two  forms :  (i)  When 
the  ends  can  be  directly  realized;  (2)  when  the  ends 
are  the  result  of  development.     Hence,  we  have 
/.  Heteronomous  Ethical  Systems. 

(i)  Political  Systems.      (2)  Religious  Systems. 

These  systems  emphasize  law,  and  either  give  no 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  391 

end,  or  affiliate,  in  respect  to  end,  with  one  of  the  au- 
tonomous systems. 

II.  Autonomous  Ethical  Systems. 

(1)  Eudemonism,  under  the  form  of 

a.  Individual  eudemonism  or  egoism. 

b.  Universal  eudemonism  or  utilitarianism. 

(2)  Evolutionism,  under  the  form  of 

a.  Individual  evolutionism. 

b.  Universal  evolutionism. 


Chapter  XVIII 
MODERN   ETHICS— OTHER   MORALISTS 

70HN  S.  MACKENZIE,  Professor  of  Logic  and 
Philosophy  in  University  College  of  South  Wales, 
has  written  a  valuable  book  on  ethics,  principally  for 
private  students.  He  defines  ethics  as  the  science  of 
conduct,  and  says:  "It  considers  the  action  of  human 
beings  with  reference  to  their  Tightness  or  wrongness, 
their  tendency  to  good  or  evil." 

He  defines  the  right  and  the  good,  and  says  the  high- 
est good  is  the  supreme  or  ultimate  end  to  which  our 
whole  lives  are  directed.  He  gives  the  scope  of  ethics 
as  a  normative  science,  and  says :  "It  is  neither  a  prac- 
tical science  nor  an  art;  it  is  rather  philosophical  than 
scientific,  since  it  is  the  study  of  the  ideal  in  conduct." 

MacKenzie  discusses  at  some  length  the  relation  of 
ethics  to  the  other  sciences,  and  devotes  a  chapter  to  the 
divisions  of  the  subject  and  the  plan  of  his  work.  In 
the  chapter  on  Desire  and  Will  he  treats  of  the  general 
nature  of  desire,  the  relation  of  want  and  appetite,  of 
appetite  and  desire,  describes  the  universe  of  desire,  the 
conflict  of  desires,  the  relation  of  desire  and  wish,  of 
wish  and  will,  will  and  act,  the  meaning  of  purpose,  and 
the  relation  of  will  to  character. 

MacKenzie  points  out  the  different  meanings  of  the 
words  intention  and  motive,  shows  their  relations,  and 

392 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  393 

discusses  the  question,  Is  the  motive  always  pleasure? 
He  criticises  hedonism,  distinguishes  between  concrete 
pleasures  and  abstract  pleasure,  and  investigates  the 
object  of  desire.  He  shows  how  reason  can  be  a  motive, 
that  some  motives  are  not  rational,  and  how  motives  are 
constituted. 

MacKenzie  holds  that  character  is  the  most  impor- 
tant element  in  moral  life;  that  conduct  signifies  those 
acts  that  are  deliberately  willed;  and  hence  that  con- 
duct corresponds  to  character.  Since  circumstances 
also  affect  conduct,  it  follows  that  conduct  is  the  product 
of  character  and  circumstance.  While  character  largely 
determines  conduct,  it  is  true  that  conduct,  especially 
when  determined  by  circumstance,  modifies  character. 

Moral  habit  is  a  habit  of  deliberate  choice — a  habit 
of  willing.  Right  willing  requires  thought.  Freedom 
of  the  will  is  liberty  to  decide  according  to  character, 
without  external  constraint.  Established  character 
gives  uniformity  of  conduct,  and  renders  it  predictable. 
Animals  have  spontaneity;  man  has  a  higher  freedom, 
the  highest  form  of  which  is  rational  freedom,  where 
the  will,  emancipated  from  the  control  of  appetite  and 
passion,  is  guided  by  reason.  Will  involves  energy,  and 
tends  to  pass  into  executive  action. 

MacKenzie  traces  the  evolution  of  conduct  from  the 
germs  found  in  animals,  through  the  acts  of  savages, 
its  guidance  by  custom  and  law,  and  by  reflection  on 
moral  ideas,  to  the  full  development  of  moral  conscious- 
ness in  enlightened  men. 

The  moral  judgment  develops  from  the  gregarious 
instincts  of  animals,  to  the  consciousness  of  "the  tribal 
self,"  of  which  the  individual  regards  himself  a  part,  held 


394 


SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 


by  the  social  bond  of  custom,  which  develops  and  guides 
his  conscience.  Positive  and  moral  law  unite  to  uphold 
the  standard  with  which  the  will  of  the  individual, 
though  sometimes  in  conflict,  must  finally  agree.  The 
individual  conscience  will  thus,  in  the  main,  agree  with 
the  social  standard,  and  in  case  of  divergence  the  growth 
of  the  reflective  judgment  will  be  stimulated,  as  is  shown 
in  the  history  of  the  progress  of  civilization. 

As  to  the  objects  of  moral  judgments,  we  pass  judg- 
ment on  voluntary  action,  also  on  the  character  of  the 
actor.  Is  the  moral  judgment  concerned  with  the  inten- 
tion or  with  the  motive?  Utilitarians  generally  answer, 
the  intention;  intuitionists,  the  motive.  MacKenzie  de- 
cides that  the  moral  judgment  is  partly  concerned  with 
the  motive,  but  really  with  the  character.  The  intention 
relates  to  what  is  expected  to  be  realized,  the  motive  to 
why  the  result  is  sought.  The  intention  decides  the  re- 
sponsibility; the  motive  reveals  moral  character. 

As  to  the  subject  of  moral  judgment,  there  are  dif- 
ferent moral  spheres,  or  "universes,"  or  points  of  view, 
from  which  a  judgment  can  be  made.  The  point  of 
view  may  be  that  of  an  impartial  spectator,  or  of  an 
ideal  self. 

MacKenzie  gives  a  careful  survey  of  ethical  thought, 
and  treats  of  the  types  of  ethical  theory,  the  various 
conceptions  of  moral  law,  the  doctrine  of  Kant,  the 
standard  of  happiness  and  of  perfection,  theory  and 
practice,  the  social  unity,  moral  institutions,  the  duties, 
the  virtues,  individual  life,  moral  pathology,  moral  prog- 
ress, and  concludes  with  a  chapter  on  the  relation  be- 
tween ethics  and  metaphysics. 

2.  T.  H.  Minrhcad,  lecturer  in  Mental  and  Moral 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  395 

Science,  Royal  Halloway  College,  begins  his  "Ele- 
ments" with  "The  Problem  of  Ethics,"  and  raises  the 
question,  "How  can  there  be  a  problem  at  all?" 

He  defines  thus :  "Ethics  is  the  science  of  character, 
as  habit  of  conduct  or  will;"  "Habit  is  the  solution  of 
practical  problems." 

So  long  as  the  solution  and  the  problem  are  congru- 
ous, the  ethical  question  remains  in  abeyance;  but  new 
problems  arise  of  which  the  early  habits  afford  no  solu- 
tion, and  doubt  is  thrown  upon  the  validity  of  custom. 
Hence  "wonder,"  the  source  of  all  science,  seeks  new 
solutions,  and  thus  begins  the  science  of  ethics. 

The  conditions  under  which  practical  problems  arise 
are  found  in  three  stages,  or  periods :  The  period  of 
formation  of  customs  and  habits,  corresponding  to  child- 
hood of  individual  life;  the  period  of  action,  in  which 
customs  are  adjusted,  corresponding  to  early  manhood; 
the  period  of  reflection,  in  which  new  problems  are 
solved,  corresponding  to  mature  manhood.  In  the  first 
period,  we  have  the  growth  of  morality;  in  the  second, 
the  equilibrium  of  moral  forces;  in  the  third,  the  devel- 
opment of  systems  of  reflective  ethics.  Historical  facts 
are  given  to  illustrate  these  conditions. 

The  effect  of  the  reflective  study  of  ethics  is  twofold : 
partly  destructive,  as  reflection  criticises  the  ethics  of 
common  sense;  and  partly  reconstructive,  as  it  elab- 
orates new  systems. 

The  question  arises,  Can  there  be  a  science  of  ethics? 
Certain  writers  hold  that  "if  the  will  be  free,  the  whole 
conception  of  a  science  of  ethics  falls  to  the  ground;" 
for  a  science  enables  us  to  predict,  which  we  can  not  do 
in  case  of  freedom  of  will.  Ethics  judges  conduct  to  be 


396  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

right  or  wrong,  and  this  it  can  do,  if  the  will  is  free.  In 
fact,  only  in  case  of  free  will  can  conduct  be  morally 
right  or  wrong.  Ethics  declares  what  ought  to  be,  and 
proclaims  the  rule  of  conduct,  and  predicts  the  conse- 
quences of  obedience  or  disobedience  to  the  righteous 
law.  Hence  free  will,  while  excluding  prediction  of 
conduct,  does  not  exclude  the  prediction  of  the  conse- 
quences of  conduct. 

Another  objection  arises:  People  ignorant  of  the 
science  often  pass  correct  moral  judgments  and  exhibit 
correct  moral  conduct.  These  people  have  common 
sense  and  a  conscience,  and  have  unconsciously  imbibed 
the  moral  sentiments  which  have  become  current. 

"Ethics  brings  the  moral  judgments  into  organic 
relation  with  one  another,  and  with  the  known  facts  of 
experience.  .  .  .  Ethics  has  to  do  with  the  description 
and  classification  of  moral  judgments.  It  can  not  fur- 
ther explain  them.  They  rest  on  an  innate  feeling  or 
instinct  that  defies  further  analysis."  Intuitional  ethics 
refers  the  primary  judgments  to  the  intuitions  of  reason; 
theistic  ethics,  to  the  will  of  God. 

As  to  the  scope  of  ethics,  Muirhead  says :  "It  is  regu- 
lative; it  treats  man  as  conscious;  it  is  closely  related  to 
philosophy;  it  involves  a  reference  to  a  cosmic  order; 
it  is  a  practical  science;  it  has  to  do  with  what  ought  to 
be,  rather  than  with  what  is;  it  is  more  authoritative  than 
civil  law,  extends  over  a  wider  field,  and  has  a  deeper 
significance." 

Muirhead  defines  conduct  as  voluntary  action.  To 
the  objection  that  we  pass  judgment  on  habitual  actions 
that  are  automatic,  not  voluntary,  he  replies:  "There 
was  a  time  when  such  actions  were  voluntary.  Conduct 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  397 

also  demands  a  purpose  or  end.  Then  moral  conduct  is 
a  voluntary  act  directed  to  a  good  or  bad  end." 

Muirhead  thus  gives  the  antecedents  of  a  voluntary 
action:  Feeling,  desire,  or  aversion,  deliberation  and 
choice.  If  the  execution  is  deferred  for  a  time,  we  have 
simply  resolution. 

"A  man  is  not  good  because  he  makes  good  resolu- 
tions, nor  bad  because  he  makes  bad  ones.  It  is  only 
when  the  resolution  passes  into  conduct  that  it  justly 
becomes  the  object  of  a  moral  judgment."  Civil  law 
demands  punishment  only  for  the  overt  act.  A  man  is 
not  guilty  of  a  crime  till  he  commits  it;  but  a  man  who 
intends  to  murder,  or  to  rob,  or  to  commit  any  other 
outrage,  is  not  morally  innocent,  though  he  is  frustrated 
in  his  attempt  to  carry  his  wicked  resolution  into  exe- 
cution. 

Muirhead  says  truly:  "It  is  a  common  mistake  to 
think  of  a  desire  as  an  isolated  element."  A  desire  is 
for  an  object;  it  is  related  to  motive  and  choice  and  exe- 
cution and  consequences;  it  is  for  self;  it  reacts  and 
modifies  self.  The  whole  combination  is  the  sphere  or 
universe  of  the  desire. 

"The  mistake  of  conceiving  of  will  and  desire  as 
controlling  or  controlled  is  connected  with  the  more 
fundamental  one  of  conceiving  of  the  will  and  the  self 
as  externally  related  to  one  another.  .  .  .  The  will  is 
dependent  on  desire,  and  all  desire  is  related  to  self  and 
character.  .  .  .  The  will  is  the  self."  The  will,  as  vo- 
lition, is  an  act  of  self;  the  will  as  power  is  not,  of 
course,  a  faculty  detached  from  self,  but  is  the  ability 
of  self  to  choose  or  decide.  There  is  more  in  self  than 
action;  for  action  is  not  self-supporting.  A  boy  runs, 


398  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

a  dog  runs;  but  running  does  not  run;  neither  does 
willing  will.  A  self  is  not  a  bundle  of  feelings,  thoughts, 
and  volitions;  it  is  a  subject  involving  a  combination  of 
capacities  and  powers  manifested  in  an  endless  variety 
of  activities. 

The  will  of  which  conduct  is  the  expression  does 
not  "stand  to  the  character  in  merely  an  external  rela- 
tion;" it  is  not  "determined  by  it  as  by  a  natural  cause;" 
nor  does  it  act  "in  an  independent  line  of  its  own  with- 
out relation  to  character;"  for  "character  is  the  habitual 
mode  in  which  will  regulates  the  system  of  impulses 
and  desires  which  looked  at  subjectively  is  the  field  of 
its  exercise.  .  .  .  There  is  the  distinction  of  character 
as  relatively  fixed  at  the  time  of  action,  and  character  as 
something  that  grows  and  changes  from  moment  to 
moment.  In  its  former  aspect  volition  must  be  con- 
ceived as  determined  by  character;  the  individual  act 
must  be  taken  as  the  expression  or  embodiment  of  char- 
acter." 

How  is  a  man  responsible  for  his  conduct?  "A 
man's  voluntary  action  may  be  taken  as  an  index  to  the 
moral  qualities  of  the  man  himself."  The  hypothesis 
of  the  determinist,  who  supposes  "actions  to  flow  from 
previous  conditions,  as  physical  effects  from  their  causes, 
or  that  of  the  libertarian,  who  isolates  the  will  from 
character,  as  a  mysterious  power  of  unmotived  choice — 
is  incompatible  with  human  responsibility."  The  vo- 
lition is  not  isolated  from  character,  for  character  is 
manifest  in  the  volition;  neither  is  the  motive  the  cause 
of  the  volition;  it  is  the  reason  in  view  of  which,  as  re- 
lated to  his  character,  the  person  decides  and  determines 
his  conduct.  There  is  no  coercion  in  the  matter;  the 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  399 

person  often  weighs  motives  and  deliberates  and  sus- 
pends judgment  for  a  time,  and  finally  decides,  it  may 
be,  in  view  of  the  bearing  of  the  decision  and  conduct 
on  his  own  attainment  of  an  ideal  character,  which  he 
hopes  to  realize. 

Muirhead  considers  conduct  in  two  aspects:  "It  is 
will,  and  it  is  action."  Does  the  Tightness  or  wrongness 
of  an  act  depend  on  the  motive,  on  the  intention,  or  on 
the  consequences?  In  regard  to  this  question,  philos- 
ophers are  divided.  Mill  says,  "The  motive  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  morality  of  the  act."  Bentham  defines 
motive  as  "that  for  the  sake  of  which  an  action  is  done." 
"The  intention  includes  both  that  for  the  sake  of  which 
the  action  is  done,  and  that  in  spite  of  which  the  action 
is  done."  "A  man  sells  his  coat  to  buy  bread;  he  in- 
tends to  sell  the  coat  and  to  buy  the  bread;  the  procur- 
ing the  bread  is  the  motive,  not  the  parting  with  his 
coat."  A  man  is,  of  course,  responsible  for  all  he  in- 
tends. Objectively  considered,  conduct  is  measured  by 
consequences. 

As  judgment  is  passed  on  voluntary  action,  it  may 
be  said  to  be  passed  on  will  and  on  self  as  expressed  in 
the  act  of  will;  and  as  character  is  a  general  habit  of 
will,  it  is  passed  on  character,  and  on  motive  as  related 
to  character. 

In  the  order  of  dependence,  the  right  rests  on  the 
good;  that  is,  the  means  is  for  the  end;  yet  the  law,  or 
rule  of  right,  is  first  in  the  order  of  time.  "The  first 
idea  of  morality  is  obedience  to  law  laid  down  for  hu- 
man guidance  by  a  superior  will."  In  primitive  times 
"the  law  is  conceived  as  external.  Later  the  internal 
law  of  conscience  supplements  the  external  law  of  au- 


400  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

thority.  When  reflection  has  more  fully  done  its  work, 
it  is  seen  that  the  law  is  related  to  the  end,  and  that  the 
justification  of  the  law  is  found  in  the  good  consequences 
that  follow  obedience.  Hence  the  three  points  of 
view — the  law  as  external  authority,  the  internal  law 
of  conscience,  and  the  law  as  related  to  the  end." 

Under  theories  of  the  end,  Muirhead  discusses  the 
end  as  pleasure,  the  end  as  self-sacrifice,  evolutionary 
hedonism,  and  the  end  as  the  common  good. 

Under  moral  progress  he  considers  the  standard  as 
relative,  the  standard  as  progressive,  and  the  standard 
as  ideal. 

As  to  evolutionary  ethics,  Muirhead  says :  "What  is 
required  to  complete  the  evolutionist  theory  is  (i)  once 
and  for  all  to  renounce  hedonism  and  all  its  works; 
(2)  to  add  to  its  empirical  demonstration  that  the  indi- 
vidual is  essentially  social,  a  teleological  demonstration 
that  his  good  is  essentially  a  common  good." 

Muirhead  has  prepared  an  able  review  of  Aristotle's 
ethics  in  a  work  entitled  "Chapters  from  Aristotle." 

j.  Professor  John  Dewey,  of  the  University  of  Chi- 
cago, has  prepared  two  books  on  ethics — the  first  en- 
titled "Outlines  of  a  Critical  Theory  of  Ethics;"  the 
second,  "The  Study  of  Ethics— A  Syllabus." 

Our  space  will  allow  only  a  summary  of  the  con- 
tents of  these  books.  In  fact,  to  review  them  in  detail 
would  require  a  volume. 

Of  the  first,  Dewey,  himself  a  teacher,  says :  "Other 
teachers,  indeed,  may  agree  that  a  general  outline  is 
better  than  a  blanket-mortgage  spread  over  and  fore- 
stalling all  the  activity  of  the  student's  mind;"  and  of 
the  second:  "The  present  pages  undertake  a  thorough 


HISTORY    OF   KTHICS  40! 

psychological  examination  of  the  process  of  active  ex- 
perience, and  a  derivation  from  this  analysis  of  the  chief 
ethical  types  and  crises — a  task,  so  far  as  I  know,  not 
previously  attempted." 

In  the  first  book,  Part  I,  Fundamental  ethical  notions, 
Dewey  treats  of  (i)  The  good  under  the  heads:  hedon- 
ism, utilitarianism,  evolutionary  utilitarianism,  Kantian- 
ism, problem  and  solution,  realization  of  individuality, 
ethical  postulate;  (2)  The  idea  of  obligation,  under  which 
are  considered  the  theories  of  Bain,  Spencer,  and  Kant, 
then  developing  its  real  nature;  (3)  The  idea  of  freedom 
— negative,  potential,  and  positive. 

Part  II. — The  ethical  world — social  relations,  moral 
relations. 

Part  III. — ( i)  The  formation  and  growth  of  ideals, 
conscience,  conscientiousness,  development  of  ideals; 

(2)  The  moral  struggle,  or  the  realizing  of  ideals,  good- 
ness,   as    struggle,    badness,    goodness    and    badness; 

(3)  Realized  morality,  or  the  virtues,  cardinal  virtues,  con- 
clusion. 

Of  the  effectiveness  of  the  first  volume,  the  present 
writer  can  speak  positively  and  favorably,  having  used 
it  with  satisfaction  in  his  own  classes. 

In  the  second  book  we  have  under  discussion: 

/.  The  nature  of  ethical  theory. — (i)  Subject-matter 
of  ethics;  (2)  Rise  of  ethical  theory;  (3)  Relation  of 
moral  theory  to  practice? 

II.  The  factors  of  moral  conduct. — (i)  Conduct,  as 
referred  to  the  agent;  (2)  Reference  of  conduct  to  the 
sphere  of  action;  (3)  Twofold  formula  for  conduct;  (4) 
Moral  functions;  (5)  Ethical  postulate. 

///.  A  general  analysis  of  conduct. — (i)  The  nature 
26 


402  SYSTEMS   OF   RTHICS 

of  impulse;  (2)  The  expression  of  impulse  and  its  con- 
sequences; (3)  Will,  or  the  mediation  of  impulse; 
(4)  Ethical  interpretation  of  this  process. 

IF.  The  moral  consciousness. — (i)  The  subject  of  the 
moral  judgment;  (2)  The  predicate  of  the  moral  judg- 
ment. 

V.  Moral  approbation,  value,  and  standard. — (i)  Nat- 
ural good;  (2)  Moral  good;  (3)  Development  of  volition 
from  the  side  of  idea;  (4)  Development  of  intention  or 
the  rational  content;  (5)  Development  of  motive;  (6) 
Nature  of  effort  or  tension;  (7)  Theories  of  abstract 
ideas;  (8)  The  hedonistic  theory  of  value;  (9)  Feeling 
as  end  or  ideal;  (10)  Happiness  and  desire;  (n)  The 
nature  of  desire;  (12)  Pleasure  and  motive;  (13)  Pleas- 
ure as  criterion;  (14)  The  standard  of  happiness;  (15) 
Standard,  ideal,  and  motive. 

VI.  Reflective     approbation. — (i)     Conscience;     (2) 
Moral  condemnation;  (3)  Various  aspects  of  conscience; 
(4)  Conscience  as  the  moral  sentiments;  (5)  Nature  of 
conscience  as  moral  knowledge. 

VII.  Nature  of  obligation. — (i)  Psychology  of  obli- 
gation; (2)  The  Kantian  theory  of  obligation;  (3)  He- 
donistic theory  of  obligation. 

VIII.  Freedom  and  responsibility. — (i)  The  psychol- 
ogy of  freedom ;  (2)  The  ethics  of  freedom  and  responsi- 
bility; (3)  Determinist  and  indeterminist  theories. 

IX.  Virtue  and  the  virtues. — (i)  The  twofold  state- 
ment of  virtue;  (2)  The  classification  of  virtues. 

Professor  Dewey  has  succeeded  admirably  in  cloth- 
ing these  bones  with  living  flesh.  Every  student  of 
ethics  should  have  Dewey's  books. 

In  an  article  for  the  Monist,  Dewey  states  the  posi- 


HISTORY    OF    KTTTTCS  403 

tion  of  Huxley,  in  his  Romanes  Lecture,  on  Evolution  and 
Ethics,  thus:  "The  rule  of  the  cosmic  process  is  struggle 
and  strife.  The  rule  of  the  ethical  process  is  sympathy 
and  co-operation.  The  end  of  the  cosmic  process  is 
the  survival  of  the  fittest;  that  of  the  ethical,  the  fitting 
of  as  many  as  possible  to  survive.  Before  the  ethical 
tribunal  the  cosmic  process  stands  condemned." 

Dewey  maintains  that  man  is  not  in  conflict  with  his 
entire  natural  environment,  but  that  he  modifies  one 
part  with  reference  to  another;  that  what  was  done  by 
animals  unconsciously,  as  by  chance,  is  done  by  man 
consciously  and  by  forethought;  that  evolution  is  not 
only  a  modification  of  organization  in  adaptation  to  en- 
vironment, but  the  evolution  of  the  environment — a 
continued  introduction  of  new  conditions;  that  the  con- 
flict between  habits  and  aims  does  not  allow  habits  to 
fossilize,  but  keeps  them  flexible  and  makes  them  effi- 
cient instruments  of  action;  and  that  thus,  by  this  cease- 
less activity,  wise  foresight,  and  deliberate  action,  the 
progress  of  the  race  is  insured. 

How  can  unconscious  evolution  in  nature,  without  a 
directing  intelligence,  work  to  a  rational  end?  Is  not 
the  cosmic  order  itself  a  proof  of  an  ultimate  rational 
cause,  the  very  power  in  the  universe  that  works  for 
righteousness,  and  gives  the  law  of  evolution,  and  that 
worketh  all  things  after  the  counsel  of  his  own  will? 


Chapter  XIX 
MODERN    ETHICS— OTHER    MORALISTS 

"\JEIVMAN  SMYTH.— In  his  work  on  Christian 
1  V  Ethics,  Smyth  says :  "  Christian  ethics  is  the  science 
of  living  well  with  one  another,  according  to  Christ.  .  .  . 
It  differs  from  scientific  ethics  by  searching  for  its  prem- 
ises, and  finding  its  laws  in  the  observed  facts  of  the 
Christian  moral  consciousness  and  in  its  historical  de- 
velopment. ...  Its  object  is  not  to  discover  a 
philosophy  of  virtue,  but  to  bring  to  adequate  interpre- 
tation the  Christian  consciousness  of  life.  ...  It 
will  be  a  comprehensive  survey,  from  the  moral  point 
of  view,  of  the  founding,  upbuilding,  and  promised  com- 
pletion of  the  kingdom  of  God." 

Smyth  treats  of  the  relation  of  Christian  ethics  to 
metaphysics,  to  philosophical  ethics,  and  to  psychology, 
also  to  theology  and  religion,  and  to  economics. 

He  says  Christian  ethics  assumes  the  philosophical 
postulates:  (i)  that  human  nature  is  constituted  for 
moral  life;  and  (2)  the  sense  of  obligation,  or  authority 
of  conscience.  It  also  assumes  the  theological  postu- 
lates: (i)  The  positions  of  Christian  theism;  (2)  a  di- 
vine self-revelation  in  man,  through  nature,  in  the  course 
of  history,  culminating  in  Christ;  and  (3)  an  ethical 
idea  of  God.  He  also  refers  to  the  special  requirements 
for  the  study  of  Christian  ethics. 

404 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  405 

\Yhat  is  the  ideal  of  Christian  ethics?  What  is  the 
supreme  good?  Smyth  answers:  "The  Christian  ideal 
has  been  given  historically;  in  its  first  revelation  to  men 
it  was  not  that  which  they  had  thought,  or  imagined, 
or  reasoned,  it  was  that  which  they  had  seen  and  heard." 
The  historical  revelation  shows  that  "(i)  The  ideal  was 
given  to  men  in  the  person  of  Christ;  (2)  It  is  presented 
to  us  through  Christian  life  and  testimony;  (3)  It  has 
been  realized  and  applied  to  life  in  many  directions  dur- 
ing the  course  of  Christian  history,  and  is  still  further  to 
be  realized  and  interpreted  in  the  progress  of  Christian 
life  and  thought."  These  points  are  fully  elaborated. 

According  to  the  prophetic  literature  of  the  Old 
Testament,  the  highest  good  is  the  social  welfare  and 
national  prosperity  of  Israel,  realized  in  righteous  obedi- 
ence to  the  laws  of  God  under  the  reign  of  the  Holy  One 
of  Israel. 

The  Messianic  view  of  Judaism  had  failed  to  reach 
a  true  ethical  universality.  It  had  clothed  itself  in  po- 
litical forms,  and  instead  .of  a  reign  of  love  among  men, 
it  expected  the  reign  of  Israel  over  the  nations. 

The  Christian  ideal  is  disclosed  in  the  doctrine  of 
the  kingdom,  that  it  is  now  here  on  earth;  that  the  ideal 
life  is  the  life  in  Christ;  and  that  the  realization  of  this 
ideal  has  the  calm  certainty  of  knowledge.  Christianity 
teaches  that  the  supreme  good  is  personal;  that  it  is 
for  humanity;  that  it  is* superhuman;  and  that  it  is  to  be 
manifested  in  the  hearts  and  lives  and  institutions  of  men. 

The  moral  ideal  of  Jesus  is  expressed  in  the  precept, 
"Be  ye  therefore  perfect  even  as  your  Father  which  is  in 
heaven  is  perfect."  Perfection  is  the  ideal,  blessedness 
the  consequence.  The  Fatherhood  of  God  implies  the 


406  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

brotherhood  of  man.  The  love  to  man  is  to  be  vital, 
warm,  personal. 

The  Christian  ideal  of  the  highest  good  has  its  final 
fulfillment  in  eternal  life.  This  is  the  antithesis  of  Bud- 
dhistic teaching,  that  life  is  undesirable,  and  that,  there- 
fore, the  consummation  to  be  sought  is  the  attainment 
of  nirvana,  the  extinction  of  conscious  being.  The 
Christian  view  is  that  personal  life  is  not  to  be  lost;  that 
it  will  be  a  deliverance  from  evil;  that  it  is  the  life  grow- 
ing out  of  the  spiritual  birth;  that  it  involves  the  fullness 
of  personal  relationships;  that  it  is  realized  in  righteous- 
ness and  love;  that  it  is  begun  in  this  life  and  is  partly 
a  present  possession;  and  that  it  is  to  be  the  fruition  of 
perfect  blessedness  in  the  life  to  come. 

The  Christian  ideal  has  its  perfect  embodiment  in 
the  personality  of  Christ,  and  is  now  realized  in  the 
spiritual  consciousness  of  his  followers,  as  holiness  of 
heart  manifested  in  righteousness  of  life.  It  is  coexten- 
sive with  all  spheres  of  activity;  it  encourages  every 
laudable  enterprise;  it  stimulates  every  form  of  benefi- 
cence. The  Christian  ideal  is  the  supreme  ideal. 

A  comparison  of  the  Christian  ideal  with  other  ideals 
awards  the  palm  to  the  Christian.  As  revealed  in  Christ, 
it  has  been  made  known  to  the  world  under  the  guid- 
ance of  the  Spirit  of  God.  It  has  advanced  by  stages 
towards  a  fuller  realization  and  universal  acceptance. 
The  Old  Testament  was  a  progressive  revelation  of 
which  the  New  is  the  fulfillment  and  completion.  The 
advance  from  the  prehistoric  stage,  through  the  legal  to 
the  spiritual,  shows  a  growth  of  conscience,  a  develop- 
ment of  moral  ideas,  and  an  elevation  of  the  standard 
of  moral  conduct. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  407 

In  the  Christian  era  of  moral  development  it  is  seen 
that  the  Word  was  the  promise  and  potency  of  pre- 
Christian  history;  that  there  is  an  indwelling  of  the  Spirit 
of  Christ  in  humanity;  that  Christ  is  evidence  of  God's 
love;  that  God  becomes  more  real  in  the  cosmical  signifi- 
cance and  ethical  environment  of  Christianity;  that  thus 
is  effected  the  reconciliation  of  man  to  God;  and  that 
faith  is  the  efficient  principle  by  which  man  realizes  the 
blessings  which  God  has  in  store  for  him. 

The  Christian  ideal  is  realized  in  the  welfare  of  soci- 
ety and  the  happiness  of  the  individual,  by  the  cultivation 
of  the  Christian  virtues  and  the  development  of  fraternal 
love.  The  Christian  character  begins  with  the  new 
birth,  and  grows  into  the  full  maturity  of  spiritual  life. 
Christian  progress  is  promoted  by  following  the  example 
of  Christ;  by  overcoming  evil;  by  the  co-operation  of 
Christians;  and  by  enlarging  the  spiritual  dominion  of 
man  over  nature. 

The  ideal  of  beneficent  love  is  realized  in  all  the 
spheres  of  human  life.  It  works  from  personal  centers; 
it  is  manifest  in  the  benevolent  enterprises  of  the  Church; 
it  is  active  in  family  life  and  Christian  society;  it  operates 
on  a  larger  scale  in  the  State  when  permeated  by  Chris- 
tian influence. 

In  Part  II,  under  the  head  of  duties,  Smyth  discusses 
at  length  the  Christian  conscience — its  specific  char- 
acter; its  education;  and  questions  concerning  con- 
science. He  also  classifies,  defines,  and  discusses  the 
various  kinds  of  duties. 

2.  Davidson,  Professor  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  in 
the  University  of  Aberdeen. — In  his  work  on  Christian 
Ethics,  Davidson  takes  for  granted  the  conceptions  and 


408  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

principles  of  general  ethics,  as  presupposed  in  Chris- 
tian ethics. 

Christianity  accepts  the  Decalogue  as  the  summary  of 
moral  law,  especially  as  condensed  by  Christ  in  the  two 
comprehensive  duties  of  love  to  God  and  love  to  man. 

Christ  emphasized  the  worth  of  the  individual,  and 
points  out  the  way  of  ethical  progress  through  conflict 
and  self-denial,  thus  giving  new  life  and  power  to  moral 
truth.  He  commended  the  gentle  virtues  of  meekness, 
patience,  and  forgiveness,  and  taught  that  the  heart  is 
the  fountain  out  of  which  are  the  issues  of  life. 

The  brotherhood  of  man  requires  not  only  good  will, 
but  benevolence  embodying  itself  in  beneficent  deeds, 
the  incentive  being  the  love  for  Christ. 

Christianity  throws  light  on  the  problem  of  evil,  and 
inspires  man  with  the  hope  of  eternal  life. 

Davidson  shows  that  Christian  ethics  is  original;  that 
it  can  not  be  separated  from  religion;  that  happiness 
resides  in  character,  and  is  transformed  into  blessedness; 
and  that  Christianity,  instead  of  giving  license  to  sin,  as 
some  maintain,  supplies  the  highest  incentive  to  holiness. 

The  incentives  to  virtue  are  found  in  the  conse- 
quence, both  of  a  righteous  and  an  unrighteous  life;  but 
the  life  and  the  consequences  are  necessarily  involved  in 
the  inward  character — the  real  nature  of  the  man  him- 
self. Moral  progress  is  a  growth  from  within ;  it  is  tested 
by  temptation,  and  is  confirmed  by  overcoming  evil. 

Faith  is  spiritual  vision  leading  on  to  victory;  hope 
is  the  anchor  of  the  soul  holding  it  steadfast  to  its  pur- 
pose; love  is  the  essence  and  fullness  of  every  virtue,  and 
as  never  failing,  it  goes  out  in  blessings  on  all  mankind. 
Love  is  the  essence  of  God,  the  crowning  virtue  of  man. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  409 

j.  James  H.  Hyslop,  Professor  of  Ethics  in  Columbia 
University. — In  his  introductory  chapter,  Hyslop  defines 
ethics  to  be  the  science  of  character  and  of  conduct,  of 
good  will  and  good  results  in  human  action.  It  investi- 
gates man's  highest  good;  it  is  closely  related  to  several 
other  sciences;  it  is  occupied  with  the  problems  of  man's 
moral  nature  and  whatever  is  contained  in  a  moral  ideal. 

He  gives  a  historical  sketch  of  the  development  of 
ethics  from  its  origin  to  recent  times. 

He  shows  the  importance  of  definition,  and  defines 
the  principal  terms,  as  virtue  and  vice,  good  and  evil, 
right  and  wrong,  morality,  duty,  and  obligation. 

The  psychological  field  of  moral  consciousness  is 
presented  in  outline.  The  conditions  of  morality  are 
stated  as  intelligence,  freedom,  and  conscience.  The 
subjective  and  objective  meanings  of  morality  are  dis- 
criminated, and  the  ambiguity  of  the  term  act  pointed 
out.  The  difference  is  shown  between  the  criterion  of 
responsibility  and  that  of  morality. 

Hyslop  discusses  the  terms,  motive,  act,  end,  result, 
choice,  and  volition;  he  discusses,  at  considerable  length, 
and  with  great  ability,  the  question  of  the  freedom  of 
the  will,  and  decides  in  favor  of  freedom.  He  shows  that 
freedom,  responsibility,  and  punishment  go  together; 
that  responsibility  implies  freedom  of  some  kind;  that  it 
involves  the  imputation  of  an  act  to  an  agent;  that  the 
agent  causes  the  act  and  elects  to  do  it,  when  he  could 
have  elected  an  alternative;  and  that  he  is,  therefore, 
praiseworthy  or  blameworthy,  as  his  own  conscience 
testifies,  since  he  recognizes  his  subjective  control,  or 
freedom  of  action.  In  this  Hyslop  is  correct. 

Responsibility  has  limitations,  in  environment,  hered- 


4io 


SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 


ity,  defective  knowledge,  or  undeveloped  moral  capacity. 
When  these  limitations  afford  no  sufficient  exculpation, 
punishment  rightly  follows  evil  doing. 

Hyslop  has  a  lengthy  discussion  on  the  nature  and 
origin  of  conscience,  in  which  he  gives  a  definition  of 
conscience,  the  history  of  its  conception  and  of  the  term, 
the  various  meanings  of  the  word,  the  analysis  of  con- 
science, its  functions  and  authority,  and  a  discussion 
of  the  theories  regarding  its  origin. 

He  criticises  the  theories  of  the  nature  of  morality, 
as  maintained  in  the  various  systems  of  ethics,  and  con- 
cludes that  each  theory  supplies  an  important  element 
in  the  complex  result  known  as  morality.  Pleasure  or 
happiness  is  a  good,  but  is  not  a  sufficient  guide,  neither 
is  it  the  sole  good,  since  perfection  is  a  good,  even  an 
ultimate  good.  Perfection  and  happiness  form  a  couple 
which  should  abide  together  as  one.  Strictly,  perfection 
is  not  ultimate,  but  penultimate,  since  no  one  would  care 
for  it  if  it  did  not  give  satisfaction;  it  is  true,  however, 
that  the  satisfaction  is  found  in  the  perfection. 

The  relation  between  morality  and  religion  has  been 
the  occasion  of  no  little  controversy.  Some  hold  that 
morality  depends  on  religion;  others  that  religion  de- 
pends on  morality;  a  third  class  maintains  that  morality 
is  independent  of  religion;  a  fourth  class  identifies  them. 
Hyslop  sums  up  the  discussion  thus :  "The  object  of  re- 
ligion is  the  supernatural,  that  of  morality  is  human 
welfare,  and  conformity  to  the  sense  of  duty.  Religion 
is  not  the  ground,  but  the  sanction  of  morality,  and  is, 
moreover,  not  the  only  sanction  of  it.  The  psychological 
or  subjective  elements  of  religion  and  morality  are  the 
same  or  closely  related,  but  the  objective  elements  are 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  411 

different.  The  two  fields  of  phenomena  intersect  and 
interpenetrate,  but  only  in  the  popular  and  concrete  use 
of  the  term  religion.  The  ideal  character  of  the  divine 
is  a  reflection  of  a  previously  developed  moral  conscious- 
ness, and  not  the  reverse." 

In  his  theory  of  rights  and  duties,  Hyslop  says  that 
rights  relate  not  to  actions,  but  to  powers;  that  right  is 
a  claim  to  the  forbearance  and  protection  of  others  in 
certain  specific  cases,  or  it  is  a  privilege  which  exempts 
the  subject  from  blame  or  censure  in  the  exercise  of  it; 
that  the  former  is  social  and  its  violation  censurable  and 
punishable,  while  the  latter  is  individual  and  moral,  and 
its  violation  only  censurable. 

Rights  are  limited  in  relation  to  nature,  against 
which  man  has  no  rights,  but  powers;  they  are  also 
limited  by  reciprocity  and  by  degree  of  responsibility. 
Rights  are  natural  or  acquired.  Natural  rights  include 
those  of  life,  liberty,  and  the  products  of  one's  own  in- 
dustry. Acquired  rights,  as  the  political,  include  those 
of  franchise  and  eligibility  to  office. 

Duty  is  what  ought  to  be  done;  it  is  imperative  and 
involves  responsibility.  Rights  imply  the  duty  to  respect 
those  rights.  Is  duty  a  moral  imperative  apart  from  rela- 
tion to  others?  It  is  a  man's  duty  to  maintain  his  dig- 
nity for  his  own  sake,  and  thus  to  be  worthy  of  self- 
respect,  and  it  is  to  the  interest  of  others  that  he  should 
do  this,  even  if  they  can  not  demand  it  as  their  right. 
No  man  is  isolated  from  the  universe,  and  to  degrade 
himself  is  to  lower  the  average  moral  standard,  and  is 
therefore  a  wrong  to  humanity.  When  one  member  of 
a  society  degrades  himself,  he  injures  every  other  mem- 
ber by  casting  suspicion  upon  them  in  the  eyes  of  the 


4I2 


SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 


world.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  one  to  treat  his  own  per- 
sonality and  that  of  others  as  an  end  of  inestimable 
worth.  If  God  takes  an  interest  in  human  beings,  to  de- 
grade one's  self  is  to  God  a  grief  and  a  wrong. 

It  is  a  duty  to  defend  one's  life,  liberty,  reputation, 
and  property,  to  secure  self-culture  by  the  pursuit  of 
truth  and  the  contemplation  of  beauty,  to  acquire  self- 
control  by  the  cultivation  of  virtue;  to  do  justice,  both 
as  a  matter  of  legality  and  equity;  and  to  manifest  be- 
nevolence by  friendship,  magnanimity,  love,  and  deeds  of 
beneficence. 

4.  Noah  K.  Davis,  Professor  of  Moral  Philosophy  in 
the  University  of  Virginia. — In  his  treatise  entitled  " Ele- 
ments of  Ethics,"  Davis  begins  with  a  chapter  on  Psy- 
chology, followed  by  one  on  Philosophy. 

He  says :  "Ethics  assumes  a  basis,  develops  a  system, 
and  elaborates  rules  for  the  conduct  of  men  individually 
and  collectively.  In  view  of  its  basis,  ethics  is  the  science 
of  rights;  in  view  of  its  system,  ethics  is  the  science  of 
obligation." 

He  regards  the  speculations  of  evolutionists  as  haz- 
ardous, though  pleasing,  and  says :  "We  are  rather  con- 
cerned to  know  what  morality  is,  and  purpose  to  study 
its  phenomena  as  manifest  in  mankind  of  to-day  and  of 
history." 

With  regard  to  Christian  ethics,  he  says :  "A  science 
may  not  borrow  its  essence,  nor  appeal  to  authority  in 
support  of  its  doctrines.  More  especially,  we  should  not 
confuse  science  and  revelation." 

Davis  assumes  human  nature  as  the  basis  of  ethics. 
"There  are  certain  fundamental  and  essential  features  of 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  413 

humanity  which  no  process  of  suppression  or  violation 
can  wholly  efface. 

"A  right  and  an  obligation  exist  only  as  they  co- 
exist. .  .  .  Rights  are  logically  prior;  they  condition  and 
originate  the  corresponding  obligations." 

Davis  shows  that  every  person  has  rights  which 
others  are  under  obligation  to  respect;  that  the  primary 
rights,  each  of  which  involves  the  others,  may  be 
summed  up  as  the  right  to  life,  to  liberty,  and  to  prop- 
erty, or  the  right  to  be,  to  do,  and  to  have.  "A  man 
has  a  right  to  the  free  use  of  his  powers  in  the  gratifica- 
tion of  his  normal  desires."  He  says :  "Freedom  lies  in 
the  power  of  choice.  It  renders  possible  not  only  moral 
obligation,  but  an  infinite  variety  of  self-determined  ac- 
tivities. .  .  .  Freedom  is  subjective,  liberty  is  objective." 

Liberty  is  restricted  by  the  rights  of  others;  and  it 
may  be  interfered  with  in  many  ways  by  internal  or  ex- 
ternal considerations,  or  by  means  warranted  or  unwar- 
ranted. 

"A  right  is  conditioned  on  a  social  relation.  A 
wrong,  however,  is  conditioned  on  a  right."  The  word 
trespass  is  used  with  some  latitude  as  coextensive  with 
wrong,  the  various  forms  of  which  are  specified. 

Davis  shows  how  an  obligation  is  related  to  law,  and 
how  it  is  enforced  by  the  sanctions  of  rewards  and 
penalties. 

Davis  gives  a  careful  treatment  of  right  and  wrong 
as  moral  qualities  of  voluntary  personal  action,  also  of 
justice,  duty,  and  virtue,  of  selfishness  and  service,  of 
charity  and  welfare,  and  of  Deity.  He  says:  "The  exist- 
ence of  God  is  a  postulate  of  ethics." 


4H 


SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 


The  second  part  of  the  book  treats  of  organization — 
the  man,  the  family,  the  community,  the  State,  and  the 
Church. 

5.  Frank  Thilly,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Missouri. — In  his  "Introduction  to  Ethics," 
Thilly  begins  by  showing  that  science,  by  analyzing  and 
classifying  things  and  occurrences,  reduces  confusion  to 
order,  or  makes  a  cosmos  out  of  chaos.  Not  content 
with  knowing  facts,  science  searches  for  causes.  Hence 
science  has  for  its  subject  matter  the  analysis,  classifica- 
tion, and  explanation  of  phenomena. 

Thilly  says :  "The  subject  matter  of  ethics  is  morality, 
the  phenomena  of  right  and  wrong.  .  .  .  That  we  place 
a  value  upon  things,  that  we  call  them  right  or  good, 
wrong  or  bad,  is  the  important  fact  in  ethics,  is  what 
makes  a  science  of  ethics  possible.  .  .  .  Ethics  may  now 
be  roughly  defined  as  the  science  of  right  and  wrong, 
the  science  of  duty,  the  science  of  moral  judgment  and 
conduct." 

He  then  gives  the  relation  of  ethics  to  psychology, 
to  politics,  and  to  metaphysics. 

As  to  method,  he  says  we  must  look  outward  and  in- 
ward for  moral  facts,  which  we  are  to  study  and  interpret. 

The  division  of  ethics  into  theoretical  and  practical 
corresponds  to  the  distinction  between  science  and  art — 
the  principles  and  the  practice. 

The  value  of  ethics  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  it  assists 
us  in  distinguishing  right  from  wrong,  and  gives  us  an 
ideal  standard  of  attainment. 

Thilly  gives  a  historical  sketch  of  the  theories  of 
conscience  from  the  mythical  view,  through  the  various 
schools  of  ethics  to  the  present  time. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  415 

In  his  own  analysis  and  explanation  of  conscience, 
Thilly  shows  the  importance  of  psychological  analysis. 
We  find  the  feeling  of  obligation,  of  approval  or  disap- 
proval, and  the  cognitive  judgment.  WJiat  is  the  gene- 
sis of  these  elements?  Children,  having  an  innate  moral 
capacity,  are  taught  the  knowledge  of  right  and  wrong, 
which  has  been  discovered  by  the  experience  of  the  hu- 
man race,  generated  through  fear  or  hope. 

The  effect  of  experience  has  been  transmitted,  and 
is  inherited  as  a  tendency  or  bias  to  accept  certain  opin- 
ions as  self-evident  or  intuitive. 

It  has  been  thought  that  conscience  will  be  felt  to 
be  more  authoritative  if  it  is  considered  as  the  voice  of 
God.  It  does  not  detract  from  the  force  of  moral  obli- 
gation to  know  how  conscience  was  generated.  An  in- 
sight into  its  origin  no  more  destroys  the  authority  of 
conscience,  than  the  understanding  of  the  psychology 
of  courage  makes  a  man  a  coward.  If  God  has  em- 
ployed evolution  in  devolping  conscience,  it  is  no  less 
the  voice  of  God. 

What  is  the  ultimate  ground  of  moral  distinctions 
and  of  moral  obligation?  Why  does  conscience  declare 
a  certain  act  right  or  another  wrong?  What  makes  an 
act  right  or  wrong?  The  theological  school  answers, 
The  will  of  God;  the  intuitive  or  common  sense  school, 
The  inherent  goodness  or  badness  of  the  act;  the  teleo- 
logical  school,  The  effect  of  the  act.  The  last  is  Thilly's 
view.  He  says :  "The  ultimate  ground  of  moral  distinc- 
tions lies  in  the  effects  which  acts  tend  to  produce." 

But  what  kind  of  effects  are  ultimately  desirable? 
If  we  say  pleasure,  we  have  hedonism,  egoistic  or  altru- 
istic; if  we  say  perfection,  wre  have  energism,  egoistic  or 


416  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

altruistic.  But  we  can  take  the  higher  forms  of  pleasure, 
better  called  happiness  or  satisfaction,  then  we  have  eu- 
demonism. 

Energism  is  the  theory  of  perfection.  The  realiza- 
tion of  a  worthy  self,  given  in  the  consciousness  of  recti- 
tude, affords  complete  satisfaction,  which  is  the  ultimate 
end,  the  highest  good. 

Thilly  gives  an  able  discussion  of  the  highest  good, 
enforcing  the  teleological  view.  He  advocates  optimism 
as  opposed  to  pessimism.  He  attempts  a  reconciliation 
of  freedom  and  determinism.  "The  will  is  determined 
in  the  sense  that  it  has  uniform  antecedents,  that  it  does 
not  act  capriciously  and  without  reason,  but  according 
to  law.  The  will  is  free  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  coerced 
by  anything  outside  of  itself."  That  is,  the  will  deter- 
mines its  own  volitions,  in  view  of  reasons,  according  to 
law,  which  may  be  accepted  as  true.  As  to  volitions 
they,  as  effects,  are  determined;  determinism  holds  true, 
but  the  determining  factor  is  not  the  motive,  but  the  per- 
son, who  decides  in  view  of  the  motive  as  a  reason. 


Chapter  XX 
OTHER    MORALISTS— EVOLUTIONISTS 

CM.  WILLIAMS.— In  Part  I  of  his  "Evolutional 
•  Ethics,"  Williams  presents  condensed  reviews, 
though  with  sufficient  clearness,  of  the  moral  systems  of 
Darwin,  Wallace,  Haeckel,  Spencer,  Fiske,  Rolph,  Bar- 
rett, Stephen,  Carneri,  Hoffding,  Gizycki,  Alexander, 
and  Ree. 

In  his  Introduction  to  Part  II,  he  says :  "In  the  very 
beginning  the  theory  of  evolution  may  be  said  to  have 
three  distinct  branches,  represented  by  the  Nebular 
theory  in  astromony,  Haeckel's  Ontogeny,  and  the 
biology  of  Lamarck,  Darwin,  Wallace,  and  Huxley;  and 
to  these  should  properly  be  added  the  sociological  ethics 
of  Spencer." 

Of  the  relation  of  evolution  to  science,  he  says: 
"Modern  science  has  so  grown  to  and  by  the  theory  of 
evolution  that  the  overthrow  of  the  latter  means  noth- 
ing more  nor  less  than  the  destruction  of  science  itself 
in  its  highest  results."  He  admits,  however,  that  evolu- 
tion does  not  account  for  the  origin  of  life.  He  says: 
"Science  has  no  desire  to  be  dogmatic.  It  readily  ac- 
knowledges the  total  absence  of  direct  and  established 
proof  at  this  particular  juncture  of  the  beginning  of  life." 
He  adds:  "What  significance  a  primal  creation  merely 
of  lowest  organisms  can  have  for  either  a  defense  of  hu- 
27  417 


418  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

man  dignity  or  for  Christian  theology,  it  is  difficult  to 
perceive."  If  nature  can  not  evolve  life  from  inorganic 
matter,  the  logical  inference  is:  a  supernatural  being  is 
the  origin  of  life,  and  if  God  created  primal  organisms, 
it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  he  guides  their  evolution. 

In  his  chapter  on  "The  Concepts  of  Evolution,"  Wil- 
liams says:  "To  Darwin  himself  the  struggle  for  exist- 
ence was  always  between  unities  represented  by  complete 
organisms,  whether  as  isolated  individuals,  or  in  family, 
tribal,  or  national  groups.  Everywhere  in  his  calcula- 
tions, appearing  unchanged  in  his  results,  is  found  the 
unknown  quantity  of  variation  from  ancestral  type,  the 
known  factors  being  heredity  and  natural  and  sexual 
selection  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 

Besides  the  external  struggle  for  existence  of  organ- 
isms with  organisms,  there  is  the  internal  struggle,  the 
competition  and  antagonism  of  organs,  as  shown  by 
Lewes  in  his  essay  on  the  "Nature  of  Life."  The  muscu- 
lar system  may  develop  at  the  expense  of  the  brain,  or 
the  reverse.  Disproportionate  exercise  of  certain  organs 
may  be  called  for  by  changing  external  conditions,  and 
the  change  required  in  the  work  of  an  organ  would,  if 
continued  for  generations,  lead  to  a  change  of  structure. 
This  corresponds  to  Spencer's  definition :  "Life  is  a  con- 
tinual adjustment  of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations." 
Of  this  definition,  Williams  says :  "Though  emphasizing 
an  important  side  of  evolution,  it  is  evidently  incomplete. 
Evolution  is  not  only  the  adjustment  of  inner  relations 
to  outer  relations;  it  is  also  the  adjustment  of  outer  rela- 
tions to  inner  relations,  as  well  as  of  inner  relations 
among  themselves.  .  .  .  The  great  question  is,  then, 
how  much  is  to  be  allowed  for  original  tendency  in 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  419 

primal  organisms,  and  how  much  is  to  be  reckoned  to 
the  account  of  the  action  of  the  environment  in  the 
course  of  evolution." 

Again :  "The  general  experience  of  mankind  has  rec- 
ognized, in  a  thousand  ways,  that  the  individual  is  a 
creature  of  habit.  The  strength  of  the  muscle,  the  cun- 
ning of  hand  or  eye  or  ear,  mental  acuteness,  and  even 
liability  t&  temptation  in  any  direction,  or  on  the  other 
hand  moral  strength,  all  are  coincident  with  exercise. 

"It  is  also  obvious  that  when,  from  our  point  of  view, 
we  distinguish  between  the  organism  as  acted  on  by  the 
environment,  and  the  environment  as  acting,  we  make 
a  distinction  that  may  be  both  useful  and  necessary  for 
many  purposes,  but  that  is  yet  an  arbitrary  one.  .  .  . 
The  two  are  interactive;  and  from  their  interaction  arises 
change,  as  resultant,  in  both  organism  and  environ- 
ment." 

In  regard  to  the  seeming  mystery  of  the  complex 
processes  of  life,  Williams  says:  "We  understand  the 
simple  parallelogram  by  which  the  physicist  represents 
to  us  the  action  of  two  forces  at  incidence;  .  .  .  but 
when  we  come  to  consider  the  formation  of  a  crystal, 
and  watch  the  regularity  of  shape  and  grouping,  this 
very  uniformity  which  had  been  before  an  explanation 
now  seems  all  at  once  to  represent  an  insoluble  mystery, 
separating  the  processes  forever  from  those  others.  The 
more  complicated  the  process  becomes,  the  more  the 
mystery  appears  to  increase,  until  we  build  up  out  of 
a  negative  ignorance  some  positive  new  entity  to  baffle 
us.  .  .  .  The  passage  from  the  inorganic  into  the  or- 
ganic, and  back  into  the  inorganic  is,  in  fact,  no  more 
mysterious  than  the  evaporation  of  water  and  its  recon- 


420  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

densation.  .  .  .  We  carry  our  human  importance  into 
all  science,  and  so  invest,  with  greater  weight  and  mys- 
tery, ignorance  that  concerns  our  life  and  that  of  allied 
forms." 

Again :  "The  abstraction  of  natural  selection  is  too 
often  elevated  to  a  separate  entity,  a  particular  power 
residing  in  the  environment.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  a 
mere  fiction,  a  device  for  assisting  our  comprehension 
of  complex  action  and  reaction.  .  .  .  There  is  always 
a  physical  function  connected  with  the  psychical,  and  the 
relation  of  the  two  is  not  an  accidental  or  variable,  but 
a  constant  one.  .  .  .  Whatever  the  metaphysical  truth 
as  to  the  freedom  of  the  will,  such  freedom  can  not  inter- 
fere with  the  constancy  of  nature/'  Man  can  lift  a 
weight  against  gravity;  but  the  weight  of  a  body  is  still 
a  constant  force;  yet  a  person  has  freedom  of  will  in 
controlling  his  psychical  activities;  he  does  this,  not 
without  motives,  which  are  reasons  for  action,  but  not 
compelling  causes. 

In  his  chapter  on  "Intelligence  and  End,"  Williams 
raises  the  question  as  to  "where  the  point  lies  at  which 
the  boundary  line  is  to  be  drawn  between  reason  and  an 
automatism  of  instinct  or  organic  action.  .  .  . 

"If  we  begin  with  man,  and  assume  intelligence  to 
be  the  cause  of  design — of  the  purposeful,  the  self- 
preserving — in  his  action,  we  shall  be  likely  to  infer  in- 
telligence as  the  cause  of  self-preserving  function  in 
all  animals,  and  shall  find  great  difficulty  in  drawing  any 
distinct  line  between  intelligence  and  automatism.  .  .  . 
If  we  begin  with  inorganic  matter  and  assume  automa- 
tism to  be  the  cause  of  its  motion,  we  are  likely,  ascend- 
ing the  scale  of  organic  existence,  to  interpret  much  of 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS 


its  function  as  due  to  material  action  and  reaction,  and 
may  again  from  this  side  find  great  difficulty  in  draw- 
ing the  line  where  intelligence  begins.  .  .  .  Assuming 
that  consciousness  is  the  cause  of  movement  by  which 
man  attempts  to  arrive  at  his  ends,  what  reason  have  we 
for  supposing  consciousness  to  exist  outside  of  man? 
Assuming  mechanical  action  and  reaction  to  be  the 
cause  of  movement  in  inorganic  nature,  what  reason 
have  we  for  assuming  this  to  be  the  cause  of  action  in 
organic  existence?  .  .  .  Materialism  is  as  much  meta- 
physics as  spiritualism;  and  the  materialist  who  con- 
demns metaphysics  condemns  himself." 

Williams  says:  "We  may  furthermore  protest 
against  the  elevation  of  any  negative,  as  for  instance 
Spencer's  Unknowable,  to  a  term  signifying  a  positive 
existence."  But  Spencer  says  the  ultimate  reality  is 
that  Power  whose  existence  is  of  all  things  most  cer- 
tain; it  is  not  a  negative.  Williams  closes  this  chapter 
by  saying:  "We  know  matter  and  motion  only  as 
united;  we  know  no  state  of  absolute  rest.  .  .  .  We 
have  no  proof  of  the  absence  of  consciousness  outside 
of  animal  life,  and  no  proof  of  the  non-existence  of 
transcendental  causes,  though  likewise  no  proof  of  their 
existence." 

In  regard  to  the  «'///,  Williams  says:  "The  most 
essential  characteristic  of  the  will,  as  a  psychical  faculty, 
is  that  it  is  connected  with  action  which  has  in  view 
some  end  consciously  sought.  .  .  .  The  arresting  ac- 
tion of  the  will,  as  the  control  of  lower  by  higher  cen- 
ters, is  its  most  important  function.  .  .  .  The  physiol- 
ogist calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  so-called  freedom 
of  the  will  has  for  its  basis  physiological  processes,  all 


422  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

of  which  are  in  accordance  with  the  strict  uniformity 
of  nature,  all  subject  to  law,  and  all,  as  we  believe, 
capable  of  exact  prediction  from  the  conditions  which 
produce  them,  if  we  but  comprehend  these  conditions. 
.  .  .  The  survival  of  any  organism,  at  a  given  period, 
is  determined  by  the  fitness  of  that  organism  for  the 
conditions  of  the  environment  at  that  period.  The  form 
and  function  of  the  animal  are  thus  at  each  moment 
determined  by  the  environment.  .  .  .  The  individual 
appears  to  himself  to  will  ends,  whereas  they  are  all  de- 
termined for  him  by  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  whose 
function  he  inherits  and  carries  out,  subject  to  the  modi- 
fication of  the  peculiar  elements  of  his  own  environ- 
ment. .  .  .  We  may  consider  all  evolution  of  higher 
function  as  increased  adaptation;  that  is,  as  harmony 
with  an  ever  wider  circle  of  nature,  the  reason  appearing 
as  corresponding  concomitant  knowledge  of  this  widen- 
ing circle  to  which  the  function  is  adjusted.  .  .  .  Evo- 
lutional ethics  demonstrates  the  constancy  of  character, 
the  persistence  of  habit,  the  uniformity  of  change,  under 
the  influence  of  environment.  If  there  is  no  persistence 
,of  character  and  uniformity  in  its  action,  we  have  no 
reason,  as  various  authors  have  shown,  for  trust  or  dis- 
trust, for  praise  or  blame;  and  I  think  we  may  add,  none 
for  love  or  dislike,  reverence  or  contempt,  enthusiasm 
or  coldness,  in  the  contemplation  of  character  or  con- 
duct." Here  Williams  reverses  the  common  opinion 
that  if  a  person  acts  from  necessity,  he  deserves  neither 
praise  nor  blame.  Freedom  implies  the  absence  of  ne- 
cessity, not  that  a  person  will  act  contrary  to  his  char- 
acter. A  person  is  not  necessarily  lawless,  because  free 
from  compulsion.  A  thief  will  steal  if  he  has  oppor- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  423 

tunity;  an  honest  man  will  not;  each  acts  according  to 
his  character;  but  a  man  can  change  his  character,  else 
reformation  is  impossible. 

Williams  says :  "We  can  not  explain  why  two  activ- 
ities are  concomitant.  .  .  .  Any  explanation  of  facts  be- 
yond analysis,  except  as  we  assume  some  transcendental 
intuition,  is  impossible." 

A  person  can  look  forward  to  the  desirable  ends  of 
excellency  of  character  and  consequent  conduct  and 
happiness,  and  in  view  of  these  ends  he  can  act,  and 
thus  change  his  habits,  modify  his  character,  govern 
his  volitions,  and  control  his  conduct.  In  any  act  of  the 
will,  the  motive  does  not  make  the  decision;  the  person 
makes  it  according  to  his  character,  in  consideration 
of  motives;  but  because  free  to  determine  his  own  vo- 
litions he  is  not  necessarily  fickle,  or  capricious,  or 
lawless.  A  reasonable  being  acts  reasonably. 

Williams  treats  of  the  mutual  relations  of  thought, 
feeling,  and  will  in  evolution.  As  to  the  relation  of 
pleasure  and  pain  to  the  will,  he  says :  "We  can  not  con- 
sider indefinite  feeling  alone  as  the  mover  of  the  will 
to  an  end.  The  pleasurableness  or  painfulness  is  predi- 
cated of  some  definite  end  or  event,  and  corresponds  to 
definite  actualities  perceived  in  the  object  or  event,  or 
imagined  with  the  help  of  former  experience." 

"Pleasure  follows  the  line  of  evolution  of  function, 
strongest  pleasure  appearing  in  the  direction  of  most 
strongly  developed  function,  so  that,  just  as  any  conflict 
of  tendencies  to  function  in  the  brain  must  result  in  con- 
quest by  the  strongest  tendency,  the  line  of  action  must 
always  correspond  with  that  of  the  greatest  pleasure. 
...  If  all  habit  comes  in  time  to  be  pleasurable,  if 


424 


SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 


pleasure  merely  follows  the  line  of  exercise  of  function, 
whatever  that  line  may  be,  and  ends  are  thus  matters 
of  habit,  and  habit  is  a  matter  of  action  and  reaction 
of  all  conditions,  then  it  is  evident  that  the  force  of  the 
teleological  argument  is  at  once  destroyed.  We  can 
not  pass  beyond  nature  by  this  route  to  the  inference 
of  a  transcendental  cause."  But  conscience  speaks  with 
authority,  with  a  menace  or  an  approval,  declaring  that 
the  ego  is  responsible  for  its  decisions,  that  it  is  not  an 
automaton  acting  by  constraint,  but  a  free  personality 
acting  without  compulsion,  though  not  without  reason. 

In  his  treatment  of  egoism  and  altrusim  in  evolu- 
tion, Williams  holds  that  altruism  is  developed  from 
egoism,  first  from  the  family  relations,  from  which  it 
is  extended  to  the  tribe  and  the  race. 

He  contends  for  the  influence  of  heredity,  in  evi- 
dence of  which  he  narrates  the  facts  relating  to  the 
Jukes  family;  yet  he  allows  for  environment,  the  influ- 
ence of  which  is  shown  by  conclusive  evidence  on  every 
hand. 

In  regard  to  the  evolution  of  conscience,  Williams 
holds  that  motives  are  mixed,  the  selfish  with  the  un- 
selfish. Reason  is  involved,  and  determines  right  and 
wrong.  Sympathy  leads  to  efforts  for  the  bestowal  of 
benefits  and  the  prevention  of  injury.  Altruistic  con- 
duct, originating  in  the  domestic  affections,  at  length 
seeks  the  general  welfare,  and  by  reflex  action  affords 
satisfaction  to  the  doer.  As  it  is  seen  to  promote  the 
good  of  all  concerned,  it  is  believed  to  be  right,  and 
thus  develops  conscience,  which  adds  the  sense  of  obli- 
gation by  approval  of  right  conduct  and  disapproval 
of  wrong. 


HISTORY   OF   KTIIICS  425 

To  appreciate  moral  conduct  is  to  learn  to  be  moral. 
The  highest  form  of  moral  conduct  is  to  do  good  to 
others  for  their  sakes.  Satisfaction  is  found  in  their 
welfare,  showing  how  intimately  blended  are  altruistic 
and  egoistic  motives.  If  one  found  no  satisfaction  in 
doing  an  act  of  kindness,  it  would,  as  a  matter  of  indif- 
ference, not  likely  be  performed.  It  is  true,  however, 
that  one  does  not  do  good  to  others  for  his  own  sake, 
but  for  their  sake,  yet  in  doing  them  good  enjoyment 
unsought  comes  to  himself. 

The  standard  of  conscience  is  advancing  with  the 
progress  of  the  race.  Egoism  is  not  lost  with  advancing 
altruism,  but  is  becoming  more  refined  in  its  action. 

Williams  traces  the  moral  progress  of  the  race  from 
savagery  to  civilization.  Even  in  enlightened  Greece, 
cruelties  were  practiced  on  the  helpless  and  barbarities 
on  slaves,  criminals,  and  prisoners  of  war.  In  Rome 
gladiatorial  shows  and  contests  with  wild  beasts  were 
the  sports  of  the  populace. 

The  Middle  Ages  were  disgraced  by  the  barbarous 
punishment  of  criminals,  the  persecution  of  Jews  and 
heretics,  the  burning  of  witches,  and  the  partiality  of 
the  laws  discriminating  against  the  poor  and  in  favor 
of  the  rich. 

Even  now  we  seem  to  be  only  at  the  threshold  of 
civilization;  but  the  unrest  of  the  times  is  a  groping 
after  better  things.  Higher  ideals  begin  to  inspire  the 
masses.  Enlightened  nations  are  coming  to  a  better 
understanding,  so  that  we  may  say  not  the  past  with 
its  darkness,  not  the  present  with  its  evils,  but  the  future 
with  its  hopes,  is  the  golden  age  of  man. 

As  morality  is  progressive,  it  follows  that  the  emi- 


426  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

nently  good  man  is  not  the  man  of  average  morality, 
but  the  leader  of  moral  progress,  who  carries  forward 
the  standard  in  advance  of  his  age. 

As  the  evolution  of  human  society  relates,  not  to 
one  nation  only,  but  to  the  whole  world,  progress  is 
hindered  by  the  uncivilized  and  non-progressive  races. 

To  what  extent  should  the  moral  make  sacrifices  for 
the  general  welfare?  Not  to  make  any  sacrifice  would 
delay  progress,  and  this  would  involve  loss  to  the  moral 
themselves. 

The  theory  of  evolution  is  a  large  addition  to  the 
progress  of  thought,  and  is  a  source  of  hope  for  the 
future. 

Williams  objects  to  Christian  ethics,  especially  to 
the  morality  of  the  Old  Testament  because  of  its  cruelty, 
and  to  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment, as  encouragement  to  sin.  It  will  suffice  to  reply 
that  we  do  not  justify  the  cruelties  of  the  Hebrews,  and 
that  forgiveness  of  sin  is  promised  on  condition  of  re- 
pentance, which  means  reformation — a  new  and  right- 
eous life. 

The  disagreement  of  opinion  in  regard  to  moral 
progress  is  not  as  to  what  the  ethical  ideal  should  be, 
but  as  to  the  method  of  its  attainment. 

In  the  sociological  contest  between  the  individual- 
ist and  the  socialist,  the  claim  of  the  individualist  can 
not  be  allowed  that  his  doings  are  of  no  consequence  to 
society,  nor  is  the  demand  of  the  socialist  for  a  revolu- 
tion in  social  conditions  likely  to  be  realized.  Practical 
reforms  will  be  inaugurated  from  time  to  time  as  their 
importance  is  understood  by  the  majority  of  the  people. 
Great  problems  relating  to  the  care  of  the  unfortunate, 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  427 

the  treatment  of  criminals,  the  relations  of  the  sexes, 
the  education  of  children  and  youth,  will  continue  to  be 
presented,  and  their  adequate  solution  will  require  the 
united  wisdom  of  the  better  classes  of  society. 

2.  Clifford. — In  treating  of  the  scientific  basis  of 
morals,  Clifford  says:  "The  moral  sense  is  the  pleasure 
or  displeasure  taken  in  conduct  felt  to  be  right  or 
wrong.  The  maxims  of  ethics  are  the  imperatives:  Do 
this  because  it  is  right;  avoid  that  because  it  is  wrong. 
The  particular  things  commanded  or  forbidden  by  a 
person's  moral  sense  depend  on  his  character.  That 
seems  right  or  wrong  which  pleases  or  displeases  his 
moral  sense.  There  is  a  general  agreement  in  the 
ethical  code  of  persons  of  the  same  race  at  a  given  time; 
but  considerable  variations  in  different  races  at  different 
times." 

The  maxims  of  ethics  are  hypothetical,  and  are  de- 
rived from  experience  on  the  assumption  of  uniformity 
in  nature. 

Self  signifies  the  conscious  subject;  it  also  denotes 
an  aggregate  of  feelings  bound  together  by  habitual 
association.  The  body  is  taken  as  belonging  to  self. 
Remote  motives  revolve  about  self,  and  thus  tend  to 
become  simple  and  immediate.  In  this  comes  the  con- 
ception of  the  family,  city,  and  tribal  self,  which  by  ex- 
tension in  higher  natures  becomes  the  self  of  humanity. 
The  disposition  which  makes  these  higher  selves  su- 
preme Clifford  calls  piety. 

Self  then  serves  as  a  peg  on  which  desires  are  hung. 
The  individual  self  is  the  peg  on  which  are  hung  remote 
desires  affecting  the  individual ;  the  tribal  self  is  the  peg 
supporting  desires  implanted  by  the  needs  of  the  tribe. 


428  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Those  tribes  that  encourage  piety;  that  is,  dispo- 
sitions and  conduct  conducive  to  the  common  interests, 
survive;  tribes  that  fail  to  do  this  perish.  When  an  indi- 
vidual does  an  act  harmful  to  the  community,  the  de- 
sire of  his  individual  self  is  stronger  than  that  of  the 
tribal  self.  On  reflection,  the  tribal  self  wakes  up,  and 
the  individual  condemns  his  conduct.  This  self-con- 
demnation is  conscience,  and  the  accompanying  dislike 
of  himself  is  remorse. 

Like  or  dislike  is  to  be  distinguished  from  its  ex- 
pression, which  is  attached  to  the  feeling  by  links  of 
association.  The  expression  serves  the  purpose  of  re- 
taining or  repeating  the  thing  liked  or  of  removing  the 
thing  disliked,  and  this  purpose  is  served  by  the  tribal 
approbation  or  disapprobation.  It  promotes  the  wel- 
fare of  the  tribe  to  encourage  piety  and  to  discourage 
impiety.  The  process  by  which  this  is  done  is  direct  or 
reflex;  by  the  direct  process  the  offender  is  cut  off,  but 
by  the  indirect  he  is  punished  in  view  of  his  reformation. 
The  person  in  either  case  is  held  responsible  for  his 
conduct. 

Clifford  holds  that  the  ethical  maxims  are  hypothet- 
ical. They  are  learned  by  the  tribe  from  the  experience 
of  their  utility;  and  being  acquired,  not  directly,  but  by 
tribal  selection,  they  appear  to  the  individual  uncon- 
ditional or  categorical;  but  their  hypothetical  character 
is  apparent  on  reflection.  If  an  individual  wishes  to  live 
with  his  tribe,  he  must  conform  to  its  customs;  if  he  does 
not  conform,  his  conscience  upbraids  him. 

The  maxims  of  ethics  are  based  on  uniformity.  Vo- 
litions occur  according  to  law;  they  are  not  uncaused; 
they  are  caused  by  the  person  himself  according  to  his 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  429 

character  and  circumstances.  Will  as  volition  or  choice 
or  decision  is  not  free,  but  caused.  The  person  alone 
is  free  to  cause  his  volitions;  he  is  free  from  external 
compulsion  or  restraint,  and  is  at  liberty  to  make  his 
decisions  according  to  the  light  of  reason. 

Clifford  thinks  that  ethics  is  a  matter  of  tribe  or 
community,  and  that  there  is  no  self-regarding  virtue. 
But  certainly  a  person  can  cultivate  his  virtues,  first  for 
his  own  sake;  and,  secondly,  for  the  sake  of  the  com- 
munity. It  is  his  duty,  for  the  sake  of  others,  to  make 
himself  as  strong,  as  wise,  as  good  as  possible. 

Ethical  investigation  demands  two  postulates — the 
uniformity  of  nature,  and  the  existence  of  other  persons, 
conscious  like  ourselves.  On  our  belief  in  these  pos- 
tulates we  are  obliged  to  act.  To  the  facts  of  moral 
life  in  ourselves  and  others  we  can  apply  the  scientific 
method. 

That  a  person  be  morally  responsible  for  an  action, 
Clifford  holds  that  three  things  are  necessary:  "He 
might  have  done  something  else,  that  is  to  say,  the 
action  was  not  wholly  determined  by  external  circum- 
stances, and  he  is  responsible  only  for  the  choice  which 
was  left  him;  he  had  a  conscience;  the  action  was 
one  in  regard  to  the  doing  or  not  doing  of  which  con- 
science might  be  a  sufficient  motive." 

Here  it  is  well  to  note  Clifford's  definition:  "Con- 
science is  the  whole  aggregate  of  our  feelings  about 
actions  as  being  right  or  wrong,  regarded  as  tending 
to  make  us  do  the  right  actions  and  avoid  the  wrong 
ones." 

The  crux  of  the  matter  lies  in  the  distinction  between 
the  voluntary  and  the  involuntary.  A  man  coughs; 


430 


SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 


that  is  involuntary,  and  he  is  not  responsible.  He  steals; 
that  is  voluntary,  and  he  is  responsible. 

Clifford  classifies  actions  as  involuntary  or  volun- 
tary; involuntary,  in  which  the  choice  of  motive  is  in- 
voluntary; and  voluntary,  in  which  the  choice  of  motive 
is  voluntary.  In  each  case  the  responsibility  is  in  that 
part  of  the  character  which  determines  what  the  act 
shall  be.  Responsibility  is  not  for  involuntary  action, 
but  for  voluntary. 

The  passions,  desires,  aversions,  pleasures,  pains,  are 
to  be  distinguished  from  the  deeper  self,  called  reason, 
will,  ego,  which  is  responsible,  not  for  the  motive,  but 
for  the  choice  of  motive. 

A  person,  however,  is  responsible  for  many  circum- 
stances, for  many  restrictions  on  his  own  freedom,  for 
those  which  he  voluntarily  produced. 

To  suppose  the  character  of  the  action  is  not  con- 
nected with  the  character  of  the  ego,  is  to  render  the 
act  lawless,  and  the  attempt  to  change  the  character 
needless,  at  least  so  far  as  the  conduct  is  concerned.  It 
is  not  necessary,  however,  to  hold  that  the  ego  is  deter- 
mined; that  is,  compelled  by  the  motive.  He  is  not 
passive  in  choice,  but  active.  He  freely  acts  in  accord- 
ance with  a  reasonable  motive.  A  reasonable  being  will 
act  reasonably,  without  compulsion.  The  thing  that  is 
free  is  not  the  choice,  which  is  made,  but  the  person 
who  makes  the  choice.  In  like  circumstances  a  person 
of  given  character  in  making  his  choice  will  freely  act 
uniformly,  according  to  character.  A  person's  char- 
acter is,  however,  subject  to  modification  by  the  person 
himself. 

The  function  of  conscience  is  the  preservation  of 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  431 

the  community,  and  we  rightly  train  our  conscience  by 
learning  to  approve  those  actions  which  tend  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  community  in  the  struggle  for  existence. 
Clifford  says :  "The  first  principle  of  natural  ethics  is 
the  sole  and  supreme  allegiance  of  conscience  to  the 
community."  He  holds  that  efficiency,  not  happiness, 
is  the  end  of  moral  action,  yet  he  admits  that  in  the  long 
run  happiness  will  be  the  outcome  of  efficiency.  If  no 
good,  except  preservation,  came  to  the  community  from 
efficiency,  preservation  itself  would  be  a  matter  of  little 
consequence. 

Clifford  is  strenuous  in  his  advocacy  of  veracity. 
The  exceptional  cases  should  remain  exceptional. 
Falsehood  should  not  be  propagated  because  believed 
to  be  useful.  Falsehood  can  not  be  necessary  to  moral- 
ity. Faith  in  humanity  and  in  the  duty  of  truthfulness 
must  finally  prevail. 

Clifford  says:  "It  is  wrong  always,  everywhere,  and 
for  any  one  to  believe  anything  on  insufficient  evi- 
dence." It  is  sometimes  necessary  to  act  on  proba- 
bilities; for  in  this  way  we  often  find  evidence  for  future 
belief. 

The  reputation  of  a  man  for  veracity  may  warrant 
the  belief  that  he  intends  to  speak  the  truth;  but  it  is 
not  sufficient  to  prove  that  he  knows  the  truth. 

The  fact  that  believers  have  found  joy  in  believing 
a  doctrine,  proves  that  the  doctrine  is  comforting  to 
them,  not  that  it  is  true. 

It  is  right  to  doubt  the  uncertain,  to  question  the 
implications  of  a  doctrine,  to  investigate  new  problems, 
to  correct  imperfect  views,  to  enlarge  and  test  our 
knowledge,  and  to  apply  it  for  the  benefit  of  mankind. 


432  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

How  far  can  we  trust  to  inference  that  goes  beyond 
experience?  From  the  experience  we  had  yesterday, 
we  infer  what  will  happen  to-morrow;  but  we  know  the 
experience  of  yesterday  only  through  memory,  which 
sometimes  fails  us;  the  inference  that  a  like  thing  will 
happen  to-morrow  also  assumes  that  the  future  will  be 
consistent  with  the  past.  Every  belief  goes  beyond 
experience;  but  what  beliefs  are  legitimate,  and  what 
is  their  warrant?  Clifford  gives  a  summary  answer: 
"We  may  believe  what  goes  beyond  our  experience, 
when  it  is  inferred  from  that  experience  by  the  assump- 
tion that  what  we  do  not  know  is  like  what  we  know. 
We  may  believe  the  statement  of  another  person,  when 
there  is  reasonable  ground  for  supposing  that  he  knows 
the  matter  of  which  he  speaks,  and  that  he  is  speaking 
the  truth  so  far  as  he  knows  it.  It  is  wrong  in  all  cases 
to  believe  on  insufficient  evidence;  and  where  it  is  pre- 
sumption to  doubt  and  to  investigate,  there  it  is  worse 
than  presumption  to  believe." 

Clifford  defines  religion  as  a  system  of  doctrines,  a 
ceremonial  or  cult,  with  a  priesthood,  a  body  of  pre- 
cepts and  a  moral  code.  He  condemns  in  strong  terms 
a  religion  which  requires  belief  without  evidence,  and 
the  pagan  religions  which  represent  their  gods  as  im- 
moral, also  the  so-called  Christian  doctrines  of  original 
sin,  vicarious  sacrifice,  and  eternal  punishment.  He 
holds  that  it  is  immoral  to  uphold  a  false  doctrine,  be- 
cause of  its  supposed  favorable  influence  on  morals. 
Priestcraft  he  unsparingly  denounces;  but  he  applauds 
the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  and  such  preachers  of  right- 
eousness as  Charles  Kingsley  and  James  Martineau. 


HISTORY   Otf   ETHICS  433 

Clifford  admits  that  belief  in  God  and  in  immortality 
is  a  source  of  refined  and  elevated  pleasure;  but  main- 
tains that  conscience,  instead  of  being  the  voice  of  God, 
is  the  voice  of  humanity,  organized  as  an  instinct  in 
the  evolution  of  the  race;  that  it  is  not  a  creed,  but  a 
habit  formed  by  social  co-operation. 
28 


Chapter  XXI 
OTHER  MORALISTS 

S  ALEXANDER.— In  his  "Moral  Order  and  Prog- 
•  ress,"  of  which  we  give  a  condensed  summary, 
Alexander  gives  a  twofold  division  of  the  work  of 
ethics :  To  supply  a  catalogue  of  the  virtues,  duties,  and 
the  corresponding  moral  judgments;  and  to  discuss 
the  signification  of  these  judgments. 

He  notes  the  convergence  of  the  ethical  schools- 
utilitarianism  developing  into  evolutional  ethics  on  the 
one  hand,  and  into  Kantian  idealism  on  the  other.  The 
convergence  is  not  merely  of  precepts,  but  in  scientific 
treatment  and  in  the  result  a  recognition  of  proportion 
in  the  organic  connection  between  the  individual  and 
society. 

Egoism  was  followed  by  altruistic  utilitarianism, 
which  enlarged  the  moral  end.  Evolutional  ethics  still 
further  enlarged  the  end,  by  accounting  for  the  rela- 
tion of  the  individual  to  the  moral  law,  to  society,  and 
the  State,  as  shown  in  historical  research  and  biological 
investigation. 

The  idea  of  freedom  has  a  two-sided  development, 
relating  to  the  rights  of  the  individual  and  to  the  rights 
of  society  as  a  collective  body. 

How  did  moral  judgments  come  to  be,  and  how 
are  they  maintained,  developed,  or  changed?  The  an- 

434 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  435 

swcr  depends  on  the  answer  to  other  questions:  What 
is  the  good?  Why  is  it  good?  How  does  goodness 
come  into  being,  how  is  it  maintained,  and  how  does  it 
advance? 

Moral  judgments  pertain  to  voluntary  action  relat- 
ing to  a  good  or  bad  end,  the  idea  of  which  is  present 
to  consciousness.  The  terms  good  and  bad  are  properly 
applied  to  ends,  but  sometimes  to  voluntary  acts, 
though  to  acts,  so  far  as  they  have  a  moral  bearing, 
the  terms  right  and  wrong  are  more  appropriately  ap- 
plied. Feelings,  as  affections  and  desires,  have  a  moral 
bearing  as  well  as  choice,  conduct,  and  consequences. 
External  conduct  has  its  internal  correlate  in  the  inten- 
tion, which  is  morally  significant,  even  in  case  of  failure 
to  realize  the  end,  as  when  the  intended  act  is  pre- 
vented or  the  proposed  end  frustrated. 

Alexander  says  moral  character  exists  only  in  con- 
duct— in  internal  conduct,  or  choice  and  intention,  and 
in  external  conduct,  or  outward  act.  Common  senti- 
ments find  expression  in  common  habits  and  customs. 
Character  resides  in  the  person,  and  is  more  permanent 
than  conduct;  it  expresses  itself  in  conduct;  that  is,  in 
choice,  intention,  and  execution.  The  person  is  re- 
sponsible for  his  conduct  and  its  foreseen  consequences. 

Motive  has  moral  character  only  as  it  is  adopted 
as  a  reason  for  action.  Conduct  and  character  are  the 
two  factors  of  the  moral  personality.  As  regard  for 
self,  prudence,  so  far  as  consistent  with  public  welfare, 
is  a  virtue,  and  therefore  a  duty.  Ethics  in  passing  from 
the  utilitarian  to  the  evolutional  system,  has  replaced 
the  ideal  of  the  end,  as  pleasure  by  that  of  social  health, 
which  is  a  living  fountain  of  perpetual  satisfaction. 


436  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

Individualism  and  universalism  in  morals  tend  to 
harmony — individualism  is  becoming  more  socialistic, 
and  universalism  more  individualistic,  as  it  is  seen  that 
the  individual  receives  benefit  from  the  prosperity  of 
society,  and  society  from  the  welfare  of  the  individuals 
of  which  it  is  composed.  The  general  prosperity  should, 
therefore,  be  the  common  aim. 

The  acts  of  a  good  man  are  adjusted  to  one  another. 
A  good  character  finds  expression  in  a  systematic  order 
of  harmonious  volitions  and  actions,  which  satisfies 
every  part  of  its  nature.  A  good  man  is  one  whose 
character  and  conduct  are  well  balanced.  The  ideal  of 
a  moral  life,  though  not  fully  attained,  is  the  end 
towards  which  progress  is  continually  made.  Every 
right  act  is  so  far  a  realization  of  the  ideal  end,  which 
is,  therefore,  not  to  be  conceived  as  infinitely  removed 
in  time,  but  as  the  whole  life  manifested  in  a  series  of 
right  acts  as  the  expression  of  a  character  tending  to 
perfection.  The  moral  aim,  then,  is  to  have  a  present 
and  continued  good  character,  expressed  in  present  and 
continued  right  conduct.  A  good  moral  life  is  there- 
fore an  increasing  variable,  daily  approaching  ideal  per- 
fection as  its  limit. 

Morality  is  the  most  important  function  of  the  indi- 
vidual as  a  member  of  society.  Each  individual  has  his 
special  work,  and  duty  varies  in  the  different  individuals 
according  to  their  endowments,  circumstances,  and  the 
requirements  of  the  social  order,  so  that  there  should  be 
an  equilibrium  between  the  members  of  society,  as  there 
should  be  between  the  acts  of  the  individual.  The  self- 
regarding  virtues  have  a  social  bearing,  and  to  disregard 
them  involves  evil,  and  is,  therefore,  immoral. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  437 

People  pass  judgment  on  others,  especially  on  their 
acquaintances;  but  as  actions  become  more  complex, 
and  their  motives  more  concealed,  they  are  left,  more 
and  more,  to  the  conscience  of  the  individual,  though 
one  will  deceive  himself  if  he  imagines  that  his  true 
character  is  not  known  to  his  associates.  Every  moral 
act  leaves  its  impress  on  the  character  of  the  agent. 
The  actions  of  an  individual  are  good  or  bad  according 
as  they  are  so  adjusted  as  to  promote  or  retard  the  prog- 
ress of  society.  Each  person  ought  first  to  adjust  his 
acts  to  one  another,  and  then  himself  to  the  social  order, 
so  as  to  be  in  harmony  with  himself  and  with  society. 

In  the  formation  of  character  people  are  both  pas- 
sive and  active — passive  as  the  character  is  modified  by 
circumstances;  active  as  they  contribute  to  its  forma- 
tion by  their  own  voluntary  acts.  The  social  ideal  has 
its  concrete  counterpart  in  the  social  organization, 
which  good  men  conspire  to  render  more  and  more  an 
adequate  expression  of  their  ideal — the  true  independ- 
ence of  the  individual  in  harmony  with  his  co-operation 
with  society.  Obligation  is  the  duty  of  adjusting  our 
conduct  so  as  to  promote  the  true  progress,  and  hence 
the  welfare  of  the  social  organization. 

With  an  upright  man  duty  and  inclination  are  not 
antagonistic.  At  the  call  of  duty  he  subordinates  his 
own  interests  to  those  of  society.  In  morals  right  and 
duty  are  identical;  and  though  individuals  differ  as  to 
particular  moral  acts,  the  consensus  of  opinion  of  the 
wise  and  good  represents  quite  correctly  the  true  moral 
standard. 

It  is  the  goodness  of  the  good  man  that  approves  of 
goodness  in  another,  or  disapproves  of  badness.  The 


438  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

goodness  or  badness  is  not,  however,  a  new  quality  of 
action,  but  is  a  conformity  or  non-conformity  to  the 
social  order.  The  good  man  from  habitual  conscien- 
tious conduct  at  length  spontaneously  acts  in  conform- 
ity to  the  social  welfare. 

The  conscience  is  the  tribunal  from  which  moral 
judgments  are  pronounced.  The  surety  of  moral  order 
is  the  general  cultivation  of  a  refined  conscience.  The 
social  conscience  is  the  criterion  by  which  conduct  is 
estimated.  Self-love  and  self-sacrifice  are  harmonized 
by  the  fact  that  a  person  is  ennobled  by  his  efforts  in 
behalf  of  the  common  welfare. 

Altruistic  instincts  are  as  original  as  the  egoistic; 
neither  are  these  instincts  nor  their  corresponding  acts 
necessarily  antagonistic.  The  moral  man  exerts  his 
energies  in  doing  what  is  appropriate,  without  attempt- 
ing nicely  to  balance  the  egoistic  and  altruistic  conse- 
quences. The  good  sacrifice  their  own  pleasure  for  the 
welfare  of  others;  and  though  they  realize  a  higher 
good,  yet  it  is  not  for  this  that  they  make  the  sacrifice. 
Good  conduct  is  voluntary,  and  the  will  is  strengthened 
by  every  right  act  which  tests  the  moral  purpose. 

Character  approximates  perfection  in  proportion  as 
it  expresses  itself  in  that  conduct  which,  in  view  of  all 
the  circumstances,  is  believed  likely  to  produce  the  best 
possible  consequences.  The  consequence  of  conduct  is 
seldom  a  single  result,  but  is  more  commonly  a  combi- 
nation or  a  series  of  results  whose  aggregate  is  not  like 
the  single  monomial  sum  of  similar  terms,  but  like  a 
polynomial  sum  of  dissimiliar  terms  connected  by  the 
sign  plus. 

The  results  of  conduct  are  various,  differing  in  qual- 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  439 

ity  as  well  as  in  quantity,  their  variety  and  variability 
adding  to  their  value.  Happiness,  though  not  exclud- 
ing pleasurable  sensations,  is  chiefly  the  ethical  satis- 
faction from  the  consciousness  of  rectitude,  accompany- 
ing present  right  conduct,  or  derived  from  reflection  on 
right  conduct  in  the  past. 

Pleasure  and  pain  involve  both  active  and  passive 
elements — active  attending  voluntary  action,  passive 
when  caused  by  environment.  Pleasure,  happiness,  sat- 
isfaction, perfection,  are  all  involved  in  the  complex 
end — the  greatest  good  of  the  greatest  number. 

Acts  are  spontaneous  or  instinctive,  as  well  as  re- 
flective. Their  explanation  is  found  in  the  evolution 
of  organism,  and  the  formation  of  habits  and  customs 
through  many  generations  of  ancestors. 

The  fact  that  pleasure  is  diminished  if  directly 
sought,  does  not  prove  that  it  is  not  involved  in  the  end 
of  action,  or  that  it  is  unwelcome  when  realized,  but 
that  it  is  wiser  to  look  after  the  cause  than  to  be  solicit- 
ous for  the  effect.  The  effects  of  right  conduct  are 
indeed  manifold. 

Is  life  worth  living?  The  end  of  ethical  effort — 
health,  achievement,  satisfaction — is  to  make  life  worth 
living;  and  every  good  man's  aim  should  be  to  make 
it  worth  living  to  the  greatest  possible  number. 

Actual  moral  conduct  is  more  variable  than  the 
moral  standard,  which,  as  the  consensus  of  the  ethical 
views  of  those  who  form  public  sentiment,  is  subject  to 
a  slow  change,  usually  perceptible  only  after  a  con- 
siderable lapse  of  time.  Morality  is  embodied  not  only 
in  the  virtues,  but  in  habits,  customs,  and  institutions, 
which  vary  in  different  nations  and  in  different  periods. 


440  SYSTEMS  OF  ETHICS 

Moral  progress  signifies  an  advance  in  ideal  and 
conduct  as  opposed  to  retrogression,  or  even  to  a  halt. 
It  is  a  change  from  the  present  status  to  a  higher  con- 
dition, by  a  more  perfect  adjustment  of  means  to  ends, 
as  tested  by  the  consequences.  The  motive  for  the  ac- 
ceptance or  rejection  of  a  proposed  plan  of  conduct,  is 
its  congruity  or  incongruity  with  character  and  circum- 
stance, though  the  tests  of  its  fitness  may  be  the  pleas- 
ures or  pains  following  its  adoption. 

A  suitable  reform,  advocated  by  popular  leaders,  at- 
tracts the  majority,  and  the  new  ideal  comes  triumphant 
from  a  struggle  of  ideas  and  the  survival  of  the  fittest. 
The  evil  or  the  obsolete  is  defeated  in  its  struggle  with 
the  good  and  the  progressive;  but  it  is  not  wise  to  at- 
tempt a  project  doomed  to  defeat,  though  in  itself  good, 
since  it  will  only  postpone  the  time  of  its  triumph.  A 
true  reformer  is  one  who  forecasts  the  movement  of 
society,  and  times  his  effort  and  secures  the  adoption 
of  his  measures.  Discussion  and  agitation  and  educa- 
tion are  necessary  to  inform  the  public  mind  and  pre- 
pare it  for  decision. 

Evil  is  not  good  for  a  bad  man,  but  to  overcome 
evil  strengthens  a  good  man.  As  a  rule,  goodness  ac- 
cords with  interests.  It  is  the  victorious  ideal;  but 
sometimes  a  bad  man  seems  to  be  successful.  He  eludes 
punishment,  or  is  not  restrained  by  censure,  or  the 
moral  sentiment  of  the  community  is  too  weak  to  bring 
him  to  justice;  but  his  success  is  only  temporary. 

Moral  sanctions  do  not  chiefly  consist  in  rewards 
and  penalties,  but  in  the  character  of  human  nature  as 
it  has  been  evolved  in  the  experience  of  past  generations 
through  the  struggle  and  adjustment  of  social  forces. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  441 

Responsibility,  involving  the  harvest  of  consequences, 
re-enforces  the  obligation  of  right  conduct.  The  will, 
as  volition,  is  determined  by  character  in  view  of  motive; 
but  the  will  by  retrospect  and  forethought  can  modify 
character.  Punishment  strengthens  a  weak  will  and 
assists  in  changing  conduct  and  eventually  character; 
but  a  proper  education  is  the  true  method  of  forming 
character.  The  ideals  of  different  races  and  nations  will 
approximate  towards  harmony;  but  there  will  remain 
enough  difference  to  cause  a  healthy  action  and  re- 
action. 

2.  Frederick  D.  Maurice  (1805-1872). — Maurice  is 
the  author  of  a  historical  work  on  "Moral  and  Meta- 
physical Philosophy,"  in  two  volumes. 

This  treatise,  though  somewhat  vague  in  its  state- 
ment of  the  various  theories,  yet  manifests  wide  sym- 
pathies and  a  desire  to  discover  the  truth  contained  in 
all  schools  of  philosophy,  declaring  that  eclecticism  is 
a  necessity  of  the  age. 

Liberal  in  theology,  Maurice  valued  religion  for  its 
reformatory  power  and  its  determination  of  the  incli- 
nations and  feelings.  He  thus  sympathized  with  the 
liberal  tendencies  of  the  times,  and  valued  truth  wher- 
ever found.  He  appealed  to  the  heart,  the  conscience, 
and  the  reason. 

Maurice  was  somewhat  of  a  mystic,  but  justified  his 
mysticism  by  saying  that  his  intuition  was  not  private, 
but  a  universal  faculty  of  the  human  heart.  What  is 
the  test  of  a  true  intuition,  by  which  it  can  be  distin- 
guished from  a  mere  fancy  of  the  imagination?  This  is 
the  question  to  which  Maurice  is  continually  endeavor- 
ing to  find  an  answer.  It  is  the  apprehension  of  the 


442  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

inner  light,  the  revelation  of  God  to  the  soul;  it  is  what 
St.  Paul  declares  to  be  the  love  of  God  shed  abroad  in 
the  human  heart.  As  a  matter  of  individual  experience, 
a  concrete  fact,  it  is  difficult  to  formulate  as  a  doctrine. 
The  subjective  experience  is,  however,  the  true  inter- 
pretation of  a  historic  religion.  This  experience  has 
not  been  unknown  to  the  wise  and  good  of  all  past  ages. 
The  true  light  enlighteneth  every  receptive  mind. 

The  discovery  of  a  truth  does  not  create  the  truth; 
for  it  pre-existed.  Its  discovery  is  a  revelation;  its 
apprehension  and  appreciation  is  the  highest  character- 
istic of  man,  who,  whatever  be  his  origin,  is  the  glory 
of  the  earth.  The  true  wisdom  of  man  is  to  make  him- 
self morally  the  best  possible. 

The  true  light  that  has  enlightened  the  nations  has 
varied,  not  in  essential  property,  but  in  form,  according 
to  the  characteristics  of  the  people.  The  Athenians 
worshiped  the  unknown  God.  We  show  our  faith  in 
truth  when  we  "study  manfully  the  inquiries  of  men  in 
all  directions,  starting  from  all  points."  Much  is  gained 
from  every  school  of  philosophy  or  system  of  ethics, 
even  from  the  various  creeds  of  theology,  or  the  specu- 
lations of  metaphysics.  The  partial  truths  found  in  the 
various  systems,  relating  to  conscience,  self-interest, 
sympathy,  sense  knowledge,  rational  knowledge,  inves- 
tigation, proof,  induction,  deduction,  utility,  happiness, 
perfection,  all  present  phases  of  truth  resting  upon 
deeper  principles  of  human  nature. 

The  error  of  each  phase  of  thought  is  to  call  all 
other  phases  erroneous.  The  finite  is  as  much  the  nega- 
tion of  the  infinite,  as  the  infinite  is  of  the  finite.  The 
extremities  of  a  straight  line  are  only  arbitrary  limits. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  443 

The  line  itself  goes  beyond  these  limits  infinitely  in  both 
directions.  Wisdom  has  been  working  in  all  systems  of 
thought,  and  in  them  we  find  explanations  of  individual 
experience.  This  wisdom  works  in  the  minds  of  men, 
prompting  them  to  search  for  the  ultimate  principles, 
to  cultivate  language,  to  search  for  the  real,  the  eternal, 
the  true,  the  beautiful,  the  good,  to  develop  religious 
systems,  to  found  societies,  and  to  found  and  consoli- 
date empires.  The  past  and  the  present  have  supplied 
the  seeds  for  the  future.  To  find  a  home  in  a  particular 
opinion  or  system  is  to  find  a  prison.  If  we  would  have 
freedom,  we  must  transcend  the  narrow  creed  of  a  single 
system.  We  need  teachers  of  various  schools.  The 
spirit  of  wisdom  is  our  guide  into  all  truth. 

It  is,  however,  a  mistake  to  search  only  for  the  con- 
clusions of  the  various  schools  of  philosophy;  for  these 
conclusions  are  premature  attempts  to  terminate  the 
search  for  wisdom,  by  assuming  that  the  whole  truth 
has  been  found.  Much  more  profitable  and  interesting 
is  it  to  trace  the  workings  of  the  minds  of  the  philos- 
ophers in  reaching  their  conclusions,  to  discover  how 
they  were  affected  by  their  times,  their  associates,  their 
opponents,  to  witness  the  conflict  of  school  with  school, 
to  understand  the  evolution  of  the  various  systems  of 
thought,  and  the  effect  of  these  systems  on  subsequent 
speculations. 

Maurice  selects  from  Hebrew  literature  the  Prov- 
erbs, Ecclesiastes,  Job,  and  the  prophets,  as  having 
philosophical  and  ethical  value.  Hebrew  theology  he 
considers  a  revelation  of  God  to  his  people,  as  their 
strength  and  support.  The  Decalogue  is  the  expres- 
sion of  universal  principles.  The  history  of  Israel  is  the 


444 


SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 


history  of  God's  dealing  with  his  people.  Other  nations 
have  had  a  divine  teacher,  not  always  recognized. 
Egyptian  theology  founded  upon  man's  conception  of 
God,  was  employed  to  uphold  society  by  divine  sanc- 
tion. The  magicians,  however,  turned  their  knowledge 
to  the  support  of  tyranny.  The  Phoenician  genius  was 
commercial,  and  their  religion  idolatrous.  The  Baby- 
lonians cultivated  astrology.  The  Persians  believed  in 
both  a  good  and  an  evil  spirit — Ormuzd  and  Ahriman — 
who  were  contending  for  the  supremacy  of  the  world. 
The  Hindoos  have  their  religion,  their  philosophy,  and 
their  social  castes,  and  the  Chinese  the  moral  teachings 
of  their  sage,  Confucius. 

After  sketching  the  philosophy  of  these  nations, 
Maurice  passes  on  to  the  clearer  light  of  the  Greek  sages, 
and  from  Greek  philosophy  to  Roman,  mediaeval  and 
modern  systems.  The  Divine  mind,  as  Maurice  main- 
tains, has  guided  the  course  of  thought,  through  Neo- 
Platonism,  Christian  teaching,  and  modern  speculation, 
and  has  directed  the  evolution  of  morals  towards  the 
goal  of  human  perfection  and  happiness.  While  we 
recognize  the  conflict  between  good  and  evil,  we  have 
reason  for  faith  in  the  ultimate  triumph  of  the  good. 


Chapter  XXII 
OTHER  MORALISTS 

T  T  S.  NASH,  professor  in  the  Episcopal  Theological 
J-  -L  •  School  at  Cambridge. — (i)  In  his  work,  entitled 
"Genesis  of  the  Social  Conscience,"  Nash  aims  to  trace 
the  development  of  social  conscience  from  the  Oriental, 
through  the  Greek  and  Roman  civilization  and  that  of 
the  Middle  Ages,  to  modern  times. 

He  holds  that  in  the  Mediterranean  world,  for  the 
first  time  in  history,  the  individual  man  was  clearly  de- 
fined— not  as  this  or  that  person,  but  as  the  generic 
individual,  the  humanity  found  in  every  man;  that  the 
worth  of  the  individual,  even  of  the  common  man,  rec- 
ognized by  the  prophets  of  Israel,  was  emphasized  by 
Christianity;  that  the  unity  of  God  involves  the  unity 
of  mankind;  that  the  potential  is  larger  than  the  actual, 
showing  that  the  good  of  self-knowledge  and  self- 
mastery,  possible  in  every  man,  better  than  his  present 
best,  is  achieved  by  working  out  through  his  freedom 
his  highest  potentiality;  that  the  sense  of  sin  became  a 
fact  of  consciousness,  and  a  leveler  and  a  foe  of  aris- 
tocracy; that  the  idea  of  the  kingdom  of  God  will  dis- 
close itself  as  the  belief  in  human  perfectibility,  and  as 
the  duty  of  lifting  the  humblest  of  mankind  to  the  at- 
tainment of  the  highest  possibilities. 

445 


446  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Neither  Assyria  nor  Chaldea,  neither  Egypt  nor 
Persia,  recognized  the  rights  of  man.  Greece  was  the 
home  of  individuality;  philosophy  and  art  flourished; 
the  favored  few  were  highly  cultured;  yet  in  Athens  the 
slaves  outnumbered  the  freemen.  Rome,  the  seat  of 
empire,  became  the  home  of  despotism  and  brutality, 
as  witnessed  in  the  tyranny  of  the  emperor,  the  sports 
of  the  circus,  and  the  contests  of  the  gladiators. 

Christianity,  in  its  life-and-death  struggle  with 
pagan  and  imperial  Rome,  finally  gained  the  day. 
"The  debate  between  the  Christian  and  heathen  con- 
cepts of  God  involved  a  warfare  of  ideals  for  humanity. 
The  dogma  of  the  incarnation  completed  the  dogmas 
of  creation  and  revelation.  It  affirmed  that  there  is 
nothing  in  God  which  may  not  come  into  relation  with 
mankind.  It  was  all  in  the  interest  of  the  common 
man." 

The  slaves  were  freemen  in  Christ.  In  the  Cata- 
combs there  is  no  inscription  which  shows  that  a  slave 
was  buried  there.  Christianity  regards  persons  as  the 
essence  of  reality.  The  offertory  for  the  poor  became 
a  part  of  the  eucharistic  service. 

The  transfer  of  the  seat  of  government  from  Rome 
to  Constantinople  left  a  free  field  for  the  development 
of  the  Church.  The  result  was  the  papacy,  or  imperial 
Christianity.  The  unworldly,  the  intensely  pious, 
sought  the  retirement  of  the  cloister,  where  they  could 
live  a  holy  life  undisturbed  by  the  excitement  of  the 
world. 

In  the  monastery  the  equality  of  man  was  recog- 
nized under  the  title  of  Christian  brotherhood.  The 
estimate  of  the  worth  of  the  individual  soul  was  sure 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  447 

to  work  out  into  the  world  and  leaven  the  whole  lump 
of  humanity. 

Monasticism  opposed  feudalism;  the  monks  pre- 
served learning.  It  was  in  the  monasteries  that  the 
common  man  first  won  a  complete  emancipation;  the 
social  function  of  monastic  life  had  its  part  in  the  prepa- 
ration of  our  times.  All  men  are  not  monks;  the  ma- 
jority must  live  in  the  world;  but  to  these  the  monks 
revealed  their  rights. 

The  Crusades  stirred  Europe  to  its  depths.  The 
Knights  of  the  Cross,  returning  from  the  Holy  Land, 
brought  with  them  the  learning  of  the  Eastern  Em- 
pire. The  Renaissance,  the  learning  of  the  Arabians, 
the  fall  of  Constantinople,  the  expulsion  of  the  Moors 
from  Spain,  the  discovery  of  America,  the  invention  of 
the  art  of  printing,  the  Protestant  Reformation,  were 
the  mighty  forces  that  developed  the  mind  of  Europe, 
and  gave  to  the  progress  of  civilization  an  impetus  un- 
paralleled in  the  history  of  the  world. 

We  inherit  our  equipment  of  reason  from  Greece, 
of  law  from  Rome,  of  conscience  from  Christianity. 
The  intellect  of  the  Church  fused  the  philosophy  of 
Greece  with  the  morality  of  the  Bible.  The  two  move- 
ments— the  Reformation  and  the  Renaissance — the  re- 
ligious and  the  secular,  broke  with  the  past,  and  started 
human  progress  on  a  new  course. 

Christianity  showed  the  moral  goal.  "The  indi- 
vidual has  an  inherent  right  to  happiness.  It  is  the 
business  of  the  State  to  guarantee  the  right."  Every 
man  has  the  divine  right  to  be  individual;  but  this  right 
can  be  secured  only  in  society,  and  by  co-operating  with 
his  fellows  for  the  common  welfare;  he  must  subordi- 


448  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

nate  his  interests  to  those  of  the  State.  Even  self- 
culture  is  not  only  for  the  sake  of  self,  but  for  the  well- 
being  of  society.  "Let  no  man  seek  his  own,  but  each 
his  neighbor's  good." 

Rousseau  was  the  embodiment  of  emotion,  Kant  of 
reason;  both  emotion  and  reason  are  necessary  to  the 
complete  man.  Sociology,  which  satisfies  the  feelings, 
must  be  guided  by  a  philosophy  which  is  approved  by 
reason.  The  State  guarantees  justice;  the  Church 
quickens  conscience;  both  have  their  problems.  By 
their  harmonious  co-operation  mankind  will  realize  its 
high  destiny. 

(2)  In  his  lectures  on  "Ethics  and  Revelation,"  Nash 
aims  to  mark  out  the  road  along  which  conscience  must 
travel.  History  impresses  upon  our  attention  the  im- 
portance of  those  social  questions  which  involve  the 
well-being  of  the  human  race.  Conscience,  which  is 
consciousness  permeated  with  a  sense  of  obligation  and 
responsibility,  must  take  a  wider  range  as  knowledge 
of  self  and  of  society  becomes  broader  and  deeper.  Re- 
ligion, the  sense  of  fellowship  with  God,  the  abiding 
reality  in  a  world  of  change,  gives  assurance  of  ability 
to  advance  towards  the  ideal  goal  of  being.  It  thus 
creates  in  ourselves,  and  aims  to  create  in  others,  an 
abiding  self-respect. 

Christianity  has  a  genius  for  history.  The  Bible 
claims  to  be  the  record  of  a  revelation  of  the  dealings 
of  God  with  man.  Criticism  has  its  work  and  its  faults; 
but  it  will  learn  to  handle  the  Bible  with  respect.  Con- 
ventionalism must  give  way  to  truth.  Traditional  things 
are  shaken,  that  those  things  that  can  not  be  shaken 
may  remain. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  449 

The  work  of  the  new  century  will  be  to  create  "a 
humanity  that  seeks  to  live  nobly,  and  would  fain  lift 
mankind  to  the  level  of  its  own  best  things." 

The  sociology  of  the  twentieth  century  will  be 
guided  by  ethics  inspired  by  revelation.  "  Nothing  is 
easier,  considering  the  narrow  range  of  our  vision,  than 
to  mistake  some  strong  eddy  near  the  shore  for  the  deep 
current  in  the  midstream  of  history." 

Between  the  ancient  and  the  modern  world  there 
are  broad  resemblances  and  deep  differences.  The  one 
was  the  then  known  civilized  world,  the  other  is  the 
actual  world  of  all  the  nations.  Christianity,  to  achieve 
success,  must  show  itself  to  be  the  friend  of  man,  the 
helper  of  the  poor.  At  home  it  is  challenged  both  by 
science  and  by  labor;  it  must  admit  the  claims  of  the 
one,  and  show  itself  the  friend  of  the  other. 

The  modern  man  has  discovered  the  infinitude  of 
the  universe  and  the  indefinite  past  of  his  race.  In  former 
times  the  typical  outside  opposer  was  the  philosopher — 
Philo  the  Jew,  or  Plotinus  the  Gentile;  now  he  is  the 
man  of  science;  but  the  man  of  science  will  be  compelled 
to  work  in  the  interests  of  humanity.  Man  is  more  than 
an  organized  body.  The  brain  can  no  more  think  than 
the  eye  can  see;  yet  both  are  instrumental. 

Culture  is  under  obligation  to  regard  the  well-being 
of  society;  it  should  seek  the  refinement  of  the  people. 
The  highest  culture  must  be  based  on  equal  rights,  com- 
petence, health  of  body,  and  soundness  of  mind  and 
morals.  Ethics,  the  science  of  righteousness,  leads  to 
that  religion  whose  two  great  principles  are  the  Father- 
hood of  God  and  the  brotherhood  of  man. 

Nash  shows  that  the  State  is  the  outcome  of  the 
29 


450  SYSTEMS   OF  ETHICS 

cosmic  order;  that  it  is  necessary  to  the  pursuit  of 
science  itself;  that  it  is,  therefore,  to  the  interest  of  the 
man  of  science  to  care  for  the  State,  which  is  the  surety 
of  justice,  the  guardian  of  individual  liberty;  and  that 
it  is  his  right  to  demand  a  pure  religion  as  a  guarantee 
of  the  highest  development  of  the  social  order. 

Our  knowledge  needs  to  be  organized  by  a  great 
conception  of  that  fundamental  reality  which  gives  sta- 
bility to  the  universe,  and  law  and  order  to  society,  in- 
vesting it  with  beauty  and  dignity.  The  ultimate  good 
is  harmony  with  universal  order,  the  foundation  of 
which  is  God,  the  ultimate  reality.  To  render  God  lov- 
ing allegiance  is  true  religion. 

The  State  is  the  highest  expression  of  the  social 
order;  its  form  may  vary,  but  its  principle  is  ever  the 
same.  The  citizen  is  bound  to  render  service  to  his 
fellow-men.  Service  itself  is  essential;  its  form  is  acci- 
dental, and  may  vary  a  thousand  ways.  In  choosing 
the  form  of  his  service,  the  individual  should  follow  the 
bent  to  his  natural  powers. 

Human  life  is  rational,  and  its  value  is  of  inestimable 
worth.  The  individual  finds  ample  scope  for  the  exer- 
cise of  his  strongest  powers  in  the  endeavor  to  realize 
his  own  highest  possibilities,  and  the  fullest  ideal  of 
social  life.  The  law  that  rules  society  is  the  law  that 
rules  the  universe — the  law  of  harmony.  Faith  in  this 
law  is  the  religion  of  science — the  enthusiasm  of  hu- 
manity for  universal  order. 

What  of  the  religions?  Kuenen  classifies  them  as 
national  and  universal,  placing  Buddhism  with  Chris- 
tianity as  universal;  but  they  have  essential  differences. 
Christianity  is  optimistic,  and  proclaims  the  ultimate 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  451 

triumph  of  the  kingdom  of  God,  and  gives  assurance 
of  eternal  life.  Buddhism  is  pessimistic,  unworldly,  and 
proffers  as  its  great  reward  the  unconsciousness  of 
nirvana. 

The  classification  of  religions  as  monotheistic  and 
polytheistic  has  won  a  wide  acceptance;  but  the  mass- 
ing of  tribes  into  nations,  and  of  nations  into  empires, 
made  the  triumph  of  monotheism  inevitable. 

Tiele  divides  religions  into  natural  and  ethical;  but 
the  moral  progress  of  mankind  demands  an  ethical  re- 
ligion. 

Hegel  classifies  religions  in  respect  to  the  principle 
of  individuality,  as  religions  of  masses,  religions  of  in- 
dividuality, and  the  religion  of  the  Spirit,  or  Christian- 
ity, in  which  the  individual  realizes  his  highest  attain- 
ments by  entering,  with  all  his  power,  into  the  historical 
life  of  the  race. 

Deism  has  given  way  to  pantheism;  but  pantheism 
is  not  friendly  to  individuality,  nor  does  it  square  with 
the  being  and  perpetuity  of  the  State.  The  claims  of 
personality  and  the  needs  of  the  State  will  incline  reason 
to  reject  the  impersonal  god  of  pantheism,  and  to  accept 
the  personal  God  of  Christianity  as  the  ultimate  re- 
ality— the  God  in  whose  keeping  the  interests  of  the 
individual  and  the  welfare  of  society  are  forever  safe. 

The  march  of  humanity  is  towards  a  universal  con- 
federation— the  commonwealth  of  all  the  nations,  in- 
suring the  rights  of  the  individual,  and  his  hearty  co- 
operation with  his  fellow-hien  for  the  welfare  of  all 
mankind. 

The  man  of  science,  realizing  his  individuality, 
knows  the  importance  of  maintaining  his  freedom  of 


452 


SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 


thought,  in  order  that  he  may  discharge  his  duty,  and 
thus  meet  his  responsibilities.  He  witnesses  the  glory 
and  majesty  of  the  universe,  and  believes  that  at  the 
foundation  of  things  there  is  sincerity  in  which  he  can 
trust.  The  sense  of  responsibility  inspires  him  with  the 
belief  that  nature  will  supply  him  with  resources  of 
power  to  meet  his  responsibilities. 

In  its  conflicts  with  paganism,  the  Church  was 
trained  to  regard  the  State  as  alien,  and  to  believe  that 
the  true  spiritual  life  could  be  found  only  by  a  with- 
drawal from  the  world.  The  monastic  tendency  became 
so  strong  that  it  prevailed  even  when  Christianity  be- 
came the  religion  of  the  State.  Mystical  views  of  reve- 
lation prevailed,  and  the  clergy  were  regarded  as  the 
infallible  guides  of  conscience.  It  has,  however,  come 
to  pass  that  thinking  men,  who  believe  in  their  own 
individuality  and  liberty,  must  follow  their  own  con- 
science in  regard  to  duty;  and  thus  ethics  is  developed 
apart  from  religion. 

As  Christianity  is  the  religion  of  the  Bible,  the  inter- 
pretation of  Scripture  must  not  be  exclusively  under  the 
control  of  the  clergy,  who  are  awake  to  their  own  inter- 
ests, but  thinkers  must  have  the  right  of  private  judg- 
ment; they  can  accept  the  Bible  as  revelation,  only  as 
they  realize  that  it  speaks  the  truth  of  God  to  the  reason 
and  conscience  of  the  people  through  spiritual  men, 
whose  reason  and  conscience  were  quickened  by  the 
Spirit  of  the  living  God. 

The  man  who  feels  himself  to  be  in  harmony  with 
the  deepest  principles  of  the  universe  maintains  his  dig- 
nity and  self-respect  through  every  conflict  and  amidst 
persecution  or  reproach. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  453 

Individuality,  free  thought,  science,  the  free  State, 
work  together  with  morality  and  religion  in  the  highest 
interests  of  the  human  race. 

The  philosophy  of  history  is  the  true  theodicy,  vin- 
dicating the  ways  of  God  to  man,  showing  that  human- 
ity is  advancing  towards  the  realization  of  a  rational 
end — the  perfection  and  happiness  of  all  mankind. 

History,  the  autobiography  of  society,  is  to  society 
what  memory  is  to  the  individual  man.  In  history,  the 
record  of  experience,  there  is  found  a  unity  of  purpose, 
showing  that  the  trend  of  events  is  not  aimless,  drifting 
without  guidance,  as  an  iceberg  upon  the  great  ocean. 
The  instincts,  the  reason,  the  conscience,  and  the  imagi- 
nation, conspire  to  guide  the  voyage  of  humanity  to 
the  destined  haven. 

The  dogmatic  claim  of  infallibility  must  give  place 
to  the  free  thought  of  conscientious  and  rational  indi- 
viduality. The  Church  can  stand  without  fear  upon 
the  Bible,  open  to  the  investigation  of  the  deepest 
reason  and  the  highest  criticism.  The  allegorical  inter- 
pretation of  Scripture,  attaching  importance  to  symbol 
rather  than  to  fact,  must  give  place  to  the  historical  and 
critical.  Not  fate,  but  free  will,  under  the  guidance  of 
reason,  will  secure  for  man  his  high  destiny.  The 
prophecies  of  the  Bible  point  to  future  history,  when 
righteousness  shall  cover  the  earth  as  the  waters  do 
the  depths  of  the  ocean. 

The  instinct  of  humanity  assumes  that  the  care  of 
things  assures  the  rights  of  individuality;  that  God's 
creative  and  providential  energy  is  committed  to  the 
purpose  of  making  what  is  harmonize  with  what  ought 
to  be. 


454  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

Revelation  assumes  that  God  has  given  to  man  his 
best  gifts.  Though  God  respects  the  individuality  and 
freedom  of  man,  yet  he  invites  his  co-operation.  The 
pantheistic  view  of  God  binds  not  only  nature  fast  in 
fate,  but  the  human  will. 

Christianity  accepts  Christ  as  the  divine  teacher  of 
man  in  both  religion  and  morals.  Faith  in  the  inmost 
center  of  things  trusts  the  laws  of  nature  as  the  laws 
of  God. 

Individuality  must  seek  self-mastery,  and  bring  its 
reason  and  conscience  and  dearest  plans  into  harmony 
with  God's  eternal  purposes,  realizing  that  it  finds  its 
own  highest  good  only  as  it  works  for  the  highest  social 
welfare. 

2.  Leslie  Stephen. — (i)  Only  a  few  salient  points  of 
Stephen's  "Science  of  Ethics"  can  be  given:  Moralists 
are  almost  unanimous  as  to  the  form  of  right  and  wrong 
conduct,  but  as  to  the  essence  and  criterion  there  is  great 
disagreement. 

Opinions  widely  spread  deserve  respect  for  their 
mere  existence;  they  are  phenomena  to  be  accounted 
for.  They  gradually  modify  and  approach  each  other, 
but  perfect  agreement  is  not  to  be  expected. 

It  is  not  easy  to  predict  the  conduct  of  an  individual 
or  the  uniformities  in  the  action  of  society,  as  shown  by 
statistics.  The  prediction  of  the  course  of  history  is 
still  more  difficult,  and  is  beyond  the  power  of  the 
human  mind. 

In  the  same  circumstances  of  outward  environment 
and  inward  character  human  conduct  does  not  change; 
but  the  difficulty  is,  the  circumstances  are  usually  not 
the  same,  either  as  to  environment  or  as  to  character. 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  455 

Social  phenomena  can  not  be  explained  by  studying 
the  constituent  elements  separately,  but  only  in  the  in- 
terrelation of  the  parts  to  the  whole.  The  problem  of 
existence  can  not  be  solved  theoretically,  but  only  prac- 
tically in  ourselves  and  in  the  evolution  of  history. 

Instincts  correspond  to  certain  permanent  condi- 
tions, and  differing  opinions  are  explained  by  circum- 
stances. The  mechanical  facts  underlying  mental  pro- 
cesses do  not  disprove  these  processes,  nor  supersede 
their  psychological  statement.  Hunger  induces  men 
to  eat,  whatever  physiological  implications  are  involved. 
Life  is  a  struggle  to  diminish  suffering  and  to  realize 
pleasure.  Good  means  everything  that  favors  happi- 
ness, and  bad  everything  that  conduces  to  misery.  The 
reasonable  man  is  one  who,  instead  of  being  a  slave  to 
immediate  impulses,  adapts  means  to  ends,  and  follows 
that  course  of  conduct,  though  not  in  itself  agreeable, 
that  promises  the  best  results. 

Happiness  that  determines  the  will  is  future;  con- 
duct is  determined  by  present  feeling,  or  by  the  judg- 
ment as  to  what  is  most  desirable.  A  great  part  of 
conduct  is  automatic,  or  if  at  the  instant  we  are  con- 
scious of  the  motive  it  is  instantly  forgotten.  Reason 
and  feeling  are  bound  together.  The  reasonable  man 
is  a  mirror  of  nature.  His  conduct  shows  a  logical  con- 
sistency in  its  parts.  We  start  with  certain  relations 
between  our  instincts,  the  variations  of  which  produce 
types  of  character. 

The  process  of  evolution  is  a  discovery  of  efficiency 
of  different  kinds,  affording  the  advantage  of  a  variety 
of  types.  The  useful,  as  pleasure-giving,  approximately 
coincides  with  the  useful  as  life-giving.  An  agent  of  a 


456  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

certain  character  does  what  affords  him  pleasure,  but 
his  character  is  determined  by  the  conditions  of  his 
existence. 

The  essential  processes  of  life  are  automatic.  Habits 
are  formed  by  repetition;  they  can  be  overcome  only  by 
persistent  change  of  conduct,  involving  modification 
of  character;  and  as  subject  to  change  are  not  essential 
to  life.  The  relations  of  the  individual  and  the  race  are 
mutual,  but  certain  qualities  of  the  individual  are  vari- 
able. Society,  though  not  strictly  an  organism,  is  an 
organization  made  up  of  component  societies  and  indi- 
viduals. 

Positive  law  is  based  on  custom  which  is  the  out- 
growth of  conduct.  Moral  law,  as  applicable  to  all  the 
members  of  society,  gives  expression  to  the  sentiments 
of  the  society  in  regard  to  certain  forms  of  conduct 
which  reason  declares  to  be  detrimental  or  beneficial, 
forbidding  the  one  and  encouraging  the  other.  Moral- 
ity, as  a  growth,  is  the  fruit  of  a  gradual  evolution  of 
the  organic  instincts  through  many  generations.  The 
fundamental  precept  of  law,  Be  strong,  implies  other 
precepts  as  conditions — be  temperate,  be  prudent,  be 
truthful,  be  courageous. 

Justice  and  benevolence  are  social  virtues;  they  are 
altruistic  in  their  consequences,  though  egoistic  as  to 
their  source  in  the  pleasure  or  pain  of  the  doer.  Sym- 
pathy implies  the  power  to  represent  the  feelings  of 
others,  so  as  to  share  their  joys  and  sorrows. 

Conscience  is  a  complex  of  instincts  and  judgments; 
it  pronounces  conduct  right  or  wrong,  as  it  is  conceived 
to  be  worthy  or  unworthy  of  the  agent,  or  useful  or 
hurtful  to  society.  Happiness  is  the  utilitarian  test,  and 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  457 

health  the  evolutional;  they  give  approximately  tlie 
same  moral  standard. 

Why  should  a  person  be  virtuous?  Because  virtue 
tends  to  the  general  welfare;  it  is  favorable  to  health; 
it  promotes  happiness;  it  prevents  discord,  and  produces 
harmony.  If  it  requires  self-sacrifice  on  occasion,  it 
stamps  heroic  conduct  with  the  seal  of  nobility,  as 
worthy  of  the  highest  honors. 

(2)  The  solid  reputation  Mr.  Stephen  gained  by  his 
two  volumes,  entitled  "History  of  English  Thought  in 
the  Eighteenth  Century,"  has  awakened  expectation  of 
something  great  in  his  treatise  of  three  volumes  on 
"English  Utilitarians,"  nor  are  we  disappointed.  The 
present  work  does  not  cover  so  wide  a  field  as  the 
former,  but  on  this  account  it  has  greater  unity,  and  is 
more  definite  and  satisfactory. 

Stephen  devotes  each  of  his  three  volumes  mainly  to 
one  of  the  three  chief  advocates  of  utilitarian  ethics — 
Jeremy  Bentham.  James  Mill,  and  John  Stuart  Mill. 

In  the  first  volume  he  treats  of  Bentham,  who  under- 
took to  reform  the  administration  of  law,  regarding  this 
legal  work  as  the  application  of  what  he  considered  the 
fundamental  principle  of  ethics,  The  greatest  happiness 
of  the  greatest  number.  This  principle,  though  previ- 
ously enunciated  by  Beccaria,  an  Italian  jurist,  was 
first  consistently  applied  by  Bentham  to  the  solution 
of  ethical  problems.  Bentham  was  a  thorough-going 
utilitarian. 

In  his  second  volume  Stephen  gives  a  clear  view  of 
the  work  of  James  Mill,  who  gave  to  utilitarianism  a 
broader  scope,  and  entitled  it  to  be  considered  a  school 
of  ethics.  Stephen  shows  how  Mill  applied  the  prin- 


458  SYSTEMS   OF   ETHICS 

ciple  of  utility  to  the  practical  questions  which  agitated 
society  in  the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  century;  and 
he  adds  to  the  interest  by  giving  an  account  of  the 
criticisms  of  his  opponents. 

In  the  third  volume  Stephen  treats  of  the  work  of 
John  Stuart  Mill,  who  by  his  general  ability,  his  power 
of  clear  statement,  and  especially  by  regarding  the  qual- 
ity of  pleasure,  gained  a  wider  acceptance  of  utilitarian 
ethics. 

If  Mill,  by  granting  moral  value  apart  from  utility, 
or  the  consequences  of  conduct,  yielded  so  much  to  the 
opposite  school  of  intuitionism,  that  utilitarianism  could 
no  longer  be  considered  the  exclusive  school  of  ethcis, 
he  simply  and  honestly  advanced  the  cause  of  truth.  It 
still  holds  true,  however,  that  in  practical  affairs,  as  in 
legislation,  where  the  law-makers  are  morally  bound 
to  vote  for  the  true  interests  of  the  people,  the  conse- 
quences are  the  chief,  if  not  the  only  guide.  In  every- 
day life  utilitarianism  still  remains,  for  the  most  part, 
the  ethics  of  the  people.  It  is,  therefore,  preposterous 
to  say  that  utilitarianism  is  dead.  It  is  not  likely  to  die; 
but  it  is  not  all  of  ethics.  Other  systems  supplement  it 
and  supply  the  guide  in  its  failing  case,  where  the  conse- 
quences can  not  be  computed. 

In  giving  attention  to  the  criticisms  of  such  able 
opponents  as  Carlyle,  Maurice,  and  Newman,  Stephen 
has  added  greatly  to  the  interest  of  his  work,  which  is  to 
be  regarded  as  a  fitting  close  to  the  labors  of  an  in- 
dustrious life. 

j.  International  Journal  of  Ethics. — Of  all  the  means 
of  stimulating  ethical  investigation,  and  of  raising  the 
standard  of  morality,  whether  by  addresses,  sermons, 


HISTORY   OF   ETHICS  459 

ethical  chairs  in  colleges,  books,  or  periodicals,  perhaps 
none  exceed  in  efficiency  the  International  Journal  of 
Ethics,  published  in  Philadelphia,  eleven  volumes  of 
which  are  now  complete.  It  has  an  editorial  staff  com- 
posed of  able  men  of  various  nationalities,  and  in  ad- 
dition contributors  of  high  attainments  and  of  national 
or  even  world-wide  reputation. 

The  Journal  does  its  work,  not  by  reaching  the 
masses  directly,  but  by  influencing  thinkers  who  reach 
the  people.  The  articles  deal  with  a  wide  range  of 
subjects,  philosophical,  practical,  critical,  and  historical, 
relating  to  ethical  questions  of  living  interest.  These 
articles  possess  a  permanent  value.  The  volumes  bound 
make  a  valuable  addition  to  any  ethical  library. 

The  Journal  is  tolerant  of  opinion,  and  gives  free 
scope  to  independent  thinkers  in  the  discussion  of  their 
themes.  One  thing  is  apparent — however  good  men 
may  differ  in  theological  opinions,  or  even  in  their 
theories  of  ethics,  they  are  in  accord  in  regard  to  prac- 
tical morality,  and  can  co-operate  in  their  endeavor  to 
lift  humanity  to  a  higher  plane  of  life. 

The  outcome  of  the  whole  investigation  is  this: 
Though  it  is  true  that  no  one  would  endeavor  to  be 
worthy  or  useful,  unless  he  found  satisfaction  in  the 
endeavor,  yet  worthiness  and  usefulness  should  be  the 
direct  aim;  satisfaction  will  follow  as  a  natural  conse- 
quence, and  will  be  all  the  more  enjoyable  because  un- 
sought. If  self-examination  should  reveal  unworthiness 
of  character  or  unrighteousness  of  life,  then  a  trans- 
formation of  character  and  a  reformation  of  life  can  be 
effected  by  forethought,  right  aims,  and  right  efforts — 
by  ceasing  to  do  evil  and  learning  to  do  well. 


Index 


ACTUAL  :  24,  339. 

Aboard:  253. 

Action  :  64,  437. 

Acts:  n,  14,  436. 

Affection:  n,  73,  76. 

Aim:  12,  18,  in. 

Alexander,  Archibald :  348. 

Alexander,  S. :  434. 

Altruism  :  59,  60. 

Altruistic  virtues  :  170,  456. 

Ambrose :  251. 

Annals  of  political  and  social  science : 

147. 

Anselm:  253. 
Appetites:    53,  72,  98,   100,  in,   124, 

255,  351- 
Aristotle:  72,  161,  224,  233,  254,  255, 

351- 

Art :  16,  20,  23. 
Augustine :  250,  254. 

BACON  :  261. 

Bascom  :  348. 

Beauty:  30,31. 

Benevolence:  74,   178,  180,   210,  221, 

228,   248,  266,  276,  280,  302,  305, 

317,  345.  346. 

Bentham  :  109,  117,  313,  457. 
Bernard:  258. 
Biology  :  28. 
Blackie  :  350. 
Bowne  :  367. 
Buddhism :  312,  450. 
Butler:  279. 

CALDERWOOD:  350. 

Cardinal  Newman :  120. 

Casuistry  :  257. 

Categorical  imperative:  115,  132,  133, 

287,  294. 
Causes:  13,  17,  55,  99,  "3,  256,  274, 

365,  366. 
Character :  n,  12, 14,  17, 18, 19,  20,  56, 

87,  88,  119,  155,  393,  398,  422,  423, 

430,  435,  436,  438,  459- 
Chastity:  165. 


Choice:  12,  13,  55,  103,  135,  227,  355, 

366. 
Christian   ethics:   35,  243,   252,  342, 

346,  351,  404,  407,  445. 
Cicero :  234. 
Clarke:  298. 
Clifford:  427. 
Code :  78,  79,  80. 
Combe:  341. 
Conduct :  n,  12,  13,  14,  17,  19,  23,  64, 

65,  86,  87,  93,  116,  118,  185,  212, 

Conscience:  24,  43,  66,  68,  128,  148, 
193,  210,  280,  281,  282,  285,  290, 
302,  304,  323,  328,  343,  344,  366, 
381,  394,  404,  407,  410,  415,  425, 
429,  438,  456. 

Consequences :  43,  54,  58,  62,  68,  80, 
90,  102,  106,  109,  113,  115,  118,  121, 
124,  131,  208. 

Courage:  72,  101,  163,  22. 

Courtney :  356. 

Crime :  147. 

Cudworth :  264. 

Cumberland :  266. 

Custom :  ii,  74,  78,  138,  386,  388,  456. 

Cynics :  219,  228. 

Cyrenaics :  220,  230. 

DAVIDSON  :  407. 
Decision:  159. 
Democritus  :  216,  232,  234. 
Descartes:  269. 
Desirable:  95. 

Desire:  12,  14,  in,  154,  365,  397. 
Determism  :  326,  398,  416. 
Dewey :  400. 

Division  of  ethics :  14,  190,  390. 
Dueling :  140. 
Duns  Scotus :  256. 

Duty:  32,  39,  60,  68,  87,  89,  in,  121, 
125)  130,  134, 183, 314,  381, 411, 413. 

ECKHART:  258. 
Eclectic  ethics:  85, 
Economics:  31,  79,  82, 


461 


462 


INDEX 


Edwards:  365. 

Egoism  :  52. 

Egoistic  virtues  :  161,  218. 

Elements  of  character :  13,  149. 

End :  11,  18,  33,  51,  68,  70,  86,  95,  102, 

106,  120,  359,  390,  435. 
Energism :  377,  416. 
Environment:   29,  32,  150,  328,  403. 
Epictetus:  237. 

Epicurean  view  of  the  good :  104. 
Epicurean  philosophy :  54,  230. 
Essence  of  virtue :  23,  181. 
Ethical  acts  and  states  :  14,  435. 
Ethics  a  normative  science :   16,  375, 

384,  392. 
Ethics,  definition  :  11,  14,  89,  341,  360, 

392,  395,  404,  409,  4H- 
Ethics,  divisions  :  14,  27,  347,  390, 412, 

434- 
Ethics,  scientific,  philosophical,  and 

practical:  27. 
Evolutionary  ethics  :  64,  32,  412,  417. 

FAITH  :  41,  193,  247,  250,  252,  255,  259, 

407,  408. 
Fairchild:  346. 
Family :  40,  58,  80,  87,  187. 
Fate:  17. 

Faults  of  utilitarianism  :  109. 
Fichte :  155,  289. 
Fisk:  75,322. 

Foundation  of  obligation :  135. 
Franklin:  339. 
Freedom:  55,  123,  154,  256,  270,  289, 

363,  383,  409,  413,  4i6. 
Free  will :  17,  122,  307,  346,  395. 
Friendship:  181,231. 
Frugality :  166. 

GERMS  of  virtue  in  animals :  17. 

Giddings  :  31. 

God  the  source  of  authority :  35,  260, 

4*3- 

Golden  rule :  36,  79. 
Good:  52,  94,  97,  104,  106,  108,  no, 

112,     114,    2l8,    225,    227,    235,    288, 

293,  354,  367,  392. 
Goodness  :  1 14,  346. 
Geulinx:  270. 
Gratitude:  178. 
Greek  ethics :  215,  224. 
Green's  "Prolegomence:"  330. 
Gregory:  347. 

HABIT:  11,  87,  166,  168,  169,  388,  419. 
Happiness :  12,  38,  49,  52,  70,  93,  95, 

102,   104,  119,  268,  310,  315,  321, 

354,  3?o,  410,  416. 


Hartley:  310. 

Hartmann ;  296. 

Hedonic  egoism  and  altruism :  52, 59, 

Hedonism  :  51,  109,  400. 

Hegel:  155,  291. 

Hereclitus :  216. 

Heredity:  149,318,424. 

Heroism :  159. 

Hickok:  343. 

Hobbs  :  33,  262,  279. 

Homicide:  138. 

Honesty :  62,  74,  90,  178. 

Honor  :  72,  140,  227. 

Honorable :  143,  169. 

Hutcheson :  282. 

Huxley :  326,  403. 

Hyslop :  322,  409. 

IDEAL:  19,  23,  32,  77,  in,  339,  382, 

406,  441. 

Idealism  :  290,  291 ,  356. 
Idealistic  :  187,  287. 
Ideas:  222. 

Individual :  26,  28,  32,  61,  381,  436. 
Influence  of  ethics :  25. 
Instinct :  71,  74,  76,  438. 
Intention  :  12,  13,  14,  19,  392,  399. 
International  Journal  of  Ethics :  147, 

458. 

Intuitional  ethics :  42-48. 
Intuitionism :   136. 
Is  life  worth  living  ?  69,  439. 

JANET:  no,  354. 
Jews:  139. 

Joannes  Scotus :  253. 
Justice  :  73,  172, 191,  221,  225,  235,  250, 
255,  280,  302,  304. 

KANT:  50,  113,  115,  287,  359. 

LAW  of  happiness :  1 19. 
Laws :  20,  36,  79,  112,  121,  130. 
Leibnitz  :  153,  273,  276. 
Liberty :  17,  366,  413. 
Locke :  267. 
Logic:  30. 
Lotze :  360. 
Lucretius:  234. 
Lying:  178. 

MALEBRANCHE:  270. 
Marcus  Aurelius :  239. 
Materials  of  reward :  199. 
Martineau ;  42,  306. 
Maurice :  441. 

Means  and  ends :  12,  92,  93. 
Mercy:  180, 


INDEX 


463 


Metaphysics :  33,  269,  356,  364,  383. 

Mill,  James:  457. 

Mill,  John  Stuart :   52,   109,  110,  117, 

315,  336,  399,  458. 
Morality  :  34,  35,  248,  436,  439. 
Moral  code :  78,  84. 
Moral  conduct :  n,  14,  17,  64. 
Moral  evil :  138,  147. 
Moral  law:  22,  121,  128. 
Moral  responsibility :  123. 
Motive :  11,  12, 13, 55, 56, 122,  256,  274, 

r   .365,394,399. 
Muirhead:  394. 
Mystics  :  357. 

NASH:  445. 

Natural  consequence :  206. 

Natural  selection  :  66,  75. 

Nature  :  14,  20,  128. 

Nature  of  duty ;  128. 

Necessity  :  122,  287,  422. 

Need  of  a  standard :  147. 

New  Testament  ethics :  36,  245. 

Nirvana:  312. 

Normative :  16,  19,  384,  392. 

OBLIGATION:  24,40, 113, 128, 135,  249, 
289,  298,  302, 305,  310, 343,  347, 361, 

Ought :'  24,  83,  122,  128,  342,  347,  363. 

PAIN  :  95,  96,  233. 

Paley:  312. 

Paradoxes  of  the  Stoics :  332. 

Patriotism:  181. 

Paulsen:  374. 

Pelagius :  249. 

Perfection :  12,  16,  50,  51,  52,  69,  70, 

93,  94,  106,  in,  119,  276,  385. 
Personal  effort:   151. 
Personality:  116. 
Peter  the  Lombard :  254. 
Philanthropy:  83,  181. 
Piety:  181. 
Pity:  180. 
Plato :  220,  253,  272. 
Pleasure  :  52,  57,  95,  99,  no,  117. 
Plotinus :  241. 
Porphyry :  242. 
Postulate  of  freedon :  20. 
Postulates  of  ethics :  in. 
Prayer :  194. 

Pre-established  harmony :  274. 
Price:  301. 
Prudence :  43,  162. 
Psychology :  30,  412. 
Punishment :  197-212. 


Purity :  159,  165. 
Pythagoras :  212. 

QUALITY  of  pleasure :  97,  100. 
Quantity  of  pleasure :  97,  100. 
Question  as  to  end :  102. 

RANK  of  pleasures  :  100. 

Reason  for  the  law  of  love :  37. 

Reformation :  259,  260. 

Reed :  302. 

Relation  of  ethics  to  other  sciences : 

Relation  of  laws :  130. 

Religion  :  34,  126,  128,  193,  432,  451. 

Remorse :  128. 

Responsibility:  13,  24,  55,   in,  123, 

2/4,  306,  355,  398,  409,  429. 
Reward ;  197-212. 

Right  and  wrong:  12,  44,  61,  94,  329. 
Robbery  :   143.  "-"   -~ 

Roman  ethics :  23^4. 
Rule  for  competing  pleasures:  101. 

SATISFACTION  :  97,  104,  120,  344,  459. 

Self:  398,  427- 

Self-interest :  59. 

Self-realization  :  120,  330,  331. 

Self-satisfaction  :  120,  330,  331. 

Schleiermacher :  292. 

Schopenhaur:  295. 

Seneca:  436. 

Senses:  21,57,98,  101. 

Shaftesbury :  277. 

Sin:  40,  147,  271,426,432. 

Slavery :  142. 

Smith:  285. 

Smyth  :  404. 

Social  conscience :  24. 

Society  :  26,  29,  32,  40,  80,  180,  187. 

Sociology :  29. 

Socrates  :  46,  153,  217,  225. 

Sophists :  216. 

Spencer  :  50,  65,  117,  32. 

State:  190. 

Stephen:  321,  454. 

Stewart :  304. 

Stoicism  :  104,  228,  279,  316. 

Sympathy  :  170,  229,  277,  285. 

TAULER:  258. 

Teleological  ethics :  374,  415. 

Temperance :  164. 

Test  of  morality :  68. 

Theistic  ethics :  35. 

Theories  of  punishment :  207. 

Thilly:  414. 

Thomas  Aquinas :  254. 


464 


INDEX 


ULTIMATE  aim :  iS. 

Ultimate  end :  86,  94,  338,  359,  416. 

Utilitarianism:  51. 

VERACITY  :  73,  178. 

Vice:  147. 

Virtue:  71,  76,  120,  159,  166,  225,  235, 

250,  255,  266,  280,  282,  294,  330, 

346,  352,  355,  368,  402. 
Volition :  55,  123,  374,  365,  383,  398, 

416,  428. 

WARS:  140. 
Wayland:  341. 


Whewell :  305. 

Will :  13,  17,  38,  55,  122,  129,  255,  256, 

269,  271,  272,  274,  307,  334,  346,  365, 

383,  392,   395,  397,  398,  409,  4i6, 

421,  423. 

William  of  Occam  :  257. 
Wisdom  :  162,  218,  221,  225,  229,  248, 

356,  442,  443. 
Wish :  12,  392. 
Wolff:  276. 
Women :  163,  165. 
Wundt :  384. 
Wundt's  classification  of  ethics  :  390. 


— 


YC  30950 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


